SUDAN'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: MORE IN CHECK

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KHARTOUM 05759 LAGOS FOR ROSE E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: MARR MCAP PGOV PINR KPRP SU SUBJECT: SUDAN'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: MORE IN CHECK THAN IN CHARGE ¶1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT ¶2. SUMMARY: IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF JUNE 30, 1989, WHEN ELEMENTS OF SUDAN'S ARMORED AND AIRBORNE FORCES SEIZED POWER FROM PRIME MINISTER SADIQ AL MAHDI, IT WAS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT THE LONG-AWAITED TAKEOVER BY THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT HAD FINALLY TAKEN PLACE. HOWEVER, IT QUICKLY BECAME CLEAR THAT THE COUP HAD BEEN ORGANIZED AND CARRIED OUT BY A SELECT FEW, PERHAPS EVEN LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED OFFICERS AND MEN, NOT EVEN FULLY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE TWO UNITS PRIMARILY INVOLVED. THE JUNTA QUICKLY ANNOUNCED THE FORMATION OF A REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL (RCC) COMPOSED OF FIFTEEN MILITARY OFFICERS RANGING IN RANK FROM BRIGADIER TO MAJOR. SOME OFFICERS SENIOR TO THE RCC MEMBERS WERE RETIRED. DESPITE THE RETIREMENTS AND TRANSFERS, IT APPEARED THAT SUDAN'S MILITARY WAS FIRMLY IN CHARGE OF THE GOVERNMENT. MANY RETIRED OFFICERS WERE CALLED BACK TO ACTIVE DUTY AND ASSIGNED CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION POSTS SUCH AS REGIONAL GOVERNOR. OTHERS WHO HAD REMAINED ON ACTIVE DUTY WERE PROMOTED. MOST OF THE NEW "LEADERS" HAD SIGNIFICANT COMBAT EXPERIENCE IN THE SOUTH AND ALL APPEARED TO SUPPORT GENERAL OMAR AL BASHIR AND THE RCC. ¶3. TEN MONTHS AFTER THE COUP, THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, AS HAVE OTHERS, HAS BEEN FORCED TO REEVALUATE ITS POSITION REGARDING THE GOS. AS MANY AS ONE THOUSAND OFFICERS (TWENTY TO TWENTY FIVE PERCENT OF THE CORPS) HAVE BEEN SACKED AND THOSE REMAINING ARE DISILLUSIONED BY THE DISTINCT ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST HUE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RECENT UNITY DECLARATION WITH LIBYA. THEY ARE ALSO UNHAPPY WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO MOVE DECISIVELY TO END THE WAR IN THE SOUTH. NEARLY ONE HUNDRED ACTIVE AND RETIRED OFFICERS ARE IN PRISON FOR TWO SEPARATE COUP PLOTS AND TWENTY EIGHT HAVE ALREADY BEEN EXECUTED. RUMORS OF CONTINUING PLOTTING AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT ABOUND, BUT THE RCC AND ITS SECURITY APPARATUS HAVE REPORTEDLY INFILTRATED UNITS FROM THE HIGHEST TO THE LOWEST LEVELS, EFFECTIVELY PREEMPTING ANY POTENTIALLY DECISIVE ACTION. FROM APPARENT POWER TO OBVIOUS EMASCULATION, SUDAN'S MILITARY IS NOW MORE IN CHECK THAN IN CHARGE AND FACES AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE. END SUMMARY. A SMALL GROUP IN CHARGE ¶4. IN FEBRUARY 1989 WHEN SUDAN'S MILITARY LEADERS GAVE PRIME MINISTER SADIQ AL MAHDI AN ULTIMATUM REGARDING THE WAR IN THE SOUTH, IT WAS CLEAR TO MANY OBSERVERS THAT