wikileaks ico  Home papers ico  Cables mirror and Afghan War Diary privacy policy  Privacy
IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
92BOGOTA10667 1992-07-23 12:24:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

"SNOW WHITE AND THE FOUR DWARFS" -- BIOS OF

Tags:   KPRP PINR PINS PGOV CO 
pdf how-to read a cable
R 231224Z JUL 92
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7184
INFO AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
CIA WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
					  C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BOGOTA 10667 

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT THROUGHOUT)

SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: KPRP PINR PINS PGOV CO
SUBJECT: "SNOW WHITE AND THE FOUR DWARFS" -- BIOS OF
FARC'S 5-MAN SECRETARIAT



1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.



2. SUMMARY: THE HIGHEST DECISION-MAKING BODY OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC), COLOMBIA'S
OLDEST AND LARGEST GUERRILLA GROUP, IS ITS FIVE-MEMBER
GENERAL SECRETARIAT, COMPOSED SINCE AUGUST 1990 OF
LEGENDARY FARC HEAD MANUEL MARULANDA VELEZ ("TIROFIJO"),
POLITICAL CHIEF ALFONSO CANO, RAUL REYES, TIMOLEON JIMENEZ
AND IVAN MARQUEZ. THE FIVE COME FROM DIVERSE BACKGROUNDS,
AND THE FARC'S HISTORICAL DISTINCTIONS -- CAMPESINOS VS.
INTELLECTUALS, OLDTIMERS VS. NEWCOMERS -- ARE EVIDENT
AMONG THEM. THE SECRETARIAT, WHICH HAS BEEN REFERRED TO
AS "SNOW WHITE AND THE FOUR DWARFS" TO ILLUSTRATE THE
DIFFERENCE IN STATURE BETWEEN MARULANDA AND THE REST, CAN
ALSO BE CHARACTERIZED AS FOUR HARDLINERS VS. ONE MODERATE,
CANO. A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE FARC IS THAT THERE
APPEARS TO BE NO ONE CAPABLE OF REPLACING MARULANDA, THE
GLUE THAT HOLDS THE FARC TOGETHER. THIS CABLE PROVIDES
BIOGRAPHIES OF THE FIVE FARC SECRETARIAT MEMBERS, AND
FULFILLS THE POST REPORTING PLAN REQUIREMENTS FOR BIOS ON
THE SECRETARIAT (JUNE) AND MARULANDA (AUGUST). END
SUMMARY.

INTRODUCTION


--------------------------





3. POLOFF GLEANED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FROM MANY
CONVERSATIONS OVER THE BETTER PART OF A YEAR WITH SEVERAL
CONTACTS, INCLUDING, FIRST AND FOREMOST, COLOMBIAN
BUSINESSMAN MORITZ AKERMAN. AKERMAN IS AN EX-COMMUNIST
PARTY ACTIVIST WHO IS CLOSE TO ALFONSO CANO AND KNOWS IVAN
MARQUEZ. INFORMATION WAS ALSO DERIVED FROM CANO'S
BROTHER, ROBERTO SAENZ (HIMSELF A COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVIST
UNTIL NOVEMBER 1991); CARLOS EDUARDO JARAMILLO, A GOC
PEACE NEGOTIATOR FOR FIVE YEARS WHO KNOWS CANO AND MARQUEZ
WELL AND HAS MET MARULANDA AND THE REST AT THE FARC'S
FORMER CASA VERDE SANCTUARY; ACADEMIC GUERRILLA EXPERT
EDUARDO PIZARRO, EX-COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVIST AND BROTHER
OF ASSASSINATED M-19 HEAD CARLOS PIZARRO, AND OTHERS.



4. BECAUSE OF THEIR WORK AS GUERRILLA PEACE NEGOTIATORS
FRON, JUNE 1991-JUNE 1992, CANO AND MARQUEZ ARE WELL-KNOWN
OUTSIDE OF THE FARC. CANO IS BY FAR THE BEST-KNOWN
SECRETARIAT MEMBER IN BOGOTA, DESPITE HIS DOZEN YEARS IN
CLANDESTINITY. AKERMAN, PIZARRO AND JARAMILLO WERE
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY CLASSMATES OF CANO'S. MARULANDA, A
LIVING LEGEND, OBVIOUSLY IS WELL-KNOWN. RAUL REYES IS
KNOWN IN BOGOTA BECAUSE OF HIS LINKS TO THE PARTY'S
HIERARCHY. THE LEAST KNOWN BY FAR (AT LEAST IN THE
CAPITAL) IS TIMOLEON JIMENEZ, A CAMPESINO WHO GREW UP IN
THE INSURGENCY.


