C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 002406


LONDON FOR TUELLER; PARIS FOR ALLEGRONE

E.O.12958: DECL: 06/19/06
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR SA
SUBJECT: CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH THE DIPLOMAT


1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CDA THEODORE KATTOUF, REASON 1.5.D.


2. (C) SUMMARY: GIVEN KING FAHD'S UNCERTAIN HEALTH,
CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH APPEARS TO HAVE MOVED INTO THE
ROLE OF REPRESENTING SAUDI ARABIA'S FACE TO THE OUTSIDE
WORLD. WHILE DRAMATIC CHANGES ARE NOT THE HALLMARK OF
SAUDI GOVERNANCE, ABDULLAH WILL NO DOUBT PUT HIS OWN
IMPRIMATUR ON SAUDI DIPLOMACY. HE IS, FOR EXAMPLE,
ATTUNED TO LOCAL POLITICS AND WILL VIEW SAG'S OVERSEAS
COMMITMENTS FROM THE OPTIC OF THE EFFECT THAY WILL HAVE
ON DOMESTIC PRIORITIES. ALTHOUGH THE CROWN PRINCE HAS
REPEATEDLY STRESSED HIS COMMITMENT TO CLOSE BILATERAL
TIES WITH THE U.S., HE HAS SPOKEN FORCEFULLY OF THE NEED
FOR A JUST PEACE FOR THE PALESTINIANS AND SYRIANS. WE
EXPECT ABDULLAH TO BE ACTIVE IN SHAPING AN ARAB
CONSENSUS THAT KEEPS THE PEACE PROCESS ALIVE, WHILE
MAINTAINING THE APPEARANCE OF ARAB UNITY AND RESOLVE.
END SUMMARY.

--------------
ABDULLAH'S DIPLOMATIC PROFILE
--------------


3. (C) CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABD AL-AZIZ, LED THE
SAUDI DELEGATION TO THE JUNE 7-8 TRIPARTITE SUMMIT IN
DAMASCUS. ABDULLAH WILL REPRESENT SAUDI ARABIA AT THE
JUNE 22 SUMMIT IN CAIRO AND PERHAPS ALL FUTURE ARAB
SUMMITRY.


4. (C) ALTHOUGH IT IS CLEAR THAT HE STILL MUST BE
CONSULTED ON KEY DECISIONS, PARTICULARLY ON FOREIGN
POLICY MATTERS, KING FAHD'S INVOLVEMENT IN DAY-TO-DAY
AFFAIRS OF STATE REMAINS SPORADIC. RECENTLY, THE KING
RECEIVED SULTAN QABUS, AND THE KUWAITI AND BAHRAINI
FOREIGN MINISTERS IN JEDDAH. HE ALSO MET IN MECCA THE
HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENTS LEADING THEIR HAJJ
DELEGATIONS. EVEN EARLIER IN THE YEAR, HE HAD A SHORT
MEETING WITH FORMER PRESIDENT BUSH. THE MEDIA REPORT
THE KING PRESIDING OVER MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS THAT ISSUE STATEMENTS SPELLING OUT THE SAG'S
POSITION ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. NEVERTHELESS, ALL
AVAILABLE EVIDENCE INDICATS THAT THESE ENCOUNTERS ARE
TIGHTLY CONTROLLED AFAIRS AND LARGELY PROTOCOLARY IN
CHARACTER.


5. (C) WHILE EFFORTS PERSIST TO FUDGE THE ISSUE OF THE
KING'S PRESENCE AT THE HELM OF STATE, THE CURRENT RUSH
OF ARAB AND PEACE PROCESS POLITICS IS INCREASINGLY

FORCING THE AL SAUD TO PERMIT THE HEIR APPARENT TO
PROJECT THEIR TOP LEADERSHIP. INDEED, ABDULLAH HAS
STEPPED IN WHERE A SUBSTANTIVE OFFICIAL SAUDI PRESENCE
IS REQUIRED. THUS, THE CROWN PRINCE ATTENDED THE GCC
SUMMIT IN MUSCAT LAST DECEMBER AND THE RECENT DAMASCUS
TRIPARTITE SUMMIT. ON THE OTHER HAND, FOREIGN MINISTER
PRINCE SAUD AL-FAYSAL REPRESENTED THE SAG AT AN EARLIER
SYRIA-EGYPT-SAUDI ARABIA SUMMIT IN EGYPT, ALSO IN
DECEMBER, AND AT THE SHARM AL-SHAYKH ANTI-TERRORISM
SUMMIT (ILLUSTRATING THE KING'S CONTINUED POLICY
ENGAGEMENT, FAHD REPORTEDLY OVERRULED ABDULLAH AND
SULTAN'S RELUCTANCE TO ATTEND THE SUMMIT, INSISTING THAT
THE SAG BE REPRESENTED).

