PAKISTAN: A CONVERSATION WITH BENAZIR BHUTTO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 006509

DEPT FOR SA/PAB, DS, AND S/CT; CENTCOM/CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD;
LONDON FOR POL/SUTPHIN; PARIS FOR RAVELING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/29/03
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: A CONVERSATION WITH BENAZIR BHUTTO

(U) CLASSIFIED BY JOHN R. SCHMIDT, POLITICAL COUNSELOR.
REASON 1.5(D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: WITH HER RIVAL NAWAZ SHARIF IN DEEP POLITICAL
TROUBLE, FORMER PRIME MINISTER BENAZIR BHUTTO IS SEEKING TO
RESHAPE HER IMAGE AND REVIVE HER OWN TATTERED POLITICAL FORTUNES.
IN A WIDE-RANGING CONVERSATION WITH POLCOUNS ON AUGUST 27, SHE
CONDEMNED THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF THE ISLAMIC RIGHT, ADVOCATED
DRASTICALLY REDUCING THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT, CALLED FOR THE END
OF POLITICAL PATRONAGE IN THE CIVIL SERVICE AND EXPRESSED
INTEREST IN PARTICIPATING IN AN ALL-PARTY CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT
WHEN AND IF THE NAWAZ REGIME FALLS . WILLING ENOUGH TO ADMIT HER
OWN MISTAKES, SHE SEEMED ANXIOUS TO PORTRAY HERSELF TO A U.S.
AUDIENCE AS A MODERATE, SECULAR, PRO-WESTERN ALTERNATIVE TO THE
CURRENT POLITICAL FORCES AT LARGE IN THE COUNTRY. END SUMMARY


2. QNGERS FROM THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT. ALTHOUGH NO
FRIEND OF NAWAZ SHARIF, BENAZIR EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN THAT THE
POLITICAL WEAKNESS OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT, DESPITE ITS
OVERWHELMING PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY, WAS PLAYING INTO THE HANDS
OF THE EXTREMIST ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS PARTIES, PREEMINENTLY THE
JAMAAT-I-ISLAMI AND THE JAMAAT-ULEMA-I-ISLAMI. SHE FEARED THAT,
IF THE SHARPLY DETERIORATING ECONOMY BEGAN TO BRING PEOPLE OUT
INTO THE STREETS, THESE ELEMENTS WOULD MAKE COMMON CAUSE WITH
SYMPATHETIC RETIRED GENERALS FROM THE ZIA ERA TO SPEARHEAD A
FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAMIC TAKEOVER. SHE NOTED THAT THE NEWSPAPERS
WERE FULL OF ARTICLES BY INFLUENTIAL FORMER GENERALS MAKING
COMMON CAUSE WITH THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT. (COMMENT: WE DOUBT SHE
REALLY BELIEVES THAT HEADLINE-GRABBERS SUCH AS FORMER COAS MIRZA
ALSAM BEG AND FORMER DG/ISI HAMEED GUL ARE A THREAT.)


3. (C) ON THE ARMY. BENAZIR SAID SHE THOUGHT THERE WERE ALSO
PLENTY OF ACTIVE DUTY MID-LEVEL ARMY OFFICERS SYMPATHETIC TO THE
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST CAUSE. THE TOP ARMY LEADERSHIP, HOWEVER,
REMAINED SOLID AND MODERATE. INDEED, SHE CONCEDED THAT ARMY
INTERVENTION OF SOME SORT COULD BE THE ONLY WAY TO AVERT A
FUNDAMENTALIST TAKEOVER IF THE NAWAZ GOVERNMENT BEGAN TO CRUMBLE.
SHE THOUGHT THE ARMY COULD PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE BY SETTING UP A
TECHNOCRATIC GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES FROM
ALL MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES, INCLUDING HER OWN PPP AND NAWAZ'S
PML (WITHOUT NAWAZ, OF COURSE). BUT SHE WAS HIGHLY SKEPTICAL
THAT THE ARMY COULD RULE EFFECTIVELY ON ITS OWN BASED ON ITS PAST
PERFORMANCE.


4. (C) ON NAWAZ. BENAZIR MADE NO EFFORT TO HIDE HER DISLIKE OF
NAWAZ SHARIF, WHOM SHE REGARDED AS BOTH WEAK AND NOT VERY BRIGHT.
SHE APPEARED TO HARBOR AN EVEN GREATER DISLIKE FOR HIS BROTHER
SHAHBAZ, WHO SHE CHARACTERIZED AS MORE INTELLIGENT, BUT ALSO MORE
BRUTAL, RELATING A BRIEF ANECDOTE ABOUT HOW HE HAD ORDERED A
HAPLESS BUREAUCRAT THROWN INTO A SEWER IN A MOMENT OF PERSONAL
PIQUE. INTERESTINGLY, SHE WAS INCLINED TO ATTRIBUTE NAWAZ'S
GROWING FLIRTATION WITH ISLAMIZATION TO HIS OWN LIGHTS RATHER
THAN SIMPLY TO POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM. SHE CONTENDED THAT NAWAZ'S
FATHER HAD BEEN VERY CLOSE TO "TALIBANISH" (HER WORD) ULEMA
(RELIGIOUS LEADERS) IN LAHORE AND HAD INCULCATED THESE SORTS OF
VALUES IN THE YOUNG NAWAZ. SHE SAID THAT NAWAZ HAD DONE THE SAME
TO HIS OWN SON, NOTING THAT THE YOUNGER SHARIF HAD REFUSED TO
GIVE HIS AGE WHEN INTERVIEWED RECENTLY ON TELEVISION IN KEEPING
WITH A CONSERVATIVE ISLAMIC SUPERSTITION.


5. (C) ON HER OWN MISTAKES. ASKED WHAT SHE WOULD DO
DIFFQHAD IT TO DO ALL OVER AGAIN, BENAZIR SAID SQ
WOULD ENDED THE PATRONAGE SYSTEM THAT LAID THE BASIS FOR THE
WIDESPREAD PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF HER AS CORRUPT. SHE LAMENTED
THAT THERE HAD DEVELOPED IN PAKISTAN A SYSTEM IN WHICH EACH
INCOMING GOVERNMENT PACKED THE CIVIL SERVICE WITH ITS OWN
CRONIES. THIS WAS A RECIPE FOR BOTH INCOMPETENCE AND CORRUPTION.
SHE HAD BEEN AS GUILTY OF THE PRACTICE AS ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT
LEADER BUT NO MORE SO. SHE NOTED THAT SHE HAD YET TO BE
CONVICTED ON ANY CORRUPTION CHARGE DESPITE TWO YEARS OF
GOVERNMENT DIGGING. NONETHELESS, THE PRACTICE OF PATRONAGE WAS
DESTRUCTIVE OF GOOD GOVERNMENT AND NEEDED TO BE REPLACED BY AN
INDEPENDENT, PROFESSIONAL CIVIL SERVICE. THIS WOULD BE A KEY
ELEMENT OF HER POLICY WERE SHE EVER TO RETURNQT: DURING THIS
EXCHANGE, SHE DID NOT MENTION HER HUSBAND,
WHO WAS HER CHIEF BAG MAN AND PATRONAGE DISPENSER.)


6. (C) ON THE ECONOMIC FAILINGS OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT.
HER CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICIES WAS STANDARD FARE.
SHE SAID THE EFFORT TO FORCE THE INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS
(IPPS) TO RENEGOTIATE THE CONTRACTS SIGNED BY HER REGIME HAD HAD
A CHILLING EFFECT ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT. IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR
GOVERNMENTS TO HONOR THE AGREEMENTS REACHED BY THEIR PREDECESSORS
EVEN IF THEY DID NOT LIKE THE TERMS. OTHERWISE, THE
PREDICTABILITY AND CONFIDENCE SO ESSENTIAL TO ATTRACTING FOREIGN
INVESTMENT WOULD BE LACKING. BENAZIR WAS ALSO HIGHLY CRITICAL OF
THE GOVERNMENT DECISION TO FREEZE HARD CURRENCY ACCOUNTS IN THE
WAKE OF ITS NUCLEAR TESTS. SHE BELIEVED THE GOVERNMENT HAD NO
CLUE ABOUT HOW TO IMPROVE THE CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION SAVE FOR
BEGGING FROM RICH ARAB NEIGHBORS AND THROWING ITSELF ON THE MERCY
OF THE IMF.