MANUEL MARULANDA: MORE CAMPESINO THAN COMMUNIST


--------------------------

---


5. THE FARC HAS BEEN CALLED AN ARMY OF SEVERAL COLONELS
BUT ONLY ONE GENERAL; MANUEL MARULANDA VELEZ IS THAT
GENERAL. AT 64, MARULANDA IS LATIN AMERICA'S OLDEST AND
MOST EXPERIENCED GUERRILLA LEADER. HE'S BEEN AN INSURGENT
FOR 43 YEARS, SINCE BEFORE CASTRO'S REVOLUTION.



6. IN 1949, DURING COLOMBIA'S LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE CIVIL
WAR, KNOWN AS "LA VIOLENCIA," MARULANDA (REAL NAME PEDRO
ANTONIO MARIN), JOINED THE LIBERAL GUERRILLA OPPOSITION TO
THE CONSERVATIVE DICTATORSHIP. WHILE MARULANDA BEGAN AS A
LIBERAL GUERRILLA, BY THE TIME LA VIOLENCIA HAD ENDED HE
HAD BECOME A COMMUNIST REBEL LEADER. LIKE MANY OF THE
COMMUNIST INSURGENCY'S EARLY LEADERS, MARULANDA HAILS FROM
AND BEGAN HIS GUERRILLA CAREER IN TOLIMA.



7. THE NOM DE GUERRE MANUEL MARULANDA VELEZ WAS ADOPTED
FROM THE COMMUNIST LABOR LEADER OF THE SAME NAME, A
PARTICIPANT IN THE VIOLENT 1925 LABOR STRIFE AND LATER A
FOUNDER OF THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCC). THE
COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES GAVE MARULANDA (MARIN) THE
NICKNAME "TIROFIJO" (SURE SHOT), WHICH HAS STUCK. INSIDE
THE INSURGENCY, HOWEVER, WHERE IT'S CONSIDERED SOMEWHAT
PEJORATIVE, NO ONE CALLS HIM THAT; HE'S "COMANDANTE
MARULANDA" TO HIS FARC UNDERLINGS.



8. THERE ARE MANY SIDES TO MARULANDA. HE'S A CAMPESINO,
GUERRILLA, COMMUNIST, SOLDIER, POLITICIAN, ALL ROLED INTO
ONE. HE IS, HOWEVER, A CAMPESINO LEADER FIRST, A
COMMUNIST SECOND; MORE ZAPATA OR PANCHO VILLA THAN LENIN
OR STALIN.



9. VARIOUS SOURCES HAVE REPORTED THAT SINCE LEADING HIS
OWN "GREAT MARCH" OF HUNDREDS OF FOLLOWERS AFTER THE ARMED
FORCES' EXPLUSION OF THE FARC FROM ITS CASA VERDE
SANCTUARY IN DECEMBER 1990 (FOUR MONTHS AFTER BECOMING FARC
HEAD) MARULANDA HAS BEEN FEELING MESSIANIC AND SOMEWHAT
LIKE MAO, WHOSE 1949 REVOLUTION STRONGLY INFLUENCED THE
PCC AND FARC.



10. AN UNEDUCATED CAMPESINO, MARULANDA IS RESPECTED BOTH
INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE INSURGENCY FOR HIS MILITARY SKILLS,
BUT HAS NEVER PROFESSED TO HAVE POLITICAL SAVVY. NOR DOES
HE HAVE POLITICAL AMBITIONS; HE HAS NO INTEREST IN A
POST-INSURGENCY POLITICAL CAREER.



11. MARULANDA HAS NEITHER A GRAND VISION FOR COLOMBIA,
NOR A SPECIFIC POLITICAL AGENDA. HE DOESN'T KNOW
PRECISELY WHAT HE'S FIGHTING FOR. HIS MOTIVATION IS THE
WELFARE OF "HIS PEOPLE," I.E., CAMPESINOS. WHILE THE
GOVERNMENT TALKS ABOUT ENDING THE INSURGENCY, MARULANDA'S
CONCERN IS WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO CAMPESINOS IF THEIR
SELF-DEFENSE ARMY (THE FARC) DISAPPEARS.