SADIQ'S DAYS WERE NUMBERED. THE MILITARY HAD BECOME INCREASINGLY UNHAPPY WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S LACK OF DECISIVENESS AND PETTY PARTISAN BICKERING, THE CONTINUING EROSION OF THE ECONOMY, AND THE GENERAL MALAISE AFFECTING VIRTUALLY ALL SECTORS OF SUDANESE SOCIETY. THUS, ON JUNE 30, 1989 WHEN RADIO OMDURMAN ANNOUNCED THAT THE MILITARY HAD DEPOSED SADIQ, MOST SUDANESE WERE ACTUALLY RELIEVED. WIDELY REGARDED AS THE MOST RATIONAL, MOST OBJECTIVE, AND ONLY TRULY NATIONALIST GROUP IN SUDAN, THE MILITARY, IT WAS BELIEVED, WOULD END THE WAR IN THE SOUTH AND GET THE COUNTRY MOVING. ¶5. IT SOON BECAME CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND HAD NO ROLE IN THE COUP. THE COUP HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT BY A FEW BRIGADIERS AND COLONELS WITH PERHAPS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED SOLDIERS. A FORMER PARATROOP COMMANDER, BRIG OMAR AL BASHIR EMERGED AS THE LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION. ALTHOUGH HE QUICKLY NAMED HIMSELF AND FOURTEEN OTHER OFFICERS TO A REVOLUTION COMMAND COUNCIL (RCC) TO RULE THE COUNTRY, CONFLICT WITH THE HIGH COMMAND WAS IMMEDIATELY EVIDENT. MOST OF THE RCC MEMBERS HAD LITTLE COMMAND OR COMBAT EXPERIENCE. THEY WERE PRIMARILY STAFF AND SUPPORT OFFICERS AND NOT ONE, INCLUDING OMAR HIMSELF, WAS WELL KNOWN WITHIN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. CONFLICT WITHIN THE MILITARY ¶6. RUMORS SPREAD QUICKLY OF A POSSIBLE COUNTERCOUP. THE FACT THAT OMAR AND HIS GROUP SUCCEEDED BY DECEIVING UNIT COMMANDERS, PLAYING THEM OFF AGAINST EACH OTHER AND LEADING THEM TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WERE ACTING WITH THE APPROVAL AND SUPPORT OF THE HIGH COMMAND, UNDERMINED THE REVOLUTION'S LEGITIMACY. MANY BELIEVED THEN, AS THEY DO NOW, THAT OMAR, AIDED AND ABETTED BY THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT (NIF),MADE HIS MOVE WHEN AND HOW HE DID TO THWART OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS FROM CARRYING OUT THEIR OWN COUP. THEY ALSO ALLEGE THAT THE COUP WAS DESIGNED TO THWART THE PEACE PROCESS WHICH LOOKED PROMISING AND WHICH THE NIF OPPOSED. WHETHER THE NIF WAS INVOLVED OR NOT IS STILL QUESTIONABLE, BUT THE PREEMPTION SCENARIO HELPS EXPLAIN WHY THERE WAS NO OPPOSITION TO THE COUP--NO ONE REALLY KNEW WHO WAS IN CHARGE AND VIRTUALLY EVERYONE SUPPORTED ONE COUP PLOTTER OR ANOTHER. ¶7. THE BIGGEST PROBLEM FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE MILITARY REPORTEDLY WAS THE 7TH ARMORED DIVISION COMMANDER, MAJOR GENERAL MIRGHANI YASIN BABIKIR, A WELL RESPECTED OFFICER WHO MANY BELIEVED HAD HIS OWN PLANS. HE TOO HAD BEEN DUPED BY OMAR AND HAD IN FACT MADE OMAR'S SUCCESS POSSIBLE BY COMMITTING HIS DUTY OFFICER, MAJOR IBRAHIM SHAMS EL DIN, TO BRING FIFTEEN TANKS INTO THE CITY FROM THEIR BASE AT AL SHAGARA. LITTLE DID GENERAL BABIKIR KNOW THAT SHAMS EL DIN WAS IN LEAGUE WITH OMAR. WITHOUT THE TANKS TO COMMAND KEY POINTS IN AND AROUND THE CITY, THE COUP PROBABLY WOULD HAVE FAILED. THE ISOLATION AND SUBSEQUENT SWIFT ARREST OF THE SPAF HIGH COMMAND ALSO