Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
95STATE260249
1995-11-03 22:27:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

// INR ASSESSMENT // - NORTH KOREA - DANGER IN THE WIND

Tags:  PINR PGOV PREL 
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R 032227Z NOV 95
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS
AIT TAIPEI 0000
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY ROME 
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU
XMT AMEMBASSY KOROR
AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
AMCONSUL BRISBANE
S E C R E T STATE 260249 

USTR FOR SANDS/LEHR

E.O. 12356: DECL: 11/3/05
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: // INR ASSESSMENT // - NORTH KOREA - DANGER IN THE WIND

DOD/ISA/AP FOR EIKENBERRY, NSC FOR ROTH/SUETTINGER, NSA
FOR LANDIS, DIA FOR NIXON, CIA WASHDC, LONDON FOR HALL,
ROME PLEASE PASS EMBASSY VATICAN

S E C R E T STATE 260249

USTR FOR SANDS/LEHR

E.O. 12356: DECL: 11/3/05
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: // INR ASSESSMENT // - NORTH KOREA - DANGER IN THE WIND

DOD/ISA/AP FOR EIKENBERRY, NSC FOR ROTH/SUETTINGER, NSA
FOR LANDIS, DIA FOR NIXON, CIA WASHDC, LONDON FOR HALL,
ROME PLEASE PASS EMBASSY VATICAN


1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT


2. THE FOLLOWING INR ASSESSMENT WAS PRODUCED BY THE
OFFICE OF EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AND IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR
INFORMATION AND COMMENT.


3. (SUMMARY) PYONGYANG'S ECONOMIC DISTRESS AND
CONTINUING POLITICAL PARALYSIS RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT
WHETHER THE CURRENT NORTH KOREAN REGIME CAN LAST THE
WINTER. IF PRAGMATISTS IN THE LEADERSHIP ARE UNABLE TO
SHOW TANGIBLE BENEFITS FROM THE AGREED FRAMEWORK SOON,
CONTINUED DETERIORATION OF THE ECONOMY AND WORSENING FOOD
SHORTAGES COULD PROMPT A TAKEOVER BY MILITARY HARDLINERS.

THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY ARE NOT "MODERNIZERS"--THEIR
COMING TO POWER WOULD GREATLY RAISE TENSIONS AND SHARPLY
INCREASE THE DANGER OF WAR. THERE IS EVIDENCE OF CONCERN
WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP OVER THE MILITARY'S INTENTIONS.


4. WE DISAGREE WITH ASSESSMENTS, PRIMARILY FROM SOUTH
KOREA, THAT PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE NORTH IN MID-OCTOBER
HAVE ALREADY PUT THE MILITARY IN CONTROL. THE NORTH'S
NEGOTIATIONS WITH KEDO AND THE CLEAR, CONSISTENT SIGNALS
IT IS SENDING SUPPORTING THE AGREED FRAMEWORK SUGGEST
THAT, SO FAR, THE AGREEMENT'S FOES HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO
DERAIL IT OR SIGNIFICANTLY IMPEDE ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

UNCOMMON FLEXIBILITY.


5. THE NORTH'S DELEGATES TO THE KEDO TALKS INSISTED
CRITICS WERE PRESSING THEM TO SECURE AN LWR SUPPLY
AGREEMENT, BUT USED THE POINT LESS TO PRESSURE KEDO THAN
AS A RATIONALE FOR MODIFYING THEIR OWN NEGOTIATING
POSITION.


6. OTHER SIGNALS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THIS
INTERPRETATION. FOR EXAMPLE, AT THE PARTY'S 50TH
ANNIVERSARY FETE ON OCTOBER 10, THE MAIN SPEECH,
DELIVERED BY THE NEW DEFENSE MINISTER, CRITICIZED NEITHER
THE US OR THE AGREED FRAMEWORK.

KEEPING A FIREBREAK.