12. OTHER THAN HIS ADOPTED COMMUNISM, MARULANDA HAS NO
FIRM POLITICAL BELIEFS. HE USUALLY SIDES WITH FARC/PCC
HARDLINERS, BUT A MORE PROMINENT FEATURE OF HIS
PERSONALITY APPEARS TO BE HIS MALLEABILITY; MARULANDA IS
OPEN TO PERSUASION. HE VARYINGLY HAS BEEN REPORTED TO BE
A HARDLINER AND TO HAVE BEEN WON OVER TO HIS POLITICAL
CHIEF ALFONSO CANO'S PRO-NEGOTIATED-PEACE POSITION. AT
THE SAME TIME, HE HAS BEEN REPORTED TO BE MORE UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF BOTH THE PCC AUD THE ELN THAN HIS
PREDECESSOR, JACOBO ARENAS.



13. INDEED, ONE CRITICISM OF MARULANDA IS THAT HE HAS
PRESIDED OVER THE "ELENIZATION" OF THE FARC, I.E., THAT
UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP (BEGINNING WITH THE DEATH OF JACOBO
ARENAS IN AUGUST 1990) THE FARC HAS ADOPTED MANY OF THE
ELN'S MILITARY TACTICS (E.G., ECONOMIC TERRORISM) WHILE
MARULANDA HIMSELF HAS FALLEN INCREASING UNDER ELN HEAD
MANUEL PEREZ' IDEOLOGICAL/POLITICAL INFLUENCE.



14. ONE PERSON'S ADVICE MARULANDA NEVER HAS SOUGHT IS
FIDEL CASTRO'S. MARULANDA NEVER HAS HAD VERY CLOSE
RELATIONS WITH THE CUBAN LEADER, WHOM MARULANDA PREDATES
AS A GUERRILLA AND NEVER HAS FIGURED HE HAD MUCH TO LEARN
FROM. MARULANDA HAS TURNED DOWN SEVERAL INVITATIONS TO
VISIT CUBA. ONE RESULT IS THAT, TYPICAL OF FARC MILITARY
LEADERS, MARULANDA HAS NO FORMAL MILITARY TRAINING.



15. VARIOUS SOURCES HAVE TALKED ABOUT MARULANDA'S
ISOLATION IN THE JUNGLE; HE IS SAID TO BE OUT OF TOUCH
WITH REALITY. MARULANDA RECEIVES VERY LITTLE INFORMATION
FROM THE WORLD OUTSIDE HIS JUNGLE RETREATS OTHER THAN THAT
EDITED BY HIS PCC VISITORS. CANO IS SAID TO BE UNABLE TO
COMMUNICATE TO HIM WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE WORLD OUTSIDE
HIS JUNGLE HAUNTS.



16. MARULANDA LAST VISITED A CITY, NEIVA IN HUILA
DEPARTMENT (1985 POP. 178,000; HARDLY A METROPOLIS), IN


1963. HE REPORTEDLY NEVER HAS FLOWN ON AN AIRPLANE, NEVER
LEFT COLOMBIA. ONE REASON HE REFUSES TO COME DOWN FROM
THE MOUNTAINS IS HIS PARANOID FEAR FOR HIS LIFE. HE IS
SAID TO FULLY TRUST NO ONE. THE PERSONS HE TRUSTS MOST
ARE THOSE FEW FELLOW FARC GUERRILLAS WITH HIM SINCE THE
EARLY YEARS.



17. FARC CONFIDANT MORITZ AKERMAN RELATED THE STORY OF
HOW MARULANDA ONCE RECEIVED A GIFT BOTTLE OF WHISKEY (HIS
FAVORITE DRINK) FROM CASTRO. FEARING BEING POISONED,
TIROFIJO REFUSED TO DRINK IT, INSISTING ON THE BOTTLE
BEING BROKEN IN FRONT OF HIM. TIROFIJO ALSO, ACCORDING TO
AKERMAN, REFUSED TO TAKE PILLS CANO BROUGHT BACK FOR HIM
FROM HIS NOVEMBER 1991 VISIT TO CUBA.


