GAMSAKHURDIA CONTINUES TO CHALLENGE MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 10336





DEPT FOR EUR/SOV, C-ZOELLICK



E.O.12356:DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, UR, PREL, SOCI, PINS

SUBJECT: GAMSAKHURDIA CONTINUES TO CHALLENGE MOSCOW



REFS: A) STATE 66817 B) MOSCOW 9932 C) MOSCOW 1511

D) MOSCOW 1050 E) MOSCOW 5940



1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.



SUMMARY

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2. DURING A MARCH 31 - APRIL 3 TRIP TO TBILISI,

POLOFF RELAYED THE TALKING POINTS IN REF A TO

GEORGIAN SUPREME SOVIET CHAIRMAN GAMSAKHURDIA AND

EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF SEEKING A MECHANISM FOR

PEACEFUL DIALOGUE TO RESOLVE THE MANY PROBLEMS

GEORGIA FACES. GAMSAKHURDIA INSISTED THAT HE HAD

BEEN FORCED TO TAKE EXCEPTIONALLY HARSH MEASURES

AGAINST THE OSSETIANS BECAUSE THEY WERE IN LEAGUE

WITH MOSCOW. GAMSAKHURDIA EXPLAINED THAT THE CENTER

HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO USE ECONOMIC PRESSURE TO FORCE

GEORGIA TO SUCCUMB TO ITS WISHES AND NOW MOSCOW WAS

RESORTING TO POLITICAL SABOTAGE. GAMSAKHURDIA

CLAIMED THAT THE CENTER WAS ANGRY BECAUSE THE

REPUBLIC'S CITIZENS HAD VOTED OVERWHELMINGLY FOR

GEORGIAN INDEPENDENCE IN THE MARCH 31 REFERENDUM. HE

FELT THAT MOSCOW WOULD MAKE FURTHER EFFORTS TO

PROVOKE A CONFRONTATION AS A PRETEXT FOR IMPOSING

PRESIDENTIAL RULE IN GEORGIA. GAMSAKHURDIA ALSO SAID

HE FELT BETRAYED BY YEL'TSIN BECAUSE THE RSFSR LEADER

HAD RENOUNCED THE AGREEMENT THEY HAD SIGNED EARLIER

IN MARCH. END SUMMARY.



3. THIS IS THE FIRST IN A SERIES OF THREE REPORTS ON

POLITICS IN SOVIET GEORGIA. THIS CABLE FOCUSES ON

GAMSAKHURDIA'S CONFRONTATION WITH THE CENTER OVER

SOUTH OSSETIA AND RELATIONS WITH OTHER REPUBLICS.

THE SECOND REPORT DEALS WITH GEORGIA'S INTERNAL

POLITICS. THE THIRD WILL COVER A TRIP POLOFF MADE TO

A KGB PRISON AND A CONVERSATION WITH THE LAWYER OF

THE IMPRISONED OSSETIAN LEADER KULUNBEGOV.



A BIRTHDAY GIFT FOR GAMSAKHURDIA

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4. POLOFF ARRIVED IN GEORGIA LATE ON MARCH 31, THE

DAY OF THE REFERENDUM ON GEORGIAN INDEPENDENCE AND

ALSO GAMSAKHURDIA'S BIRTHDAY. GAMSAKHURDIA SENT

GEORGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GEORGIY KHOSHTARIA TO THE

AIRPORT TO GREET POLOFF AND WHISK HER AWAY TO A

BIRTHDAY/REFERENDUM CELEBRATION HELD AT AN OPULENT

GOVERNMENT HOUSE OVERLOOKING THE CITY. MANY OF

GAMSAKHURDIA'S CLOSEST FRIENDS AND SUPPORTERS WERE IN

ATTENDANCE INCLUDING FOREIGN MINISTER KHOSHTARIA,

PRIME MINISTER TENGIZ SIGUA, AND ALL OF THE OTHER

MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT.



