Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
97ANKARA8752
1997-09-03 08:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

A "SPECIAL TEAM" VIEW ON THE PKK, OHAL,

Tags:  PREL KISL PHUM PINS TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
P 030828Z SEP 97
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5128
INFO USEU BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 
AMEMBASSY BONN 
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ3/ECJ5/ECPOLAD//
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/USDP/ISA:EUR//
ODC ANKARA TU//TCH//
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//POLAD//
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 
CTF NORTHERN WATCH INCIRLIK AB TU//CC/CS//
AMCONSUL ADANA 
AMEMBASSY LONDON
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 008752 


LONDON FOR TUELLER
PARIS FOR LEAF

E.O. 12958: DECL:09/03/17
TAGS: PREL KISL PHUM PINS TU
SUBJECT: A "SPECIAL TEAM" VIEW ON THE PKK, OHAL,
AND ISLAMIC SENTIMENT IN THE TNP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 008752 LONDON FOR TUELLER PARIS FOR LEAF E.O. 12958: DECL:09/03/17 TAGS: PREL KISL PHUM PINS TU SUBJECT: A "SPECIAL TEAM" VIEW ON THE PKK, OHAL, AND ISLAMIC SENTIMENT IN THE TNP ¶1. CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLCOUNS MARC SIEVERS, AMEMBASSY ANKARA. REASON: 1.5(B)(D). ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: ON THE EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 2, POLOFF DISCUSSED THE KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK), PROSPECTS FOR REFORM OF THE "STATE OF EMERGENCY" REGIME (OHAL),AND RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS IN THE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE (TNP),WITH A MEMBER OF THE ANTI- TERRORIST "SPECIAL TEAMS" POLICE FORCE. THE OFFICER HAS CLOSE TIES TO SEVERAL OF POLOFF'S SOURCES AND CONTACTS IN THE ISLAMIST/RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY, INCLUDING PROMINENT MEMBERS OF THE ISLAMIST REFAH (WELFARE) PARTY OF NECMETTIN ERBAKAN AND A LOCAL SHAYKH OF THE NAKSHIBENDI TARIKAT (ONE OF THE WIDESPREAD BUT ILLEGAL SUFI ORDERS JUDGED BY THE MILITARY AS A PARTICULARLY DIRE THREAT TO TURKEY'S SECULAR KEMALIST INSTITUTIONS). END SUMMARY. -------------- PKK AND OHAL -------------- ¶3. (C) THE OFFICER, WHO ONCE SERVED IN THE COMMANDO FORCES OF THE TURKISH JANDARMA, JOINED THE SPECIAL TEAMS IN 1994, SERVING IN VARIOUS AREAS OF KURDISH SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY UNTIL HIS RECENT TRANSFER TO ANKARA. DURING HIS YEARS IN THE SOUTHEAST, HE HAD WITNESSED A DECLINE PKK OPERATIONS, HE SAID. HOWEVER, THE PKK WAS STILL QUITE ACTIVE AND WAS NOT ON THE VERGE OF BEING ELIMINATED AS A MAJOR FORCE IN THE REGION. THE OFFICER ADDED THAT THERE WAS A WIDENING RIFT IN THE PKK RANKS BETWEEN THOSE WHO EXHIBITED UNQUESTIONING SUPPORT OF THE PKK LEADERSHIP'S TRADITIONAL MARXISM, AND THE INCREASING CADRES OF RELIGIOUS SYMPATHIZERS. IF LEFT TO FESTER, THIS