NEW ARMED GROUPS JOINING THE OLD FIS?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 000952


E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/14/2007
TAGS: PINS PTER KISL AG
SUBJECT: NEW ARMED GROUPS JOINING THE OLD FIS?

REF: A) FBIS LD 1502183497 B) ALGIERS 864
C) 96 ALGIERS 250, 632 AND 1062
D) ALGIERS 931 E) FBIS MM1212143096
F) FBIS MM1109104796


1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN,
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS, REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D).


2. (C) SUMMARY: THE ABILITY OF THE LONG-BANNED
ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT (FIS) TO RESTRAIN THE
ISLAMIST ARMED GROUPS HERE IS QUESTIONABLE. OVER
TIME, HOWEVER, THE BARBAROUS ATROCITIES OF THE ARMED
ISLAMIC GROUP (GIA) MAY BE WORKING IN THE FIS' FAVOR
AMONG ISLAMIST ARMED GROUPS. THERE ARE SIGNS,
ALBEIT SMALL AND TENTATIVE, THAT MORE GROUPS ARE
CLAIMING LOYALTY TO THE ORIGINAL FIS LEADERSHIP OF
ABASSI MADANI AND ALI BENHADJ (JAILED SINCE 1991).
THERE ARE ALSO SOME HINTS THAT THESE GROUPS ARE
JOINING OR AT LEAST WORKING TOGETHER. THEY HAVE
CALLED FOR MORAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDE
ISLAMIC "MOVEMENTS" (INCLUDING, PERHAPS, IRAN). THE
NEW EFFORTS TOWARDS COORDINATION OR UNITY MAY NOT
SUCCEED IN THE END; THE ARMED ISLAMIST GROUPS ON THE
WHOLE REMAIN SERIOUSLY SPLIT IN TERMS OF IDEOLOGY
AND LEADERSHIP. WE SEE NO SIGN THAT THEY ARE
STRONGER MILITARILY. IN ADDITION, THEY HAVE GIVEN
NO INDICATION THEY WILL BE LOYAL TO THE FIS
LEADERSHIP IN EXILE, UNDER REBAH KEBIR IN GERMANY.
END SUMMARY.


A NEW FIS ATTACK ON THE GIA
--------------


3. (C) THERE ARE SOME SMALL, AND STILL TENTATIVE,
INDICATIONS THAT THE ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT (FIS)
IS TRYING TO REASSERT CONTROL OVER THE ARMED GROUPS
ONCE LOYAL TO THE ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP (GIA). THE
TREND SO FAR APPEARS LIMITED MAINLY TO CENTRAL
ALGERIA. THE FEBRUARY 1997 ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE
ISLAMIC LEAGUE FOR THE (ISLAMIC) CALL AND FOR DJIHAD
(IN FRENCH, LIDD) EMPHASIZES THE LEAGUE'S LOYALTY TO
ABASSI MADANI AND ALI BENHADJ (SEE REFS A AND B).
(IT ALSO PRAISES THE MEMORY OF ANOTHER FIS LEADER,
MOHAMED SAID, THE LEADER OF THE FIS' DJAZAIR'IST
WING.) FOUR MEN SIGNED THE COMMUNIQUE. THE FIRST
TWO, ALI BENHADJER AND MAHFOUD RAHMANI HIGHLIGHTED
THEIR STATUS AS FIS OFFICIALS ELECTED TO PARLIAMENT
IN 1991; THE THIRD, YOUSSEF BOUBRAS, NOTES THAT HE
WAS THE FIS PRESIDENT OF THE BOUIRA OFFICE AND LATER
A MEMBER OF THE FIS EXECUTIVE OFFICE.


4. (S) THE LIDD COMMUNIQUE SINGLES OUT THE
GOVERNMENT'S "PLOT" AGAINST THE ISLAMIC DJIHAD IN
ALGERIA AS BEING EMBODIED IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP (GIA). THE CAMPAIGN, THE LIDD
SAID, DEVIATED INTO KILLING THE "BEST SCHOLARS,
PREACHERS AND MOUJADHIDINE." IT THEN SAID THAT
FAITHFUL MUSLEM SOLDIERS ARE, THEREFORE, QUITTING
THE GIA. IT CALLS ON THOSE YOUNG MEN IN THE GIA TO
UNDERSTAND THAT MASSACRES ARE NOT JUSTIFIABLE UNDER
ISLAM, BUT RATHER ARE THE WORK OF THE ALGERIAN
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.