ALFONSO CANO: CITY-SMART BOY STUCK IN A CAMPESINO ARMY


--------------------------



--------------------------




18. THE FARC'S SECRETARIAT CAN BE VIEWED IN GENERAL AS
FOUR PRO-ARMED STRUGGLE HARDLINERS AGAINST ONE
PRO-NEGOTIATED PEACE MODERATE, ALFONSO CANO. GUILLERMO
LEON SAENZ VARGAS (ALIAS ALFONSO CANO) IS THE SECOND IN
COMMAND AND THE FARC'S IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL LEADER.
CANO, MID-40S, IS FROM BOGOTA, WHERE HE STUDIED
ANTHROPOLOGY AT THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, WHERE THE BEST
BRAINS IN A GENERATION OF COLOMBIAN LEFTISTS WERE
GATHERED. AT THE TIME, SAENZ (THE NON DE GUERRE WAS
ADOPTED WHEN HE JOINED THE INSURGENCY) WAS ACTIVE IN THE
COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY'S YOUTH MOVEMENT, JUCO. IN THE
EARLY 1980S, JUST BEFORE COMPLETING HIS STUDIES, CANO LEFT
TO JOIN THE FARC'S RURAL INSURGENCY.



19. CANO HAS NEVER COMMANDED A FRONT; INDEED, HE HAS NO
MILITARY EXPERIENCE. FROM DAY ONE, HIS JOB HAS BEEN TO
PROVIDE THE CAMPESINO ARMY WITH POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. HE
REPORTEDLY WAS CLOSE TO FARC HEAD JACOBO ARENAS UNTIL HIS
AUGUST 1990 HEART-ATTACK DEATH, AT WHICH TIME CANO
REPLACED ARENAS AS THE FARC'S POLITICAL/IDEOLOGICAL CHIEF.



20. CANO WAS THE BEST AND BRIGHTEST OF A CROP OF JUCO
ACTIVISTS THE PARTY SENT TO THE FARC IN THE EARLY 1980S
OSTENSIBLY TO PROVIDE THE GUERRILLA GROUP WITH POLITICAL
ADVICE, BUT ACTUALLY TO MAINTAIN THE PARTY'S INFLUENCE
OVER THE RAPIDLY EXPANDING INSURGENCY.



21. ARENAS' DEATH LEFT CANO FAR AND AWAY THE MOST
INTELLECTUALLY CAPABLE GUERRILLA LEADER, FARC OR ELN.
THAT SUPERIOR INTELLECT, HOWEVER, COMBINED WITH HIS LACK
OF MILITARY SKILLS AND THE FACT THAT HE IS AN EDUCATED
"CITY BOY" IN A CAMPESINO ARMY, HAS STEERED HIM TOWARD
BECOMING A SPOKESMAN/NEGOTIATOR/DIPLOMAT FOR THE
INSURGENCY, RATHER THAN A LEADER OF IT. (FOR EXAMPLE, A
PROBLEM FOR THE PEACE TALKS IS THAT CANO HAS LACKED
DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY.)



22. SEVERAL SOURCES HAVE REPORTED CANO TO BE THE
CONSUMATE DIPLOMAT, NEVER LOSING CONTROL OF HIMSELF OR
HIS TEMPER, ALWAYS CHOOSING HIS WORDS CAREFULLY. THAT'S
EVIDENT IN BROADCAST INTERVIEWS. CARLOS EDUARDO
JARAMILLO, WHO AS A GOC NEGOTIATOR SAT ACROSS THE TABLE
FROM CANO FROM JUNE-NOVEMBER 1991 IN CARACAS, CREDITED
CANO WITH KEEPING THE NEGOTIATING SESSIONS MOVING
FORWARD. BY CONTRAST, JARAMILLO CHARACTERIZED THE OTHER
CGSB NEGOTIATORS, INCLUDING IVAN MARQUEZ, AS "MILITARY
TYPES" WHO WOULD STATE THEIR POSITION, THEN REFUSE TO
BUDGE. HE CREDITED CANO WITH ALWAYS MANEUVERING TO AVOID
OR RESOLVE QUARRELS.



23. EVERYONE AGREES CANO IS THE CGSB'S MOST ACTIVE
CATALYST FOR A NEGOTIATED END TO THE INSURGENCY. CANO
UNDERSTANDS THAT THE INSURGENCY IS DEFEATED POLITICALLY,
IF NOT YET MILITARILY. HE KNOWS THE ARMED STRUGGLE HAS NO
FUTURE, NOR HE IN IT. CANO ALSO MAY BE EXPERIENCING A
"MID-LIFE CRISIS," DREADING SPENDING THE REST OF HIS LIFE
AS A GUERRILLA, AS DID ARENAS. HE WOULD LIKE TO DO
SOMETHING ELSE BEFORE IT'S TOO LATE. AS AKERMAN ONCE TOLD
POLOFF, "CANO WOULD RATHER BE NO. 50 IN SOMETHING THAT HAS
A FUTURE THAN NO. 2 IN A DEAD-END VENTURE." CANO WOULD
LIKE TO TRY HIS HAND AT POLITICS, BUT IS TRAPPED IN THE
INSURGENCY. HE REALIZES THAT THE ONLY WAY TO GET OUT
ALIVE IS TO BRING THE REST OF THE FARC WITH HIM, I.E., TO
NEGOTIATE AN END TO THEIR ARMED STRUGGLE. BECAUSE HE IS
THE INSURGENCY'S MOST PRO-PEACE LEADER, THE GOC WOULD
PREFER TO DEAL WITH CANO THAN ANY OTHER GUERRILLA.