PREVENTED THE ISSUANCE OF ORDERS TO SUPPRESS BASHIR'S COHORTS. ¶8. OMAR REASSURED GENERAL BABIKIR AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS OF HIS NATIONALISM AND UNSELFISH COMMITMENT TO SUDAN. HE ALSO ASSURED THEM HE WOULD NOT POLITICIZE THE MILITARY AND THAT HE WOULD KEEP IT ABOVE THE SECTARIAN SQUABBLES OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTIES. PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS ADOPTED A "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE. SENIOR OFFICERS OUT ¶9. WHILE REASSURING THE MILITARY ON ONE HAND, THE NEW GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO DISCHARGE OFFICERS SENIOR TO THE RCC MEMBERS. VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE COMMAND STRUCTURE WAS PENSIONED OFF ALONG WITH APPROXIMATELY THREE HUNDRED OTHER OFFICERS TO INCLUDE MAJOR GENERALS, BRIGADIERS, AND A FEW COLONELS. SEVERAL OFFICERS SYMPATHETIC TO THE REVOLUTION WERE PROMOTED AND A FEW WHO HAD BEEN RETIRED WERE RECALLED TO SERVE AS REGIONAL GOVERNORS AND IN OTHER ROLES IN THE GOVERNMENT. THE NEW COMMAND STRUCTURE JUSTIFIED THE RCC'S ACTIONS IN MILITARY TERMS, INDICATING THAT OFFICERS SENIOR TO THE MEMBERS OF THE RCC COULD NOT TAKE ORDERS FROM THEM. RETIRED OFFICERS IN SUDAN RECEIVE NINETY PERCENT PAY SO THERE WAS LITTLE IMPACT ON THEIR FINANCIAL WELL-BEING. IN MAY 1990, HOWEVER, RETIRED OFFICERS LOST SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS INCLUDING ACCESS TO MILITARY COMMISSARIES AND FUEL SUPPLIES FOR PERSONAL VEHICLES. CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RCC AND THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT ¶10. PROBLEMS, HOWEVER, AROSE ALMOST IMMEDIATELY BETWEEN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND THE RCC. THE NEW GOVERNMENT, IN ATTEMPTING TO GOVERN THE COUNTRY AND DEAL WITH THE MANY NON-MILITARY PROBLEMS FACING IT, PAID LESS AND LESS ATTENTION TO THE CONCERNS OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. RUMORS THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS CONTROLLED OR HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT (NIF) FURTHER UNDERMINED THE RCC. THE MILITARY, FOR THE FIRST TIME, BEGAN TO FEEL THE THREAT OF POLITICIZATION. HOWEVER, THEY CONTINUED TO "WAIT AND SEE," THOUGH SEVERAL OFFICERS CLAIM THEY URGED GENERAL OMAR TO PURGE OR OTHERWISE CONTROL THE NIF INFLUENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT. ¶11. DUE TO A GENUINE DESIRE FOR PEACE, AND PARTLY IN AN EFFORT TO APPEASE THE MILITARY, THE RCC ANNOUNCED A CONTINUATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE WITH THE SPLA/M AND ATTEMPTED TO NEGOTIATE AN END TO THE CIVIL WAR IN THE SOUTH. AT THE SAME TIME, THE NEW GOVERNMENT BEGAN REINFORCING GARRISONS THROUGHOUT THE SOUTH WITH ARMS PURCHASED FROM CHINA BY THE SADIQ GOVERNMENT. ADDITIONAL SHIPMENTS OF SMALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION WERE ARRANGED WITH LIBYA AND IRAQ WHICH BEGAN TO MAKE DELIVERIES DIRECTLY INTO JUBA AS WELL AS KHARTOUM. NEGOTIATING FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH WAS THE WATCHWORD AND THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT APPEARED SATISFIED, CONVINCED OF THE RCC'S SINCERITY. THE WAR IN THE SOUTH ¶12. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SPLA/M DID NOT GO WELL AND IN LATE OCTOBER GARANG'S FORCES ATTACKED AND TOOK THE BORDER TOWN OF KURMUK. THE GOS RESPONDED BY BOMBING SEVERAL SOUTHERN TOWNS AND THE CEASE-FIRE EFFECTIVELY ENDED. GOS FORCES RETOOK KURMUK IN LATE NOVEMBER, AFTER THE SPLA WITHDREW, BUT REBEL FORCES LAUNCHED SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS ON GOVERNMENT GARRISONS THROUGHOUT THE SOUTH. ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATIONS FAILED TO ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE AND THE SPLA BESIEGED YEI IN AN EFFORT TO TAKE ALL OF EASTERN EQUATORIA AND ISOLATE JUBA. THEY ALSO BEGAN INDISCRIMINATE SHELLING OF JUBA. REINFORCED BY TROOPS FROM JUBA, YEI HELD AND THE SPLA CAMPAIGN CAME TO A HALT. ALTHOUGH FIGHTING CONTINUES THROUGHOUT THE SOUTH, AND BOTH THE SPAF AND THE SPLA APPEAR TO BE MASSING TROOPS FOR A MAJOR CONFRONTATION IN UPPER NILE REGION, BOTH SIDES ARE AGAIN STALEMATED, ALTHOUGH SOME MIGHT ARGUE THAT THE SPLA NOW HAS THE UPPER HAND. PEOPLE'S ARMY OR BUDDING ISLAMIC LEGION? ¶13. AS NIF INFLUENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT INCREASED, SO DID DISSATISFACTION WITHIN THE MILITARY. TO PROTECT ITSELF FROM DISAFFECTED OFFICERS THE RCC INFILTRATED VIRTUALLY EVERY MILITARY UNIT WITH LOYALISTS, MANY WITH STRONG NIF SYMPATHIES. AT THE SAME TIME, NIF SYMPATHIZERS WERE ADMITTED IN INCREASING NUMBERS TO OFFICER TRAINING SCHOOL. BY EARLY APRIL 1990 SENIOR NIF MEMBERS TOLD EMBOFFS THAT AS MANY AS FIFTEEN PERCENT OF THE OFFICER CORPS WERE NIF, UP FROM AN ESTIMATED LESS THAN FIVE PERCENT DURING THE SADIQ ERA. FOLLOWING THE MARCH AND APRIL COUP ATTEMPTS, ANOTHER THREE TO FOUR HUNDRED OFFICERS WERE PURGED FROM THE MILITARY, INCREASING NIF AND OTHER LOYALIST CONTROL OF UNITS. ¶14. OVER FIFTY PERCENT OF MOST ARMY UNITS ARE STAFFED BY SOLDIERS AND NCOS FROM THE SOUTH. MOST HAVE LITTLE COMMITMENT OR DEDICATION TO THE GOVERNMENT--THEY JOINED FOR THE SUGAR AND OTHER RATIONS GIVEN TO SOLDIERS, AS WELL AS THE SALARY. ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE OFTEN ACQUITTED THEMSELVES WELL IN BATTLE, GENERALLY SURRENDERING ONLY WHEN THEIR FOOD AND AMMUNITION WERE DEPLETED, THEY HAVE LITTLE STOMACH FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. AS WITH MORE OBVIOUS MERCENARIES, THEIR LOYALTY IS A FUNCTION OF THEIR PAY AND ALLOWANCES. OFFICERS IN THE SOUTH ARE ALSO KNOWN FOR THEIR CORRUPTION WHICH NOT ONLY EARNS THEM THE ENMITY OF THE LOCAL POPULATION BUT ALSO FURTHER DIVIDES THEM FROM THEIR TROOPS. NORTHERN, ARAB OFFICERS ARE REPORTEDLY LESS THAN COMFORTABLE WITH THEIR SUBORDINATES AND THIS FEELING OF UNEASE IS INCREASING AS THE OFFICER CORPS BECOME MORE AND MORE POLITICIZED. ¶15. OFFICERS ARE ALSO CONCERNED THAT THE CURRENT HIGH COMMAND LACKS THE PERSONALITIES AND CLOUT TO TAKE ON THE RCC OVER ISSUES CONCERNING THE WELFARE OF THE OFFICER CORPS. THIS IS A MARKED DEPARTURE FROM THE TRADITIONAL POLITICO-MILITARY