5. THE PRELIMINARY REFERENDUM RETURNS WERE ANNOUNCED

AS THEY CAME IN. WITH EACH NEW ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT

THE OVERWHELMING VOTE IN VARIOUS REGIONS IN FAVOR OF

INDEPENDENCE, THE CELEBRANTS MADE MORE TOASTS AND

BECAME ALMOST DELIRIOUS WITH THEIR VICTORY. THE

BANQUET WAS LAID OUT IN TYPICAL GEORGIAN FASHION WITH

PLATES FULL OF GEORGIAN DELICACIES AND FREE-FLOWING

LIQUOR OF ALL SORTS. POLOFF ARRIVED RATHER LATE INTO

THE CELEBRATION AND GAMSAKHURDIA WAS ALREADY INTO HIS

SECOND ROUND OF TOASTS OFFERED TO MOST OF HIS MANY

GUESTS. THE TOASTS WERE INTERSPERSED WITH TYPICAL

GEORGIAN SINGING WHICH CONSISTS OF A FOUR-PART

HARMONY A CAPPELLA. ONE OF THE MORE INTERESTING

TOASTS OFFERED BY THE MINISTER OF FINANCE BEGAN WITH

REGRET THAT GEORGIA WAS REMEMBERED ONLY AS STALIN'S

BIRTHPLACE.



6. PRIME MINISTER SIGUA (PROTECT) SAT NEXT TO POLOFF

AND TOLD HER THAT IT WAS HIS IDEA THAT GAMSAKHURDIA

ATTEND THE MARCH 16 DINNER IN MOSCOW WITH SECRETARY

BAKER. SIGUA SAID THE CENTER HAD DISCOURAGED ALL

REPUBLIC LEADERS FROM ATTENDING AND THAT WAS WHY

GAMSAKHURDIA HAD ARRIVED AFTER ANNOUNCING OVER THE

TELEPHONE THAT HE WAS NOT COMING. SIGUA SAID THAT

GORBACHEV HAD SUCCESSFULLY PRESSURED MOST OF THE

OTHER REPUBLIC LEADERS TO DECLINE THE SECRETARY'S

INVITATION.



GEORGIA'S DISPUTE WITH THE CENTER INTENSIFIES

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7. POLOFF MET WITH GAMSAKHURDIA SEVERAL TIMES DURING

THE VISIT TO DISCUSS GEORGIAN POLITICS AND THE

DEVELOPING POLITICAL DRAMA BETWEEN GEORGIA AND

MOSCOW. POLOFF DREW ON POINTS OUTLINED IN REF A

DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH GAMSAKHURDIA AND EMPHASIZED

THE IMPORTANCE OF FINDING A PEACEFUL MECHANISM FOR

THE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES. GAMSAKHURDIA FELT THAT

HE HAD OFFERED MORE THAN ONCE TO RESOLVE HIS DISPUTES

WITH THE CENTER THROUGH PEACEFUL DIALOGUE BUT WAS

REBUFFED BY MOSCOW. HE RECOUNTED SEVERAL RECENT

CONFRONTATIONS WITH USSR LEADERS OVER THE UNION

TREATY, SOUTH OSSETIA, AND THE GEORGIAN MVD.



8. GAMSAKHURDIA REFERRED TO A FEBRUARY 25

CONVERSATION WITH GORBACHEV IN WHICH THE SOVIET

LEADER REPORTEDLY WARNED GAMSAKHURDIA THAT IF HE DID

NOT SIGN THE UNION TREATY, GEORGIA WOULD FACE EVEN

MORE VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL UNREST. HE ALSO SHOWED

POLOFF COPIES OF TELEGRAMS HE HAD RECEIVED FROM

MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS BORIS PUGO AND GORBACHEV

WARNING HIM TO COMPLY WITH USSR DECREES OR FACE THE

CONSEQUENCES. GAMSAKHURDIA SAID HE STILL HAS NO

INTENTION OF SENDING EVEN OBSERVERS TO THE UNION

TREATY NEGOTIATIONS AND THE GEORGIAN SUPREME SOVIET

WOULD NOT EVEN BE DISCUSSING THE SUBJECT.



9. ON APRIL 7, THE GEORGIAN SUPREME SOVIET PRESIDIUM

PASSED A RESOLUTION PROTESTING THE ADDITION OF

FURTHER SOVIET TROOPS IN SOUTH OSSETIA AS A "RUDE

VIOLATION OF GEORGIAN SOVEREIGNTY," ACCORDING TO

GEORGIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER GEORGIY KHONELIDZE

(PROTECT),WHO CALLED POLOFF THAT SAME DAY. THE

RESOLUTION DECRIES THE USE OF TROOPS AGAINST SOCIETY

AND EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE CENTER WOULD REFRAIN

FROM FURTHER DESTABLIZING THE SITUATION IN THE

REPUBLIC. THE RESOLUTION ALSO CALLS FOR A PEACEFUL

DIALOGUE TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE OSSETIAN

PROBLEM. THE RESOLUTION EMPHASIZED GEORGIA'S INTENT

TO LEGALLY SEEK INDEPENDENCE AND INITIATE DIRECT

ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH THE

RSFSR, ARMENIA, AZERBAYDZHAN AND OTHER REPUBLICS.