7. (C) ON OTHER ASPECTS OF HER OWN PROGRAM. IN ADDITION TO
PROFESSIONALIZING THE CIVIL SERVICE, BENAZIR SAID SHE STRONGLY
FAVORED DOWNSIZING GOVERNMENT AT ALL LEVELS. GOVERNMENT-OWNED
ENTERPRISES SHOULD BE SOLD OFF AND THE NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT
MINISTRIES AND BUREAUCRATS SHARPLY REDUCED. THE MILITARY BUDGET
WOULD ALSO NEED TO BE REDUCED. PAKISTAN COULD NOT PRETEND TO
MATCH INDIA SOLDIER FOR SOLDIER AND MACHINE FOR MACHINE AND WOULD
NEED TO TAILOR ITS FOREIGN POLICY TO ACCOUNT FOR THIS REALITY.
AS FOR THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT, SHE SAID SHE FAVORED SHUTTING DOWN
THE MADARASSA SCHOOLS THAT WERE CHURNING OUT SO MANY YOUNG
FUNDAMENTALISTS. HER BASIC THEME, HOWEVER, WAS THAT THE BEST WAY
TO COMBAT FUNDAMENTALISM WAS TO IMPROVE THE ECONOMY BY ENDING
CORRUPTION, DOWNSIZING GOVERNMENT AND ATTRACTING FOREIGN
INVESTMENT.


8. (C) ON RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND THE WEST. BENAZIR TOLD
POLCOUNS SHE HAD SEEN PRESS REPORTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD
AGREED TO SIGN THE CTBT DURING THE SHAMSHAD-TALBOTT TALKS IN
LONDON ON AUGUST 25. SHE HOPED THIS WAS TRUE, SINCE PAKISTAN
COULD NOT AFFORD A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE WITH INDIA OR BAD RELATIONS
WITH THE UNITED STATES. SHE SAID THAT ONE POSITIVE RESULT
FLOWING FROM THE MAY NUCLEAR TESTS WAS ITS IMPACT ON THE U.S.
THE TESTS HAD FORCED THE UNITED STATES TO PAY GREATER ATTENTION
TO PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN NEEDED ACTIVE U.S. ENGAGEMENT AND SHE
HOPED THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN
THE REGION.


9. (C) ON THE TALIBAN AND BIN LADEN. BENAZIR SAID SHE HAD
STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS AND WAS STRONGLY
OPPOSED TO TERRORISM OF ANY KIND. BUT SHE FELT THE U.S. SHOULD
HAVE PURSUED USAMA BIN LADEN THROUGH THE UN PROCESS IN THE FIRST
INSTANCE, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE AUGUST 20 CRUISE MISSILE STRIKES
HAD ALIENATED PUBLIC OPINION THROUGHOUT THE ISLAMIC WORLD. SHE
SAID SHE WAS NO FAN OF THE TALIBAN, WHOM SHE VIEWED AS AN
EXTENSION OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT IN PAKISTAN. INDEED, SHE WAS
FEARFUL THAT RETURNING TALIBAN MIGHT SERVE AS FOOT SOLDIERS FOR
RELIGIOUS EXTREMISTS IN A FUTURE CONFRONTATION WITH AUTHORITIES.


