MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD: DEFANGED BUT REHABILITATED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 CAIRO 16206 LONDON FOR MILLIKEN, PARIS FOR WINN, CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12356: DEC:OADR TAGS: KISL PGOV PINS KPRP EG SUBJECT: MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD: DEFANGED BUT REHABILITATED REF: FBIS JN2505152689 ¶1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. ¶2. SUMMARY: TWO YEARS AGO, MUBARAK BET THAT BY ADMITTING THE OUTLAWED MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD (MB) TO THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY, THE GROUP WOULD BE COOPTED AND THUS UNDERMINED AS THE CATALYST OF AN ISLAMIC OPPOSITION MOVEMENT. NOW, THE BET IS PAYING OFF: THE MB HAS GAINED IN STATUS IN THE RAREFIED ESTABLISHMENT POLITICAL ARENA, BUT HAS BEEN DEFANGED AS A THREAT TO THE REGIME. EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC FACTORS ALSO HAVE HELPED DIMINISH ANXIETY OVER THE MB IN PARTICULAR AND REVOLUTIONARY ISLAM IN GENERAL: THE FAILURE OF ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT IN IRAN; THE COLLAPSE OF THE "ISLAMIC" INVESTMENT COMPANIES; DISSENSION BETWEEN THE MB AND ITS OPPOSITION PARTNERS AND MORE EXTREME ISLAMIC RIVALS; AND A STRING OF MB PROGRAM FAILURES UNDER A GERIATRIC LEADERSHIP. YET, THE MB ALSO HAS BENEFITED FROM PLAYING THE REGIME'S GAME: IN PART, THE REHABILITATION OF THE MB IS A STRATEGIC SUCCESS OF THEIR OWN ATTEMPT TO APPEAR RESPONSIBLE AND ESTABLISHMENTARIAN. THAT THEY AIM CLEARLY AT THE POLITICAL CENTER IS CLEAR FROM THEIR MOST RECENT, REMARKABLY MODERATE-SOUNDING PLATFORM. THUS, THEY MAY BE SUCCEEDING IN TRANSFORMING FROM A PERCEIVED POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY FORCE INTO A MORE SUBTLE BUT STILL SUBSTANTIAL THREAT TO THE REGIME: A POTENTIALLY PLAUSIBLE, "MODERATE" CIVILIAN ALTERNATIVE. THOUGH THEY ARE STILL FAR FROM ACHIEVING SUCH A DEGREE OF CREDIBILITY, WITH THEIR EXPERIENCE, DISCIPLINE, MONEY, LINGERING POPULARITY, AND YOUNGER TALENT WAITING RESPECTFULLY IN THE WINGS, THE MB SEEM THE OPPOSITION ELEMENT MOST LIKELY TO ENDURE IN EGYPTIAN POLITICS. MOREOVER, IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE MB HAVE DETERMINED TO STAY WITHIN THE SYSTEM. MEANWHILE, THE GOVERNMENT REMAINS A FAR MORE INFLUENTIAL FORCE THAN THE MB OR ANY OTHER POLITICAL GROUP IN THE BROADER, CULTURAL RELIGIOUS REAWAKENING. END SUMMARY. -------------- REHABILITATION FOR REGIME PURPOSES -------------- ¶3. LEGAL LIMBO: OVER ITS 60 YEARS OF EXISTENCE, THE MB HAS USUALLY SPRAWLED MORE (BUT NOT ENTIRELY) TO ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER OF THE AMBIGUOUS DIVISION BETWEEN UNDERGROUND AND ESTABLISHMENT POLITICS. TODAY, IT IS ALL BUT COMPLETELY INTO THE MAINSTREAM POLITICAL ARENA, FORSWEARING UNDERGROUND ACTIVITY AND POSSESSING ALL THE EARMARKS AND ACTIVITIES OF A LEGITIMATE POLITICAL PARTY EXCEPT THE OFFICIAL LICENSE TO CALL ITSELF ONE. THE MB MAINTAINS THAT THE 1954 DECREE DISSOLVING IT WAS LATER RESCINDED. THE GROUP