Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
95ZAGREB4931
1995-12-05 15:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Zagreb
Cable title:  

CODEL MOLINARI MEETS SRSG ANNAN, GENERAL

Tags:  NOTAG HR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 004931 

SIPDIS


USVIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/5/00
TAGS:
SUBJECT: CODEL MOLINARI MEETS SRSG ANNAN, GENERAL
JANVIER, AND PRESIDENT TUDJMAN

REF: SARAJEVO 886

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 004931 SIPDIS USVIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL OSCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/5/00 TAGS: SUBJECT: CODEL MOLINARI MEETS SRSG ANNAN, GENERAL JANVIER, AND PRESIDENT TUDJMAN REF: SARAJEVO 886 ¶1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY PETER W. GALBRAITH, AMBASSADOR, CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 ZAGREB 04931 01 OF 02 051623Z REASON 1.5(B) AND (D) . ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: ON DECEMBER 2 A 30-MEMBER CODEL LED BY REPRESENTATIVES MOLINARI AND LEVIN VISITED ZAGREB TO DISCUSS U.S. PARTICIPATION IN IFOR DEPLOYMENT IN BOSNIA. THE CODEL MET WITH SRSG KOFI ANNAN AND GENERAL JANVIER, AND LATER WITH PRESIDENT TUDJMAN. JANVIER SAID THE "THE WAR IS OVER" AND THE MILITARY SITUATION WAS MUCH IMPROVED, THOUGH FIGHTING CONTINUED AND CASUALTIES MUST BE EXPECTED. ANNAN AND TUDJMAN DISCUSSED THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S. PARTICIPATION. BOTH SAID SEPARATELY THAT WHILE DANGERS EXIST, NEITHER BELIEVES NATO WILL BECOME ENGAGED IN RENEWED WARFARE BECAUSE THE SITUATION HAS FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED SINCE ALL SIDES HAVE SIGNED ON TO A PEACE AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY. -------------- CODEL MOLINARI MEETS ANNAN AND JANVIER -------------- ¶3. (C) IN A MEETING AT UN PROTECTION FORCE (UNPF) HEADQUARTERS, SRSG KOFI ANNAN GAVE AN OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF PEACEKEEPING VERSUS PEACE IMPLEMENTATION. HE ARGUED STRONGLY THAT THE UN HAS LAID A SOLID GROUNDWORK FOR THE IMPLEMENTING FORCE FOR BOSNIA. GENERAL JANVIER DESCRIBED THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND AND EMPHASIZED THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN A COMPLETE HALT TO THE FIGHTING, BUT CURRENTLY THE UN ENJOYED FULL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN MOST AREAS OF BOSNIA, PARTICULARLY IN SARAJEVO. ¶4. (C) THE REPRESENTATIVES ASKED WHETHER THE FRENCH CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 ZAGREB 04931 01 OF 02 051623Z CONTINGENT WOULD BE UNDER NATO COMMAND AND EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER COMMENTS BY FRENCH GENERAL BACHELET CRITICAL OF THE U.S. ROLE IN NEGOTIATING THE DAYTON AGREEMENT (REF). ANNAN ASSURED THE REPRESENTATIVES THAT THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT THE FRENCH WOULD BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF NATO. HE SAID THAT GENERAL BACHELET'S COMMENTS WERE UNFORTUNATE AND MARRED HIS OTHERWISE OUTSTANDING RECORD (AS THE GENERAL WHO LIFTED THE SIEGE OF SARAJEVO). GENERAL JANVIER SAID BACHELET'S COMMENTS WERE HIS OFF-THE- RECORD P
