S E C R E T STATE 377793

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM PREL CBW ETTC TH LY
SUBJECT: WHITE PAPER ON LIBYA'S CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM

REF: BANGKOK 42119


1. (S) PRESENTED BELOW IN PARA 2 IS AN INTERAGENCY
COORDINATED "WHITE PAPER" ON LIBYA'S CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW)
PROGRAM. THIS PAPER IS UNCLASSIFIED AND IS TO BE PROVIDED
TO THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT FOR ITS USE. THE PAPER CAN
BE USED BY THE THAIS IN HELPING TO PREPARE THE CASES
AGAINST THE THREE THAI FIRMS FOR ASSISTING THE LIBYAN CW
PROGRAM. NO OTHER PAPERS ARE PLANNED TO BE GIVEN TO THE
RTG. ALTHOUGH, IF A SPECIFIC LEGAL QUESTION ARISES AFTER
THE THAIS DETERMINE WHICH LAWS OR REGULATIONS THEY PLAN TO
CHARGE THE FIRMS UNDER, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.


2. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF WHITE PAPER ON LIBYA'S CW PROGRAM
RELEASABLE TO RTG:

- LIBYA IS EXPANDING ITS CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM

THERE IS OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE THAT LIBYA IS ENGAGED IN
CONSTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES AT
THE TARHUNAH SITE. MOREOVER, THIS EVIDENCE IS IN THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN, HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY ACTION OF THE UN
SANCTIONS COMMITTEE, AND HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY OTHER
COMPANIES THAT FORMERLY HAD SUPPLIED THE PROJECT. IT IS
NOT CREDIBLE THAT THAI FIRMS PARTICIPATING IN THIS
CONSTRUCTION ARE UNAWARE OF THE TRUE NATURE OF THIS
FACILITY UNLESS THEY HAVE IMPERMISSIBLY "BURIED THEIR
HEADS IN THE SAND."

LIBYA SHOWS TREMENDOUS RESOLVE IN MOVING ITS OVERALL
CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) PROGRAM FORWARD. DESPITE
INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION AND POLITICAL PRESSURE
TRIPOLI'S PURSUIT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IS BARELY
DISGUISED. TRIPOLI'S ONGOING CW ACTIVITIES AND ITS
REFUSAL IN JANUARY 1993 TO JOIN A GLOBAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION (CWC) SIGNED BY MORE THAN 150 OTHER NATIONS
UNDERLINE THE JUDGMENT OF MANY GOVERNMENTS THAT LIBYA HAS
NO INTENTION OF GIVING UP ITS CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM.

LIBYA HAS CHEMICAL FACILITIES AT RABTA AND TARHUNAH
-------------- --------------

LIBYA HAS PRODUCED AT LEAST 100 TONS OF CW AGENTS MOSTLY
THE BLISTER AGENT MUSTARD AND SMALLER AMOUNTS OF THE NERVE
AGENT SARIN.

- LIBYA HAS A CW AGENT PRODUCTION FACILITY AT RABTA
ALTHOUGH THAT FACILITY CURRENTLY IS INACTIVE. THE MAXIMUM
PRODUCTION CAPACITY FOR RABTA IS 40 TONS OF CW AGENT
DAILY, AND THE PLANT WAS DESIGNED TO MAKE THE BLISTER
AGENT MUS

TARD AND HIGHLY LETHAL NERVE AGENTS. FACILITIES
AT THE RABTA COMPLEX INCLUDE A METAL FABRICATION AREA FOR
MAKING MISSILE WARHEADS, BOMBS, AND ARTILLERY SHELLS FOR
CHEMICAL WARFARE PURPOSES. THE RABTA COMPLEX WAS BUILT
WITH ASSISTANCE FROM TECHNICIANS, ENGINEERS. AND LABORERS
FROM SEVERAL COUNTRIES. INCLUDING WEST GERMANY. JAPAN AND
THAILAND.

- SINCE 1990, TRIPOLI HAS TURNED ITS ATTENTION TO A NEW
PROJECT--CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORLD'S LARGEST KNOWN
UNDERGROUND CW PLANT, DEEP IN AN INTERIOR MOUNTAIN NEAR
TARHUNAH ABOUT 60 KM SOUTHEAST OF TRIPOLI. EXCAVATION AT
TARHUNAH, WHICH BEGAN IN 1992 IS GOING FORWARD AND
ASSEMBLY OF THE PLANT WILL BE COMPLETE WITHIN THE DECADE.
THE INTERIOR PLANS AND EQUIPMENT FOR THE UNDERGROUND
PLANT. PUBLISHED IN THE MAGAZINE "THE ECONOMIST"'S
"FOREIGN REPORT'" INDICATE THAT THE TARHUNAH PLANT IS A
RECONFIGURED VERSION OF THE RABTA FACILITY. THE SAME
LIBYAN PURCHASING OFFICERS INVOLVED WITH THE RABTA PLANT
ARE NOW WORKING ON DUPLICATING EQUIPMENT ORDERS FROM THOSE
DESIGNS FOR USE AT TARHUNAH.

UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS COMMITTEE ACKNOWLEDGE TARHUNAH'S
-------------- --------------
CW LINK
--------------

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THROUGH UN SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 748. PASSED ON MARCH 31, 1992, HAS SOUGHT TO
ISOLATE LIBYA AND CEASE ITS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES--IN PART
THOUGH A BAN ON MILITARY SALES AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO
LIBYA. INCLUDED IN THIS BAN IS THE TRANSFER OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS-RELATED MATERIAL AND ACTIVITIES.

- THE UN IN RESOLUTION 748 ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT LIBYA IS
CONSIDERED AN OUTLAW STATE THROUGH VARIOUS OTHER DEMANDS.
UN MEMBER STATES ARE REQUIRED TO REDUCE LIBYAN DIPLOMATIC
MISSIONS AND TO DRAW DOWN THEIR OWN REPRESENTATION TO
LIBYA. THE RESOLUTION ALSO TERMINATED INTERNATIONAL AIR
SERVICE TO AND FROM LIBYA.

BARRING SHIPMENT TO LIBYA: IN MARCH 1993 THE UN.
INVOKING THESE SANCTIONS, BARRED A SHIPMENT OF CHEMICAL
PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT--REACTOR VESSELS--DESTINED FOR
LIBYA'S CW PROGRAM. LIBYA HAD CLAIMED IT WAS PURCHASING
THE EQUIPMENT FOR STRICTLY COMMERCIAL USE--TO MAKE
DRILLING MUD ADDITIVES FOR OIL EXPLORATION. THE EQUIPMENT
WAS PRODUCED BY THE MALAYSIAN SUBSIDIARY OF A BRITISH
FIRM. SINGAPORE HALTED TRANSSHIPMENT OF THE REACTOR
VESSELS TO A LIBYAN FACTORY IN BENGHAZI PENDING A UN
SANCTIONS COMMITTEE DETERMINATION. AFTER THE SANCTIONS
COMMITTEE FOUND THAT THE SHIPMENT WAS IN VIOLATION OF
RESOLUTION 748, SINGAPORE REFUSED TO ALLOW THEM TO BE
SHIPPED AND SUBSEQUENTLY RETURNED THEM TO THE MALAYSIAN
SHIPPER WHERE THEY REMAIN UNDER MALAYSIAN CUSTOMS CONTROL
PENDING SALE TO A LEGITIMATE BUYER.

GERMAN COMPANIES CEASED SUPPLYING TARHUNAH
--------------

THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT IS CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING GERMAN
FIRMS FOR DELIVERING EQUIPMENT AND CHEMICALS FOR THE
TARHUNAH PLAN VIA THIRD COUNTRIES TO AVOID SUSPICION.
CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL'S OFFICE CONFIRMED TO THE PRESS IN
MID-FEBRUARY 1993 THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD RECEIVED
INFORMATION THAT GERMAN FIRMS WERE INVOLVED IN PROVIDING
MATERIAL FOR LIBYA'S CLANDESTINE CW PROJECT. AT LEAST TWO
IMPLICATED FIRMS IMMEDIATELY AGREED TO BONN'S DEMANDS TO
STOP ANY FURTHER DELIVERIES, THE SPOKESMAN SAID.

GERMAN PROSECUTION OF CASES AGAINST FIRMS DEALING WITH
LIBYAN CW PROGRAMS DATES BACK TO 1990. INITIALLY, THE
WEST GERMAN FINANCE MINISTER SAID THAT INFORMATION ABOUT
THE RABTA PLANT WAS TOO VAGUE FOR BONN TO PURSUE COMPANIES
INVOLVED. ALTHOUGH THE BONN GOVERNMENT AT FIRST STRONGLY
DENIED ALLEGATIONS THAT GERMAN FIRMS HAD SUPPLIED AND
BUILT A CW FACTORY IN LIBYA, AFTER EXTENSIVE
INVESTIGATIONS IT FOUND THE CHARGES WERE TRUE. THE GERMAN
FIRM IMHAUSEN-CHEMIE STATED IN COURT THAT RABTA IS A
POISON GAS PLANT, AND THE FIRM'S OWNER WAS SUBSEQUENTLY
SENTENCED TO FIVE YEARS IN PRISON FOR VIOLATION OF EXPORT
CONTROL LAWS.