24. CANO HAS HIS FOLLOWERS IN THE FARC, AND IF HE LEFT
THE INSURGENCY, POSSIBLY COULD TAKE A SIGNIFICANT PORTION
(ESTIMATES VARY FROM 30-70 PERCENT) OF THE GUERRILLA GROUP
WITH HIM. CANO, HOWEVER, PREFERS TO STRUGGLE FROM WITHIN
TO DRAG TIROFIJO AND THE ENTIRE FARC INTO A PEACE
AGREEMENT. THAT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE. IN TAKING THE SLOW,
INTEGRAL APPROACH, CANO RISKS LOSING THE GOVERNMENT ALONG
THE WAY (AS THE RECENT GOC TURN TOWARD A MORE MILITARISTIC
APPROACH HAS SHOWN). AKERMAN HAS COUNSELED CANO THAT "HE
HAS TO CHOOSE BETWEEN 30,000 INSURGENTS/SYMPATHIZERS AND
30 MILLION COLOMBIANS."



25. CANO'S PERSISTENCE IN PUSHING A NEGOTIATED END TO THE
INSURGENCY HAS EARNED HIM THE WRATH OF HIS HARDLINE
COMRADES IN BOTH THE FARC AND THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST
PARTY (PCC). THE PARTY IS NO MORE MONOLITHIC THAN THE
FARC, HOWEVER, AND DEPENDING ON THE ISSUE, CANO
OCCASIONALLY ENJOYS THE PARTY'S SUPPORT. FOR EXAMPLE,
BOTH CANO AND THE PARTY (HISTORICALLY, THE "BRAINS" OF THE
CAMPESINO ARMY) FEAR THEIR LOSS OF INFLUENCE AS MARULANDA
HAS TURNED TOWARD GREATER IDEOLOGICAL AND TACTICAL ACCORD
WITH THE ELN.



26. FEBRUARY'S DISAPPEARANCE OF CANO'S ASSISTANT IN
PUSHING PEACE, FARC MEMBER DANIEL GARCIA, IS EVIDENCE THAT
FARC/PCC HARDLINERS ARE WILLING TO GET TOUGH. SHORTLY
BEFORE HE VANISHED, GARCIA (WHOM THE FARC "TRIED" TWICE
FOR THE BOTCHED 1989 "COPACABANA" ARMS DEAL) REPORTEDLY
SAID HIS ORDEAL WAS "THE FIRST CHAPTER IN A BOOK ABOUT
CANO." AT THE JULY 4 RECEPTION, GEN. MANUEL BONNET, THE
PREVIOUS HEAD OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, TOLD POLOFF HE
COULDN'T BELIEVE CANO RECENTLY HAD OPTED TO RETURN TO HIS
GUERRILLA COMRADES IN THE COLOMBIAN JUNGLE. CANO, WHO WAS
VILIFIED (ALONG WITH GARCIA) AND TEMPORARILY DUMPED AS
FARC NEGOTIATOR AT A JOINT FARC/PCC MEETING THE LAST TIME
HE RETURNED HOME, IS KNOWN TO FEAR THAT EACH RETURN TO THE
BUSH COULD REPRESENT THE BOOK'S FINAL CHAPTER.


RAUL REYES: THE PARTY'S MAN


--------------------------




27. RAUL REYES, THE FARC'S THIRD-RANKING LEADER, IS IN
CHARGE OF LOGISTICS AND FINANCES. IT'S REYES WHO
DISPENSES FUNDS TO SUPPORT THE PCC AND THE FARC'S URBAN
FRONTS. LIKE CANO, REYES IS A POLITICAL LEADER WITH NO
MILITARY EXPERIENCE.