ERSONAL OPINIONS AND DID NOT REFLECT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT OR MILITARY. ¶5. (C) REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF IFOR AND THE TRANSITION FROM UN TO NATO CONTROL, ANNAN TOLD THE CODEL THAT THE ENTIRE UN MILITARY COMMAND WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AND ALL COMMAND FUNCTIONS WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO NATO. THE ONLY REMAINING UN INVOLVEMENT IN BIH WOULD BE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING WITH AN INTERNATIONAL POLICE TASK FORCE, AND SUPPORT FOR THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE WHO WILL CONTROL CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES. -------------- JANVIER: THE WAR IS OVER -------------- ¶6. (C) IN RESPONSE TO THE CODEL'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR U.S. TROOPS GETTING CAUGHT IN RENEWED WARFARE, ANNAN SAID THAT THE UN HAD RIDDEN OUT THE MOST DANGEROUS PERIOD AND THAT WHILE THERE WERE STILL PERILS, NATO TROOPS WOULD FACE A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT SITUATION; THERE WAS NOW AGREEMENT BY ALL SIDES TO A PEACE CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 ZAGREB 04931 01 OF 02 051623Z AGREEMENT. JANVIER SAID "THE WAR WAS OVER," HOWEVER THE FIGHTING IS NOT. BIH WAS STILL DANGEROUS AND THAT MEANT THERE WOULD BE LOSSES WHICH TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS MUST ACCEPT. JANVIER EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THERE WOULD BE NO LARGE SCALE COMBAT BECAUSE NATO FORCES WOULD BE A DETERRENT TO ANY GROUP TRYING TO START A FIGHT. HOWEVER, HE WARNED, THERE WOULD BE INCIDENTS AND RESISTANCE BY SOME ELEMENTS ON BOTH SIDES AS THEY WITHDREW FROM AREAS CURRENTLY UNDER THEIR CONTROL. ¶7. (C) THE CODEL ASKED HOW MUCH CONTROL MILOSEVIC COULD BE EXPECTED TO EXERT OVER THE BOSNIAN SERB MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND. ANNAN ASSURED THEM THAT MILOSEVIC HAD SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE, BUT THAT SINCE BOSNIA WAS ENTERING A PERIOD OF PEACE, MILOSEVIC MUST COMMENT CAUTIOUSLY IN ORDER TO DISTANCE HIMSELF FROM WAR CRIMINALS. ¶8. (C) THE CODEL WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE FUTURE ROLE OF GENERAL MLADIC AND WHO WOULD REPLACE HIM. JANVIER OPINED CONFIDENTIAL NNNNPTQ7823 CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7823 PAGE 01 ZAGREB 04931 02 OF 02 051623Z ACTION H-06 INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 DS-00 EUR-01 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00 OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 /009W -------------- 05F285 051623Z /38 O 051535Z DEC 95 FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8251 INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECPOLAD// HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD// AMEMBASSY BELGRADE DIA WASHDC USMISSION USUN NEW YORK AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ZAGREB 004931 SIPDIS USVIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL OSCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/5/00 TAGS: SUBJECT: CODEL MOLINARI MEETS SRSG ANNAN, GENERAL JANVIER, AND PRESIDENT TUDJMAN THAT MLADIC'S DEPUTY GENERAL GERO IS A LIKELY CANDIDATE, BUT IS LARGELY AN UNKNOWN. HOWEVER, GERO HAD ACCEPTED THE DAYTON ACCORD. REPRESENTATIVES ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 ZAGREB 04931 02 OF 02 051623Z ABOUT THE MUJAHADEEN AND THE THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS. ANNAN SAID THAT THERE WERE ONLY AN ESTIMATED 700 PRESENT IN BIH, INTEGRATED INTO BOSNIAK UNITS. HE SAID IT WAS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOBH TO GET THEM OUT OF THE COUNTRY IN THE ONE MONTH SPECIFIED IN THE AGREEMENT. -------------- MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TUDJMAN -------------- ¶9. (C) WITH HIS TYPICAL HISTORICAL SWEEP, PRESIDENT TUDJMAN TOLD THE CODEL THAT THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA WAS THE CLASH OF WESTERN, EASTERN, AND MUSLIM CIVILIZATIONS. THE UNEQUAL BALANCE OF FORCES AMONG THEM WAS THE REASON FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA, BUT NOW A NEW BALANCE WAS BRINGING AN END TO THE WAR AND THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CROATIA AND SERBIA. AT DAYTON, HE SAID, IT WAS OBVIOUS THE SERBS WANTED AN AGREEMENT BECAUSE THEY KNEW THERE WAS NO CHANCE TO WIN IF THE WAR CONTINUED. TUDJMAN ANSWERED CONCERNS ABOUT THE DANGER TO U.S. FORCES BY SAYING THAT WHILE SPORADIC FIGHTING IS LIKELY, THE SERBS' DESIRE FOR A SOLUTION WOULD TRANSLATE INTO NO SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION TO IFOR. ¶10. (C) ASKED ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE FORCE, TUDJMAN RESPONDED THAT A LARGE FORCE WAS NOT NEEDED IN EASTERN SLAVONIA (ALTHOUGH HE EXPECTED U.S. PARTICIPATION AT THE HEAD OF THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION),BECAUSE THE SERBS HAVE AGREED TO REINTEGRATION. BOSNIA REQUIRED A LARGE PRESENCE, HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE DEEP DIVIDE BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND SERBS. WITHOUT A LARGE FORCE, NEITHER CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 ZAGREB 04931 02 OF 02 051623Z SIDE WOULD LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS. HE SAID THAT UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS THE 5:2:2 ARMS RATIO (FRY:CROATIA:B-H) WAS ACCEPTABLE, HOWEVER, A DIFFERENT RATIO MIGHT BE NECESSARY LATER. ¶11. (C) CODEL MEMBERS ASKED TUDJMAN ABOUT THE MUJAHADEEN PRESENCE AND IF THE GOC WOULD ASSIST IN THEIR IDENTIFICATION AND REMOVAL. TUDJMAN SAID IT WAS NOT KNOWN HOW MANY ARE PRESENT IN BOSNIA, PERHAPS 3-4,000. HE HAD LITTLE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WOULD LEAVE SINCE THEY COMMANDED LITTLE TRUST ON THE PART OF LOCAL MUSLIMS. HE OPINED THAT THEY WOULD NOT OPPOSE THE OVERWHELMING FORCE OF IFOR. DEFENSE MINISTER SUSAK ADDED THAT THE GOC WOULD "HELP THE MUJAHADEEN LEAVE." ¶12. (C) TUDJMAN SAID THAT THE GOC WOULD COOPERATE WITH THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL AS LONG AS THE PROCEEDINGS REMAINED UNBIASED. HE ASSURED THE CODEL THAT THE GOC WOULD EXERT LEVERAGE OVER THE BOSNIAN CROATS TO STOP LOOTING AND BURNING IN AREAS THAT ARE DUE TO BE RETURNED TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS. HE ADDED THAT TENSIONS IN BIH ARE COMPLEX AND THAT ALTHOUGH ISOLATED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS CONTINUE, THE BOSNIAKS AND CROATS HAD SUCCEEDED IN PREVENTING WIDER CONFLICT THROUGH THE FEDERATION. ¶13. (C) WHEN ASKED WHY THE U.S. SHOULD PARTICIPATE ON THE GROUND AND NOT JUST PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND AIR POWER, TUDJMAN SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS THE LAST REMAINING SUPERPOWER AND MUST BE THE FOUNDATION FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION; THAT IS A ROLE THAT CANNOT BE ESCAPED. THE TROUBLES OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SHOULD BE A EUROPEAN CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 ZAGREB 04931 02 OF 02 051623Z ISSUE, BUT EUROPE HAD NO POLITICAL UNITY AND COULD NOT DEAL WITH SUCH A COMPLEX ISSUE AS BOSNIA. ¶14. (U) CODEL MOLINARI DID NOT CLEAR THIS MESSAGE PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FROM ZAGREB ON DECEMBER 3. ¶15. (U) SARAJEVO -- MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. GALBRAITH CONFIDENTIAL NNNN

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