AKASHI SAYS TENSION LOWER IN "RSK"; DEFENDS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ZAGREB 001822 SIPDIS VIENNA FOR BOSNIA CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 ZAGREB 01822 01 OF 05 111610Z BAKU FOR DCM FINN FRANKFURT PASS TO A/S HOLBROOKE E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/11/00 TAGS: MOPS HR HR HR HR HR BK SUBJECT: AKASHI SAYS TENSION LOWER IN "RSK"; DEFENDS DECISION ON AIR STRIKES REF: STATE 112876 ¶1. CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶2. AT A MAY 10 MEETING AT UN HQ IN ZAGREB, UNSYG SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE YASUSHI AKASHI TOLD AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH THAT "RSK PRESIDENT" MILAN MARTIC APPEARED TO HAVE A "FIRMER GRIP ON REALITY" DURING THEIR DISCUSSIONS THE PREVLOUS DAY IN BELGRADE AND THAT THE "HIGH POINT OF TENSIONS" SEEMS TO HAVE PASSED. HE DEFENDED HIS FAILURE TO INFORM ZAGREB DIPLOMATS OF MARTIC'S THREAT TO BOMB THE CITY BY SAYING HE BELIEVED IT WAS A BLUFF, ONLY POSTURING. - ¶3. FOLLOWING HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH TUDJMAN'S CHIEF OF STAFF SARINIC EARLIER IN THE DAY, AKASHI SAID HE FELT THE CROATS "WERE TRYING HARD TO COOPERATE" WITH THE UN IN "SECTOR WEST." THE UN'S FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT HAD BEEN ALMOST COMPLETELY RESTORED AND SARINIC HAD AGREED TO UN MONITORING OF HUMAN RIGHTS. NEVERTHELESS, AKASHI WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE SLOW PACE FOR THE RELEASE OF SERBIAN CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 ZAGREB 01822 01 OF 05 111610Z DETAINEES. THE SERBS WERE STILL REQUIRING A "SOLUTION" TO SECTOR WEST BEFORE THEY WOULD COME TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN GENEVA. ¶4. TURNING TO BOSNIA, AKASHI CLAIMED THAT SARAJEVO COMMANDER GENERAL RUPERT SMITH HAD WAFFLED ON THE DECISION TO CALL AIR STRIKES, INITIALLY ARGUING AGAINST THEM, LATER CHANGING HIS MIND, AND FINALLY COMING AROUND TO HIS ORIGINAL POSITION. THE AMBASSADOR ARGUED THAT THE UN'S PREFERENCE FOR TALKS AND ACCOMMODATION TO BRING THE SERRS AROUND HAD BEEN TRIED FOR THREE YEARS AND PROVEN A FAILURE. THE TIME HAD COME TO SEND TO THE SERBS THE ONLY KIND OF SIGNAL THEY UNDERSTAND. END SUMMARY. -------------- - MARTIC LESS "DERANGED"; FIRMER GRIP ON REALITY -------------- - ¶5. AKASHI TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT HIS MEETING IN BELGRADE MAY 9 WITH THE "RSK" LEADERSHIP (MARTIC, MIKELIC, AND BABIC) WAS BETTER THAN THEIR PREVIOUS ENCOUNTER ON MAY 5 IN KNIN. HE FELT THAT THE HIGHEST POINT OF TENSION HAD PASSED. ON MAY 5, AKASHI FOUND MARTIC "UPTIGHT, NERVOUS, BITTER, DAZED BY DEFEAT AND SOMEWHAT DERANGED, SHOWING SIGNS OF HAVING LOST HIS GRIP ON REALITY." ON MAY 9, HE SEEMED TO HAVE RECOVERED SOME OF HIS COMPOSURE, AND HE REFRAINED FROM REPEATING MOST OF THE THREATS HE HAD MADE AT THE EARLIER MEETING (INCLUDING FURTHER ROCKETING OF ZAGREB). NEVERTHELESS, HE STILL HAD A LONG LIST OF GRIEVANCES AGAINST THE UN AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 ZAGREB 01822 01 OF 05 111610Z ¶6. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THE U.S. WAS EXTREMELY CONCERNED THAT MARTIC'S THREAT, IN THE MAY 5 MEETING, TO "FLATTEN ZAGREB" HAD NOT BEEN COMMUNICATED TO THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY IN ZAGREB. AKASHI SAID THAT, DURING THE MEETING, MARTIC HAD INITIALLY THREATENED TO BOMB ZAGREB WITHIN 24 HOURS, THEN 48, AND FINALLY FOUR DAYS. TOWARDS THE END OF THE TALKS, HE SEEMED TO BE SAYING THE CROATS HAD A WEEK TO COMPLY WITH HIS DEMANDS. IN THE END, AKASHI CLAIMED, HE FELT THAT IT WAS MOSTLY BLUFF AND POSTURING AND THAT IF MARTIC SAW A SINCERE COMMITMENT AND REASONABLE SPEED IN RELEASING THE DETAINEES HE WOULD NOT FOLLOW THROUGH ON HIS THREAT. AKASHI ALSO FELT THAT BY COMMUNICATING THE THREAT IT WOULD LEAD THE SERBS TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WERE BEING TAKEN SERIOUSLY, WHICH WOULD BE PLAYING INTO THEIR HANDS. ¶7. THE AMBASSADOR INSISTED THAT, GIVEN AKASHI'S DESCRIPTION OF MARTIC'S STATE OF MIND, SUCH THREATS SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. LITTLE WOULD HAVE BEEN RISKED RY INFORMING THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY OF HIS CONVERSATION. CONFIDENTIAL NNNNPTQ3390 CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3390 PAGE 01 ZAGREB 01822 02 OF 05 111610Z ACTION EUR-01 INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 OASY-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-10 L-01 ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 PM-00 P-01 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-01 PMB-00 /017W -------------- C49B20 111610Z /38 O 111710Z MAY 95 FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5738 INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE USLO SKOPJE AMEMBASSY VIENNA AMEMBASSY BAKU AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA AMEMBASSY MADRID AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY BELGRADE AMCONSUL FRANKFURT C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 ZAGREB 001822 SIPDIS VIENNA FOR BOSNIA CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 ZAGREB 01822 02 OF 05 111610Z BAKU FOR DCM FINN FRANKFURT PASS TO A/S HOLBROOKE E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/11/00 TAGS: MOPS HR HR HR HR HR BK SUBJECT: AKASHI SAYS TENSION LOWER IN "RSK"; DEFENDS DECISION ON AIR STRIKES -------------- CROATS "TRYING HARD TO COOPERATE" -------------- ¶8. AKASHI SAID THAT HE HAD MET WITH TUDJMAN'S CHIEF OF STAFF SARINIC AND ACTING HEAD OF CROATIA'S ARMED FORCES GENERAL CERVENKO EARLIER IN THE DAY. HE BELIEVED THAT THE CROATS WERE "TRYING HARD TO COOPERATE WITH US." THE UN'S FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN "SECTOR WEST" HAD BEEN ALMOST COMPLETELY RESTORED. NEVERTHELESS, AKASHI WAS CONCERNED BY THE SLOWNESS OF PROCESSING THE SERB DETAINEES AND PERMITTING THEM TO LEAVE FOR BOSNIA OR RETURN TO THEIR HOMES IN CROATIA. THE AMBASSADOR AGREED, RECOUNTING HOW HE HAD CALLED SARINIC FROM STARA GRADISKA TO OBJECT TO THE INEXCUSABLE DETENTION OF OLD MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN FROM OKUCANI AND THERERY OBTAINED THEIR RELEASE. ¶9. AKASHI SAID THAT MARTIC SEEMED TO HAVE CUT BACK ON HIS EXPECTATIONS ALTHOUGH HE WAS STILL INSISTING ON A "RESOLUTION" IN "SECTOR WEST." IN THE MAY 9 MEETING THE SERBS HAD FOCUSSED ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE BEING HELD, THEIR TREATMENT, AND THE PROCEDURES FOR SCREENING. (NOTE: CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 ZAGREB 01822 02 OF 05 111610Z ICFY AMBASSADOR ALFREDO MATACOTTA TOLD US THAT AT THE MEETING ON MAY 9 EVEN MILOSEVIC WAS STILL INSISTING ON A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO BEFORE THE CONFLICT IN SECTOR WEST.) SARINIC HAD TOLD AKASHI THAT ONE OF THE DETAINEES WAS SUSPECTED OF KILLING 18 CROATS AND MAY BE TRIED FOR WAR CRIMES. SINCE THE MAY 3 CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AGREEMENT CALLED FOR THE RELEASE OF ALL PRISONERS WITHOUT ANY EXCEPTIONS, AKASHI WAS CONCERNED THAT THE SERRS WOULD REACT VERY NEGATIVELY IF THE CROATS FAIL TO