KHONELIDZE ALSO TOLD POLOFF THAT GEORGIA'S WORKERS

WERE PREPARING TO CALL FOR A GENERAL STRIKE IN

SUPPORT OF THE MINERS AS A RESULT OF THE PRICE RISES

AND CONTINUED PARTIAL ECONOMIC BLOCKADE.



GAMSAKHURDIA SEES CENTER'S HAND IN SOUTH OSSETIA

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10. GAMSAKHURDIA INSISTED THAT THE CENTER WAS

FUELING THE OSSETIAN PROBLEM AND THAT GORBACHEV HAD

REFUSED TO ENGAGE IN ANY KIND OF DIALOGUE ON THE

PROBLEM. THE GEORGIAN LEADER ACCUSED USSR COUNCIL OF

NATIONALITIES CHAIRMAN RAFIK NISHANOV OF

MASTERMINDING THE CENTER'S MANIPULATION OF OSSETIA.

GAMSAKHURDIA CLAIMED THAT ARRESTING OSSETIAN LEADER

KULUNBEGOV WAS "THE ONLY WAY TO STOP THE BLOODSHED

AND DEFUSE THE SITUATION." (SEE SEPTEL FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION ON KULUNBEGOV'S DETENTION.)



11. GAMSAKHURDIA CLAIMED THAT GEORGIA WOULD BE

WILLING TO ALLOW THE OSSETIANS TO HOLD A REFERENDUM

ON AUTONOMY BUT ONLY AFTER GEORGIA ACHIEVED

INDEPENDENCE. HE SAID THAT NOW THEY COULD NOT BE

SURE WHETHER THE OSSETIANS GENUINELY WANTED POLITICAL

AUTONOMY OR WHETHER THEY WERE BEING DRIVEN BY THE

CENTER TO DEMAND THIS AUTONOMY. AS IN PAST

CONVERSATIONS (REFS C-E),HE ROUTINELY REFERRED TO

THE OSSETIANS AND THEIR LEADERS AS "CRIMINALS" AND

"TERRORISTS." HE CLAIMED THAT HE HAD ORDERED AN END

TO THE GEORGIAN BLOCKADE OF TSKHINVALI BUT THAT

"BANDS OF CRIMINALS" CONTINUED TO SABOTAGE THE

OSSETIANS.



12. WHEN POLOFF SUGGESTED THAT INNOCENT OSSETIANS,

SUCH AS TSKHINVALI'S CHILDREN, MIGHT BE SUFFERING,

GAMSAKHURDIA AGAIN BLAMED THE OSSETIANS FOR THE

PROBLEM. HE CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD BROUGHT THIS FATE

UPON THEMSELVES BY CONTINUING TO DEMAND AUTONOMY. HE

ALSO ASSERTED THAT "BANDS OF OSSETIAN CRIMINALS" WERE

FIGHTING AGAINST EACH OTHER --A POINT THE OSSETIANS

DENY.



13. ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 2, POLOFF SAT WITH

GAMSAKHURDIA IN HIS OFFICE IN THE GEORGIAN SUPREME

SOVIET AND WATCHED THE SOVIET NEWS PROGRAM "VREMYA"

WHICH WAS FEATURING AN ITEM ON THE VIOLENCE IN

TSKHINVALI. "THEY ARE ANGRY BECAUSE WE HAD SUCH AN

OVERWHELMING VICTORY IN THE REFERENDUM ON

INDEPENDENCE. NOW THEY ARE PREPARING THE GROUND TO

SEND IN TROOPS TO TAKE OVER OSSETIA AND MAYBE THE

REPUBLIC," HE SAID.



14. THOSE WORDS PROVED TO BE PROPHETIC BECAUSE

GORBACHEV BEGAN TO SEND IN ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO SOUTH

OSSETIA THE NEXT DAY. ON ALRIL 3, GAMSAKHURDIA TOLD

POLOFF HE HAD SPOKEN TO USSR SUPREME SOVIET CHAIRMAN

LUK'YANOV BY TELEPHONE ABOUT THE TROOPS BEING SENT TO

SOUTH OSSETIA. GAMSAKHURDIA SAID HE HAD WARNED

LUK'YANOV THAT MORE TROOPS WOULD INCREASE BLOODSHED

IN THE REGION AND THAT HE AND GORBACHEV WOULD BE HELD

ACCOUNTABLE FOR THIS BLOODSHED. LUK'YANOV REPLIED

THAT HE WOULD PASS THIS MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV.