5. (S) THE LIDD COMMUNIQUE TOUCHES ONLY BRIEFLY ON
RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES. IT STRONGLY
DENOUNCES PAST FRENCH COLONIAL POLICY IN ALGERIA.
(IT MAKES NO MENTION OF THE U.S.) IT ALSO CALLS ON
"OTHER ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS" TO PROVIDE SPIRITUAL AND
MATERIAL AIDE TO THE ALGERIAN DJIHAD. (COMMENT:
THE LIDD MIGHT LOOK TO THE IRANIANS AND OTHERS FOR
ASSISTANCE. WE RECALL THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE
DENOUNCED PUBLICLY THE GIA'S CAMPAIGN OF
INDISCRIMINATE CAR BOMBINGS IN ALGERIA AS THE WORK
OF ALGERIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. END COMMENT.)


6. (C) THE GIA'S MURDER OF MOHAMED SAID AND HIS
FOLLOWERS IN LATE 1995 SPURRED A NUMBER OF LOCAL GIA
MEMBERS TO QUIT THE GROUP IN EARLY 1996 (SEE REFS C,
D). AN APPARENTLY GENUINE "AL-DJIHAD" BULLETIN FROM
THE SPRING OF 1996 CLAIMED THAT THESE GROUPS
EXTENDED FROM THE LARBAA AND MEDEA REGIONS SOUTH OF
THE CAPITAL (THE MEDEA GROUP LED BY ALI BENHADJER)
TO BOUSAADA ON THE HIGH PLATEAU. WE REPORTED LAST
YEAR THAT SOME OF THESE GIA SPLINTERS WERE
SYMPATHETIC TO MOHAMED SAID AND HAD REGROUPED UNDER
THE BANNER OF THE OLD DJAZAIR'IST AL-FIDA GROUP.


7. (C) IN THE FEBRUARY 1997 LIDD COMMUNIQUE, THE
FOURTH SIGNER IS "AHMED ABOU EL-FIDA," SAID TO BE
THE COMMANDER OF THE AL-FIDA. (COMMENT: WE DO NOT
KNOW EXACTLY WHO AHMED ABOU AL-FIDA IS. ACCORDING
TO A WELL-INFORMED JOURNALIST, WHO HAS SOURCES IN
THE ALGERIAN SECURITY SERVICES, HIS REAL NAME IS
ABDELLAH SEDOUKI (NFI). WE HAVE OBTAINED AN
APPARENTLY GENUINE COMMUNIQUE FROM AHMED ABOU
AL-FIDA CLAIMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE JANUARY 28
KILLING OF ABDELHAK BENHAMOUDA, PRESIDENT ZEROUAL'S
ALLY. END COMMENT.) THE LIDD COMMUNIQUE, THUS,
SUGGESTS THAT AL-FIDA OF CENTRAL ALGERIA HAS
RETURNED FULL CIRCLE FROM THE GIA TO THE FIS.


8. (C) IN ADDITION, THE LIDD'S MAHFOUD RAHMANI
COMES FROM M'SILA, WHILE YOUSSEF BOUBRAS COMES FROM
BOUIRA. (A LAWYER IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH FIS
LEADERS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE ALGERIA TOLD US JANUARY
28 OF A MID-JANUARY AMBUSH AGAINST THE ALGERIAN ARMY
WHICH KILLED DOZENS OF SOLDIERS IN BOUIRA.) THUS,
THE LIDD SUGGESTS, ALBEIT TENTATIVELY, THAT ARMED
GROUPS LOYAL TO THE FIS NOW EXTEND FROM MEDEA EAST
TO BOUIRA AND PERHAPS EVEN TO M'SILA AND BOUSAADA TO
THE SOUTHEAST.



8. (S) (COMMENT: IF/IF THIS IS TRUE, IT IS A
DIFFERENT PICTURE OF THE ARMED GROUPS FROM WHAT WE
SAW IN LATE 1994 AND THROUGHOUT 1995 AND 1996.
DURING THAT TIME, THERE WERE FEW SIGNS THAT THE FIS,
DEFINED AS THE LEADERSHIP OF ABASSI MADANI AND ALI
BENHADJ, HAD THE LOYALTY OF ANY ARMED GROUPS OUTSIDE
THE ISLAMIC SALVATION ARMY (AIS) GROUPS IN THE
JIJEL/SKIKDA REGION IN THE EAST AND THE
RELIZANE/MASCARA/SIDI BEL ABBES REGION IN THE WEST.
END COMMENT.)