7. THOSE BACKING THE AGREEMENT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ISOLATE
THE KEDO TALKS FROM THE HARSH RHETORICAL EXCHANGES
BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH. THE NORTH'S VENOMOUS
RESPONSE TO PROVOCATIVE ROK STATEMENTS HAS NOT KEPT IT
FROM NEGOTIATING ACROSS THE TABLE WITH ROK DELEGATES.
SUCH COMPARTMENTALIZATION OF ISSUES IS RARE DURING A TRUE
CRISIS OR POLICY REVERSAL.

LEADERSHIP LOGJAM.


8. WE BELIEVE THE DPRK LEADERSHIP IS SHARPLY DIVIDED,

AND THAT THE FRAMEWORK IS A SYMBOL OF WHAT ITS CRITICS
FEAR (AND ITS PROPONENTS HOPE) WILL BECOME THE NEW
REGIME'S DIRECTION ON A BROAD RANGE OF FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC ISSUES.


9. PRAGMATISTS SEEM TO FEAR A LOSS OF MOMENTUM IN THE
FRAMEWORK PROCESS, WHICH WOULD UNDERCUT THEIR ARGUMENT
THAT THE AGREEMENT BRINGS TANGIBLE BENEFITS TO THE NORTH.
THEY APPARENTLY SOLD THE AGREED FRAMEWORK AS A GOOD
BARGAIN--THE START OF A PROCESS THAT WOULD LEAD TO A
LESSENING OF MILITARY PRESSURES AND INCREASED FOREIGN
ECONOMIC COOPERATION. NOW, THEY ARE UNDER ATTACK FOR
HAVING COMPROMISED DPRK SECURITY AND GAINED LITTLE IN
RETURN.


10. SHOWDOWN APPROACHING? A LENGTHY ARTICLE IN THE
PARTY NEWSPAPER EARLY THIS MONTH SUGGESTS THAT A SHOWDOWN
IS NEARING. IN DISCUSSING THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET
UNION, THE ARTICLE ALLUDED TO KHRUSHCHEV'S DE
STALINIZATION CAMPAIGN, ARGUING THAT "ENEMIES AT HOME AND
ABROAD, USING THE ALLEGED PERSONALITY CULT AS AN EXCUSE,
LAUNCHED ATTACKS AND COMMITTED TRAITOROUS ACTS TO DAMAGE
HIS (STALIN'S) AUTHORITY; THE COUNTRY WAS RUINED WHEN HIS
IDEAS AND ACHIEVEMENT WERE COMPLETELY REJECTED AND
NEGATED." THE ARTICLE WENT ON TO WARN AGAINST HAVING
"ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE ENEMY'S CONSPIRATORIAL PEACE
OVERTURES."


11. THE ARTICLE APPEARS TO BE AN ESCALATION OF THE LONG-
RUNNING DEBATE BETWEEN THE REGIME'S PRAGMATISTS AND
HARDLINERS. IN THE CURRENT SITUATION, REFERENCES TO A
"PERSONALITY CULT" AND DE-STALINIZATION COUPLED WITH
WARNINGS ABOUT THE ENEMY'S "PEACE STRATEGY" ARE THE
POLITICAL EQUIVALENT OF NUCLEAR WARFARE. THE ARTICLE
NECESSARILY RAISES THE QUESTION OF WHO--ASSUMING IT IS
NOT KIM JONG IL--IS BEING SET UP TO PLAY THE ROLE OF
KHRUSHCHEV.


12. SUCH RHETORIC SUGGESTS THAT THE SITUATION IS MOVING
TOWARD A SHOWDOWN. KIM JONG IL, WHOM INR BELIEVES LEANS
TOWARD HIS MORE PRAGMATIC ADVISORS, WOULD NO DOUBT LIKE
TO RESOLVE IT WITHOUT FIREWORKS. NEVERTHELESS, EVERYONE
IN THE LEADERSHIP (KIM MOST OF ALL) KNOWS THAT KIM IL
SUNG HAD TO PUT DOWN SEVERAL COUP ATTEMPTS IN THE LATE
195 OS BEFORE FIRMLY ESTABLISHING HIS POSITION.


