POLITICAL ISLAM IN JORDAN: STRUGGLING FOR THE SOUL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 AMMAN 003050


LONDON FOR TUELLER, PARIS FOR LEAF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/08
TAGS: PGOV PINR KISL PHUM JO
SUBJECT: POLITICAL ISLAM IN JORDAN: STRUGGLING FOR THE SOUL
OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

REF: A) AMMAN 2812 B) AMMAN 2906



1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM JANET A. SANDERSON; REASONS:
1.5(B) AND (D).

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SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
--------------


2. (C) THE NOVEMBER 1997 BOYCOTT OF PARLIAMENTARY
ELECTIONS BY THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND ITS POLITICAL WING,
THE ISLAMIC ACTION FRONT, EXPOSED INTERNAL DIVISIONS WHICH
WILL HAVE A PROFOUND EFFECT ON THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT'S
POLICIES AND TACTICS. THE ISLAMIST LEADERSHIP IS DIVIDED
INTO THREE COMPETING CAMPS, ALL WITH A DIFFERENT VISION OF
WHERE THE MOVEMENT SHOULD BE HEADED. THE "MODERATES"
INCLUDE THE LEADERS OF BOTH THE IAF AND THE MB AND A HANDFUL
OF OTHERS WHO FAVOR CONTINUING THE MB'S LONGSTANDING
ACCOMODATIONIST STRATEGY. HOWEVER, THEY LACK A LARGE
FOLLOWING IN THE RANKS OF THE MB/IAF OR IN THE SHURA
COUNCILS. RATHER, THEY ARE "COMPROMISE" LEADERS CHOSEN FOR
THEIR PROMINENCE AND PUBLIC RELATIONS SKILLS, BUT HAVE BEEN
INEFFECTIVE IN SHAPING OPINIONS WITHIN THE MOVEMENT. A
SECOND FACTION, THE MOST POWERFUL OF THE THREE, IS A GROUP
OF "POLITICAL ACTIVISTS" WHO REPRESENT A YOUNG, WELL-
EDUCATED GENERATION OF MB MEMBERS SEEKING TO PROMOTE A MORE
AGGRESSIVE, ACTIVIST ROLE FOR THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT. THIS
GROUP, LED BY A 41 YEAR OLD U.S.-EDUCATED ENGINEER NAMED
IMAD ABU DIYAH, ENJOYS A LARGE BLOCK OF SUPPORT IN THE SHURA
COUNCILS OF THE MB AND IAF, AND A BROAD BASE OF
ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT IN THE MB RANK AND FILE. WHILE THEIR
SUBSTANTIVE VIEWS, WHICH EMPHASIZE DOMESTIC POLITICAL
REFORMS, ANTI-NORMALIZATION, AND INTERNATIONAL MUSLIM
SOLIDARITY, DIFFER LITTLE FROM THE MODERATE LEADERSHIP, THEY
PUSH FOR A MORE CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH WITH THE GOVERNMENT
AS A MEANS TO THAT END. A THIRD FACTION, WHICH ALSO ENJOYS
STRONG SUPPORT IN THE SHURA COUNCILS AND AMONG THE RANK AND
FILE, ARE THE "RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES". THIS GROUP HAS NOT
BEEN COMFORTABLE WITH THE NOTION OF WORKING WITH THE
GOVERNMENT ON ANY TERMS. THEY WOULD HAVE THE MB FOCUS MORE
NARROWLY ON AN AGENDA OF SHARIA LAW REFORMS, RELIGIOUS
EDUCATION, AND SPIRITUAL MATTERS. THEY ARE MORE STRICTLY
REJECTIONIST IN FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS THAN THE OTHER TWO
GROUPS AS WELL. CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS, INCLUDING A YOUNGER
AND MORE ETHNICALLY PALESTINIAN MEMBERSHIP, ARE IN PART
BEHIND THE SHIFTING AGENDAS WITHIN THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. A
NUMBER OF THE MODERATES AND POLITICAL ACTIVISTS HAVE
EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT A RISING TIDE OF EXTREMISM WITHIN
THE MB RANK AND FILE, WHICH THEY FEEL WILL BE EXACERBATED BY
GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO SUPPRESS THE MOVEMENT.