EQUATION IN SUDAN. THE MILITARY HAS ALSO NOT BEEN IMMUNE TO RESTRICTIONS AND OTHER LAWS AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTED BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT. MILITARY OFFICERS ARE REQUIRED TO OBSERVE CURFEW HOURS AND CURRENCY AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS. ALTHOUGH FEW OFFICERS HAVE BEEN DISCIPLINED BY THE REGIME, (EXCEPT THOSE IMPLICATED IN COUP PLOTS OR ATTEMPTS),SEVERAL, INCLUDING THE CHIEF OF STAFF, HAVE RELATIVES WHO HAVE BEEN DETAINED OR ROUGHED UP BY SECURITY OFFICIALS. IN ALMOST ALL CASES, THE OFFICER'S STATUS HAS BEEN INSUFFICIENT TO PROTECT THE RELATIVE. ¶16. TO AUGMENT THE ARMY, THE GOS IN LATE 1989 PASSED THE POPULAR DEFENSE ACT PROVIDING FOR THE LOCAL ESTABLISHMENT OF POPULAR DEFENSE FORCES (PDF) AND THE ARMING OF TRIBAL MILITIAS. ALTHOUGH MILITIAS ARE NOW BETTER ARMED THAN EVER BEFORE, THE GOS EXERTS LITTLE CONTROL OVER THEM. POPULAR DEFENSE FORCES HAVE BEEN ALMOST COMPLETELY TAKEN OVER BY NIF ELEMENTS. AS SUCH, ALTHOUGH NOMINALLY UNDER A MILITARY COMMANDER, THEY REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT COUNTERFORCE TO THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. AS MANY AS TWO THOUSAND KHARTOUM RESIDENTS, MOSTLY NIF SYMPATHIZERS AND INCLUDING MANY UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, WERE RECRUITED AND TRAINED IN THE PDF. SEVERAL OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT MILITARY UNITS MAY EVENTUALLY BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE KHARTOUM AREA WHOSE SECURITY WILL BE PROVIDED FOR BY PDF FORCES ACTING AS A PALACE GUARD. SUCH A CHANGE WOULD FURTHER REDUCE TRADITIONAL MILITARY INFLUENCE IN SUDAN. SO FAR, HOWEVER, THE NIF HAS ONLY BEEN MARGINALLY SUCCESSFUL IN THE PDF. THERE IS LITTLE EMPATHY BETWEEN THEM AND THEIR TRAINERS AND MANY NIF RECRUITS HAVE ALREADY DESERTED DUE TO THE SPARTAN AND DISCIPLINED CONDITIONS IN PDF CAMPS. BUDGET/CAPABILITIES ¶17. ACTUAL MINISTRY OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1988-1989 UNDER THE SADIQ GOVERNMENT TOTALLED 1.5 BILLION SUDANESE POUNDS (333 MILLION USDOLS AT THE LEGAL RATE OF EXCHANGE). THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1989-1990 UNDER GENERAL OMAR ALLOCATES 3.6 BILLION SUDANESE POUNDS (800 MILLION USDOLS) FOR DEFENSE. NEITHER OF THESE FIGURES INCLUDES THE APPROXIMATELY 1 MILLION USDOLS WHICH THE GOS SAYS THAT IT SPENDS PER DAY IN WAGING THE WAR IN THE SOUTH. ALTHOUGH THE INCREASE OF OVER 100 PERCENT IN DEFENSE SPENDING IS IMPRESSIVE, PLANNED EXPENDITURES IN THE MINISTRIES OF AGRICULTURE AND ENERGY ALSO DOUBLED, AND THE IRRIGATION MINISTRY SHOWS A 300 PERCENT INCREASE. DESPITE THEIR BACKGROUNDS, THE RCC HAS NOT FAVORED THE MILITARY OVER OTHER MINISTRIES. IN ADDITION, ACCORDING TO RCC ECONOMIC COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, COL. SALAH EL DIN KARRAR, THERE WILL BE NO PROMOTIONS OR PAY RAISES IN THE MILITARY FOR THE NEXT THREE YEARS. ¶18. SHORTLY AFTER ASSUMING POWER, GENERAL OMAR'S GOVERNMENT BEGAN TO RECEIVE TANKS, ARMORED CARS, AND AIR DEFENSE AND FIELD ARTILLERY FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. ALTHOUGH CONTRIBUTING SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE CAPABILITIES OF THE SPAF, THIS EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN ORDERED BY SADIQ AND FINANCED BY SAUDI ARABIA (THROUGH A THIRD COUNTRY) PRIOR TO JUNE 30. SMALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION AND AIR TRANSPORTS WERE PROVIDED BY BOTH LIBYA AND IRAQ AT OMAR'S REQUEST. OTHERWISE, THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAS DONE LITTLE TO ENHANCE OR STRENGTHEN THE MILITARY. RECRUITMENT INTO MILITARY UNITS, AFTER AN INITIAL SURGE, HAS NOW TAPERED OFF IN FAVOR OF THE PDF. ¶19. SPAF STRENGTH HAS REMAINED CONSTANT WITH AN ESTIMATE OF APPROXIMATELY 4,000-6,000 OFFICERS AND 65,000-70,000 ENLISTED MEN AND WOMEN. THERE ARE 55,000-60,000 IN THE ARMY; 3,000 IN THE AIR FORCE; 3,000 IN THE AIR DEFENSE FORCE; AND 1,500 IN THE NAVY. ORDER OF BATTLE INCLUDES FOUR INFANTRY DIVISIONS; ONE ARMORED DIVISION; ONE ENGINEER DIVISION; ONE AIRBORNE DIVISION CONSISTING OF ONE BRIGADE, SPECIAL FORCES AND RECONNAISANCE UNITS; FIELD AND AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY UNITS; AND A TRANSPORTATION AND SUPPLY CORPS. THE AIR FORCE HAS THIRTY-THREE OPERATIONAL SOVIET AND CHINESE MIG-21, MIG-23, F-5, AND F-6 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT; SIX C-130 TRANSPORTS (FIVE OPERATIONAL); THIRTY-FOUR U.S., FRENCH, AND SOVIET HELICOPTERS; AND FIVE OPERATIONAL SOVIET TRANSPORTS. NAVAL EQUIPMENT INCLUDES EIGHTEEN COASTAL PATROL CRAFT, MOSTLY PROVIDED BY YUGOSLAVIA. ALL SENIOR SUDANESE NAVAL OFFICERS WERE TRAINED IN YUGOSLAVIA, BUT NAVAL OPERATIONAL READINESS REMAINS VERY LOW. COMMENT ¶20. WHILE SUDAN'S MILITARY APPEARS LITTLE CHANGED AS A RESULT OF THE JUNE 30, 1989 COUP, THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS RADICALLY DIFFERENT. PREMATURE RETIREMENTS, PROMOTIONS WITHOUT REGARD TO SENIORITY, AND ASSIGNMENTS WITHOUT REGARD TO ABILITY HAVE SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED TRADITIONAL MILITARY VALUES. TOGETHER WITH OBVIOUS POLITICIZATION OF THE OFFICER CORPS, THEY HAVE ERODED PROFESSIONALISM PERHAPS BEYOND REPAIR. ¶21. EXECUTIONS FOR THE APRIL 1990 COUP ATTEMPT FOLLOWING HASTILY ORGANIZED CLOSED TRIALS WITH NO REGARD TO DUE PROCESS HAVE FURTHER ISOLATED THE GOS FROM THE MILITARY. DISAFFECTION IN THE ARMED FORCES REMAINS HIGH AND IS LIKELY TO INCREASE. COUP PLOTTING CONTINUES AND FUTURE ATTEMPTS TO DEPOSE GENERAL OMAR AND THE RCC ARE ALMOST CERTAIN. ¶22. WHILE THE CURRENT GOS IS CONTROLLED BY CAREER MILITARY OFFICERS AND NO EFFORT HAS BEEN SPARED TO PROVIDE THE SPAF WITH THE RESOURCES NECESSARY TO PROSECUTE THE WAR IN THE SOUTH, SUDAN'S MILITARY IS FAR FROM IN CHARGE OF THE COUNTRY. THE SPLA STILL CONTROLS THE MAJORITY OF THE SOUTH AND NIF INFLUENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT HAS DRIVEN A WEDGE BETWEEN THE RCC AND THEIR FORMER COMRADES IN ARMS. SUDAN MAY HAVE A MILITARY GOVERNMENT, BUT FOR THE TIME BEING THE MILITARY ITSELF HAS BEEN CHECKED AND GENERAL OMAR APPEARS TO BE SETTING UP THE MATE. CHEEK