THAI NATIONALS ARE INVOLVED
--------------

THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT CONCLUDED THAT A THAI BUSINESSMAN
WITH AN ENGINEERING DEGREE WHO WAS INVOLVED IN BUILDING
THE RABTA PLANT PROVIDED CRITICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE
TARHUNAH PLANT, AS INDICATED IN A GERMAN NEWSPAPER. THE
THAI EXPERT COPIED THE PLANS FOR THE RABTA FACILITY,
ALTERED THEM, AND THEN CONTACTED GERMAN COMPANIES FOR
ASSISTANCE IN BUILDING AND EQUIPPING THE FACILITIES. THAI
COMPANIES HAD TAKEN OVER CW PROJECTS IN LIBYA AFTER GERMAN
AND JAPANESE CONTRACTORS WERE FORCED TO WITHDRAW IN THE
1980S UNDER PRESSURE FROM THEIR GOVERNMENTS, ACCORDING TO
A PRESS REPORT IN "THE NEW TIMES."

THE THAI FIRM W AND M LIMITED PARTNERSHIP HAS ACKNOWLEDGED
THAT IT IS THE SOLE SOURCE FOR TUNNELING DESIGN AND
EXCAVATION WORK AT THE TARHUNAH SITE. WIROTE
SUKUNMUTHITA, OF W AND M, TOLD THE PRESS THAT HIS COMPANY
WAS HIRED THREE YEARS AGO TO DESIGN THE TUNNELS. HE ALSO
SAID THAT ABOUT 60 THAI WORKERS, INCLUDING A NUMBER OF
ENGINEERS, WERE ASSIGNED TO THE TARHUNAH PROJECT.

LIBYA'S DENIALS ARE NOT CREDIBLE
--------------

COL. MU'AMMAR QADHAFI CONTINUES TO DENY THAT LIBYA
POSSESSES A CW PROGRAM AND THAT HE IS BUILDING AN
UNDERGROUND CW PLANT AT TARHUNAH. LIBYA STILL INSISTS
THAT THE CW PLANT AT RABTA WAS DESIGNED TO PRODUCE ONLY
PHARMACEUTICALS AND THAT TARHUNAH IS A CIVILIAN PROJECT.
WHILE CONTINUING EXCAVATION, LIBYA HAS STRIVED TO PROVIDE
A SEEMINGLY PLAUSIBLE ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION FOR THE
INTENSIVE TUNNELING ACTIVITY THAT BEGAN IN 1992.

THE LIBYAN DENIALS ABOUT TARHUNAH, HOWEVER, ARE
REMINISCENT OF TRIPOLI'S PAST ATTEMPTS TO CONCEAL THE TRUE
CW NATURE OF THE "RABIA PHARMACEUTICAL FACTORY. TRIPOLI
CLAIMS TARHUNAH IS A TUNNEL EXCAVATION TRAINING SITE FOR
LIBYAN WORKERS ON THE MUCH PUBLICIZED CIVILIAN "GREAT
MANMADE RIVER PROJECT," WHICH IS NOT IN THE IMMEDIATE
VICINITY. IN FEBRUARY 1993, LIBYAN TELEVISION AIRED A
STAGED VISIT BY QADHAFI TO THE TUNNELS, AND THE LIBYAN
GOVERNMENT HAS INVITED THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL
MEDIA TO TOUR THE EXCAVATION. THE LIBYANS PROBABLY
ANTICIPATED THAT INSPECTORS WOULD BE UNABLE TO IDENTIFY
THE FACILITY AS CW-RELATED BECAUSE IT WAS IN THE EARLY
STAGES OF CONSTRUCTION AND NO PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT IS YET
PRESENT.

TRIPOLI HAS EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE IN MANIPULATING
INTERNATIONAL OPINION, WHILE CONSTRUCTING AND RUNNING A CW
FACILITY. DURING THE 1980S, LIBYA CLANDESTINELY
ESTABLISHED A GLOBAL PROCUREMENT NETWORK TO OBTAIN
MATERIALS TO BUILD THE RABTA CW PLANT. THERE WAS A
CONNECTION BETWEEN A BELGIAN SHIPPING FIRM AND WEST GERMAN
CHEMICAL MANUFACTURES.

END TEXT OF WHITE PAPER.

CHRISTOPHER