ANOTHER GIA SPLIT: AL-BAQAOUN
--------------


9. (C) THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE OTHER
IN-FIGHTING INSIDE THE GIA DURING THE PAST YEAR (SEE
REF D ABOUT WESTERN ALGERIA, FOR EXAMPLE). NOTABLY,
GIA GROUPS AROUND CHLEF IN DECEMBER 1996 REPORTEDLY
REBELLED AGAINST THE CORE GIA UNDER ANTAR ZOUABRI
AND ELECTED A FORMER FIGHTER FROM AFGHANISTAN NAMED
SLIMANE MAHERZI AS THEIR LEADER, ACCORDING TO THE
SOMETIMES WELL-INFORMED LONDON NEWSPAPER ASH-SHARQ
AL-AWSET (REF E). MAHERZI, WHOSE WAR NAME IS
ABDERAHMANE ABOU DJAMIL, WAS ALSO REPORTED TO BE THE
LEADER OF AL-BAQAOUN 'ALA AL-'AHD, ACCORDING TO THE
OFTEN WELL-INFORMED LONDON NEWSPAPER AL-HAYAT (REF
F). ACCORDING TO THESE LONDON PRESS SOURCES, ABOU
DJAMIL'S BASE OF OPERATION IS WEST OF THE CAPITAL
BETWEEN CHLEF AND BLIDA.


10. (C) WHILE MAHERZI APPEARS TO HAVE SPLIT WITH
THE GIA UNDER ZOUABRI, IT IS NOT CLEAR IF HE HAS
ALIGNED WITH BENHADJER'S LIDD AGAINST THEIR COMMON
ENEMIES, ZOUABRI AND THE ALGERIAN ARMY. A
WELL-INFORMED ALGERIAN JOURNALIST ASSERTED THAT
AL-BAQAOUN IS PART OF THE LEAGUE (SEE REF B). THE
FRENCH EMBASSY PROVIDED US A COPY OF A POSSIBLY
GENUINE JANUARY 1997 AL-BAQAOUN COMMUNIQUE WHICH
CONFIRMED AL-FIDA KILLED ABDELHAK BENHAMOUDA AND
CALLED AL-FIDA THE FAITHFUL'S "COLLEAGUES." THE
COMMUNIQUE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED THE MURDER AND THE
AL-FIDA CLAIM OF RESPONSIBILITY; IT SUGGESTS THAT
THE TWO GROUPS MIGHT BE IN REGULAR CONTACT. IN
ADDITION, THE SEPTEMBER 1996 AL-BAQAOUN COMMUNIQUE
REFERS TO THE UNJUSTIFIED GIA KILLING OF "PREACHERS
AND MOUJAHIDINE"--LANGUAGE IDENTICAL TO THAT OF THE
AL-FIDA AND THE LIDD IN FEBRUARY 1997. MOREOVER,
THE OATH IN THE GROUP'S NAME IS, BY ALL ACCOUNTS,
ONE OF LOYALTY TO MADANI AND BENHADJ, JUST AS THAT
EXPRESSED BY BENHADJER (SEE REFS B AND D).


11. (C) NOT ALL SIGNS SUGGEST THAT AL-BAQAOUN
DEFINITELY HAS JOINED WITH AL-FIDA, AND HENCE TO THE
LIDD. THE AL-BAQAOUN COMMUNIQUE ABOUT BENHAMOUDA
WAS IN FRENCH, WHICH MADE SOME OBSERVERS WHO SAW IT
IMMEDIATELY SUSPICIOUS THAT THE COMMUNIQUE WAS A
GOVERNMENT-PRODUCED FAKE. WE HAVE ALSO RECEIVED AN
APPARENTLY GENUINE FEBRUARY 1997 AL-BAQAOUN
COMMUNIQUE, IN ARABIC, WHICH STRONGLY DENOUNCES
THOSE WHO WOULD NEGOTIATE WITH THE ALGERIAN
GOVERNMENT. THE SEPTEMBER 1996 COMMUNIQUE DID SO AS
WELL. SINCE MADANI AND BENHADJ DID TALK WITH THE
GOVERNMENT IN 1994 AND 1995, ABOU DJAMIL'S LOYALTY
TO THEM WOULD HAVE TO BE QUESTIONABLE IF EITHER
COMMUNIQUE IS GENUINE.