LUK'YANOV ALSO TOLD GAMSAKHURDIA THAT THE RSFSR

CONGRESS' RESOLUTION CALLING ON GORBACHEV TO "TAKE

URGENT MEASURES TO NORMALIZE THE SITUATION IN SOUTH

OSSETIA" HAD HEAVILY INFLUENCED GORBACHEV'S DECISION

TO SEND MORE TROOPS. GAMSAKHURDIA ASKED LUK'YANOV,

"WHAT RIGHT DOES THE RSFSR HAVE TO TELL THE CENTER

WHAT TO DO IN GEORGIA?" THE GEORGIAN LEADER SAID HE

CONSIDERED THIS INTERFERENCE IN GEORGIA'S INTERNAL

AFFAIRS. HE SAID LUK'YANOV HAD NO ANSWER AND WAS

SILENT.



15. GAMSAKHURDIA TOLD POLOFF THAT ACCORDING TO THE

GEORGIAN MVD COMMANDANT IN TSKHINVALI, THE CENTER

PLANNED TO SEND IN THE DZHERZHINSKIY DIVISION TO

IMPOSE ORDER IN SOUTH OSSETIA. THIYSPARTICULAR

DIVISION WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BRUTAL TREATMENT OF

AZERBAYDZHANIS IN BAKU IN JANUARY 1990.



16. GAMSAKHURDIA CLAIMED THAT THE CENTER WAS

FUNNELING WEAPONS THROUGH THE SOVIET ARMY TO THE

OSSETIANS. HE TOOK POLOFF TO A ROOM WITH A DISPLAY

OF SOVIET ARMY WEAPONS ALLEGEDLY CONFISCATED FROM THE

OSSETIANS. THE GEORGIAN LEADER ALSO SHOWED POLOFF A

ROCKET WHICH ALLEGEDLY HAD BEEN USED IN AN ATTACK ON

A GEORGIAN VILLAGE NEAR TSKHINVALI. THE ROCKET HAD

KILLED A GEORGIAN FAMILY OF FIVE AND WAS THE SAME

TYPE USED IN THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, ACCORDING TO A

GEORGIAN VETERAN OF THAT WAR. GAMSAKHURDIA USED THIS

EXHIBIT TO ILLUSTRATE THAT OSSETIANS WERE NOT THE

ONLY ONES SUFFERING IN THIS CONFRONTATION. THE

GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT ALSO HAD SEVERAL GEORGIAN

REFUGEES FROM TSKHINVALI ON DISPLAY IN THE LOBBY OF

THE INTOURIST HOTEL IVERIA WITH SIGNS WRITTEN ONLY IN

ENGLISH PROTESTING OSSETIAN ACTS AGAINST GEORGIA.

ALTHOUGH THE REFUGEES' SUFFERING APPEARED TO BE

GENUINE, THEIR USE AS PAWNS IN A POLITICAL PROPAGANDA

GAME WAS OBVIOUS AND A BIT CRUDE.



17. INTERESTINGLY, GEORGIAN REPUBLIC OPPOSITION

LEADERS ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE OSSETIANS ARE "TOOLS OF

THE KGB" AND THAT OSSETIAN LEADER CHOCHIYEV IS A KGB

OFFICER. LIKE GAMSAKHURDIA, THE GEORGIAN NATIONAL

CONGRESS LEADERS BELIEVE THAT OSSETIANS SHOULD BE

GRANTED CULTURAL BUT NOT POLITICAL AUTONOMY.



