U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS: THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 04161

E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL UR JA US
SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS: THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE


1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.


2. SUMMARY: THE ORIENTAL INSTITUTE'S TOP JAPAN
EXPERT, CONSTANTIN SARKISOV, THINKS UNCERTAINTY IN
THE U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP WILL CONTINUE AND WILL
EVENTUALLY FORCE A STRUCTURAL 'REMODELLING" OF THE
RELATIONSHIP. THE U.S. WILL HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THE
INEVITABILITY OF JAPAN'S BECOMING THE WORLD'S LEADING
ECONOMIC POWER. THE CHANGES IN U.S.- JAPAN RELATIONS
OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE U.S. AND SOVIETS TO
COOPERATE IN CHANNELING JAPAN INTO PRODUCTIVE
ENDEAVORS AND MAKING SURE JAPAN DOES NOT GET "OUT
FRONT" POLITICALLY OR MILITARILY. SINCE THE SOVIETS
HAVE LITTLE ECONOMIC INFLUENCE IN THE REGION, THE
U.S. WILL NEED TO TAKE THE LEAD IN FINDING AN
ECONOMIC ROLE FOR JAPAN THAT WILL KEEP IT HAPPY.
"DON'T ASK THEM," HE ADVISED. "PUSH THEM." THE
COROLLARY, SARKISOV SUGGESTED, IS THAT IT IS IN
SOVIET INTERESTS TO MOVE THINGS ALONG IN THE RIGHT
DIRECTION MILITARILY, BY ACTING TO FURTHER DIMINISH
THE ALREADY SHRINKING PERCEPTION IN JAPAN OF THE
"SOVIET THREAT." END SUMMARY.


3. WORLD'S LEADING ECONOMIC POWER
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CONSTANTIN SARKISOV, THE ORIENTAL INSTITUTE'S LEADING
JAPAN EXPERT, PROVIDED POLOFF WITH HIS VIEWS ON U.S.
- JAPAN RELATIONS AND ON HOW THE U.S. AND SOVIET
UNION COULD COOPERATE IN THE FUTURE ON JAPAN POLICY.
IN A JANUARY 19 MEETING WITH POLOFF, SARKISOV SAID HE
SAW CONSIDERABLE TENSION IN U.S. - JAPAN RELATIONS.
CURRENT UNCERTAINTIES ON BOTH SIDES WOULD EVENTUALLY
FORCE A "REMODELLING" OF THE CURRENT RELATIONSHIP,
WHICH HE THOUGHT WAS OUTDATED. THE U.S. NEEDED TO
COME TO GRIPS WITH THE FACT THAT IN THE NEXT CENTURY
JAPAN WOULD BE THE WORLD'S LEADING ECONOMIC POWER.
IN TEN YEARS, JAPAN'S GNP WOULD BE 75 PERCENT OF U.S.
GNP--OR MORE, HE SAID.


4. A MODEL RELATIONSHIP
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SARKISOV SAID THE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO
POWERS WOULD CONTINUE AND THE U.S. - JAPAN
RELATIONSHIP SHOULD PROVE TO BE A MODEL OF FUTURE
RELATIONSHIPS IN THE WORLD. THERE WOULD BE FRICTION
IN THE PROCESS BUT THE RELATIONSHIP WOULD SURVIVE
INTACT ALBEIT WITH ALTERED SECURITY AND ECONOMIC
DIMENSIONS. THE U.S. WOULD NEED TO ACTIVELY SEEK OUT
A LEADING ROLE FOR JAPAN ECONOMICALLY--NOT AS A BILL
PAYER OR DISCOUNT BANK BUT AS THE PREDOMINANT
FINANCER AND DECISIONMAKER IN MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC
PROJECTS. SARKISOV SAID THE U.S. SHOULD NOT
NEGOTIATE THIS WITH JAPAN, BUT SHOULD PUSH JAPAN INTO
THE ROLE, WHICH HE FELT WOULD SATISFY THE JAPANESE
"EGO" AND KEEP TOKYO FROM CONCENTRATING ON POLITICAL
OR STRATEGIC ISSUES.


5. THE SOVIETS, SARKISOV SAID, DID NOT SEE AN
ECONOMIC THREAT FROM JAPAN. THERE WAS AN ECONOMIC
MISMATCH. THE SOVIETS DID, HOWEVER, FEAR A MILITARY
THREAT FROM JAPAN SHOULD JAPANESE MILITARY POWER
CONTINUE TO GROW. IT HAS NOT IN SOVIET OR U.S.
INTERESTS TO SEE JAPAN BECOME A WORLD POLITICAL OR
STRATEGIC POWER. TOGETHER, THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION
COULD WORK TO ENSURE THIS DID NOT HAPPEN. MANY
SOVIETS CONSIDERED THE U.S. PRESENCE IN JAPAN AN
ANCHOR RESTRAINING JAPANESE MILITARY POWER, SAID
SARKISOV, AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT CONTINUE
INDEFINITELY. BUT THE SIZE OF THE U.S. PRESENCE
NEEDED TO BE REDUCED. U.S. REDUCTIONS--OR EVEN U.S.
WILLINGNESS TO TALK SERIOUSLY ABOUT REDUCTIONS--COULD
OPEN THE WAY FOR SOVIET MILITARY REDUCTIONS IN THE
REGION. SOVIET REDUCTIONS WOULD FURTHER REDUCE THE
PERCEPTION IN JAPAN OF A SOVIET THREAT. EVEN NOW,
PEOPLE IN JAPAN DID NOT FEEL AS THREATENED BY THE
SOVIET UNION AS THEY HAD TWO YEARS AGO, SARKISOV
SAID.



