SADC CONFLICT RESOLUTION CONFERENCE: AMBASSADOR'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GABORONE 001886


DEPARTMENT FOR PM/DAS COOK FROM AMBASSADOR
ALSO FOR AF, AF/RA AND AF/S - JACKSON
LONDON FOR YOUNG

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL SADC BC
SUBJECT: SADC CONFLICT RESOLUTION CONFERENCE: AMBASSADOR'S
MEETING WITH BDF COMMANDER KHAMA

REF: STATE 73668


1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.


2. AS REQUESTED REFTEL, AMBASSADOR, ACCOMPANIED BY DCM AND ODC
CHIEF, MET WITH BDF COMMANDER IAN KHAMA MARCH 29 FOR A READOUT
ON THE GABORONE CONFERENCE OF SADC MEMBER STATE ARMY CHIEFS OF
STAFF. KHAMA SAID ONLY ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE AND LESOTHO WERE
UNREPRESENTED AT THE MEETING, WHICH FOCUSSED ON CONFLICT
PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT. SOUTH AFRICA, AN ACTIVE
PARTICIPANT, WAS REPRESENTED BY SANDF ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF
MEIRING. ACCORDING TO KHAMA, THE FOLLOWING FOUR SUBJECTS WERE
ADDRESSED:

-- THE TYPE OF STRUCTURE BEST SUITED TO TRY TO PREVENT
CONFLICTS AND TO MANAGE THEM IF THEY DO BREAK OUT;

-- THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF COUPS;

-- DISCUSSION OF THE HARARE PEACEKEEPING SUMMIT TO EXPLORE THE
POSSIBILITY OF REGIONAL OR CONTINENT-WIDE APPROACHES TO
PEACEKEEPING;

--THE EFFECT OF REFUGEES ON STABILITY AND HOW TO REDUCE THEIR
NEGATIVE IMPACT.

STRUCTURE/ AREAS OF INTER-STATE COOPERATION
--------------


3. PARTICIPANTS IDENTIFIED AREAS IN WHICH THEY SHOULD ENGAGE
IN REGULAR COOPERATION. KHAMA CITED THE FOLLOWING AS DIRECTLY
RELATED TO CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT: OPERATIONS,
INTELLIGENCE FOR EARLY WARNING, LOGISTICS, AVIATION, MARITIME
ASSETS. MEDICINE (E.G. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON REGIONAL
OUTBREAKS OF DISEASE, AIDS) AND OTHER UNSPECIFIED AREAS WERE
IDENTIFIED FOR COOPERATION EVEN OUTSIDE THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION
CONTEXT. THESE PROPOSED AREAS OF COOPERATION WERE ALLOCATED TO
MEMBER STATES REPRESENTED. EACH WILL ORGANIZE A MEETING TO
FURTHER EXPLORE EACH RESPECTIVE TOPIC AND PREPARE
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MINISTERIAL APPROVAL AT A JUNE DEFENSE
MINISTERS MEETING IN SOUTH AFRICA.

PREVENTION OF COUPS
--------------


4. KHAMA SAID MANY, INCLUDING HIMSELF, "POINTED FINGERS AT THE
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP" ON THIS ISSUE. THEY FELT THAT POOR
MANAGEMENT BY THE POLITICAL LEVEL, RESULTING IN ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS, CONTRIBUTED TO CREATING FERTILE GROUND FOR COUPS.
KHAMA CITED UNBALANCED DEVELOPMENT, CORRUPTION, AND FAVORITISM
ALONG TRIBAL LINES, INCLUDING IN THE ARMED FORCES, AS
CONTRIBUTORS TO THE PROBLEM. POOR TREATMENT OF THE MILITARY
POSES ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS, KHAMA SAID, CITING THE FACT THAT
JUNIOR RANKS, NOT JUST COMMANDERS ARE NOW ENGAGING IN COUPS.
THE ARMY COMMANDERS CONCLUDED THAT THE AVOIDANCE OF COUPS COULD
ONLY BE ADDRESSED BY POLITICAL LEADERS, NOT MILITARY MEN.