--------------
BURNISHING CREDENTIALS: AT HOME AND ABROAD
--------------


6. (C) AT HOME, ABDULLAH IS NOW MEETING VIRTUALLY ALL
HIGH-LEVEL FOREIGN VISITORS TO SAUDI ARABIA (USUALLY ONE
A DAY AND OFTEN SEVERAL MORE) AND IS CONDUCTING
WIDELY-PUBLICIZED AND QUITE INTENSE TELEPHONE DIPLOMACY
WITH ARAB AND OTHER FOREIGN LEADERS. BY CONTRAST,
MINDEF SULTAN - LONG CONSIDERED BY FOREIGN PUNDITS AS A
RIVAL TO ABDULLAH WHO WOULD INTRUDE ON THE CROWN
PRINCE'S SPACE - IS MUCH LESS VISIBLE AND CLEARLY
SECONDARY IN THESE FOREIGN CONTACTS. ALL THIS HAS
CERTAINLY HELPED BURNISH THE CROWN PRINCE'S DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL CREDENTIALS AND HELPED RAISE HIS RATHER
LOW PROFILE IN THE DIPLOMATIC ARENA STEMMING FROM FAHD'S
PREVIOUSLY JEALOUS OVERSIGHT OF FOREIGN POLICY, NOT TO
MENTION THE CROWN PRINCE'S RETICENCE STEMMING FROM A
SPEECH IMPEDIMENT.


7. (C) ABDULLAH'S ACTIVISM ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE
PERMITS HIM TO PROJECT HIMSELF AS A DE FACTO HEAD OF
STATE -- A ROLE IN WHICH HE APPEARS TO BE INCREASINGLY
COMFORTABLE. ABDULLAH WAS AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN
DAMASCUS AND, BY SAUDI ACCOUNT, WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN
ENSURING THAT IRAQ NOT BE INVITED TO THE CAIRO SUMMIT.
OTHER MEETINGS, SUCH AS THE CAIRO SUMMIT, WILL LIKELY
FURTHER BOOST THE CROWN PRINCE'S STATURE. IN SHORT,
DOMESTICALLY, THE SAUDIS ARE GETTING USED TO SEEING
ABDULLAH IN CHARGE. ARAB LEADERS ARE LEARNING TO DO THE
SAME.

-------------- --------------
THE INNER CIRCLE: CONFLICTING ADVICE AND FRUSTRATION
-------------- --------------


8. (C) AS ABDULLAH BURNISHES HIS CREDENTIALS HERE AND
ABROAD, WE ARE TOLD THERE IS RISING IMPATIENCE WITHIN
HIS INNER CIRCLE THAT THE CROWN PRINCE ASSERT HIMSELF
MORE WITH REGARD TO THE KING; THAT IS, THAT ABDULLAH
TAKE A MORE VOCAL POSITION ON KEY ISSUES WHICH ARE
BEFORE THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP. THIS VIEW, REPORTEDLY
HELD BY YOUNGER MEMBERS OF ABDULLAH'S FAMILY, HAS BEEN
COUNTERED BY THE APPROACH OF SENIOR ADVISORS --
PRINCIPALLY SHAYKH ABD AL-AZIZ AL-TUWAYJRI -- WHO
COUNSEL PATIENCE AND RESTRAINT. TO DATE ABDULLAH HAS
EMBRACED THE LATTER VIEW, PERHAPS COGNIZANT THAT LITTLE
WOULD BE GAINED, AND MUCH COULD BE LOST, BY PUSHING THE
LIMITS OF EXISTING LINES OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY
WITH A KING WHO HAS NEVER BEEN RETICENT TO EXERCISE
POWER, AND WHO COULD THEORETICALLY, AT LEAST, REMOVE
ABDULLAH AS HEIR APPARENT.