28. REYES IS THE KEY MAN INSIDE THE FARC IN THE GUERRILLA
GROUP'S SIBLING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST
PARTY. WHILE ALL FIVE FARC SECRETARIAT MEMBERS ARE PCC
MEMBERS, REYES SERVES AS "THE PARTY'S MAN" INSIDE THE
FARC. WHILE HIS FELLOW SECRETARIAT MEMBERS, WHETHER
MILITARY OR POLITICAL TYPES, WHETHER CAMPESINOS OR
INTELLECTUALS, HAVE CLOSER TIES TO THE INSURGENCY THAN TO
THE PARTY, REYES IS MORE COMMUNIST THAN GUERRILLA. IN
THAT RESPECT, REYES IS UNIQUE IN THE FARC HIERARCHY. FROM
JACOBO ARENAS TO ALFONSO CANO, THE PARTY, AS A RULE, HAS
LOST CONTROL OVER THE YOUNG ACTIVISTS IT HAS SENT TO THE
FARC TO MAINTAIN ITS CONTROL OVER THE INSURGENCY.



29. REYES IS LINKED TO THE PARTY'S MOST INFLUENTIAL AND
RADICAL FACTION, LED BY PARTY SECRETARIAT MEMBER MANUAL
CEPEDA. REYES' MAIN POINT OF CONTACT IN THE PCC IS PARTY
ORGANIZATION SECRETARY (AND CEPEDA-FACTION NUMBER) MILLER
CHACON ("MISAEL"), WHO REGULARLY TRAVELS FROM BOGOTA TO
THE FARC'S SECRETARIAT.


TIMOLEON JIMENEZ: A BROWN-NOSE TO HIS MENTOR, TIROFIJO


--------------------------



--------------------------




30. TIMOLEON JIMENEZ ("TIMOCHENCO") IS FOURTH IN COMMAND
AND IN CHARGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.



31. A CAMPESINO, JIMENEZ JOINED THE FARC AT 13, AND EARLY
WAS "ADOPTED" BY MARULANDA, WITH WHOM HE HAS BEEN EVER
SINCE. THE ADOLESCENT JIMENEZ FIRST WAS USED AS A GOPHER
FOR THE SECRETARIAT, THEN LATER AS A COURIER. AS A
TEEN-AGER, JIMENEZ SERVED AS A "STAFF ASSISTANT" TO THE
SECRETARIAT. HE GREW UP WITH THE SECRETARIAT, AT
TIROFIJO'S SIDE.



32. WHILE MARULANDA HAS MANY SONS IN THE FARC, NONE HAVE
SPENT AS MUCH TIME WITH HIM OR ARE AS CLOSE TO HIM AS
JIMENEZ, HIS CHOSEN PROTEGE. THERE IS LIKELY NO ONE THE
PARANOID TIROFIJO TRUSTS MORE. JIMENEZ IS THE ONE MEMBER
OF THE SECRETARIAT WHO IS NEVER SEPARATED FROM TIROFI)O.


33. JIMENEZ IS A REPLICA OF MARULANDA. LIKE HIS MENTOR,
JIMENEZ IS AN UNEDUCATED CAMPESINO; A MILITARY LEADER (AND
A NOTED ONE) NOT A POLITICAL ONE. LIKE TIROFIJO, JIMENEZ
HAS NO FORMAL MILITARY TRAINING, AND HAS NEVER TRAVELED TO
CUBA OR THE EAST BLOC.



34. WHILE FAR FROM BRILLIANT, JIMENEZ IS SMART ENOUGH TO
KNOW WHAT SIDE HIS BREAD IS BUTTERED ON. HE ALWAYS AGREES
WITH TIROFIJO. MARULANDA BELIEVES IN CONTINUING THE ARMED
STRUGGLE, THEREFORE SO DOES JIMENEZ.



35. WHILE JIMENEZ IS ABOUT THE SAME AGE AS FELLOW
SECRETARIAT MEMBERS CANO, REYES AND MARQUEZ, HE REPRESENTS
A DIFFERENT CURRENT OF GUERRILLA LEADER. WHILE THEY
JOINED THE FARC AFTER UNIVERSITY STUDIES AND CIVIL
POLITICAL ACTIVISM, JIMENEZ AND OTHERS OF HIS ILK ARE
CAMPESINOS WHO GREW UP IN THE INSURGENCY.


IVAN MARQUEZ: "MORE AMBITION THAN BRAINS"


--------------------------




36. WHEN FARC HEAD JACOBO ARENAS DIED IN AUGUST 1990, AND THE
REMAINING FOUR FARC GENERAL SECRETARIAT MEMBERS ALL MOVED
UP A NOTCH (WITH SECOND-IN-COMMANDER MARULANDA REPLACING
ARENAS), IVAN MARQUEZ WAS ELEVATED TO THE GENERAL
SECRETARIAT'S FIFTH AND LOWEST POSITION.