COMPLY. -------------- -------------- CROATS AGREE TO MONITORING OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SECTOR WEST -------------- -------------- ¶10. IN THE SARINIC-AKASHI MEETING IT WAS AGREED THAT THE UN COULD MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SECTOR. SPECIFICALLY, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE UN WOULD: - SUPPORT AND FACILITATE THE RETURN OF PEOPLE TO THEIR HOMES OR HELP TRANSPORT THEM TO BOSNIA IF SO DESIRED, - MONITOR THE RETURN OF DISPLACED PEOPLE TO THE SECTOR, - ASSIST WITH DEMINING AND IMPLEMENTING THE ECONOMIC AGREEMENT, - ASSURE PASSAGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN FRIENDS AND RELATIVES, - MONITOR PRISONS AND DETENTION CENTERS, - PROTECT MINORITIES, AND CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 ZAGREB 01822 02 OF 05 111610Z - MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL. THESE NEAR- TERM TASKS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN COOPERATION WITH UNHCR, ECMM, AND ICRC. TO THAT END, A COORDINATION GROUP HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. -------------- SERBS STILL BALKING AT TALKS WITH CROATS -------------- ¶11. AFTER "SECTOR WEST," AKASHI SAID HIS NEXT PRIORITY WAS TO EASE TENSIONS IN THE OTHER SECTORS, ESPECIALLY SECTOR EAST. THE CROATS HAVE PROPOSED A MEETING OF THE MILITARY COMMANDERS BUT THE SERBS HAVE BEEN DRAGGING THEIR FEET, INSISTING ON A SOLUTION IN "SECTOR WEST" FIRST. MILOSEVIC HAD ARGUED THAT THERE COULD BE NO MILITARY SOLUTION WITHOUT A POLITICAL SOLUTION COMING OUT OF FACE TO FACE TALKS IN GENEVA. CONFIDENTIAL NNNNPTQ3391 CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3391 PAGE 01 ZAGREB 01822 03 OF 05 111610Z ACTION EUR-01 INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 OASY-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-10 L-01 ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 PM-00 P-01 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-01 PMB-00 /017W -------------- C49B34 111610Z /38 O 111710Z MAY 95 FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5739 INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE USLO SKOPJE AMEMBASSY VIENNA AMEMBASSY BAKU AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA AMEMBASSY MADRID AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY BELGRADE AMCONSUL FRANKFURT C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 ZAGREB 001822 SIPDIS VIENNA FOR BOSNIA CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 ZAGREB 01822 03 OF 05 111610Z BAKU FOR DCM FINN FRANKFURT PASS TO A/S HOLBROOKE E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/11/00 TAGS: MOPS HR HR HR HR HR BK SUBJECT: AKASHI SAYS TENSION LOWER IN "RSK"; DEFENDS DECISION ON AIR STRIKES ¶12. AKASHI SAID THAT SARINIC WAS WILLING TO HOLD BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL TALKS AND AGREED TO HOLD AT LEAST THE INITIAL TALKS IN GENEVA (WITH SUBSEQUENT TALKS IN CROATIA). MEANWHILE, THE UN WAS TRYING TO CONVINCE THE SERBS NOT TO TACKLE THE ISSUES SEQUENTIALLY (I.E., INSISTING ON RESOLVING "SECTOR WEST" FIRST) BUT RATHER OPEN UP DISCUSSION TO ALL ISSUES SIMULTANEOUSLY. ¶13. WHEN ASKED IF THE SERBS UNDERSTOOD THAT RESOLVING "SECTOR WEST" DID NOT MEAN A RETURN OF "RSK" AUTHORITY IN THE SECTOR, AKASHI SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SURE. MIKELIC, ALTHOUGH HE MOUTHED MARTIC'S DEMANDS, SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WAS THE MAY 3 AGREEMENT (I.E., A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, SURRENDER OF WEAPONS, AND THE CHOICE OF REMAINING IN CROATIA OR LEAVING FOR BOSNIA) AND NOT THE MAY 2 AGREEMENT WHICH CALLED FOR A RETURN TO THE ST ATUS QUO ANTE. ¶14. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE USG STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE RETURN OF UN AUTHORITY IN THE SECTOR, ESPECIALLY IN THE AREA OF MONITORING HUMAN RIGHTS. AKASHI REPLIED THAT THE UN WOULD SOON BE NEEDING GUIDANCE FROM THE SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 ZAGREB 01822 03 OF 05 111610Z COUNCIL IN DEFINING ITS MANDATE IN THE SECTOR AND IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF THE USG WERE TO TAKE SUCH A POSITION. -------------- -------------- AKASHI CLAIMS SMITH WAFFLED, ARGUED AGAINST ON AIR STRIKES -------------- -------------- ¶15. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THE USG WAS VERY DISAPPOINTED AT THE UN'S FAILURE TO RESPOND MORE FORCEFULLY TO THE RECENT SERB ATTACKS AROUND SARAJEVO IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE HEAVY WEAPONS EXCLUSION ZONE. ¶16. AKASHI CLAIMED THAT, IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY, GENERAL RUPERT SMITH INITIALLY CAME DOWN AGAINST AIR STRIKES. A FEW HOURS LATER, SMITH APPARENTLY CHANGED HIS MIND AND CALLED FOR AIR STRIKES, WHICH WERE DENIED BASED ON SMITH'S PREVIOUS ARGUMENTS. A FEW HOURS LATER, AKASHI SAID, SMITH CAME AROUND TO HIS ORIGINAL POSITION. AKASHI QUOTED FROM THE GENERAL'S INITIAL ANALYSIS, WHICH WE PROVIDE BELOW. ¶17. BEGIN TEXT AS HEARD. BEFORE REQUESTING NATO TO ATTACK IN WHAT SEEMS TO BE A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE EXCLUSION ZONE THERE ARE CERTAIN FACTORS WHICH NEED TO BE BORNE IN MIND. ¶A. THE AIR STRIKES MIGHT NOT STOP THE SERB ATTACKS. - ¶B. UNPROFOR IN BOSNIA IS UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE FROM THE SERBS DUE TO EVENTS IN CROATIA AND GETTING CONVOY CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 ZAGREB 01822 03 OF 05 111610Z CLEARANCE HAS BECOME HARDER. ¶C. IT CAN BE ANTICIPATED THAT SUCH A RESPONSE WILL HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE CROATIAN SITUATION AND THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KRAJINA SERBS. ¶D. UNPROFOR IS NOT IN TOUCH WITH MLADIC OR OTHER BOSNIAN SERB LEADERS. ¶E. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO PROVOKE AN INTERNATIONAL REACTION AND THE BOSNIAN SERBS MIGHT BE LOOKING FOR AN EXCUSE TO SEIZE HOSTAGES. SO, MILITARY ACTION MAY NOT ACHIEVE THE DESIRED OBJECTIVES AND MAY HAVE FAR-REACHING NEGATIVE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. END OF TEXT AS HEARD. ¶18. AKASHI SAID THAT HE AND FORCE COMMANDER JANVIER SHARED SMITH'S ANALYSIS AND FELT THAT THE DISADVANTAGES CONFIDENTIAL NNNNPTQ3393 CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3393 PAGE 01 ZAGREB 01822 04 OF 05 111611Z ACTION EUR-01 INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 OASY-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-10 L-01 ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 PM-00 P-01 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-01 PMB-00 /017W -------------- C49B48 111611Z /38 O 111710Z MAY 95 FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5740 INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE USLO SKOPJE AMEMBASSY VIENNA AMEMBASSY BAKU AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA AMEMBASSY MADRID AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY BELGRADE AMCONSUL FRANKFURT C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 ZAGREB 001822 SIPDIS VIENNA FOR BOSNIA CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 ZAGREB 01822 