COULD POSE A PROBLEM FOR THE PKK IN THE FUTURE, HE OBSERVED. ¶4. (C) ACCORDING TO THE OFFICER, THE YILMAZ GOVERNMENT'S TENTATIVE PROPOSALS TO END THE OHAL REGIME IN THE SOUTHEAST AMOUNTED TO A COSMETIC CHANGE THAT WOULD NOT IN ANY WAY RESTRICT THE SECURITY FORCES' REGIONAL DOMINANCE AND FREEDOM OF ACTION. BY WAY OF EXAMPLE, HE VOLUNTEERED THAT ALTHOUGH THE OHAL FORMALLY HAD BEEN LIFTED IN MARDIN PROVINCE, NOTHING HAD CHANGED ON THE GROUND. (COMMENT: MARDIN WAS DROPPED FROM THE LIST OF OHAL PROVINCES DURING THE TENURE OF THE PREVIOUS REFAH-LED GOVERNMENT. REFAH, WHICH LONG HAS VISCERALLY OPPOSED THE STATE OF EMERGENCY REGIME, HAD HOPED THAT MARDIN WOULD SERVE AS A SYMBOL OF THE PARTY'S COMMITMENT TO ENACT REFORMS FOR ITS KURDISH CONSTITUENTS. SHORTLY BEFORE TAKING POWER IN JULY OF 1996, HOWEVER, REFAH SOURCES INDICATED TO POLOFF THAT THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF HAD MADE CLEAR TO THE REFAH LEADERSHIP THAT THE MILITARY WOULD HAVE THE FINAL SAY ON ANY PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE OHAL. THE MILITARY'S REPEATED "RECOMMENDATIONS" IN FAVOR OF CONTINUING THE OHAL REGIME, AND THE ERBAKAN GOVERNMENT'S ACQUIESCENCE TO THE GENERALS' DEMANDS, GENERATED CONSIDERABLE DISCONTENT IN THE REFAH RANKS. THE EXPERIENCE WITH LIFTING OHAL IN MARDIN PROVINCE ALMOST CERTAINLY WAS SOMETHING OF A DRY-RUN FOR THE MILITARY. ACCORDING TO A VARIETY OF REPORTING, THE GENERALS HAVE GIVEN THEIR BLESSING TO THE YILMAZ GOVERNMENT'S TINKERING WITH OHAL -- NOW THAT REFAH IS SAFELY OUT OF POWER AND, PRESUMABLY, NOT IN A POSITION TO CAPITALIZE ON ANY GOT REFORMS IN THE SOUTHEAST. END COMMENT.) -------------- ISLAM AND THE POLICE -------------- ¶5. (C) ACCORDING TO THE OFFICER, THE TNP, UNLIKE THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP, WAS "COMFORTABLE" WITH THE RELIGIOUS INCLINATIONS OF SOME OF ITS MEMBERS. THE TNP DID NOT CONDUCT ROUTINE PURGES OF RELIGIOUS COPS FROM THE RANKS, HE SAID. THE TNP TOP BRASS KNEW BETTER: SUCH ACTIONS WOULD BE MET WITH WIDESPREAD HOSTILITY BY RANK-AND-FILE OFFICERS. WHILE THE TNP WAS BOUND TO OUST FLAGRANT RELIGIOUS PROSELYTIZERS, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE LATTITUDE GIVEN TO THOSE WHO KEPT A RELATIVELY LOW PROFILE, THE OFFICER EXPLAINED. ¶6. (C) THE OFFICER COMMENTED THAT THE TURKISH POLICE'S STANDING IN THE EYES OF THE PUBLIC VARIED FROM NEIGHBORHOOD TO NEIGHBORHOOD. HE VOLUNTEERED THAT IN SINCAN (AN ANKARA SUBURB NOTORIOUS FOR ITS ISLAMIST SYMPATHIES),THE LOCALS "KISS OUR HANDS," AND RECOGNIZED THE TYPICAL POLICE OFFICER AS "ONE OF THE PEOPLE." BY CONTRAST, IN BASTIONS OF KEMALIST SECULARISM SUCH AS THE UPSCALE ANKARA NEIGHBORHOODS OF CANKAYA AND GAZIOSMANPASA, POLICE ROUTINELY WERE GREETED WITH DISDAIN. (COMMENT: THESE ATTITUDES PROBABLY ARE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE MORE A MATTER OF SOCIAL STATUS THAN PURE POLITICS. END COMMENT.) RICCIARDONE

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -