DEMARCHE TO GOS REGARDING INTELLIGENCE

S E C R E T KHARTOUM 12303 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL PINR MOPS MARR SU IZ SA US SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO GOS REGARDING INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH IRAQ REF: A) STATE 397758, B) CAIRO 23889, C) KHARTOUM 12254 ¶1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT ¶2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR PRESENTED REF A DEMARCHE TO FOREIGN MINISTER SAHLOUL MORNING NOVEMBER 26. FOREIGN MINISTER GRAVELY ACKNOWLEDGED SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR GOS AVOWED POSITION OF NEUTRALITY IN GULF CONFLICT AND ITS RELATIONS WITH USG AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF ANY SHARING WITH IRAQ OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE SAUDI FIGHTER PILOT DEFECTOR. HE AGREED PROMPTLY TO CONVEY OUR DEMARCHE TO THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GOS. END SUMMARY ¶3. AMBASSADOR ACCOMPANIED BY ECON COUNSELLOR CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER ALI SAHLOUL MORNING NOVEMBER 26 TO PRESENT DEMARCHE AS INSTRUCTED REF A. ALSO PRESENT ON GOS SIDE WERE DIRECTOR TWO AMERICAS DEPARTMENT, AMB. OMAR ABDEL MAGID, AND HIS DEPUTY KAMAL AHMED FADUL (NOTETAKER). ¶4. AMBASSADOR BEGAN BY RECALLING HIS AUGUST 28 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT AL BASHIR DURING WHICH HE HAD WARNED THE PRESIDENT AGAINST ANY GOS ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR IRAQ AND VIOLATIONS OF UNSC RESOLUTIONS ON THE GULF CONFLICT. HE NOTED THAT PRESIDENT HAD ASSURED HIM AT THAT TIME THAT GOS HAD NOT AND WOULD NOT ACTIVELY SUPPORT IRAQ AND THAT IT WOULD RESPECT UNSC RESOLUTIONS ON THE GULF. SINCE THEN THERE HAD BEEN SOME INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS ON UNSC RESOLUTIONS RELATED TO ASSISTANCE TO IRAQUI SHIPS IN PORT SUDAN WHICH WE HAD BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOS. GIVEN THIS BACKGROUND WE WERE NOW SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT IRAQ COULD GATHER INTELLIGENCE FROM THE SAUDI FIGHTER PILOT WHO DEFECTED TO SUDAN RECENTLY AND REMAINED IN GOS CUSTODY. THIS CONCERN HAD INCREASED IN RECENT DAYS AS A RESULT OF INDICATIONS THAT THE GOS MIGHT ALLOW THE IRAQUIS TO EXPLOIT THE SAUDI PILOT FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES. ¶5. THE AMBASSADOR THEN SLOWLY READ TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER THE FULL TEXT OF THE TALKING POINTS IN PARA 2 OF REF A AND GAVE HIM A NON-PAPER WHICH CONTAINED THEM. THE FOREIGN MINISTER GRAVELY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WAS A MOST SERIOUS MATTER WHICH HE APPRECIATED THE AMBASSADOR PROMPTLY BRINGING TO HIS ATTENTION. HE AGREED WITH THE POINT THAT SUCH ACTION BY THE GOS WOULD DESTROY ITS CLAIM TO NEUTRALITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN THE GULF CONFLICT AND UNDERMINE ITS EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION WITHIN THE ARAB FAMILY. HE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THE GRAVE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH ACTION FOR GOS RELATIONS WITH THE USG AND OTHER ALLIED GOVERNMENTS. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD CONVEY OUR DEMARCHE TO THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GOS. AMBASSDOR URGED HIM TO DO SO QUICKLY GIVEN THE GRAVITY OF THE ISSUE AND THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES FOR SUDAN. AS AMBASSADOR OMAR ABDEL MAGID ESCORTED AMBASSADOR TO HIS CAR HE CONFIDED THAT THIS WAS THE MOST SERIOUS MEETING HE HAD ATTENDED DURING HIS TENURE IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. AMBASSADOR AGREED THAT IT WAS INDEED SERIOUS. ¶6. COMMENT: I DOUBT THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER IS IN THE LOOP ON GOS HANDLING OF THE DEFECTED SAUDI FIGHTER PILOT. HE NOW IS AND I BELIEVE HE WILL DO AS HE SAID AND CONVEY OUR DEMARCHE TO THE PRESIDENT. IT MAY WELL BE TOO LATE TO DETER THE GOS (REF B). NEVERTHELESS, AS I NOTED REF C, WE HAVE AT LEAST PUT THE GOS ON NOTICE AND LAID DOWN A MARKER SHOULD A MORE SEVERE RESPONSE BE REQUIRED LATER. ¶7. POSTSCRIPT: AFTER DRAFTING ABOVE, AMBASSADOR OMAR MAGID TELEPHONED TO INFORM ME THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SAHLOUL HAD SPOKEN TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT OUR DEMARCHE THIS MORNING AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER WISHED TO SEE ME TOMORROW (NOVEMBER 27) AT 0845. CHEEK