REFUGEES AND STABILITY
--------------


5. THIS FOURTH POINT CENTERED ON THE IMPACT OF REFUGEES ON
STABILITY AND MEANS TO REDUCE THEIR NEGATIVE IMPACT. AS WITH
THE AGENDA ITEM ON COUPS, KHAMA SAID THE MEETING CONCLUDED THE
IMPACT AND MANAGEMENT OF REFUGEES WAS A PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED BY
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, NOT THE ARMED FORCES. THE DISRUPTION
CAUSED BY REFUGEE FLOWS, AND THE PERCEPTION IN SOME COUNTRIES
THAT BECAUSE OF INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORTS, REFUGEES ACHIEVE
A HIGHER STANDARD OF LIVING THAN LOCAL CITIZENS, CAUSED REAL
PROBLEMS. HE CITED TANZANIA AS A COUNTRY PARTICULARLY HARD HIT
BY THIS PROBLEM.

HARARE PEACEKEEPING SUMMIT
--------------


6. KHAMA TOLD AMBASSADOR THE GABORONE MEETING ACHIEVED THE
LEAST ON THIS IMPORTANT TOPIC. THERE WAS MUCH DISCUSSION, HE
SAID, OF REGIONAL LOGISTICAL AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, BUT NO
ANSWERS TO SUCH QUESTIONS AS : "WHO WILL EQUIP AND FUND
PEACEKEEPERS?" AND "WHO WILL BE GIVEN ACCESS TO STORES OF
EQUIPMENT FOR PEACEKEEPING, AND WHEN?"


7. AT THE MEETING, KHAMA REMINDED HIS COUNTERPARTS THAT IN THE
LESOTHO CRISIS ONLY SOUTH AFRICA AND BOTSWANA HAD BEEN ABLE TO
MOBILIZE AND TRANSPORT THEIR FORCES. ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA, BY
CONTRAST, REQUIRED TRANSPORTATION FOR THEIR TROOPS AND
MATERIEL. THE BDF COMMANDER STRESSED TO THE AMBASSADOR HIS
CONVICTION -- WHICH HE ALSO CONVEYED TO THE GABORONE MEETING --
THAT "ALL NATIONS MUST HAVE A COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT ANY TROOPS
THEY SEND. THEY MUST NOT ASK JUST ONE COUNTRY (I.E. SOUTH
AFRICA) FOR HELP." ANY PEACEKEEPING ENGAGED IN BY REGIONAL
FORCES, HE UNDERLINED, WOULD HAVE TO BE ENDORSED IF NOT
REQUESTED BY THE UN AND/OR OAU. THIS ENDORSEMENT WOULD OPEN
THE WAY TO REQUESTS FOR DONOR SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATION.


8. IN SOUTH AFRICA IN JUNE DEFENSE MINISTERS WILL MEET TO TRY
TO COME UP WITH A FORMULA FOR FIRST USING MEMBER STATES' OWN
RESOURCES FOR PEACEKEEPING, THEN TURNING TO THE UN FOR
SUPPORT. KHAMA STRESSED HIS VIEW THAT INITIATING REGIONAL
PEACEKEEPING SHOULD NOT BE DEPENDENT ON RECEIVING DONOR SUPPORT
FROM THE OUTSET. INSTEAD, HE SAID, THERE MUST BE NATIONAL
POLITICAL COMMITMENT IN EACH COUNTRY. EACH COUNTRY'S ARMED
FORCES SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO COMMIT NATIONAL RESOURCES TO
PEACEKEEPING IN ADVANCE OF REQUESTING INTERNATIONAL DONOR HELP.
THIS, KHAMA TOLD THE AMBASSADOR, IS WHAT HE INTENDS TO "WHISPER
IN (HIS) MINISTER'S EAR" AT THE MEETING IN SOUTH AFRICA.

THUMBS DOWN ON STANDING FORCE BUT SUPPORT FOR EARMARKING
-------------- --------------


9. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED FOR KHAMA'S VIEWS ON THE STANDING
FORCE CONCEPT. KHAMA SAID HE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF
A "COMBINED STANDING FORCE," PRIMARILY FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST,
BECAUSE TO BE EFFECTIVE IT WOULD HAVE TO TRAIN TOGETHER --
SOMETHING MOST COUNTRIES IN THE REGION CANNOT AFFORD. SECOND
BECAUSE, IN KHAMA'S VIEW, PARTICIPATION IN A COMBINED STANDING
FORCE WOULD AMOUNT TO BOTSWANA SIGNING AWAY ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHT
TO DECIDE, ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, WHEN AND WHERE TO SEND ITS
TROOPS. BY CONTRAST, KHAMA FAVORED CREATION OF A FORCE BASED
ON EARMARKING SPECIFIC CONTINGENTS IN EACH PARTICIPATING
MILITARY AND PREPARING THEM TO BE MOBILIZABLE WITHIN 48 HOURS.
ODC CHIEF NOTED THAT EVEN UNDER NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY
COMMAND EACH NATION RETAINS THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO DETERMINE
WHETHER OR NOT TO RELEASE ITS EARMARKED FORCES TO NATO COMMAND.

