PRESIDENTIAL CHIEF OF STAFF ON 6/30 SAYS "NO PRECONDITIONS" FOR NEGOTIATIONS; TUDJMAN ON 7/2 GIVES ICFY A LIST OF PRECONDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 ZAGREB 002493 SIPDIS BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEU USVIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE E.O. 12356: DECL: 7/3/05 TAGS: SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CHIEF OF STAFF ON 6/30 SAYS "NO PRECONDITIONS" FOR NEGOTIATIONS; TUDJMAN ON 7/2 GIVES ICFY A LIST OF PRECONDITIONS ¶1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶2. TWO DAYS AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF, HRVOJE SARINIC, TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE GOC HAD (ALMOST) "NO PRECONDITIONS" FOR TALKS WITH THE KRAJINA SERBS, PRESIDENT TUDJMAN PUBLICLY LAID OUT SIX CONDITIONS FOR CROATIAN PARTICIPATION. SARINIC COMPLAINED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S FOCUS ON GAINING RECOGNITION OF BOSNIAN HERZEGOVINA WAS POINTLESS, AND CREATED A "DANGEROUS" SITUATION IN CROATIA. AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH URGED THE GOC TO OPEN A "SECOND TRACK" OF NEGOTIATIONS: TO HOLD TALKS WITH SERBS FROM GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED TERRITORY ON HOW TO IMPROVE THE OVERALL STATUS OF SERBS IN CROATIA. END SUMMARY. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 ZAGREB 02493 01 OF 03 031643Z -------------- -------------- SARINIC: GOC WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITH KRAJINA SERBS -------------- -------------- ¶3. AT LUNCH ON JUNE 30, PRESIDENTIAL CHIEF OF STAFF HRVOJE SARINIC TOLD AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH THAT THE GOC WAS WILLING TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KNIN SERBS. SARINIC, SAYING HE WAS REPEATING A STATEMENT HE MADE TO UN SRSG AKASHI, SAID "THE ONLY PRECONDITION IS THAT THERE BE NO PRECONDITIONS." HE NOTED IN PARTICULAR THAT SERB PRECONDITIONS, SUCH AS A CROATIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM MOUNT DINARA IN SECTOR SOUTH, WERE NOT CONSTRUCTIVE. NOTING THAT THE EU AMBASSADORS HAD PRESENTED A DEMARCHE URGING WITHDRAWAL FROM MOUNT DINARA, SARINIC SAID THE GOC OFFERED "NO APOLOGIES" FOR THE SITUATION: FOR A LONG TIME, THE SITUATION FOR CROATIA HAD BEEN "VERY BAD," NOW IT WAS ONLY CROATIAN MILITARY STEPS WHICH HAD MADE THINGS "A BIT BETTER." ¶4. SARINIC HEDGED THE GOC'S LACK OF PRECONDITIONS ON NEGOTIATIONS. THE GOC "OBVIOUSLY" WAS NOT PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH "RSK PRESIDENT" MARTIC. SARINIC ALSO CLAIMED THE GOC WAS STILL WILLING TO MEET IN GENEVA, BUT THAT THIS "FLEXIBILITY" WOULD "NOT LAST LONG." TUDJMAN WAS AGAINST HOLDING THE MEETING IN GENEVA, AND "SOON" THE GOC WOULD RETURN TO ITS INSISTENCE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS BE HELD IN CROATIA. -------------- TUDJMAN: BUT ONLY UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS -------------- CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 ZAGREB 02493 01 OF 03 031643Z ¶5. "SOON" ARRIVED EARLIER THAN EVEN SARINIC HAD EXPECTED. ON JULY 2, PRESIDENT TUDJMAN TOLD ICFY CO-CHAIRMEN BILDT AND STOLTENBERG THAT CROATIA WOULD SEEK PRECONDITIONS TO ANY NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KNIN SERBS. UNDER THE HEADLINE "THREE PRECONDITIONS FOR TALKS" THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED DAILY "VJESNIK" REPORTED SIX (BY OUR COUNT) CONDITIONS: 1) THAT MILAN MARTIC NOT PARTICIPATE, AS HE WAS A "WAR CRIMINAL" WHO ORDERED THE MAY 2-3 SHELLING OF ZAGREB; 2) THAT THE TALKS BE HELD "ON THE TERRITORY OF CROATIA;" 3) THAT ANY POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH MIGHT TAKE PLACE MUST "SUBMIT TO THE SPIRIT OF THE CROATIAN CONSTITUTIONAL ACT ON MINORITIES AND ETHNIC COMMUNITIES;" 4) THE RIJEKA- SISAK OIL PIPELINE BE REOPENED, AS AGREED IN THE DECEMBER 1994 ECONOMIC AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AGREEMENT (ECBMA); 5) THE EU ASSIST IN OPENING OF THE ZAGREB-KNIN- SPLIT RAILWAY; AND 6) THE UNCRO MANDATE BE IMPLEMENTED "A S ENVISAGED IN THE UN RESOLUTIONS." (NOTE: THE PRESS RELEASE FROM TUDJMAN'S OFFICE SOUGHT TO PORTRAY ONLY THE LATTER THREE DEMANDS AS GOC "PRECONDITIONS." END NOTE.) CONFIDENTIAL NNNNPTQ4973 CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4973 PAGE 01 ZAGREB 02493 02 OF 03 031643Z ACTION EUR-01 INFO LOG-00 AID-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 OASY-00 SRPP-00 FBIE-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-08 L-01 ADS-00 M-00 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-01 SCT-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 PRMC-01 DRL-09 G-00 /027W -------------- D5EAEB 031643Z /38 O 031739Z JUL 95 FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6286 INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE NATO EU COLLECTIVE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-5PMA/J21// SECDEF WASHDC//ISA/ISP// AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//DO/LG/XOX/IN/POLAD// DIA WASHDC USMISSION GENEVA CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//J3/J4/J5/POLAD// AMCONSUL MUNICH AMEMBASSY BELGRADE JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//CA/POLAD// COMSIXTHFLT //N2// USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ3/ECJ4/ECJ5/ECPOLAD// USLO SKOPJE CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 ZAGREB 02493 02 OF 03 031643Z C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 ZAGREB 002493 SIPDIS BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEU USVIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE E.O. 12356: DECL: 7/3/05 TAGS: SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CHIEF OF STAFF ON 6/30 SAYS "NO PRECONDITIONS" FOR NEGOTIATIONS; TUDJMAN ON 7/2 GIVES ICFY A LIST OF PRECONDITIONS ¶6. COMMENT: TUDJMAN'S CONDITIONS, IF HELD TO STRICTLY, MEAN WEEKS MORE OF PRE-NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE ANY REAL TALKS CAN GET UNDER WAY. THE PRESS ACCOUNT REPORTED THAT TUDJMAN AND THE ICFY CO-CHAIRMEN "AGREED TO ARRANGE INTRODUCTORY TALKS IN GENEVA TO DECIDE THE AGENDA AND THE TERMS OF FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CROATIAN SERBS. THE ICFY CO-CHAIRMEN WENT TO KNIN ON JULY 3. END COMMENT. -------------- PRESSURE BELGRADE -------------- ¶7. SARINIC NOTED THAT IT WAS HARD TO BE SURE WHO AMONG THE KRAJINA SERBS STILL HAD AUTHORITY, AND URGED THAT MORE PRESSURE BE PLACED ON MILOSEVIC. SARINIC CLAIMED THAT MILOSEVIC HAD "GOOD RELATIONS" WITH "RSK PRIME MINISTER- DESIGNATE" MILAN BABIC, AND HAD IN FACT ENGINEERED BORISLAV MIKELIC'S OUSTER WHEN MIKELIC BECAME INEFFECTIVE. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 ZAGREB 02493 02 OF 03 031643Z (COMMENT: SARINIC OFFERED NO EVIDENCE FOR THIS CLAIM. END COMMENT.) WHEN THE AMBASSADOR ASKED IF THE GOC WAS PREPARED TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION, PRESUMABLY AT THE END OF THE CURRENT UN MANDATE, SARINIC GAVE A SOMEWHAT DESULTORY "YEAH" BUT THEN NOTED THAT SEVERAL MONTHS STILL REMAINED AND EXCLAIMED, "MAKE SOMETHING HAPPEN!" -------------- BUT DON'T IGNORE CROATIA -------------- ¶8. BUT THE CURRENT APPROACH WAS "DANGEROUS," SARINIC SAID, BECAUSE CROATIA WAS AGAIN ON THE BACK BURNER FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. COMMENTING ON THE EU'S CANNES STATEMENT, SARINIC ARGUED THAT RECOGNITION OF CROATIA AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BY THE "FRY" SHOULD BE A PACKAGE. THE U.S. HAD SEEMED TO BELIEVE THIS, SARINIC SAID, "BUT THEN MR. FRASURE MADE HIS TRIPS TO BELGRADE." RECOGNITION OF B-H BY MILOSEVIC "WILL CHANGE NOTHING," WHEREAS RECOGNITION OF CROATIA COULD ACTUALLY PAY REAL DIVIDENDS. THE AMBASSADOR TOLD SARINIC THAT THE SANCTIONS PACKAGE PRESENTED TO MILOSEVIC STILL SOMETHING IN RESERVE LINKED TO RECOGNITION OF CROATIA. BUT SARINIC AGAIN NOTED THAT CROATIA HAD SUNK INTO "THE SECOND LINE" AGAIN, AND COMMENTED THAT MANY IN THE GOC DREW THE LESSON THAT "WE ONLY SEE POLITICAL ATTENTION WHEN THERE ARE HOSTILITIES." -------------- -------------- PUSHING FOR A "SECOND TRACK": TALK TO YOUR "LOYAL" SERBS -------------- -------------- CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 ZAGREB 02493 02 OF 03 031643Z ¶9. OBSERVING THAT WE HAD NO REAL CAUSE FOR OPTIMISM OVER THE PROSPECTS FOR ZAGREB-KNIN TALKS, THE AMBASSADOR URGED SARINIC TO PURSUE A "SECOND TRACK" OF DISCUSSIONS: WITH THE SERBIAN COMMUNITY ON CROATIAN GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED TERRITORY. THIS INCLUDED