NOVEMBER 11 MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOGADISHU 09903





E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PINS, EAID, SO

SUBJ: NOVEMBER 11 MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER



REF: A) STATE 380832 (NOTAL) B) MOGADISHU 09699



1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.



2. SUMMARY: THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE

AS COHEN'S LETTER WELCOMING CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND

ACCEPTED THE POINT THAT THE REGIME'S COMMITMENT NEEDS TO

BE DEMONSTRATED IN CONCRETE FASHION BEFORE IT COULD

LEAD TO ADDITIONAL RESOURCE FLOWS. THE MINISTER

ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE GSDR HAS OFFERED TO SEND TROOPS

TO JOIN COALITION FORCES BUT HAD NO WORD ON SAUDI

REACTION. HE REPORTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S TOUR

OF GCC COUNTRIES IS GOING WELL BUT DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE

OF SPECIFIC RESULTS. HE ASKED FOR HELP PERSUADING THE

REBEL MOVEMENTS TO ATTEND THE CAIRO CONFERENCE AND FOR

PRESSURE ON THE ETHIOPIANS TO STOP PROVIDING THEM WITH

SANCTUARY. FINALLY, HE EMPHASIZED THE URGENT NEED FOR

EMERGENCY FOOD SHIPMENTS TO MOGADISHU. END SUMMARY.



3. INTRODUCTION: CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER

AHMED MOHAMED ADEN NOVEMBER 11 TO DELIVER AS COHEN'S

SECOND MESSAGE (REFTEL A) AS WELL AS THE LETTER I HAD

PROMISED THE MINISTER ON THE BROOKE AMENDMENT (REFTEL B).

ASSISTANT MINISTER BASI TOOK NOTES FOR ADEN. I WAS

UNACCOMPANIED.



4. AMERICAN ASSISTANCE: AFTER READING COHEN'S LETTER,

THE MINISTER ASKED IN EFFECT WHAT IT WAS ALL ABOUT. I

EXPLAINED THAT COHEN HAD BEEN CONCERNED BY AD/N'S

VERY NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO HIS FIRST LETTER. HE WANTED

TO UNDERLINE THAT THE USG APPLAUDS THE GSDR'S INTENTION

TO LIBERALIZE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL LIFE. HOWEVER,

THERE IS CONSIDERABLE SKEPTICISM IN WASHINGTON ABOUT

THE GSDR'S COMMITMENT. BEFORE REFORM COULD LEAD TO

RENEWED ASSISTANCE FLOWS, THERE MUST BE EVIDENCE THAT

THE REFORMS ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED, E.G. POLITICAL

PARTIES MUST HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO FORM AND INDEPENDENT

NEWSPAPERS ALLOWED TO PUBLISH. THE BROOKE PROBLEM

ALSO MUST BE RESOLVED. AT THAT POINT, I GAVE AD/N A

LETTER THE USAID DIRECTOR AND I HAD PREPARED ON BROOKE

AND ITS LOCAL CONSEQUENCES.



5. RESPONDING, THE MINISTER SAID HE ACCEPTED THE

REASONABLENESS OF WASHINGTON'S SKEPTICISM, "CONSIDERING

ALL THE HOSTILE PROPAGANDA THERE". HE VOLUNTEERED

THAT ON RE-READING COHEN'S FIRST LETTER HE HAD FOUND IT

MORE UNDERSTANDABLE THAN ON FIRST REVIEW. AD/N SAID

HE REPEATED TO SIAD WHAT I HAD SALD ABOUT THE

DIVISION OF LABOR IN RESPONDING TO IRAQI AGGRESSION, I.E.

GCC COUNTRIES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ADDRESSING THE ECONOMIC

LOSSES EXPERIENCED BY STATES LIKE SOMALIA, WHILE THE

USG TAKES ON MOST OF THE HUMAN, POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL

COSTS OF THE MILITARY RESPONSE. HE HAD NOT, THE

MINISTER SAID, SHOWN COHEN'S FIRST LETTER TO SIAD.