3. (U) THIS IS THE THIRD IN A SERIES OF REPORTS EXAMINING
THE STATE OF ISLAMIST POLITICS IN JORDAN. REF A CONSIDERED
THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND STRENGTH OF THE MOVEMENT.
REF B LOOKED AT THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
ISLAMISTS AND THE GOVERNMENT. WHILE OTHER ISLAMIST
MOVEMENTS EXIST IN JORDAN, THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, INCLUDING
ITS POLITICAL ARM, THE ISLAMIC ACTION FRONT PARTY, SO
DOMINATES ISLAMIST POLITICS IN JORDAN THAT "ISLAMIST" AND
"MB" WILL BE USED INTERCHANGEABLY. THE INFORMATION IN THESE
REPORTS WAS COLLECTED FROM MEETINGS OVER THE PAST SEVERAL
MONTHS WITH MB AND IAF LEADERS FROM ACROSS THE ISLAMIST
POLITICAL SPECTRUM, AS WELL AS CONTACTS FORM ACADEMIA,
JOURNALISM, AND THE GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY AND
INTRODUCTION.

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BOYCOTT HIGHLIGHTS DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT
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4. (C) THE NOVEMBER 1997 BOYCOTT OF PARLIAMENTARY
ELECTIONS BY THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND ITS POLITICAL WING
THE ISLAMIC ACTION FRONT (IAF) EXPOSED DIVISIONS WHICH WILL
HAVE A PROFOUND EFFECT ON THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT'S POLICIES
AND TACTICS. HOWEVER, WHILE THE MEDIA AND SOME ANALYSTS
TROTTED OUT SHOPWORN CLICHES REGARDING "HAWKS" AND "DOVES"
IN THE MB RANKS, THE REAL DIVISIONS ARE MORE COMPLEX, AND
WERE ONLY PARTIALLY CONCERNED WITH THE QUESTION OF
BOYCOTTING ELECTIONS. IN FACT, THE ISLAMIST LEADERSHIP IS
DIVIDED INTO THREE COMPETING CAMPS, ALL WITH DIFFERENT
VISIONS OF WHERE THE MOVEMENT SHOULD BE HEADED. THE
CONFLICTING VISIONS ARE NOT NEW, AND IN FACT HAVE BEEN
PRESENT IN VARIOUS FORMS SINCE THE MB'S ESTABLISHMENT IN
JORDAN IN THE 1940'S. HOWEVER, THE WADI ARABA PEACE TREATY
WITH ISRAEL, DETERIORATING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS FOR MANY
JORDANIANS, AND STALLED PROGRESS ON JORDANIAN
DEMOCRATIZATION HAVE COME TOGETHER MAKE THE DIVIDING LINES
BRIGHTER.


5. (C) BRIEFLY, THE THREE MAJOR DIVISIONS WITHIN THE MB
TODAY ARE: FIRST, A SMALL GROUP OF MODERATE LEADERS WHO
HOLD TOP LEADERSHIP POSITIONS AND SEEK TO CONTINUE A LOW-
KEY, NON-CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH TOWARD WORKING WITH THE
GOVERNMENT ("MODERATES"); SECOND, A GROUP OF YOUNG MB
LEADERS, WELL-REPRESENTED IN THE SHURA AND EXECUTIVE
COUNCILS, WHO SEEK A MORE CONFRONTATIONAL, ACTIVIST APPROACH
TO THE GOJ, ESPECIALLY ON KEY ISSUES SUCH AS DEMOCRATIZATION
AND THE PEACE PROCESS ("POLTICAL ACTIVISTS"); AND THIRD, A
GROUP OF RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES WHO SEEK STRONGER EMPHASIS
ON SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES AND HAVE EMERGED OVER THE LAST
FIVE YEARS AS A POWERFUL POLITICAL FACTION WITHIN THE PARTY
("RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES"). A MORE DETAILED EXAMINATION OF
THESE DIVISIONS FOLLOWS.