LOTS OF QUESTIONS; NO DECISIONS
--------------


10. KHAMA REITERATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE MEETING DID NOT/NOT
AGREE ON ANY STANDBY FORCE OPTION. MANY QUESTIONS REMAINED,
INCLUDING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SIZE OF SUCH A FORCE,
COORDINATION MECHANISMS BETWEEN A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE
UN, AND WHETHER A REQUEST TO BECOME INVOLVED IN A CONFLICT
SITUATION WOULD BE INITIATED BY THE UN OR BY THE REGIONAL
ORGANIZATION. THERE WAS AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, THAT A COUNTRY
ASKED BY THE UN TO DEPLOY FORCES SHOULD IN TURN SEEK UN
SUPPORT. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION FROM THE ODC CHIEF KHAMA
SAID DEPLOYABILITY HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED. HE EXPLAINED THAT
IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE DISCUSSION CENTERED ON A FORCE
PERTAINING ONLY TO THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN (SADC) REGION, NOT
BEYOND (E.G. TO BURUNDI).


11. THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT THE U.S. HAS NO FIXED FORMULA
IN MIND BUT IS EAGER TO RECEIVE AND EXAMINE OTHERS' VIEWS ON
REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING, PARTICULARLY IN PREPARATION FOR THE MAY
MEETING AT THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE. KHAMA REITERATED HIS
LONG-STANDING CONCERN THAT ANY PEACEKEEPING ARRANGMENT FULLY
RESPECT AND PRESERVE A COUNTRY'S SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO DECIDE, ON
A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, WHETHER, WHERE, AND WHEN TO DEPLOY ITS
TROOPS. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT PROPOSALS SUCH AS A
CANADIAN ONE (UNFAMILIAR TO US) TO CREATE A STANDING RAPID
DEPLOYMENT FORCE.

THE FLS/ASAS/SADC CONNECTION
--------------


12. AMBASSADOR CLOSED BY ASKING HOW THE INTERSTATE COMMITTEE
ON DEFENSE AND SECURITY FITS WITH SADC. IN RESPONSE, KHAMA
RECALLED THAT LAST YEAR IN ARUSHA COMMITTEE MEMBERS HAD DECIDED
THEY DID NOT WANT TO BECOME PART OF SADC. WHILE THE TRANSITION
FROM OLD TO NEW ORGANIZATIONS IS CURRENTLY A BIT CONFUSED,
KHAMA SAID THAT IN THE END, THE FRONTLINE STATES (FLS) WILL BE
TRANSFORMED INTO THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES
(ASAS) AND "WE (I.E. THE COMMITTEE) SEE OURSELVES LINKED WITH
ASAS." IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION, KHAMA WENT ON TO
SAY HE EXPECTED NO COORDINATION PROBLEMS BETWEEN ASAS AND SADC
SINCE THE SAME COUNTRIES ARE MEMBERS OF BOTH GROUPS AND
POLITICAL DECISIONS ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEKEEPING ARE
MADE BY THE SAME LEADERS.

COMMENT
--------------


13. THREE THINGS STRUCK US ABOUT THE KHAMA BRIEFING: ONE IS
THE DETERMINATION AND SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH KHAMA AND HIS ARMY
COMMANDER COLLEAGUES ARE APPROACHING THESE ISSUES; TWO IS THE
ACTIVE AND SUPPORTIVE ROLE THAT SOUTH AFRICA IS NOW PLAYING IN
THESE DISCUSSIONS; AND THREE IS THE DIFFICULTY OF COMING TO
GRIPS WITH THE ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF FUTURE CONFLICT
RESOLUTION/MANAGEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.


14. WHILE WE ARE UNSURE OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE MAY
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE MEETING, IT SEEMS, FROM WHERE WE SIT, THAT
WE COULD MAKE A LARGE CONTRIBUTION BY HELPING COUNTRIES IN THIS
REGION TO WORK OUT THE CONCEPTUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS ON
WHICH FUTURE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT/PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS MAY
REST.


JETER