Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
90MOGADISHU11232
1990-12-24 09:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Mogadishu
Cable title:  

DECEMBER 22, 1990 MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR SO 
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O 240954Z DEC 90
FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1291
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
USCENTCOM REAR MACDILL AFB FL//
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOGADISHU 11232 


E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, SO
SUBJ: DECEMBER 22, 1990 MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

REF: MOGADISHU 08583

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOGADISHU 11232





E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, SO

SUBJ: DECEMBER 22, 1990 MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER



REF: MOGADISHU 08583



1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.



2. SUMMARY: THE PRIME MINISTER ACCEPTED STOICALLY

NOTIFICATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF FUEL, EQUIPMENT AND USG

CONTRACT PERSONNEL FROM BERBERA. INITIALLY UPSET

ABOUT THE EVACUATION OF USG PERSONNEL AND DEPENDENTS

FROM MOGADISHU, HE CONCEDED THAT WE HAD THE RIGHT TO

TAKE WHAT SAFETY PRECAUTIONS WE FELT APPROPRIATE.

ASKED WHAT GAMEPLAN HIS GOVERNMENT HAD FOR POLITICAL

RECONCILIATION FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OF THE

CAIRO CONFERENCE, HE COULD NOT IDENTIFY ONE. THE

PRIME MINISTER DID PLEA FOR FOOD AID AND REQUESTED OUR

INTERCESSION WITH THE IBRD. END SUMMARY.



3. INTRODUCTION: CALLED DECEMBER 22, 1990 ON PRIME

MINISTER MOHAMED HAWADLE MADAR TO OFFICIALLY NOTIFY

THE GSDR OF THE SUSPENSION OF OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF PERSONNEL, FUEL AND EQUIPMENT

FROM BERBERA. I INFORMED THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR

FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF OUR VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE STATUS

DECEMBER 8. BUT I SUBSEQUENTLY DELAYED TELLING THE

GSDR WE HAD MOVED TO AN ORDERED DEPARTURE, AND OF THE

CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, UNTIL OUR

FILIPINO CONTRACTORS LEFT THE COUNTRY. I WAS AFRAID

THE GSDR MIGHT COMPEL THEM TO REMAIN, IN ORDER TO KEEP

ITS PEACE CUBE MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK FUNCTION-

ING. MADAR MET ME WITHOUT A NOTETAKER OR OTHER AIDE.

I WAS UNACCOMPANIED.



-

4. EVACUATION: INITIATING THE DISCUSSION, I

EXPLAINED THAT THE CONTINUED DETERIORATION OF

THE SECURITY SITUATION HAD LED TO A USG DECISION

TO WITHDRAW ALL AMERICAN GOVERNMENT DEPENDENTS AND

NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL FROM SOMALIA. UNFORTUNATELY,

THIS STEP WOULD MAKE IT NECESSARY TO SUSPEND OUR CIVIL

AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. THESE WOULD RESUME

WHEN AN IMPROVEMENT IN SECURITY CONDITIONS PERMITTED

THE RETURN OF THE PERSONNEL NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT THEM.

THE FUEL AND EQUIPMENT STORED AT BERBERA ARE NEEDED

BY U.S. FORCES IN THE GULF, I TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER.

THESE COMMODITIES, AND THE AMERICAN AND FILIPINO

CONTRACTORS ASSIGNED TO BERBERA, WOULD BE REMOVED

WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, I EXPLAINED.



-

5. RESPONDING FIRST ON THE SUBJECT OF EQUIPMENT IN

BERBERA, THE PRIME MINI
STER SAID SIMPLY, "IT BELONGS

TO YOU. IF YOU NEED IT ELSEWHERE, TAKE IT." ON THE WITH-

DRAWAL OF USG DEPENDENTS AND STAFF FROM MOGADISHU, MADAR

FIRST REGISTERED UNHAPPINESS AT THE "UNILATERAL" AMERICAN

DECISION. BUT AS WE TALKED IT THROUGH, AND I REMINDED

HIM HOW OFTEN I HAD TOLD SENIOR GSDR OFFICIALS THAT OUR

PERSONNEL WOULD BE REDUCED IF THE SECURITY PICTURE

BECAME BLEAKER, THE PRIME MINISTER BACKED DOWN. HE

FINALLY STATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD MY FIRST CONCERN HAD

TO BE THE WELFARE OF MY COLLEAGUES. HE THEN ADMITTED

HIS BASIC CONCERN WAS THAT THE REGIME'S OPPONENTS HAVE

BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE PARTIAL EVACUATION OF THE

DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS NO NEED

TO NEGOTIATE WITH HIS GOVERNMENT, BECAUSE IT IS ON ITS

LAST LEGS. I ASSURED MADAR THAT WE HAVE BEEN TRYING

TO DISCOURAGE SUCH UNFOUNDED CONCLUSIONS BY TELLING THE

OPPOSITION IT SHOULD TALK WITH THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE

THE REGIME HAS CONSIDERABLE STAYING POWER.