CONTINUES TO SLOG ALONG WITH AN ARRAY OF LEGAL CASES AIMED AT GAINING FORMAL PARTY STATUS AND RECOVERING VARIOUS SUSPENDED PUBLISHING LICENSES. AT THE SAME TIME, INTERIOR MINISTER ZAKI BADR LOSES NO OPPORTUNITY TO PROCLAIM THE MB IS ILLEGAL, CRIMINAL, SUBVERSIVE -- AND DOES NOT EVEN EXIST; IF IT DID EXIST, ITS MEMBERS SHOULD BE IN JAIL, NOT STANDING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE. ¶4. POLITICAL PAWNS: SADAT BEGAN THE MB'S REHABILITATION WHEN, IN THE MID-1970S, HE RELEASED THOSE OLDTIME MB PERSONALITIES WHO HAD SURVIVED NASSER'S PRISONS. HIS OBJECTIVE WAS TO HELP ESTABLISH HIS CREDENTIALS AS THE "BELIEVER PRESIDENT", AIMING TO USE ISLAM TO CRUSH THE REMNANTS OF LEFTIST INFLUENCE. MUBARAK FURTHER EXPANDED THE MB'S ACCESS TO ESTABLISHMENT POLITICS BY ALLOWING ABOUT SIX OF THEM TO BE ELECTED TO THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY UNDER THE OPPOSITION WAFD PARTY IN 1984. ZAKI BADR'S VIEWS NOTWITHSTANDING, IN 1987, MUBARAK ALLOWED ABOUT 35 MB DEPUTIES TO BE OPENLY IDENTIFIED AND ELECTED AS SUCH (WITH ONLY THE THINNEST OF LEGAL COVERS AS TECHNICAL MEMBERS OF THE SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY). MUBARAK'S MOTIVES WERE QUITE DIFFERENT FROM SADAT'S: UNDER HIS CONCEPT OF "DEMOCRACY" (ESSENTIALLY MEANING FREEDOM OF SPEECH) AS A "SAFETY VALVE", HE EVIDENTLY CALCULATED THAT THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY THREAT PERCEIVED IN THOSE TIMES WOULD PROVE MORE MANAGEABLE ABOVE GROUND, WITH THE MB AS THE PRINCIPAL VOICE OF POLITICAL ISLAM. OVER TWO YEARS AFTER MUBARAK WAS ACCUSED OF A DANGEROUS GAMBLE, IT APPEARS THAT THE CALCULATIONS BEHIND HIS BET WERE CORRECT. ¶5. DE FACTO PARTY: TODAY, THE MB RECEIVE FOREIGN DIPLOMATS AND JOURNALISTS -- WITHOUT THE ADVANCE APPROVAL OF THE INTERIOR MINISTRY UPON WHICH THEY USED TO INSIST AS RECENTLY AS 1986 -- AND CONDUCT OTHER ORDINARY POLITICAL PARTY BUSINESS AT A WELL-KNOWN HQ IN DOWNTOWN CAIRO. THEY PUBLISH A MONTHLY MAGAZINE (LIWA' AL-ISLAM, THE BANNER OF ISLAM) AND HAVE DIRECT ACCESS TO SEVERAL OTHER INDEPENDENT MONTHLIES AND WEEKLIES (AL-'ETISAM, AL-MOKHTAR AL-ISLAMI, AL-NUR, AL-SHAAB). MB MEMBERS ALSO ARE IDENTIFIED AS SUCH ON THE BOARDS OF THE PHYSICIANS AND JOURNALISTS' SYNDICATES AND, UNTIL RECENTLY, THE LAWYERS' SYNDICATE. THE MOST SUBSTANTIAL RECOGNITION OF THE MB AS A POLITICAL PARTY REMAINS THEIR IDENTITY AS AN INDEPENDENT GROUP IN THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY UNDER THEIR OWN DELEGATION LEADER, FORMER SENIOR JUDGE MA'MUN AL-HODEIBY (SON OF AN EARLY SUPREME GUIDE). THE MB NOW ARE THE LARGEST (THERE ARE ABOUT 33) AND CERTAINLY THE MOST COHESIVE BLOC OF OPPOSITION DEPUTIES IN THE ASSEMBLY. MOREOVER, THE MB AND THE CENTER-RIGHT, RELATIVELY SECULAR NATIONALIST WAFD, ARE THE ONLY TWO LEGAL OPPOSITION GROUPINGS WITH ANY PROVEN HISTORIC STAYING POWER AND SIGNIFICANT POPULAR FOLLOWING FROM ASWAN TO ALEXANDRIA. -------------- GETTING MIRED IN THE MAINSTREAM -------------- ¶6. JOINING THE OPPOSITION DOLDRUMS: THIS STATUS, HOWEVER, REMAINS FAR FROM SATISFACTORY TO THE