Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
97ISLAMABAD3085
1997-04-14 12:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

AFGHANISTAN: OBSERVERS SAY "RADICALS" HAVE UPPER HAND IN

Tags:  PGOV PTER KISL PINR AF PK 
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O 141255Z APR 97
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6273
INFO AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
AMEMBASSY ALMATY 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA J5//
DIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY MBABANE 
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 
AMCONSUL JEDDAH 
AMEMBASSY RIYADH 
AMEMBASSY ROME 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 
AMCONSUL LAHORE 
AMCONSUL KARACHI 
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003085 


DEPT FOR SA/PAB, S/CT, AND EUR/CEN; LONDON FOR POL/TUELLER; PARIS
FOR POL/RAVELING; MBABANE FOR MALINOWSKI; CENTCOM/CENTPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/14/07
TAGS: PGOV PTER KISL PINR AF PK
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: OBSERVERS SAY "RADICALS" HAVE UPPER HAND IN
TALIBAN AND ARE PUSHING FOR PROTECTION OF BIN LADEN

REFS: (A) ISLAMABAD 2987
(B) ISLAMABAD 2849
(C) PESHAWAR 277


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003085 DEPT FOR SA/PAB, S/CT, AND EUR/CEN; LONDON FOR POL/TUELLER; PARIS FOR POL/RAVELING; MBABANE FOR MALINOWSKI; CENTCOM/CENTPAC FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/14/07 TAGS: PGOV PTER KISL PINR AF PK SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: OBSERVERS SAY "RADICALS" HAVE UPPER HAND IN TALIBAN AND ARE PUSHING FOR PROTECTION OF BIN LADEN REFS: (A) ISLAMABAD 2987 (B) ISLAMABAD 2849 (C) PESHAWAR 277 ¶1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DAN MOZENA, ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR. REASONS: 1.5 (C) (D). ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS, HAMED GAILANI, THE POLITICALLY-ACTIVE SON OF PIR GAILANI, AND MULLAH MALANG, AN AFGHAN WITH LINKS TO THE TALIBAN, TOLD POLOFF RECENTLY THAT "RADICALS" ARE GAINING THE UPPER HAND IN THE TALIBAN. THEY PICTURE THE "RADICALS" AS BEING STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF THE TALIBAN'S POLICY OF OFFERING SAFE HAVEN TO FUGITIVE SAUDI FINANCIER BIN LADEN. THEY ADDED THAT SOME OF THE "RADICALS," INCLUDING "JUSTICE MINISTER" TURABI AND HIGH- LEVEL TALIBAN ADVISER WAKIL AHMED, WERE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN CLOSE TO MULLAH MANSOUR, A STRONGLY ISLAMIST RESISTANCE LEADER, WHO WAS ASSASSINATED IN 1992. END SUMMARY. "RADICALS" SEEN AS GAINING THE UPPER HAND -------------- / ¶3. (C) IN AN APRIL 12 CONVERSATION WITH POLOFF, HAMED GAILANI, THE DEPUTY LEADER OF THE SMALL NATIONAL ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF AFGHANISTAN, SAID HE HAD HEARD REPORTS THAT A NUMBER OF "RADICALS" HAVE GAINED THE UPPER HAND IN TALIBAN DECISION-MAKING. IN A SEPARATE APRIL 14 CONVERSATION, MULLAH MALANG, A COMMANDER IN THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE WITH CLOSE LINKS TO THE TALIBAN, TOLD POLOFF THAT HE HAD ALSO NOTED A "MORE EXTREME EDGE" TO THE TALIBAN, ESPECIALLY IN THE PAST MONTH. BOTH GAILANI AND MALANG LISTED THE FOLLOWING TALIBAN LEADERS AS "RADICALS" WITH INCREASED IMPORTANCE IN THE MOVEMENT: -- MULLAH WAKIL AHMED, ADVISER TO TALIBAN LEADER MULLAH OMAR. -- MULLAH TURABI, THE "JUSTICE MINISTER." -- MULLAH MUTAQI, THE "INFORMATION MINISTER." -- MULLAH JALIL, THE "DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER" IN KANDAHAR. -- SHER MOHAMMAD STANEKZAI, THE "DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER" IN KABUL. -- MULLAH SIDDIQI, THE "ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE." (NOTE: SEE REF B FOR RECORD OF POLOFF'S RECENT MEETING WITH SIDDIQI, IN KABUL.) STRONG PRO-BIN LADEN VIEWS -------------- / ¶4. (C) MALANG TOLD POLOFF THAT ALL OF THESE TALIBAN OFFICIALS ARE STRONGLY COMMITTED TO THE TALIBAN'S POLICY OF PROVIDING SAFE HAVEN AND PROTECTION TO FUGITIVE SAUDI FINANCIER USAMA BIN LADEN. IN PARTICULAR, HE NOTED, TURABI, WA