ECONOMIC PRESSURE INEFFECTIVE AGAINST GEORGIA

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18. GAMSAKHURDIA ASSERTED THAT THE CENTER'S ATTEMPTS

TO USE ECONOMIC PRESSURE AGAINST GEORGIA HAD FAILED

FOR SEVERAL REASONS. HE SAID THAT GEORGIA HAD BEEN

ABLE TO RETALIATE AGAINST THE CENTER'S ATTEMPTS TO

USE ECONOMIC PRESSURE BY THREATENING TO CLOSE THE

REPUBLIC'S RAILWAYS AND PORTS. HE SAID THAT THIS

TACTIC HAD BEEN EFFECTIVE DURING THE REPUBLIC'S

DISPUTES WITH MOSCOW LAST SUMMER WHEN GEORGIA WAS

ABLE TO FORCE THE CENTER TO GIVE INTO ITS DEMANDS ON

SOVEREIGNTY. GAMSAKHURDIA POINTED OUT THAT BECAUSE

OF THE ARMENIAN-AZERBAYDZHANI CONFLICT, GEORGIA'S

RAILWAYS WERE THE ONLY ONES FULLY FUNCTIONING IN THE

CAUCASUS AND THEREFORE CONSTITUTED A CRITICAL

TRANSPORTATION LINK TO THE REST OF THE USSR.

GAMSAKHURDIA ALSO POINTED OUT THAT MANY SOVIET

MILITARY FAMILIES LIVED IN GEORGIA AND THEY TOO WOULD

SUFFER FROM ANY MORE SHORTAGES OF FOOD AND ENERGY.

IN ADDITION, THE NON-GEORGIANS IN THE REPUBLIC WOULD

PAY A PRICE FOR ANY ECONOMIC SANCTIONS OR DEPRIVATION

IMPOSED ON GEORGIA.



19. GAMSAKHURDIA OBSERVED THAT THE ECONOMIC WEAPON

WAS NOT GEORGIAN-SPECIFIC AND THEREFORE COULD NOT BE

USED EFFECTIVELY TO STEM GEORGIAN NATIONALISM AND THE

DESIRE FOR INDEPENDENCE. HE MAINTAINED THAT THE

CENTER WAS MORE LIKELY TO USE A COMBINATION OF

POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURE SUCH AS IMPOSING

PRESIDENTIAL RULE, INSTEAD OF ECONOMIC THREATS WHICH

HAD PROVEN INEFFECTIVE.



BETRAYED BY YEL'TSIN

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20. GAMSAKHURDIA SAID HE COULD NO LONGER TRUST RSFSR

LEADER BORIS YEL'TSIN "BECAUSE ONE DAY HE SAYS ONE

THING AND THE NEXT DAY HE SAYS THE OPPOSITE."

GAMSAKHURDIA WAS REFERRING TO THE PROTOCOL HE HAD

SIGNED WITH YEL'TSIN ON MARCH 23. THE PROTOCOL

STIPULATED RSFSR-GEORGIAN COOPERATION IN QUELLING THE

OSSETIAN CONFLICT WITHOUT THE CENTER'S INTERFERENCE.

THE PROTOCOL ALSO CALLED FOR CLOSER POLITICAL AND

ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE REPUBLICS IN THE

FUTURE. GAMSAKHURDIA AND OTHER GEORGIAN OFFICIALS

SUCH AS GEORGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHOSHTARIA ON

PREVIOUS OCCASIONS HAD EMPHASIZED THE GREAT

IMPORTANCE OF THIS PROTOCOL FOR GEORGIA'S FUTURE (REF

B).



21. GAMSAKHURDIA TOLD POLOFF THAT YEL'TSIN WAS

"FIGHTING FOR HIS POLITICAL LIFE IN THE RSFSR

CONGRESS AND HE HAD TO GIVE UP HIS AGREEMENT WITH US

IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS OWN POLITICAL FUTURE." THE

GEORGIAN LEADER SAID YEL'TSIN HAD REJECTED THE

PROTOCOL AS A SOP TO THE RSFSR COMMUNIST PARTY.

GAMSAKHURDIA CONTINUED TO LAMBAST YEL'TSIN AND HIS

PERSONAL CHARACTER SAYING THAT THE RSFSR LEADER IS A

"DRUNKARD AND OBVIOUSLY UNTRUSTWORTHY." "YEL'TSIN

WILL DO ANYTHING TO SAVE HIS SKIN," GAMSAKHURDIA

SAID. INTERESTINGLY, ONLY A COUPLE WEEKS BEFORE,

GAMSAKHURDIA HAD BEEN SINGING YEL'TSIN'S PRAISES AND

STRESSING THAT YEL'TSIN WAS THE SOVIET UNION'S ONLY

HOPE FOR THE FUTURE. GAMSAKHURDIA ALSO CRITICIZED

USSR PEOPLE'S DEPUTY GALINA STAROVOYTOVA FOR HER ROLE

IN BACKING THE SOUTH OSSETIANS' CAUSE.



22. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.





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