MB. AS IS TRUE FOR ALL EGYPTIAN OPPOSITION GROUPINGS, THE MB'S FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ACCESS TO THE MEDIA AND ASSEMBLY DO NOT CONSTITUTE GENUINE POLITICAL ENFRANCHISEMENT. LACKING THE RULING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S (NDP) ACCESS TO THE STATE BUREAUCRACY AND ITS ABILITY TO DISTRIBUTE JOBS, EDUCATION, HOUSING, AND OTHER GOODS AND SERVICES, THE MB (OR ANY OTHER OPPOSITION GROUPING) IS UNLIKELY EVER TO BE VOTED INTO POWER, EVEN IF THE INTERIOR MINISTRY WERE TO PERMIT GENUINE ELECTIONS. THE MB AND OTHER OPPOSITION PARTIES CAN OFFER ONLY SLOGANS; THE RULING PARTY -- ANY RULING PARTY -- OFFERS TANGIBLE BENEFITS TO INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITIES. ¶7. DEFANGING: THUS, AS THE REGIME MUST HAVE HOPED, THE MB'S PARTICIPATION IN THE FORMAL POLITICAL "SYSTEM" OF THE PAST FEW YEARS HAS DEFANGED THE GROUP AS THE PRETENDERS TO LEADERSHIP OF A NEW ISLAMIC ERA: IN THE ASSEMBLY AND IN THEIR PRESS, THEY HAVE LOOKED AND SOUNDED MUCH LIKE THE OTHER OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES; THEY HAVE ACCOMPLISHED NO MORE THAN THE OTHERS, AND HAVE PROVED NO MORE OF A THREAT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE. IN SUM, EVEN EGYPTIAN SECULARISTS AND CHRISTIANS NO LONGER LIVE IN IMMEDIATE DREAD OF THE MB. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ISLAMICISTS HAVE SHOWN GREATER INDEPENDENCE OF THE MB: NOW IN THE LEGITIMATE POLITICAL THEATRE THERE ARE A GAGGLE OF MORE PROMINENT ISLAMIC "INDEPENDENTS", AND A NEW (MORE OR LESS FRIENDLY) RIVAL PARTY IN THE ISLAMIC WING OF THE BELEAGUERED SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY. -------------- EBBING OF REVOLUTIONARY ISLAM? -------------- ¶8. EXTERNAL FACTORS -- IRAN: THE DEFLATION OF THE PERCEIVED THREAT FROM THE MB TAKES PLACE IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF A RELAXATION OF PERCEPTIONS OF A THREAT FROM REVOLUTIONARY ISLAM IN GENERAL. THE MB, LIKE EGYPT'S OTHER ISLAMIC POLITICIANS, EVIDENTLY FAILED IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO PICK AND CHOOSE ONLY THOSE ASPECTS OF KHOMEINISM WITH WHICH THEY WISHED TO BE ASSOCIATED. EVEN THOSE EGYPTIANS WHO PERCEIVE AND RESENT WESTERN CULTURAL OR POLITICAL DOMINATION SEEM MORE REVOLTED BY THE ISLAMIC "ALTERNATIVE" MODELED BY "HANGING JUDGE" KHAMENEI, THE NEAR-HERESY AND VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH SHI'ISM, AND, PERHAPS MOST OF ALL, IRAN'S PERCEIVED "LOSS" OF THE WAR WITH IRAQ. "NEITHER EAST NOR WEST" -- A KHOMEINI SLOGAN BORROWED BY THE MB FOR ITS 1987 ELECTION CAMPAIGN -- HAS A SUPERFICIAL APPEAL TO BOTH LEFTIST AND ISLAMICIST INTELLECTUALS, BUT EVEN THEY JOIN THE MASSES IN SETTING THE WEST AND EAST ON VERY DIFFERENT LEVELS OF FRIENDSHIP AND ATTRACTION: FOR THE VAST MAJORITY OF EGYPTIANS, THE WEST IS NO SATAN AND THE EAST IS NO FRIEND. THUS, EXCEPT AMONG THE COMMITTED MINORITY, THE APPEAL OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN EGYPT HAS FALLEN WITH ITS FORTUNES IN IRAN. ¶9. DOMESTIC SETBACKS: OTHER UNCONTROLLABLE