37. THE SECRETARIAT'S NEWEST MEMBER IS UNIQUE IN HAVING
BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL CAPABILITY. MARQUEZ IS A
PROVEN MILITARY LEADER WITH POLITICAL EXPERIENCE, HAVING
SERVED BOTH AS A PATRIOTIC UNION (UP) CONGRESSMAN AND A
CGSB/FARC NEGOTIATOR IN BOTH THE CARACAS AND TLAXCALA
ROUNDS OF THE PEACE TALKS. AS HEAD OF THE FARC'S SOUTHERN
BLOC IN HIS NATIVE CAQUETA DEPARTMENT BEFORE JOINING THE
SECRETARIAT, MARQUEZ EARNED RESPECT FOR HIS MILITARY
LEADERSHIP CAPABILITIES, HAVING ONCE WIPED OUT A
PARAMILITARY GROUP IN PUTUMAYO DEPARTMENT LINKED TO
MEDELLIN CARTEL CAPO GONZALO RODRIQUEZ GACHA.



38. MARQUEZ ALSO IS THE SECRETARIAT'S MOST ENIGMATIC
MEMBER. SOURCES HAVE DIFFERED OVER WHETHER HE IS A
HARDLINER. AMONG THOSE DENYING MARQUEZ IS A WARMONGER IS
FORMER COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVIST ROBERTO SAENZ, BROTHER OF
MARQUEZ' NEGOTIATING PARTNER, ALFONSO CANO. PRESIDENTIAL
PEACE ADVISER GONZALO DE FRANCISCO HAS DESCRIBED MARQUEZ
AS "A HARDLINER THE GOVERNMENT CAN DO BUSINESS WITH."



39. THE TRUTH MAY BE, AS ACADEMIC GUERRILLA EXPERT AND
EX-COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVIST EDUARDO PIZARRO HAS
REPORTED, THAT MARQUEZ "IS NOT A MAN TO LET HIS HEART GET
IN THE WAY OF HIS AMBITION." PEACE PROCESS PUSHER MORITZ
AKERMAN, WHO KNOWS MARQUEZ, HAS CHARACTERIZED HIM AS FIRST
AND FOREMOST AN AMBITIOUS OPPORTUNIST WHO "BLOWS WITH THE
PREVAILING WIND." PIZARRO THINKS THAT MARQUEZ SHARES
CANO'S BELIEF THAT THE INSURGENCY IS A DEAD-END, BUT THE
PREVAILING WIND HAPPENS TO COME FROM THE DIRECTION OF
DOMINANT FARC/PCC HARDLINERS, AND THUS SO BLOWS MARQUEZ.



40. MARQUEZ HAS VARIOUSLY BEEN REPORTED TO BE IN ACCORD
WITH CANO, HIS FELLOW FARC NEGOTIATOR, AND AT ODDS WITH
HIM, WHETHER OUT OF CONVICTION OR BECAUSE OF COMPETING
AMBITIONS. MARQUEZ REPORTEDLY SHARES CANO'S DREAM OF A
POST-INSURGENCY, POLITICAL CAREER; HOWEVER, WHILE CANO IS
INTELLECTUALLY BRILLIANT, MARQUEZ IS MEDIOCRE. ALTHOUGH
NOT AN UNEDUCATED CAMPESINO LIKE MARULANDA, MARQUEZ LACKS
CANO'S INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT. AKERMAN HAS DESCRIBED
MARQUEZ AS HAVING "MORE AMBITION THAN BRAINS.''



41. MARQUEZ REPORTEDLY WAS NAMED TO THE FARC NEGOTIATING
TEAM (A) BECAUSE OF HIS POLITICAL EXPERIENCE, (B) BECAUSE
HE WANTED THE CHANCE IN THE LIMELIGHT, AND (C) TO KEEP AN
EYE ON CHIEF FARC NEGOTIATOR CANO, WHO'S TOO MODERATE TO
HAVE THE FULL CONFIDENCE OF HIS FELLOW SECRETARIAT MEMBERS
AND THE PCC. WHEN AFTER THE CARACAS TALKS CANO WAS
VILIFIED AND TEMPORARILY YANKED AS THE FARC NEGOTIATOR FOR
BEING TOO SOFT, MARQUEZ WAS NAMED TO HEAD THE NEW HARDLINE
FARC DELEGATION.