KIL AHMED AND MUTAQI HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED WITH THE PRO-BIN LADEN WING OF THE TALIBAN. ON THE OTHER HAND, MALANG CONTINUED, ALTHOUGH MULLAH RABBANI, THE TALIBAN "CHIEF OF THE CARETAKER COUNCIL," AND MULLAH GHAUS, THE TALIBAN "FOREIGN MINISTER," ARE NOT AGAINST OFFERING HAVEN TO BIN LADEN, THEY HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE TALIBAN OF BEING IDENTIFIED WITH BIN LADEN'S ANTI-SAUDI AND ANTI-AMERICAN POLICIES. HOWEVER, MALANG ADDED, RABBANI AND GHAUS HAVE "LOST THE ARGUMENT" AND THE TALIBAN HAVE NO PLANS TO ADJUST THEIR POLICY ON BIN LADEN. ¶5. (C) ASKED WHY BIN LADEN IS SO IMPORTANT TO THE "RADICALS," MALANG REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT CERTAIN, BUT HE BELIEVED THAT THE RADICALS SEE BIN LADEN AS A "LEARNED MUSLIM," WHO CAN QUOTE FROM THE KORAN AND HADITHS (SAYINGS OF THE PROPHET). IN ADDITION, THEY FEEL HE IS OWED RESPECT BECAUSE HE HELPED THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE DURING THE WAR AGAINST THE SOVIETS. FINALLY, MALANG OBSERVED, THE "RADICALS" ARE APPRECIATIVE OF THE FUNDS THAT BIN LADEN PROVIDES THE TALIBAN. THE "MANSOUR" GROUP -------------- / ¶6. (C) BOTH GAILANI AND MALANG ASSERTED THAT MOST OF THE TALIBAN "RADICALS" WERE AFFILIATED WITH AN AFGHAN RESISTANCE PARTY LED BY NASRULLAH MANSOUR. GAILANI TOLD POLOFF THAT MANSOUR WAS ORIGINALLY THE DEPUTY TO MOHAMMED NABI MOHAMMEDI, THE LEADER OF HARAKAT-I- INQILAB-I-ISLAMI (HII),BUT LEFT THE PARTY TO FORM A BREAKAWAY FACTION IN 1981. THE ISSUE THAT LED TO THE HII SPLIT, ACCORDING TO GAILANI, WAS NABI'S BELIEF THAT MANSOUR HAD GROWN "TOO INTERNATIONALIST" IN HIS ISLAMIC BELIEFS. HE NOTED THAT MANSOUR WAS ASSASSINATED BY UNITS LOYAL TO HEZB-I-ISLAMI (HEKMATYAR) IN 1992, AND ADDED THAT WAKIL AHMED, TURABI, AND SIDDIQI, IN PARTICULAR, ARE CONSIDERED "PROTEGES OF MANSOUR." "MANSOURIS" SEEN AS LESS ANTI-IRANIAN" -------------- / ¶7. (C) NOTING THAT MANSOUR SPENT A NUMBER OF YEARS IN IRAN IN THE 1980S, MALANG TOLD POLOFF THAT THOSE PEOPLE WHO ARE CONSIDERED "MANSOURIS" (AS SUPPORTERS OF MANSOUR ARE KNOWN) ARE CONSIDERED TO BE LESS ANTI-IRANIAN THAN OTHER TALIBAN. EXPANDING ON THIS POINT, HE EXPLAINED THAT SINCE "MANSOURIS" ARE MORE ISLAMIST IN ORIENTATION AND LESS NATIONALISTIC, THEY DO NOT HOLD THE STRONG ANTI-IRANIAN BELIEFS COMMON TO OTHER AFGHANS, ESPECIALLY THOSE PASHTUNS FROM WESTERN PROVINCES LIKE KANDAHAR, HELMAND, URUZGAN, AND FARAH. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THEY ARE PRO-IRANIAN, HE CONCLUDED, BUT SIMPLY THAT "MANSOURIS" ARE MORE WILLING TO TALK TO THE IRANIANS. A TALIBAN "REFORM COMMISSION" -------------- / ¶8. (C) NEITHER GAILANI NOR MALANG BELIEVED THAT THE TREND TOWARD WHAT THEY PERCEIVE AS THE "RADICALIZATION" OF THE TALIBAN WOULD EBB IN THE NEAR-TERM. BOTH NOTED THAT THAT THEY HAD HEARD THAT MULLAH TURABI WAS NAMED THE HEAD OF A "REFORM COMMISSION" BY TALIBAN LEADER MULLAH OMAR IN MARCH. FROM THIS POSITION, MALANG COMMENTED, IT IS BELIEVED THAT MULLAH TURABI NOW MAINTAINS A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE ON PERSONNEL DECISIONS AND DEPARTMENTAL ORGANIZATION. IN ADDITION, SINCE IT WAS REPORTED THAT TURABI WAS CHOSEN FOR THE POST PERSONALLY BY MULLAH OMAR, IT IS BELIEVED THAT HE IS NOW, ALONG WITH MULLAH WAKIL AHMED, ONE OF OMAR'S CLOSEST ADVISERS, HE STATED. COMMENT -------------- / ¶9. (C) BOTH GAILANI AND MALANG ARE KNOWLEGEABLE CONTACTS ON AFGHANISTAN; MALANG, IN PARTICULAR, APPEARS TO KNOW A LOT ABOUT TALIBAN PERSONALITIES AND DECISION-MAKING. THEIR ASSERTION THAT "RADICALS" IN THE TALIBAN HAVE BEEN GAINING INFLUENCE HAS BEEN REPEATED BY OTHER OBSERVERS, INCLUDING GENERAL PAYENDA, DOSTAM'S REPRESENTATIVE IN PAKISTAN (REF A). BIN LADEN'S ASSOCIATION WITH THE PURPORTEDLY ASCENDANT "RADICALS" IS POTENTIALLY OF GREAT CONCERN, ESPECIALLY IF IT MEANS THAT BIN LADEN IS ABLE TO EXPAND HIS INFLUENCE ON THE TALIBAN. SIMONS

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