12. (C) MEANWHILE, THE FIS LEADERSHIP IN EXILE HAS
UNDERGONE OTHER TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE PAST MONTH.
MOST IMPORTANTLY, IT EXPELLED KHEIREDINE KHERBANE
FROM ITS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. OUR FIS LAWYER SOURCE
TOLD US MARCH 10 THAT KHERBANE TOO OFTEN STRAYED
PUBLICLY FROM THE OFFICIAL FIS LINE. IN ADDITION,
HE SAID, KHERBANE'S CONTACTS IN LONDON WITH PERSONS
THOUGHT LINKED TO THE GIA MADE KEBIR AND OTHER FIS
OFFICIALS NERVOUS. HE ADDED THAT THE EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE HAS APPOINTED ABDELKRIM OULD ADDA, A
PROFESSOR ORIGINALLY FROM MOSTAGANEM AND A KEBIR
AIDE, TO BE THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE'S SPOKESMAN.
THIS SOURCE BELIEVES THE CHANGES TO THE EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE AIM AT CONSOLIDATING KEBIR'S AUTHORITY
OVER THE COMMITTEE.


COMMENT:
--------------


13. (C) COMPARED TO ANALYSES OF ALGERIA'S
SPLINTERED ARMED ISLAMIST GROUPS, ECONOMICS IS AN
EXTREMELY PRECISE SCIENCE. LOCAL RIVALRIES,
IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES, AND THE GROUPS' INSTINCTIVE
PENCHANT FOR SECRECY AND NAME CHANGES, NOT TO
MENTION FAKE COMMUNIQUES AND OTHER PRESSURE FROM THE
ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT, MAKE ALL JUDGEMENTS HIGHLY
PRONE TO ERROR. NONETHELESS, WE HAZARD THAT THE
FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS:

-- THE RUTHLESS TACTICS OF ANTAR ZOUABRI AND THE
"CORE" GIA HAVE ALIENATED SUBSTANTIAL PARTS OF THE
GROUP'S MEMBERS;

-- THERE ARE NEW (OR RENEWED) GROUPS IN CENTRAL
ALGERIA WHO EITHER BY COMMUNIQUE OR BY THEIR VERY
NAME HAVE LEFT THE GIA AND AGAIN CLAIM LOYALTY TO
THE TRADITIONAL FIS LEADERSHIP OF ABASSI MADANI AND
ALI BENHADJ;

-- THESE GROUPS' LOYALTY TO THE TRADITIONAL FIS
LEADERSHIP, CREATES A NEW ALIGNMENT OF ISLAMIST
FORCES BOTH IN CENTRAL ALGERIA, AND PERHAPS EVEN
NATIONALLY, COMPARED TO THE DISPOSITION OF 1994 OR
1995;

-- IN ADDITION, THE FIS APPEARS TO STILL HAVE THE
LOYALTY OF THE ISLAMIC SALVATION ARMY, LOCATED IN
EASTERN AND WESTERN ALGERIA;

-- IT STILL SEEMS TOO EARLY TO KNOW IF EFFORTS BY
GROUPS LIKE ALI BENHADJER'S LIDD TO MERGE OR ALLY
WITH OTHER ARMED GROUPS, LIKE AL-BAQAOUN, HAVE, IN
FACT, SUCCEEDED;

-- EFFORTS TO UNIFY ARE SIGNIFICANT MAINLY IN TERMS
OF POLITICAL ABILITY TO WORK TOGETHER; AND

-- TENTATIVE EFFORTS TO UNIFY THEIR RANKS DOES NOT
MEAN THESE ARMED GROUPS ARE STRONGER MILITARILY;
RATHER, THEIR EFFORTS MAY BE IN RESPONSE TO
TREMENDOUS PRESSURE FROM THE "CORE" GIA AND THE
ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT.


14. (C) WHILE THE LIDD, AL-FIDA AND AL-BAQAOUN
COULD BE LOYAL TO THE FIS AS PERSONIFIED BY ABASSI
MADANI AND ALI BENHADJ, NOWHERE HAVE WE SEEN THEM
EXPRESS LOYALTY TO THE FIS LEADERSHIP IN EXILE UNDER
REBAH KEBIR. (INDEED, SOME OF THE AL-BAQAOUN
COMMUNIQUES IMPLICITLY ATTACK THE EXILES.) THUS,
THE EXILE LEADERSHIP IS UNLIKELY TO BE ABLE TO DO
MUCH TO REDUCE VIOLENCE. EVEN THE EXTENT OF MADANI
AND BENHADJ'S ABILITY TO REDUCE SIGNIFICANTLY THE
ONGOING VIOLENCE IS QUESTIONABLE (AFTER ALL, THESE
GROUPS MAY USE THEM AS A RALLYING POINT ONLY BECAUSE
THEY ARE IN NO POSITION TO GIVE ORDERS).

NEUMANN