SERBS WHO HAD STAYED IN CITIES SUCH AS ZAGREB OR RIJEKA THROUGHOUT THE WAR, BUT ALSO THOSE SERBS WHO REMAINED IN, OR RETURNED TO, THEIR HOMES IN WESTERN SLAVONIA (SECTOR WEST). MANY STEPS COULD BE TAKEN SUCH AS: REBUILDING SERB AS WELL AS CROAT HOMES DAMAGED DURING THE WAR, TAKING STEPS AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, GIVING THE SERBS MORE OF A VOICE IN CURRICULUM DECISIONS, AND PUNISHING ANY CROATIANS WHO MAY HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES AGAINST SERBS IN THE AFTERMATH OF OPERATION "FLASH." BUT THIS WERE JUST SOME IDEAS, PERHAPS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT WOULD BE TO BEGAN A PUBLIC, AND OFFICIAL, DIALOGUE WITH SERB COMMUNITY LEADERS, SO THAT THEY FELT THEY HAD AN INFLUENCE ON THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE GOC. RIGHT NOW, THE AMBASSADOR NOTED, THE SERBS OF CROATIA FEEL SHUT OUT FROM DECISION-MAKING, EVEN ON THE ISSUES OF GREATEST CONSEQUENCE TO THEM. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO NOTED THAT PUBLIC STEPS TO IMPROVE AND SECURE THE CONFIDENTIAL NNNNPTQ4974 CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4974 PAGE 01 ZAGREB 02493 03 OF 03 031644Z ACTION EUR-01 INFO LOG-00 AID-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 OASY-00 SRPP-00 FBIE-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-08 L-01 ADS-00 M-00 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-01 SCT-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 PRMC-01 DRL-09 G-00 /027W -------------- D5EAF6 031644Z /38 O 031739Z JUL 95 FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6287 INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE NATO EU COLLECTIVE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-5PMA/J21// SECDEF WASHDC//ISA/ISP// AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//DO/LG/XOX/IN/POLAD// DIA WASHDC USMISSION GENEVA CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//J3/J4/J5/POLAD// AMCONSUL MUNICH AMEMBASSY BELGRADE JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//CA/POLAD// COMSIXTHFLT //N2// USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ3/ECJ4/ECJ5/ECPOLAD// USLO SKOPJE CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 ZAGREB 02493 03 OF 03 031644Z C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 ZAGREB 002493 SIPDIS BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEU USVIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE E.O. 12356: DECL: 7/3/05 TAGS: SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CHIEF OF STAFF ON 6/30 SAYS "NO PRECONDITIONS" FOR NEGOTIATIONS; TUDJMAN ON 7/2 GIVES ICFY A LIST OF PRECONDITIONS STATUS OF ETHNIC SERB CITIZENS COULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT WITH THE POPULATION OF THE "RSK" IN TERMS OF REDUCING SUPPORT FOR THE REBEL REGIME, AND WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT ON CROATIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. ¶10. SARINIC'S REACTION WAS COOL, BUT NOT NEGATIVE. NO ONE FROM THE SERB COMMUNITY HAD APPROACHED HIM WITH A FORMAL REQUEST FOR A MEETI NG. IF HE RECEIVED ONE, HE WOULD "CATALYZE" IT, AND PERHAPS EVEN PARTICIPATE HIMSELF. SARINIC ARGUED THAT THE GOC HAD "TRIED ITS BEST" TO SHOW SERBS IN WESTERN SLAVONIA THAT LIFE IN CROATIA WAS POSSIBLE, AND REPEATED THAT THE GOC WAS READY TO RECEIVE ALL SERBS WHO WANTED TO RETURN. THE GOC HAD PROBLEMS, HOWEVER, WITH "LOCAL PEOPLE" WHO RESIST THE GOC'S DECISIONS. ACCORDING TO SARINIC, "DECISIONS TAKEN AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL ARE NOT IMPLEMENTED LOCALLY. IT IS NOT EASY." CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 ZAGREB 02493 03 OF 03 031644Z ¶11. COMMENT: THE REALITY OF RESISTANCE AMONG MANY (BUT NOT ALL) OF THE DISPLACED PERSONS, WAR VETERANS, AND EVEN AVERAGE CROATIANS FOR FULL PROTECTION OF THE HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE SERB COMMUNITY IS PRECISELY WHY THE GOC MUST TAKE AN ACTIVIST APPROACH ON THE ISSUE. WE PLAN TO CONTINUE TO PUSH THE GOC TO BEGIN A PROCESS OF DIALOGUE (UNDER MODIFIED Z-4 AUSPICES) WITH THE "LOYAL" SERB COMMUNITY AS A "SECOND TRACK" WHICH CAN BE FOLLOWED IN PARALLEL TO, BUT INDEPENDENT OF, THE NORMAL Z-4 NEGOTIATIONS WITH KNIN. GALBRAITH CONFIDENTIAL NNNN