42. MARQUEZ' AMBITIONS ARE POLITICAL, NOT MILITARY; HE
WANTS TO BE THE NEXT ANTONIO NAVARRO WOLFF, NOT REPLACE
TIROFIJO. IT IS FOR THAT REASON THAT HE VIEWS CANO
(RATHER THAN, FOR EXAMPLE, TIMOLEON JIMENEZ) AS HIS RIVAL,
EVEN IF THEY MAY BE IN IDEOLOGICAL ACCORD.



43. MARQUEZ, WHO RECENTLY TOLD AKERMAN HE RECEIVED
TRAINING IN THE SOVIET UNION, REPORTEDLY HARBORS DEEP
HATRED FOR COLOMBIA'S SECURITY FORCES, WHO TORTURED AND
KILLED A NON-GUERRILLA BROTHER OF HIS IN CAQUETA.


CONCLUSION: NONE OF THE DWARFS CAN REPLACE SNOW WHITE


--------------------------



--------------------------




44. DURING HIS LATE JUNE TRIP TO TLAXCALA, MEXICO,
AKERMAN FOR THE FIRST TIME HEARD FARC GUERRILLAS TALKING
ABOUT SUCCESSION TO MARULANDA. OVER A MEAL, FARC
NEGOTIATORS PABLO CATATUMBO AND TOMAS LINCE -- BOTH CANO
SUPPORTERS -- SAID THE PERSON MOST LIKELY TO SUCCEED
MARULANDA WAS TIMOLEON JIMENEZ. JIMENEZ WAS SAID TO ENJOY
THE ADVANTAGES OF BEING MARULANDA'S MOST TRUSTED
CONFIDANT, AND OF HAVING THE SUPPORT OF JORGE BRICENO
SUAREZ ("MONO JOJOY"), HEAD OF THE ESTADO MAYOR DEL BLOQUE
ORIENTAL (EMBO), THE FIVE FARC FRONTS WHOSE PRINCIPAL
RESPONSIBILITY IS TO PROTECT THE FARC GENERAL SECRETARIAT.



45. CATATUMBO AND LINCE NAMED MONO JOJOY AS THE SECOND
MOST LIKELY TO REPLACE MARULANDA (AFTER JIMENEZ). MONO
JOJOY REPORTEDLY IS THE SECRETARIAT'S FIRST ALTERNATE,
MEANING HE'S NEXT IN LINE TO ASCEND TO THE FIVE-MEMBER
BODY. JIMENEZ AND MONO JOJOY ARE THE FARC'S SECOND AND
THIRD RANKING MILITARY LEADERS BEHIND MARULANDA. THE
FARC'S ESTADO MAYOR (SECOND-TIER LEADERSHIP BODY) AND
CAMPESINO RANK AND FILE APPEAR TO HAVE A BIAS IN FAVOR OF
CAMPESINO/MILITARY LEADERS OVER INTELLECTUAL/POLITICAL
ONES (LIKE CANO AND REYES).



46. THERE IS A MARKED DIFFERENCE IN STATUTE INSIDE THE
FARC, HOWEVER, BETWEEN MARULANDA AND THE OTHER FOUR
SECRETARIAT MEMBERS. AKERMAN HAS REFERRED TO THE
SECRETARIAT AS "SNOW WHITE AND THE FOUR DWARFS" TO
ILLUSTRATE THAT DIFFERENCE.



47. THE FARC FACES A LONG-TERM PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION FOR
WHICH THERE APPEARS TO BE NO SOLUTION. MARULANDA, AS
RESPECTED AS HE IS INSIDE THE FARC, IS INCAPABLE OF FULLY
REPLACING ARENAS, WHO WAS A MILITARY, POLITICAL AND
IDEOLOGICAL GIANT. THERE IS NO ONE, HOWEVER, TO REPLACE
MARULANDA. CANO OR REYES, AS INTELLECTUALS IN A CAMPESINO
ARMY, NEVER WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE RANK AND FILE.
JIMENEZ, WHILE CUT FROM THE SAME MOLD AS MARULANDA, LACKS
TIROFIJO'S SYMBOLIC SIGNIFICANCE. IT IS THE HISTORICAL
FIGURE OF MARULANDA THAT HAS HELD THE FARC TOGETHER SINCE
ARENAS' DEATH. IN AN ARMY WITH ONE GENERAL AND SEVERAL
COLONELS, THE COLONELS WILL PROBABLY GO THEIR SEPARATE
WAYS ONCE THE GENERAL HAS DEPARTED THE SCENE.


BUSBY