10. (C) ON WHAT IS GOING RIGHT IN PAKISTAN. DESPITE HER
OPPOSITION TO THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT AND FEAR OF ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM, BENAZIR SAID SHE BELIEVED THERE HAD BEEN MANY
POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN IN THE TEN YEARS SINCE THE
DEATH OF ZIA (AUGUST 17, 1988) AND RETURN OF DEMOCRACY. ALTHOUGH
SHE HAD FELT ITS STING MORE THAN ANY OTHER PAKISTANI POLITICIAN,
SHE WAS PROUD OF THE FACT THAT PAKISTAN HAD DEVELOPED A
REMARKABLY FREE PRESS, WHICH SHE BELIEVED WAS AN ESSENTIAL
UNDERPINNING OF GENUINE DEMOCRACY. SHE SAID SHE ALSO BELIEVED
THAT THE JUDICIARY HAD ACHIEVED A LARGE MEASURE OF INDEPENDENCE,
ALTHOUGH IT REMAINED UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM POLITICAL
AUTHORITIES. SHE ALSO THOUGHT THAT ORDINARY PAKISTANIS HAD BEGUN
TO THINK FOR THEMSELVES AND TO QUESTION WHAT THEY WERE TOLD BY
THE GOVERNMENT AND BY POLITICIANS RATHER THAN PASSIVELY ACCEPT
SIMPLISTIC SLOGANS AS WAS PREVIOUSLY THE CASE.


11. (C) ON HER CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION. BENAZIR SAID SHE
THOUGHT THE WEAKNESS OF THE NAWAZ GOVERNMENT HAD IMPROVED HER OWN
POLITICAL POSITION IN THE COUNTRY. SHE THOUGHT SHE WAS STRONG IN
RURAL AREAS, BUT REMAINED WEAK IN URBAN PUNJAB. SHE RUED THE
FACT THAT THE ELECTORAL WEAKNESS OF HER OWN PPP PARTY (REDUCED IN
THE LAST ELECTION TO ITS SINDHI BASE) HAD FORCED HER TO MAKE
COMMON CAUSE WITH SOME OF THE SMALLER, MORE EXTREMIST RELIGIOUS
PARTIES UNDER THE PAKISTAN AWAMI ITIHAT (PAI) UMBRELLA. BUT SHE
FELT THAT HER PARTY WAS NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO CARRY THE BURDEN OF
OPPOSITION ON ITS OWN. MORE RECENTLY, SHE HAD ALSO BEGAN
REACHING OUT TO SOME OF THE NATIONALIST REGIONAL PARTIES, SUCH AS
THE NORTHWEST FRONTIER PROVINCE-BASED ANP. HOWEVER, WHEN ASKED
HOW SHE COULD MANEUVER FROM WHERE SHE WAS NOW BACK INTO A
POSITION OF POWER HER ONLY COMMENT WAS A RUEFUL "THAT IS THE 64
DOLLAR QUESTION."


12. (C) COMMENT. BENAZIR WAS RELAXED AND TALKATIVE DURING A
CONVERSATION THAT STRETCHED ON FOR NINETY MINUTES. HER COMMENTS
WERE CLEARLY CALCULATED TO GO DOWN WELL WITH AN AMERICAN AUDIENCE
AND SHE CLEARLY SEEMS TO BE POSITIONING HERSELF AS A MODERATE,
SECULAR, MORE WESTERN-ORIENTED ALTERNATIVE TO THE CURRENT
GOVERNMENT AND ITS EVEN MORE FUNDAMENTALIST FOES. SHE HAS
RECENTLY TURNED FOR ADVICE TO A MODERATE FORMER MILITARY OFFICER,
RETIRED GENERAL TALAT MASOOD, WHO IS NOTED FOR PROMOTING THE NEED
FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION-BUILDING IN PAKISTAN. AS FOR WHETHER
BENAZIR BELIEVES WHAT SHE IS SAYING, THAT IS HARD TO SAY. HER
BEST CHANCE OF ONE DAY RETURNING TO POWER IS ALMOST CERTAINLY AS
PART OF A COALITION RATHER THAN ON HER OWN. THAT MIGHT NOT BE A
BAD THING, GIVEN THAT, LEFT STRICTLY TO HER OWN DEVICES, SHE
WOULD REMAIN BEHOLDEN TO THE LANDLORDS OF HER FEUDAL SINDH BASE,
AND THESE ARE NOT THE SORT OF PEOPLE INTERESTED IN ENDING
PATRONAGE AND PROMOTING INSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC REFORMS. END
COMMENT.


MILAM