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THE MODERATE LEADERSHIP: HOLDING A TIGER BY THE TAIL
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6. (C) THE MOST VISIBLE GROUPING WITHIN THE ISLAMIST
MOVEMENT CONSISTS OF MANY OF THE TOP MB/IAF LEADERS,
INCLUDING MB CONTROLLER GENERAL ABDEL MAJEED THUNAYBAT, IAF
SECRETARY GENERAL ABDEL LATIF ARRABIYAT, AND IAF SHURA
COUNCIL CHIEF ISHAQ FARHAN. THESE MEN AND A HANDFUL OF
OTHERS HAVE HELD TOP POSITIONS IN THE MOVEMENT FOR THE PAST
DECADE, AND SEEK TO CONTINUE THE MB'S LONGSTANDING
ACCOMODATIONIST POLICY TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT. WORKING FROM
AN ASSUMPTION OF LOYALTY TO THE HASHEMITE REGIME, ALL HAVE
LONG HISTORIES OF ADVOCATING AND PRACTICING COOPERATION WITH
THE GOVERNMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, FARHAN WAS FOR A TIME IN THE
EARLY 1970'S EXPELLED FROM THE MB FOR AGREEING TO SERVE AS
EDUCATION MINISTER. THEY ARE CAPABLE LEADERS, INTELLIGENT,
AND WELL-RESPECTED. FARHAN AND ARRABIYAT HOLD DOCTORATES
FROM U.S. UNIVERSITIES. THEY CAME TO PROMINENCE IN 1989 AS
JORDAN MOVED TO OPEN ITS POLITICAL PROCESS, AND THE MB FOUND
ITSELF LACKING IN EXPERIENCED LEADERSHIP READY TO TAKE ON A
MORE PUBLIC ROLE.


7. (C) THE STRENGTH OF THESE LEADERS - THAT THEY WERE
CHOSEN ON MERIT WITH LITTLE REGARD FOR THEIR PERSONAL
POLITICAL FOLLOWINGS - IS ALSO A WEAKNESS. FARHAN,
ARRABIYAT, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT THUNAYBAT, LACK A STRONG
POLITICAL BASE WITHIN THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD. MORE
PARTICULARLY, THEY HAVE NEVER BEEN GRASS ROOTS ORGANIZERS
AND THEREFORE LACK THE STRONG CONNECTIONS TO THE RANK AND
FILE ENJOYED BY THEIR IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITORS WITHIN THE
MOVEMENT. THE MB HAS, SINCE THE LATE 70'S, ABSORBED A LARGE
NUMBER OF NEW MEMBERS WHO MAKE UP THE MAJORITY OF THE
ISLAMIST MOVEMENT TODAY. THIS YOUNGER GENERATION IS FAR
MORE INCLINED TO ALLY ITSELF TO THE RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVE
OR POLITICAL ACTIVIST LEADERS WHO RECRUITED IT.