6. COMMENT: SARKISOV'S COMMENTS ABOUT THE
COMMONALITY OF U.S. AND SOVIET INTERESTS VIS-A-VIS
JAPAN ARE PART OF A BROADER SOVIET ARGUMENT WE HAVE
BEEN HEARING MUCH OF RECENTLY IN SUPPORT OF SOVIET
ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES. THE BASIC THRUST IS THAT,
TO OPEN THE POSSIBILITIES FOR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL
COOPERATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA IN WHICH THE U.S.,
JAPAN AND THE SOVIET UNION ALL PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE
ROLES, THE U.S. NEEDS TO BEGIN THE ARMS CONTROL
PROCESS. THE RIGHT U.S. GESTURE WOULD OPEN THE WAY
FOR SOVIET FORCE REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD LESSEN
JAPANESE (AND KOREAN) SECURITY CONCERNS. A CONTINUED
U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN JAPAN IS ALSO PART OF THE
ARGUMENT. OFFICIAL SOVIETS ARE CLAIMING THAT THE
SOVIET UNION HAS DONE WHAT IT CAN TO INITIATE THE
PROCESS AND CANNOT AFFORD TO MAKE LARGE UNILATERAL
REDUCTIONS.


7. NORTHERN TERRITORIES
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SARKISOV NOTED THAT MOSCOW WAS TRYING TO ESTABLISH
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS. THE JAPANESE WERE
THINKING ABOUT IT BUT WERE STILL HESITANT "BECAUSE
THEY WANT TO DO IT ONLY WITH YOU--AND WITHOUT YOUR OK
THEY WON'T." SARKISOV THOUGHT A MOMENT, THEN ADDED,
"ALSO, THEY WANT A CONCESSION ON THE NORTHERN
TERRITORIES." BUT THERE WOULD BE NO PROGRESS ON THE
NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE WHEN SHEVARDNADZE GOES TO
TOKYO IN MARCH, SARKISOV PREDICTED. GROWING
NATIONALISM MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIETS TO
CONCEDE ON ETOROFU AND KUNASHIRI. THE EMERGENCE OF
THE SUPREME SOVIET FURTHER COMPLICATED THE ISSUE.
AZERBAYDZHAN AND THE BALTICS WERE TOO CLOSELY
CONNECTED TO THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES AND IT WOULD
THEREFORE BE "ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE" TO GET A DEAL
THROUGH THE SUPREME SOVIET. MOSCOW WAS PREPARED TO
OFFER JOINT ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND NO-VISA TRAVEL TO
THE ISLANDS. THE IDEA OF SELLING THEM TO JAPAN WAS A
NON-STARTER. FOR MOSCOW, IT WAS SIMPLY SAFER TO HOLD
ON TO THE ISLANDS THAN TO OPEN POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE
NEGOTIATIONS OR SELL THEM. SHEVARDNADZE MIGHT,
HOWEVER, REFORMULATE THE ISSUE IN MARCH SO THAT
MOSCOW RECOGNIZED THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES
SPECIFICALLY AS AN UNRESOLVED PROBLEM BETWEEN THE
TWO COUNTRIES.


8. COMMENT: ON THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES, RECENT
COMMENTS MADE BY A NUMBER OF SOVIETS, INCLUDING
GORBACHEV HIMSELF, ARE BEGINNING TO DEVELOP INTO A
VAGUE PATTERN CENTERED ON SOVIET AIR POWER IN THE
NORTHERN TERRITORIES. ORIENTAL INSTITUTE ACTING
DIRECTOR CHUFRIN POINTEDLY TOLD VISITING SENATOR
WIRTH RECENTLY THAT U.S. WILLINGNESS TO START TALKING
ABOUT ARMS CONTROL WOULD PROMPT SOVIET AIR FORCE
REDUCTIONS IN THE REGION. GORBACHEV TOLD ABE THAT
JAPANESE WERE NOT ALLOWED TO MAKE GRAVE VISITS TO
ETOROFU IN THE PAST BECAUSE OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
THERE, BUT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD "SEE WHAT THEY
COULD DO" ABOUT THE PROBLEM. IMEMO JAPAN EXPERT
KUNADZE TOLD POLOFF GORBACHEV COULD NOT AFFORD AN
UNSUCCESSFUL FOREIGN TRIP. WE DO NOT THINK ANY
DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE ON HOW TO MOVE THE NORTHERN
TERRITORIES PROBLEM FORWARD, OR EVEN WHETHER IT
SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE HANDLED AS A BILATERAL PROBLEM
OR AS AN EAST-WEST ISSUE. SOVIET DOMESTIC CONCERNS
WOULD ARGUE FOR A CONTINUED BILATERAL APPROACH, WHILE
SOVIET ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES COULD CLEARLY BENEFIT
FROM ITS TREATMENT AS AN EAST-WEST ISSUE. WE KNOW
THAT HIGH LEVEL ATTENTION IS NOT FOCUSED ON THE
NORTHERN TERRITORIES. BUT IT WILL INCREASE AS THE
TIME FOR GORBACHEV'S VISIT NEARS, AND THOSE TO WHOM
THE LEADERSHIP TURNS FOR ANSWERS AT THAT TIME ARE NOW
IN THE PROCESS OF SEEING WHAT WILL FLY--AND WHAT
WON'T.

MATLOCK


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