9. (C) THE SHIFTING LINES OF AUTHORITY, AND UNCERTAINTY
OVER WHETHER AND WHEN THE KING WILL WEIGH IN ON MATTERS,
HAS GENERATED FRUSTRATION AMONG THE CROWN PRINCE'S
CLOSEST SUPPORTERS. A FORMER U.S. MILITARY ADVISOR TO
THE SANG AND CLOSE FRIEND OF SHAYKH TUWAYJRI FOR OVER
TWENTY YEARS DESCRIBES TUWAYJRI AS "DEPRESSED" OVER THE
CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS WITHIN THE HIGHEST COUNCILS OF
THE RULING FAMILY. TUWAYJRI REPORTEDLY HAS HAD TO
SUFFER BROADSIDES FROM YOUNGER ABDULLAH FAMILY MEMBERS
WHO CHARGE THAT TUWAYJRI IS OLD, OUT OF TOUCH, AND NO
LONGER DISPENSES SOUND ADVICE TO THE CROWN PRINCE.
TUWAYJRI'S VISIBLE PRESENCE AT THE TRIPARTITE SUMMIT IN
DAMASCUS, AND HIS RECENT REGIONAL TRAVELS ON BEHALF OF
ABDULLAH, TO SYRIA AND MOROCCO, HOWEVER, REAFFIRM THAT
ABDULLAH HAS NOT ABANDONED HIS LONG-STANDING
CONFIDANTE. INDEED, TUWAYJRI WILL ACCOMPANY HIM TO
CAIRO ON JUNE 21.

--------------
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.
--------------


10. (C) WHILE ABDULLAH WILL QUIETLY BEGIN TO PUT HIS
OWN IMPRIMATUR ON SAUDI DIPLOMACY, WE WILL ALSO BE
WATCHING TO SEE IF AND HOW THE CONVENTIONAL THINKING ON
ABDULLAH -- MORE ATTUNED TO SYRIAN AND ARAB CONCERNS --
IS TRANSLATED INTO ANY SPECIFIC AGENDA. IN ADDITION TO
ARAB AND BROADER MUSLIM INTERESTS, AS WE HAVE REPORTED
BEFORE (RIYADH 29), ABDULLAH IS ATTUNED TO THE DOMESTIC
POLITICS OF SAUDI ARABIA, ITS SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, AND
THE AFFECT THAT THE SAG'S OVERSEAS COMMITMENTS WILL HAVE
ON DOMESTIC PRIORITIES OR ON THE VERY CONSERVATIVE SAUDI
POPULACE. THAT SAID, CHANGE IS NOT A HALLMARK OF SAUDI
GOVERNANCE AND ABDULLAH, WHO HAS BEEN FAITHFULLY
DEFERENTIAL TO FAHD, HAS GIVEN NO INDICATION THAT HE IS
SEEKING ANY DRAMATIC REVERSAL OF CURRENT POLICIES.


11. (C) THE CROWN PRINCE HAS REPEATEDLY AND
EMPHATICALLY STRESSED HIS PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO A
STRONG U.S.-SAUDI BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND APPEARS
ANXIOUS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE WILL KEEP U.S. POLICY
INTERESTS FIRMLY IN VIEW. WE EXPECT THIS TO CONTINUE.
AT THE SAME TIME, ABDULLAH HAS SPOKEN FORCEFULLY ABOUT
ARAB RIGHTS AND FEAR THAT A STALEMATE IN THE PEACE
PROCESS WILL ONLY SPAWN THE POPULARITY OF EXTREMISTS.
HE BELIEVES THAT IT PROFITS THE AL SAUD AND THE U.S.
LITTLE, IF BY ACCEDING TO U.S. WISHES, THE RULING FAMILY
ALIENATES KEY DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCIES. UNDER ABDULLAH'S
INCREASING INFLUENCE, WE EXPECT THE SAG TO ADHERE
CLOSELY TO THE ARAB CONSENSUS, INCLUDING: ESTABLISHMENT
OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF
LAND FOR PEACE. ABDULLAH HAS REPEATEDLY STRESSED HIS
PERSONAL BOTTOM LINE FOR THE PEACE PROCESS --
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM.


12. (C) OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO THE U.S. IS WHETHER
ABDULLAH WILL SEEK TO PLAY A MORE FORCEFUL AND ACTIVIST
ROLE IN ARAB COUNCILS THAN HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN THE
CASE FOR THE SAG. ABDULLAH'S LONGSTANDING TIES TO ASAD
MAY GIVE HIM A SPECIAL INFUENCE WITH THE SYRIANS, BUT
THE REVERSE IS MORE LIKELY TO PROVE TRUE. HIS FORCEFUL
LINE ON IRAQI PARTICIPATION AT THE CAIRO SUMMIT IS
PERHAPS A HARBINGER OF GREATER EFFORTS TO SHAPE ARAB
POSITIONS RATHER THAN REACT TO THEM.


13. (C) SEE RIYADH 29 (NOTAL) FOR MORE BIOGRAPHIC
INFORMATION ON CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH.


KATTOUF