8. (C) THE POLITICAL WEAKNESS OF THE MODERATES WAS MADE
CLEAR WHEN THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION BOYCOTT DECISION WAS
ANNOUNCED LAST SUMMER. FARHAN, ARRABIYAT, AND THUNAYBAT ALL
THREATENED TO RESIGN IN PROTEST IF THE ISLAMISTS VOTED TO
BOYCOTT OVER THEIR STRONG AND PUBLICLY EXPRESSED OBJECTIONS.
WHEN THE PRO-BOYCOTT MEASURE PASSED EASILY (MB SOURCES SAY
ABOUT 85 PERCENT VOTED IN FAVOR IN BOTH THE MB AND IAF SHURA
COUNCILS),ALL WERE FORCED TO RETRACT THEIR RESIGNATIONS AND
HEW TO THE PARTY LINE. OTHER MODERATES, SUCH AS
PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTIES ABDULLAH AKAILEH AND BASSAM EMMOUSH,
WHO PUBLICLY REPUDIATED THE BOYCOTT DECISION, WERE EXPELLED
FROM THE MB AND SUSPENDED FROM THE IAF. THUS, THE COMBINED
MB/IAF LEADERSHIP AND SEVERAL OF THE MOST PROMINENT
ISLAMISTS IN JORDAN HAD NO VISIBLE EFFECT ON THE ISLAMIST
BOYCOTT DECISION. EVEN THE GOJ MAY HAVE BEEN SURPRISED BY
THE POLITICAL WEAKNESS OF THE MODERATE LEADERSHIP. AS AN MB
JOURNALIST (AND MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL ACTIVIST CAMP)
EXPLAINED: "THE GOVERNMENT HAS NEVER UNDERSTOOD THE MB.
THEY SAW ONLY THE EXTREME RIGHT (RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES)
AND THE EXTREME LEFT (MODERATE LEADERSHIP). THEY WOULD ONLY
TALK TO FARHAN, AKAILEH, AND EMMOUSH (WELL-KNOWN MODERATES).
THEY NEVER REALIZED THAT A THIRD FORCE (POLITICAL ACTIVISTS)
WAS READY TO TAKE POWER."

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THE POLITICAL ACTIVISTS: A NEW GENERATION PREPARES FOR
POWER
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9. (C) AT STREET LEVEL, AND IN THE SHURA COUNCILS, A GROUP
OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS IMPATIENT WITH THE ACCOMODATIONIST
APPROACH OF THE MODERATE LEADERSHIP HAS EMERGED AS THE MOST
POWERFUL AND EFFECTIVE POLITICAL FORCE WITHIN THE MB. THE
LEADERS OF THIS GROUP WERE GRASS ROOTS ORGANIZERS OF THE
1980'S AND 90'S, WHO RECRUITED AND INDOCTRINATED THE NEW
GENERATION OF MB MEMBERS WHICH NOW MAKES UP A NUMERICAL
MAJORITY OF THE PARTY, ACCORDING TO MB SOURCES. IMAD ABU
DIYAH, A CHARISMATIC 41 YEAR-OLD U.S.-EDUCATED COMPUTER
PROGRAMMER AND MEMBER OF THE MB EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, HAS
EMERGED AS THE LEADER OF THIS GROUP, WHICH ALSO INCLUDES MB
SPOKESMAN JAMIL ABU BAKER, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBER SALIM
FALAHAT, AND OTHERS.


10. (S) BY ALL ACCOUNTS, ABU DIYAH WAS THE POLITICAL FORCE
BEHIND THE ELECTION BOYCOTT LAST YEAR, A CONTEST WHERE HE
WENT HEAD TO HEAD WITH MB LEADER THUNAYBAT. HIS SUPPORTERS
SPEAK OF HIM IN HIGHLY DEFERENTIAL AND ADMIRING TERMS. THE
EDITOR OF MB NEWSPAPER AL-SABEEL, SAUD ABU MAHFOUZ (PLEASE
PROTECT),TOLD POLOFF RECENTLY: "HAMMAM SAEED (LEADER OF
THE RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES IN THE MB) IS MY SHAYKH, BUT
IMAD ABU DIYAH IS MY LEADER." ABU MAHFOUZ, 10 YEARS OLDER
THAN ABU DIYAH AND A MEMBER OF THE IAF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,
IS REPRESENTATIVE OF A NUMBER OF SENIOR MB POLITICAL AND
INTELLECTUAL LEADERS WHO SPEAK OF ABU DIYAH IN THE SAME
MANNER. A MEMBER OF THE MB POLICY PLANNING COMMITTEE TOLD
POLOFF THAT ABU DIYAH "HAS BEEN ONE OF THE MB'S BEST GRASS
ROOTS ORGANIZERS - HE HAS AN ENORMOUS FOLLOWING ON THE MB
STREET." EVEN HIS POLITICAL ENEMIES ACKNOWLEDGE HIS
EFFECTIVENESS AS A POLITICIAN. FORMER IAF DEPUTY BASSAM
EMMOUSH (PLEASE PROTECT),WHO WAS EJECTED FROM THE MB FOR
HIS PUBLIC REJECTION OF THE ELECTION BOYCOTT (AND WAS
REWARDED BY THE GOJ BY BEING NAMED MINISTER FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT),RECENTLY TOLD POLOFF THAT ABU
DIYAH IS A "DANGEROUS" LEADER WHO "WILL LEAD THE BROTHERHOOD
TO PRISON."