-

6. RECONCILIATION: EXPRESSING REGRET AT THE

COLLAPSE OF THE CAIRO CONFERENCE, I ASKED THE

PRIME MINISTER TO OUTLINE THE GSDR'S NEXT STEPS

TOWARD A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF ITS DIFFERENCES

WITH ITS OPPONENTS. IN RESPONSE, AN EXTREMELY

DEFENSIVE MADAR SOUGHT TO JUSTIFY THE GOVERNMENT'S

ARREST OF THE MANIFESTO GROUP MEMBERS, INSISTING THAT

THE GSDR SHOULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE POSTPONE-

MENT OF THE CONFERENCE BECAUSE IT HAD ARRESTED TWO

MEN GUILTY OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY. RATHER THAN ENGAGE

IN FRUITLESS DEBATE ON THAT ISSUE, I AGAIN ASKED THE

PRIME MINISTER TO OUTLINE WHAT STEPS THE GSDR NEXT

INTENDS TO TAKE TO REACH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WITH

ITS OPPONENTS. MADAR STATED THAT THE GSDR STANDS

READY TO GO TO CAIRO OR TO MEET IN MOGADISHU WITH

ANYONE CONCERNED ABOUT THE COUNTRY'S FUTURE. IT ALSO

MIGHT TRY TO HOST A CONFERENCE OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS,

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND INTELLECTUALS IN MOGADISHU,

HE SAID. HOWEVER, MADAR HAD NO STRATEGY TO DESCRIBE.

IN FACT, HE ASKED ME TO SUGGEST ONE TO HIM. HE PROVED

UNFAMILIAR WITH HICKS' SPEECH ON FEDERALISM AND

SKEPTICAL OF ITS THESIS WHEN I DESCRIBED IT.



-

7. FOOD AID: LABELING HIS GOVERNMENT AS THE FIRST

CIVILIAN REGIME IN 21 YEARS, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID

HE WAS VERY DISAPPOINTED THAT HIS PROVISIONAL

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, UNDERTAKEN AT

THE URGING OF WESTERN EMBASSIES, HAD NOT TRIGGERED THE

RESUMPTION OF WESTERN ASSISTANCE HE EXPECTED. THE

WEST RISKS SEEING ANOTHER MILITARY REGIME IN SOMALIA

HE INSISTED. MADAR THEN TOOK ME TO TASK FOR THE

ALLEGED REFUSAL OF THE USG TO PROVIDE FOOD AID TO

SOMALIA, AT A TIME WHEN IT IS FURNISHING HOSTILE

REGIMES IN ETHIOPIA AND MOZAMBIQUE WITH MASSIVE FOOD

ASSISTANCE. MADAR LISTENED PATIENTLY AS I EXPLAINED

THE APOLITICAL NATURE OF USG EMERGENCY RELIEF PROGRAMS,

INFORMED HIM THAT USG COMMODITIES ARE BEING DELIVERED

TO THE ICRC AT BERBERA FOR USE IN THE NORTH, AND GAVE

HIM A STATUS REPORT ON OUR PROPOSAL FOR 5 MILLION USDOLS

IN EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE FOR THE MOGADISHU AREA.



-

8. PETROLEUM SHORTAGE: BEFORE I COULD LEAVE, THE

PRIME MINISTER ASKED THAT THE USG INTERCEDE WITH THE

IBRD TO OBTAIN RELEASE OF THE THIRD TRANCHE

OF THE AGRICULTURAL STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM. HE

EXPLAINED THAT THE GSDR WAS COUNTING ON IT TO FINANCE

PETROLEUM IMPORTS FOR WHICH IT HAS NO OTHER FUNDS. AS

JUSTIFICATION, HE MENTIONED SEVERAL REFORMS THE GSDR

HAS TAKEN SINCE THE RECENT DEPARTURE OF THE IBRD

AGRICULTURAL TEAM. IN RESPONDING TO MADAR, I GAVE

HIM NO BASIS FOR ENCOURAGEMENT.



-

9. COMMENT: THE PRIME MINISTER'S INABILITY TO

IDENTIFY A STRATEGY FOR POLITICAL RECONCILIATION

REFLECTS MORE, I SUSPECT, THE NEAR PARALYSIS

AFFLICTING SIAD BARRE'S GOVERNMENT THAN ANY

WIDESPREAD BELIEF THAT GENERAL MORGAN'S ONGOING

MILITARY CAMPAIGN IS GOING TO CHECKMATE THE REGIME'S

ARMED OPPONENTS. MADAR'S DEFENSIVENESS AND LACK OF

A POLITICAL GAMEPLAN WERE ECHOED AT LUNCH DECEMBER 23

BY REGIME LOYALIST BASHIR FARAH KAHIE, MADAR'S

MINISTER OF COMMERCE.



BISHOP

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