04 OF 05 111611Z BAKU FOR DCM FINN FRANKFURT PASS TO A/S HOLBROOKE E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/11/00 TAGS: MOPS HR HR HR HR HR BK SUBJECT: AKASHI SAYS TENSION LOWER IN "RSK"; DEFENDS DECISION ON AIR STRIKES OUTWEIGHED THE ADVANTAGES. SINCE AT THAT TIME THE UN WAS ENGAGED IN DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS IN KNIN AND SINCE AN AIR STRIKE, UNLIKE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT WHERE LIVES ARE AT RISK, DOES NOT HAVE TO BE CARRIED OUT IMMEDIATELY, (HE NOTED THE DELAYED STRIKE ON UDBINA AIRFIELD),AKASHI AND JANVIER FELT THEY HAD TIME TO REFLECT AND ANALYZE. ¶19. THEY CONSULTED WITH NEW YORK AND THE UNSYG IN MOSCOW AND, CONSIDERING "THE TERRIBLE MOOD OF THE BOSNIAN SERBS," DECIDED THAT AIR STRIKES MIGHT HAVE MEANT THE END OF THE UN MISSION IN BOSNIA. "AND MAY STILL," AKASHI ADDED. -------------- BOSNIAN SERBS UNDER PRESSURE -------------- ¶20. THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS ARE UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE. THEIR SITUATION WAS GROWING WORSE AS THAT OF THE ROSNIAN GOVERNMENT GREW STRONGER, WHICH EXPLAINED WHY THEY WERE DESPERATELY TRYING TO FOR A DECISION NOW. HENCE, THE ATTACKS ON SAFE HAVENS, THE CLOSING DOWN OF THE AIRPORT AND CONVOYS, AND THE ATTACKS ON PEACEKEEPERS. THE UN NEEDED TO SHOW RESOLVE, INCLUDING CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 ZAGREB 01822 04 OF 05 111611Z AIR STRIKES, SO THAT THE SERBS WOULD UNDERSTAND THEY CANNOT GET AWAY WITH THEIR STRATEGY. ¶21. AKASHI EXPRESSED HIS DOUBT THAT AIR POWER ALONE COULD DO IT. THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT NATO HAS CONSIDERABLE AIR POWER. AKASHI ARGUED THAT UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES UN PEACEKEEPERS WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN. THE AMBASSADOR AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD BE TAKEN OUT OF HARM'S WAY, ESPECIALLY POTENTIAL HOSTAGES LIKE THE UN MILITARY OBSERVERS. AKASHI SAID THE UN HAD NOT DONE THAT YET AND NEEDED ADVANCE NOTICE. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT AIR STRIKES MIGHT SOLIDIFY THE POSITION OF THE EXTREMISTS. THE AMBASSADOR COUNTERED THAT IT MIGHT HAVE THE OPPOSITE EFFECT, NOTING THAT MARTIC APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLY WEAKENED AFTER THE CROATIAN ACTION IN SECTOR WEST. -------------- -------------- "TRIED UN WAY FOR THREE YEARS, NOW ITS TIME TO TRY OURS" -------------- -------------- ¶22. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE UN HAD TRIED AKASHI'S APPROACH OF NEGOTIATION AND ACCOMMODATION FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT AND THE RESULT HAD REEN THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS HAD BEEN PERMITTED TO GET AWAY WITH OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT. MEANWHILE, THE ONLY SUCCESSES WE HAD SEEN TO DATE HAD BEEN AFTER A CREDIBLE THREAT OF USE OF FORCE SUCH AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EXCLUSION ZONE FOLLOWING THE MARKET PLACE MASSACRE IN SARAJEVO. THE UN AND NATO HAVE ALREADY AGREED ON HOW TO RESPOND TO THESE CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 ZAGREB 01822 04 OF 05 111611Z SITUATIONS, HE ARGUED, "YOU'VE TRIED YOUR WAY FOR THREE YEARS, NOW IT'S TIME TO TRY OURS." ¶23. AKASHI CAUTIONED THAT THE UN PEACEKEEPERS WERE VULNERABLE. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THEY WERE BEING TARGETED ANYHOW. THE SOLUTION WOULD BE TO HUNKER DOWN UNTIL THE SERBS WERE FORCED TO BACK OFF. IF ENOUGH PAIN WAS INFLICTED THE SERBS WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO HONOR THE SAFE HAVENS AND REOPEN THE AIRPORT. ¶24. UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, AKASHI ARGUED, THE UN WOULD BE UNABLE TO PROTECT THE ENCLAVES, KEEP THE AIRPORT OPEN AND PROVIDE SAFE PASSAGE FOR CONVOYS. HOWEVER, IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTIONING HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT TWO MONTHS HAD GONE BY WITH NO CONVOYS TO THE ENCLAVES AND THE AIRPORT HAD BEEN CLOSED FOR A MONTH WITH LITTLE PROSPECT FOR ANY CHANGE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE UN WAS SUFFERING TREMENDOUS DAMAGE TO ITS IMAGE BY ALLOWING ITSELF TO BE HELD UP BY A BUNCH OF THUGS. CONFIDENTIAL NNNNPTQ3394 CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3394 PAGE 01 ZAGREB 01822 05 OF 05 111611Z ACTION EUR-01 INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 OASY-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-10 L-01 ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 PM-00 P-01 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-01 PMB-00 /017W -------------- C49B55 111611Z /38 O 111710Z MAY 95 FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5741 INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE USLO SKOPJE AMEMBASSY VIENNA AMEMBASSY BAKU AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA AMEMBASSY MADRID AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY BELGRADE AMCONSUL FRANKFURT C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 ZAGREB 001822 SIPDIS VIENNA FOR BOSNIA CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 ZAGREB 01822 05 OF 05 111611Z BAKU FOR DCM FINN FRANKFURT PASS TO A/S HOLBROOKE E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/11/00 TAGS: MOPS HR HR HR HR HR BK SUBJECT: AKASHI SAYS TENSION LOWER IN "RSK"; DEFENDS DECISION ON AIR STRIKES ¶25. AKASHI NOTED THAT, SINCE THE 1956 SUEZ CRISIS, THE UN'S PEACEKEEPING POLICY HAD BEEN THE IMPARTIAL POSITIONING OF TROOPS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN A CONFLICT, USING FORCE ONLY IN SELF-DEFENSE. SO FAR, THERE HAD BEEN NO CLEAR DECISION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS THAT A MORE ROBUST, "MUSCULAR USE OF FORCE" WAS CALLED FOR. "IT MAY COME TO THAT," HE SAID, "BUT FOR NOW THE SECURITY COUNCIL APPEARS TO HAVE OPTED FOR THE MORE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF PEACEKEEPING." ¶26. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF PEACEKEEPING IS APPLICABLE WHEN THERE ARE TWO SIDES THAT WANT PEACE, WHICH WAS CLEARLY NOT THE CASE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA WHERE THE SERBS HAD SHOWN THAT THEY ONLY UNDERSTOOD THE USE OF FORCE. ¶27. AKASHI ASKED THE AMBASSADOR TO CONSIDER THE UN'S CAPACITY IN THE REGION, ARGUING THAT ITS FORCES WERE NEITHER EQUIPPED, NOR TRAINED, NOR CONFIGURED TO FIGHT A WAR AGAINST A NON-COOPERATING PARTY. UN OBSERVATION POSTS WERE LOCATED BETWEEN THE FRONT LINES ONLY BECAUSE THE SIDES RESPECT THE UN'S IMPARTIALITY. THE AMBASSADOR CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 ZAGREB 01822 05 OF 05 111611Z REPLIED THAT THE SERBS HAD ALREADY SHOWN THEY DID NOT RESPECT THE UN'S NEUTRALITY AND THEREFORE CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO MOVE EXPOSED UN FORCES SUCH AS UNMOS OUT OF HARM'S WAY AS A PRELUDE TO SERIOUS USE OF FORCE. HE REITERATED THE POINT THAT THE UN'S EFFORTS FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION HAD NOT WORKED. THE BOSNIAN SERB LEADERS WERE NOT REASONABLE PEOPLE. AKASHI READILY AGREED TO THE LAST POINT. GALBRAITH CONFIDENTIAL NNNN