6. PRIME MINISTER'S MISSION: ADRN REPORTED THAT HE HAD

HEARD BY TELEPHONE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE

LATTER'S TOUR OF GCC STATES IS GOING WELL. HOWEVER,

HE SAID, THE PRIME MINISTER HAD NOT BEEN MORE SPECIFIC.

I THEN ASKED ABOUT THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION'S PUBLIC

OFFER TO HAVE SOMALI TROOPS SERVE ALONGSIDE OTHER

COALITION MILITARY UNITS, AND AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT

THE SAUDIS HAD ACCEPTED THIS OFFER. ADEN SAID HE KNEW THE

OFFER HAD BEEN MADE BUT HE HAD HEARD NOTHING ABOUT ITS

ACCEPTANCE. COMMENTING THAT THE GSDR COULD ONLY SEND A

FEW HUNDRED SOLDIERS, HE ASKED WHAT DIFFERENCE SUCH

A SMALL NUMBER COULD MAKE. I RESPONDED THAT THE ACTIVE

PARTICIPATION OF ANOTHER ARAB LEAGUE STATE IN THE COALI-

TION'S MILITARY FORCES WOULD UNDERLINE THAT SADDAM'S

AGGRESSION IS ANATHEMA, EVEN TO THOSE OTHERWISE CLOSEST

TO HIM. AFTER ASKING A FEW NEUTRAL QUESTIONS ABOUT

THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL US MILITARY FORCES, THE

MINISTER EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE CONFLICT CAN

BE RESOLVED WITHOUT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.



7. RECONCILIATION: STATING THAT PEACE IS NECESSARY

FOR POLITICAL RECONCILIATION, THE FOREIGN MINISTER

SAID THE GSDR NEEDS THE HELP OF THE ITALIAN,

BRITISH AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS. HE ASKED THAT ALL

THREE MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE SOMALI REBEL MOVEMENTS

TO ATTEND THE CAIRO CONFERENCE AND OTHERWISE ENGAGE IN

RECONCILIATION WITH SIAD'S REGIME. HE ALSO ASKED THAT

PRESSURE BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE ETHIOPIANS TO STOP

PROVIDING TO THE REBEL MOVEMENTS THE SANCTUARY WHICH

ALLOWS THEM TO CONTINUE TO OPERATE.



8. FOOD AID: THE MINISTER DESCRIBED HUNGER IN MOGADISHU

AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO PEACE. NOTING THAT HE HAD BEEN

INFORMED BY HIS MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES OF MY DISCUSSIONS

WITH THEM ON THE SUBJECT, HE PLEADED FOR FASTER AMERICAN

ACTION. THE FRENCH, HE SAID, HAVE AGREED TO PROVIDE

3,000 TONS OF WHEAT, AND THE ITALIANS ARE TO FURNISH 4,000

TONS OF RICE. I EXPLAINED THAT PREPARATION OF OUR

PROPOSAL HAS BEEN DELAYED BY THE TIME IT HAS TAKEN TH/

RED CRESCENT TO ENGAGE IN SURVEY AND ORGANIZATIONAL WORK

WITH WHICH IT HAS HAD LITTLE PRIOR EXPERIENCE. AD/N

TOOK THE POINT BUT STRESSED THE URGENT NATURE OF THE

FOOD CRISIS IN THE CAPITAL AND ITS DESTABILIZING POTENTIAL.



9. APO: AS THE MEETING ENDED SO THAT THE MINISTER COULD

MEET WITH SIAD ON THE BROOKE ISSUE, I GAVE HIM THE

TEXT OF A LETTER REQUIRED AS PART OF OMC'S PROPOSAL FOR

ESTABLISHMENT OF AN APO IN MOGADISHU. I POINTED OUT

THAT AN APO IS AUTHORIZED BY THE MILITARY ACCESS

AGREEMENT. ADEN MADE NO COMMITMENT BUT SEEMED WELL

DISPOSED.



BISHOP