11. (C) POLOFF MET WITH ABU DIYAH AT MB HEADQUARTERS
RECENTLY. A 1984 GRADUATE OF UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAVEN (MS -
COMPUTER SCIENCE),ABU DIYAH SPEAKS FLUENT ENGLISH. IN
CONTRAST TO OTHER MB AND IAF LEADERS, WHO CITED THE JUNE,
1997 PRESS AND PUBLICATIONS LAW AMENDMENTS AND JORDAN'S
ELECTORAL LAW AS THE IMMEDIATE REASONS FOR THE BOYCOTT, ABU
DIYAH CITED "JORDANIAN FOREIGN POLICIES" (READ THE PEACE
PROCESS) AS THE FIRST REASON FOR THE BOYCOTT, ONLY FOLLOWED
BY THE LACK OF MEANINGFUL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION FOR THE
LEGISLATURE. IMPLICITLY CRITICIZING MB LEADERS WHO HAVE
ARGUED THAT CONFRONTATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT WILL LEAD TO A
HARSH GOJ RESPONSE, ABU DIYAH SAID: "THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE
ARE ANGRY, HUNGRY, AND SUFFERING GREATLY. IT'S TIME WE
BEGAN REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE RATHER THAN
OURSELVES."


12. (C) SUPPORTERS OF ABU DIYAH SAY THAT HIS PRIMARY
POLITICAL GOAL IS TO PUSH FOR A MORE OPEN POLITICAL SYSTEM
WHERE THE MB WILL HAVE A OPPORTUNITY FOR MEANINGFUL
PARTICIPATION IN POLICY-MAKING. IN PURSUIT OF THIS GOAL, HE
IS WILLING TO USE CONFRONTATIONAL (BUT NOT VIOLENT)
TACTICS - SUCH AS BOYCOTTS, DEMONSTRATIONS, AND STRIKES -
WHICH HAVE TRADITIONALLY BEEN AVOIDED BY ISLAMISTS IN
JORDAN. IT IS THIS ISSUE OF STRATEGY WHICH DIVIDES ABU
DIYAH AND HIS SUPPORTERQE MODERATE LEADERSHIP. THE
POLITICAL ACTIVISTS ARE PROFOUNDLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE
EFFICACY OF WORKING WITH THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT (REF B).
INSTEAD, THEY LOOK FOR WAYS TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POPULAR
STRENGTH AND AFFECT CHANGE THROUGH DIRECT GRASS ROOTS
ORGANIZING, A PROGRAM THEY REFER TO AS "BEYOND POLITICS."


13. (C) IN FACT, THE SUBSTANTIVE AGENDA OF THE POLITICAL
ACTIVISTS DIFFERS LITTLE FROM THAT OF THE MODERATE
LEADERSHIP. BOTH ESPOUSE A VAGUE PAN-ARAB/ISLAMIC
SOLIDARITY, AN END TO NORMALIZATION WITH ISRAEL, AND REFORMS
TO ADDRESS JORDAN'S POVERTY, INEQUALITIES OF WEALTH, AND
GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION. HOWEVER, ABU DIYAH IS MORE OUTSPOKEN
IN HIS WILLINGNESS TO CALL FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS WHICH
WILL OBVIOUSLY AFFECT THE HASHEMITE REGIME'S MONOPOLY ON
POWER. EVEN ON THE LIGHTNING ROD ISSUE OF THE PEACE
PROCESS, ABU DIYAH, IN A CONVERSATION WITH POLOFF, DISPLAYED
SURPRISING FLEXIBILITY. WHEN POLOFF ASKED ABU DIYAH WHETHER
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN JORDAN COULD LIVE WITH THE STATE
OF ISRAEL UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, ABU DIYAH REPLIED "IF WE
CAN FIND A FORMULA WHICH WOULD SATISFY THE NATIONAL
ASPIRATIONS AND PERSONAL AMBITIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE, WE WILL HAVE ATTAINED OUR GOAL."