13. PRESSURE INCREASING. THE CHANCES OF A NEARTERM
SHOWDOWN ARE INCREASED BY UNREMITTING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
STRAINS AND POLITICAL PRESSURES GENERATED BY THE SLOW-
MOTION SUCCESSION. A HARSH WINTER, PUSHING THE ECONOMY
AND SOCIAL CONTROLS TO THE BREAKING POINT, WOULD PROBABLY
BE MORE THAN THE FRAGILE POLITICAL SYSTEM COULD ENDURE.
BY SPRING, FOOD SHORTAGES MAY BE THE WORST SINCE THE
KOREAN WAR.


14. PARTICULARLY DISTURBING IS EVIDENCE THAT THE CENTER
IS NO LONGER ABLE TO HANDLE THE FOOD SITUATION AND IS
TELLING LOCAL AUTHORITIES THAT THEY ARE ON THEIR OWN.
THAT MESSAGE WILL SEND SHOCKWAVES THROUGH THE POLITICAL
SYSTEM AND SORELY TEST SOCIAL CONTROL MECHANISMS.


15. WILL THE GENERALS STEP IN? SUCH A SCENARIO IS
UNLIKELY TO LEAD TO A SOFT LANDING"--THAT IS, PEACEFUL
TRANSFORMATION AND EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION WITH THE SOUTH.
RATHER, A SHARPLY DETERIORATING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
SITUATION IS LIKELY TO TRIGGER A TAKEOVER BY HARDLINE
MILITARY ELEMENTS--"TRUE BELIEVERS," FOR WHOM DISCIPLINE
AND MORAL RECTITUDE CAN OVERCOME ANY ADVERSITY, AND WHO
SEE COMPROMISE WITH "EVIL" AS DEFEAT.


16. FOR YEARS, THESE HARDLINERS HAVE BEEN CHAFING AT
WHAT THEY SEE AS A DANGEROUS DRIFT TOWARD POLICIES OF
OPENING AND REFORM. THEY HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY ALARMED BY
EVENTS SINCE THE DEATH OF KIM IL SUNG. NEVER HAPPY WITH
THE SUCCESSION PLANS, THEY HAVE WATCHED WITH
CONSTERNATION AS KIM JONG IL HAS MOVED STEP-BY-STEP
TOWARDS AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE US AND EXPERIMENTATION
WITH ECONOMIC REFORM.


17. UP TO NOW, KIM, LIKE HIS FATHER, HAS BEEN ABLE TO
KEEP THE MOST CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS IN LINE. BUT
PRAGMATISTS IN THE REGIME FEAR THAT, IF THINGS REMAIN AS
THEY ARE, HE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO MUCH LONGER. A
HIGH-RANKING PARTY OFFICIAL RECENTLY WARNED A FOREIGN
ACADEMIC THAT AN INTERNAL CRISIS WAS APPROACHING; HE
EMPHASIZED THAT THE MILITARY WAS DOMINATED BY DOGMATISTS
WHO LOOK ONLY TO VIOLENCE TO SOLVE PROBLEMS. EARLIER
THIS MONTH, A DPRK DIPLOMAT TOLD A US OFFICIAL THAT THE
MILITARY WAS DETERMINED THAT ANY COLLAPSE OF THE NORTH
"WOULD NOT BE PEACEFUL." EVEN A HIGH-LEVEL KOREAN
PEOPLE'S ARMY OFFICER PRIVATELY WARNED A FEW MONTHS AGO
THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO START US-DPRK MILITARY CONTACTS
BECAUSE THE ARMY WAS BECOMING RESTLESS AND HAD DANGEROUS
PLANS. (SECRET) (RCARLIN/JMERRILL)


CHRISTOPHER