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THE RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES: A NEW ASSERTIVENESS
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14. (C) A THIRD FACTION WHICH COMMANDS CONSIDERABLE
INFLUENCE WITHIN THE MB TODAY ARE THE "RELIGIOUS
CONSERVATIVES." THESE ARE A GROUP OF RELIGIOUSLY-ORIENTED
MUSLIM BROTHERS WHO FOCUS ON A TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC SOCIAL
AND SPIRITUAL MESSAGE. THEY ARE LED BY A 54 YEAR OLD AL-
AZHAR-EDUCATED SHAYKH NAMED HAMMAM SAEED. THE RELIGIOUS
CONSERVATIVES, AS PART OF A COMPROMISE WITH IAF MODERATES
DIRECTED AGAINST ABU DIYAH'S MORE POWERFUL POLITICAL
CONSERVATIVE FACTION, RECENTLY ENGINEERED SAEED'S ELECTION
AS DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE IAF. SAEED, MB EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE MEMBER MOHAMMED ABU FARES, AND SEVERAL OTHER
LEADERS OF THIS GROUP CONTROL, ACCORDING TO MB SOURCES,
ABOUT 30 PERCENT OF THE MB AND IAF SHURA COUNCILS. THEY
HAVE A STRONG AND PARTICULARLY LOYAL BASE IN THE MB RANK AND
FILE, WHERE, LIKE ABU DIYAH AND HIS SUPPORTERS, THEY HAVE
BEEN ACTIVE AND SUCCESSFUL RECRUITERS AND ORGANIZERS.


15. (C) THE RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES HAVE A LONG HISTORY IN
THE MB. UNLIKE THE MODERATES OR THE POLITICAL ACTIVISTS,
THEY FOCUS THEIR MESSAGE ON SOCIAL ISSUES SUCH AS
IMPLEMENTATION OF SHARIA LAWS, SEGREGATION OF THE SEXES, AND
THE CORRUPTING INFLUENCE OF WESTERN CULTURE. TRADITIONALLY,
THEY HAVE BEEN LESS INTERESTED IN DIRECT POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION THAN OTHERS IN THE MB, BELIEVING THAT WORKING
WITH WHAT THEY DEEM AN ILLEGITIMATE (I.E. NON-ISLAMIC)
GOVERNMENT WOULD INEVITABLY CORRUPT THE MOVEMENT. FOR THIS
REASON THEY HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY WEAK IN THE IAF. HOWEVER,
MOST MB OBSERVERS SEE THESE ATTITUDES CHANGING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF THE AMBITIOUS SAEED.


16. (C) THE RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES HAVE EMERGED OVER THE
PAST FIVE YEARS AS THE FASTEST GROWING FACTION WITHIN THE
MB. ACCORDING TO A MEMBER OF THE MB POLICY PLANNING
COMMITTEE, THE RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES "SURPRISED EVERYBODY"
WITH A POWERFUL SHOWING IN THE 1994 SECTION (LOCAL CHAPTERS)
AND SHURA COUNCIL ELECTIONS, AND HAVE BEEN ON THE ASCENDENT
SINCE THEN. THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF AN ACTIVE RELIGIOUS
CONSERVATIVE BLOC UNDER SAEED WORRY EVEN THE POLITICAL
ACTIVISTS, SEVERAL OF WHOM REFERRED TO SAEED AS AN
"EXTREMIST." INDEED, SAEED AND HIS SUPPORTERS, IN ADDITION
TO THEIR CALL FOR STRICTER APPLICATION OF ISLAMIC LAW (WHICH
MANY MB LEADERS SEE AS A COUNTERPRODUCTIVE STRATEGY FOR THE
ISLAMISTS),TAKE HIGHLY UNCOMPROMISING POSITIONS ON SUCH
THINGS AS THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL,
IRAQ SANCTIONS, AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT OR OTHER FOREIGN
PRESENCE IN THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY. THOUGH SAEED IS CAREFUL
IN PUBLIC, MANY IN HIS FACTION GO SO FAR AS TO QUESTION THE
(ISLAMIC) LEGITIMACY OF THE HASHEMITE REGIME.

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"YOUTH AND ETHNICITY" BEHIND CHANGING ATTITUDES
-------------- --


17. (C) THE POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND THE RELIGIOUS
CONSERVATIVES TOGETHER PROBABLY ACCOUNT FOR AT LEAST 80
PERCENT OF THE MB MEMBERSHIP. MB SOURCES ATTRIBUTE THEIR
STRENGTH TO DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFTS WHICH HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY
ALTERED THE MB'S MEMBERSHIP PROFILE SINCE THE LATE
SEVENTIES. ONCE DOMINATED BY RURAL AND PROVINCIAL EAST
BANKERS, THE MB NOW HAS A NEAR EVENLY-DIVIDED
PALESTINIAN/EAST BANK MEMBERSHIP WITH A MAJORITY OF ITS
MEMBERS UNDER 40. THE YOUNGER MEMBERS ARE LESS LIKELY TO
HAVE ESTABLISHED TRIBAL TIES OR OTHER VESTED INTERESTS WHICH
THE GOJ CAN MANIPULATE. THEY ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE WELL-
EDUCATED AND UNDEREMPLOYED. THOUGH THEY ARE PARTICULARLY
WELL REPRESENTED IN THE ABU DIYAH'S POLITICAL ACTIVIST WING,
THEY ALSO HAVE A STRONG PRESENCE IN AMONG THE RELIGIOUS
CONSERVATIVES. MB LEADER ABDEL MAJEED THUNAYBAT TOLD POLOFF
IN A RECENT CONVERSATION THAT "YOUTH AND ETHNICITY (I.E.
PALESTINIANS)" ARE BEHIND THE MB'S MORE CONFRONTATIONAL
APPROACH IN GENERAL AND THE BOYCOTT IN PARTICULAR - A VIEW
ECHOED BY EVERY MB CONTACT CONSULTED.

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FEARS OF RISING EXTREMISM
--------------


18. (S) SEVERAL ISLAMIST LEADERS EXPRESSED TO POLOFF THEIR
CONCERN ABOUT A RISING TIDE OF EXTREMIST SENTIMENT AMONG THE
MB RANK AND FILE. THEY FEEL THAT CURRENT AND ANTICIPATED
GOJ MEASURES TO SUPPRESS THE MB WILL WEAKEN THEIR ABILITY TO
CONTROL EXTREMIST ELEMENTS WITHIN THE MOVEMENT. MB
CONTROLLER GENERAL THUNAYBAT (PLEASE PROTECT),TOLD POLOFF
THAT "I WORRY ABOUT THE FUTURE OF OUR MOVEMENT - THE MB WILL
NOT TAKE UP MILITARY ACTIVITY. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT CAN
ONLY PRESS US SO FAR. THERE IS A VERY REAL DANGER THAT
UNDER PRESSURE, GROUPS WILL ARISE OUT OF THE MB RANKS WHO DO
CHOOSE THE PATH OF VIOLENCE." IAF LEADER ABDEL LATIF
ARRABIYAT (PLEASE PROTECT),A WELL-SPOKEN, THOUGHTFUL
MODERATE TOLD POLOFF THAT "WITHIN THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
NOW, WE ARE NOT SEEING EXTREMIST VIEWS OF THE KIND THAT
PRODUCED THE ATROCITIES IN LUXOR OR ALGERIA - WE ARE NOT AT
THAT POINT. HOWEVER, I DO FEAR THAT SOMETHING OF THE SORT
COULD ARISE." ARRABIYAT THEN DESCRIBED HOW AT A RECENT
PARTY MEETING A YOUNG MB DELEGATE DEMANDED THAT HE
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT GAMAL ABDEL NASSER WAS A "KAFFIR"
(INFIDEL). WHEN ARRABIYAT REFUSED, HIS QUESTIONER LOOKED
THE DISTINGUISHED 68 YEAR OLD PARTY LEADER IN THE EYE AND
ANNOUNCED "THEN YOU ARE A KAFFIR YOURSELF." ARRABIYAT SHOOK
HIS HEAD IN DISMAY AS HE RELATED THE STORY. (NOTE:
DENOUNCING ARAB LEADERS AS INFIDELS IS THE HALLMARK OF
EXTREMIST MB OFFSHOOTS.)


19. (S) BOTH ARRABIYAT AND FORMER MB DEPUTY (NOW MINISTER
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT) BASSAM EMMOUSH (PROTECT),IN
CONVERSATIONS WITH POLOFF, APPEALED TO THE USG TO COUNSEL
THE GOJ THAT THEIR UNCOMPROMISING POLICIES TOWARD THE MB ARE
MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE MB TO COMBAT EXTREMISM
WITHIN ITS RANKS. EMMOUSH SAID "CLINTON CAME TO SHARM AL-
SHEIK AND TOLD ARAB GOVERNMENTS THAT THE WAY TO FIGHT
EXTREMISM IS MORE JAILS, MORE POLICE. THIS IS WRONG. TO
FIGHT EXTREMISTS WITHIN A POPULAR MOVEMENT LIKE THE
ISLAMISTS, YOU MUST SUPPORT THE MODERATES. WHEN YOU PUNISH
THE MODERATES, YOU END UP WITH SITUATIONS LIKE ALGERIA AND
EGYPT. WE HAVE NOT HAD THAT PROBLEM UNTIL NOW. THE KING
CAN STILL WALK DOWN THE STREET WITHOUT FEAR OF BEING
ASSASSINATED. BUT THAT WILL CHANGE - WE ARE HEADING IN THAT
DIRECTION."


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CONCLUSION
--------------


20. (S) THE FUTURE OF THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT IN JORDAN IS
WITH IMAD ABU DIYAH'S POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND HAMMAM SAEED'S
RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES. IN SOME COMBINATION, THEY WILL
SEEK OUT A MORE CONFRONTATIONAL, ACTIVIST APPROACH TOWARD
THE GOJ ON MANY ISSUES. HAVING DEMONSTRATED THE CAPACITY TO
MAINTAIN A UNITED PUBLIC FRONT THROUGH DIFFICULT INTERNAL
DEBATES, THE DIVISIONS THEY REPRESENT SHOULD NOT BE
OVEREMPHASIZED. RATHER, THEIR GROWING CONFIDENCE WILL DRIVE
THEM TO PUSH THEIR RESPECTIVE AGENDAS ON THE MODERATE
LEADERSHIP. THEY HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO MAKE THE POLITICAL
STATEMENTS OF THE MB AND IAF MORE FORCEFUL AND DIRECT. IT
REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE GOJ WILL LOOK FOR CREATIVE
WAYS TO ADAPT TO A CHANGING ISLAMIST POLITICAL LANDSCAPE.
FOR NOW, THE GOJ'S INSTINCTS SEEM TO BE TO PUSH BACK HARD.
IN THIS REGARD, IT IS WORRISOME THAT THE GOJ'S TOUGH
APPROACH TO THE MB OF LATE IS SEEN BY ITS MODERATE LEADERS
AS UNDERMINING THEIR ABILITY TO CONTROL EXTREMIST ELEMENTS
IN THE RANK AND FILE.

EGAN