EVENTS HAVE ADDED TO THE MB'S MISFORTUNES. MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, THE CRASH OF THE ISLAMIC PONZI SCHEMES IN 1988 DEALT A SHATTERING BLOW TO THE ATTRACTION OF POLITICAL ISLAM TO THE LITTLE MAN, WHILE THE GOVERNMENT SOMEHOW HAS MANAGED TO ESCAPE THE ANTICIPATED BACKLASH FROM THE THOUSANDS OF RUINED SMALL INVESTORS. AS RECOGNIZED CAPITALISTS, THE MB PERHAPS UNFAIRLY WAS IDENTIFIED WITH THESE COMPANIES; IT HAD KNOWN CLOSE TIES ONLY TO "SHERIF", THE MOST LEGITIMATE OF THE "ISLAMIC" COMPANIES AND THE ONLY ONE THAT SEEMS TO HAVE SURVIVED. MOREOVER, THE ONGOING, BITTER FACTIONALISM THAT SHATTERED THE SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY THIS SPRING WAS WIDELY BLAMED ON THE INFECTION OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN GENERAL, AND ON THE SLP'S DALLIANCE WITH THE MB IN PARTICULAR. MEANWHILE, OVER THE PAST YEAR AND ONE HALF, THE MB HAS FACED SHARP, SOMETIMES EVEN VIOLENT ATTACK FROM ITS MORE EXTREME RIVALS FOR LEADERSHIP OF POLITICAL ISLAM. ¶10. FAILURES: FINALLY, THE MB HAS HAD A STRING OF PROGRAM FAILURES, PROBABLY AT LEAST PARTLY DUE TO THE AGING LEADERSHIP'S INABILITY TO CUT DEALS WITH STRONGER ADVERSARIES. THE MB LOST ITS TWO SEATS ON THE BOARD OF THE LAWYERS' SYNDICATE. THEY FAILED TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT EVEN A TOKEN SEAT IN THE SHURA COUNCIL ELECTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS. MOREOVER, AS THE SECULARISTS ARE CROWING, THE MB HAVE LITTLE IN THE WAY OF TANGIBLE ISLAMIC ACHIEVEMENT TO SHOW FOR THEIR TWO YEARS IN PARLIAMENT: THE MOST ONE MB DEPUTY COULD CLAIM WAS SUCCESS IN "PRESENTING ISLAMIC IDEAS WITH CLARITY." IN PRIVATE, THE MB LEADERS ARE FAR MORE DISGRUNTLED. WE EXPECT THAT MANY IN THE MB WILL BE REASSESSING THEIR STRATEGY OF PLAYING WITHIN THE SYSTEM -- ESPECIALLY FOLLOWING THE INSULT AND INJURY THEY SUFFERED AT THE HANDS OF THE REGIME DURING THE SHURA COUNCIL ELECTIONS. -------------- WHOSE STRATEGIC SUCCESS? -------------- ¶11. DE-RADICALIZATION: ON THE OTHER HAND, THE MB'S PRESENT UNTHREATENING PUBLIC IMAGE MAY REPRESENT AS IMPORTANT A STRATEGIC SUCCESS FOR THEM AS FOR THE SECULAR STATE. IF MUBARAK HAS WON HIS OBJECTIVE OF DEFLATING THE REVOLUTIONARY THREAT FROM THE MB AND EXTREMIST POLITICAL ISLAM, THE MB ALSO HAS COME FAR TOWARD ITS GOAL OF LOOKING MODERATE, RESPONSIBLE, AND ESTABLISHMENTARIAN. SINCERE OR NOT, THE MB LEADERS' PUBLIC STATEMENTS REITERATE THE GROUP'S REJECTION OF ASSOCIATION WITH KHOMEINISM, EGYPTIAN RADICAL GROUPS, VIOLENCE, OR EVEN URGENCY IN THE ISLAMIC REFORMS FOR WHICH THEY CALL. THUS, WHILE EGYPTIAN OPPOSITION PARTIES MARCH LEMMING-LIKE FOR THE EDGES OF PUBLIC OPINION, THE MB CALMLY AND METHODICALLY AIMS FOR DEAD CENTER. IN FACT, BY EGYPTIAN STANDARDS, THE MB'S PROGRAM PUBLISHED DURING THE SHURA COUNCIL ELECTION "CAMPAIGN" LAST MAY IS A MODEL OF BOTH RHETORICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE MODERATION. MANY OF ITS POINTS ARE NEAR OR IDENTICAL TO NDP POSITIONS. THUS THE MB DIRECTLY CHALLENGE THE CLAIM OF THE REGIME AND ITS PARTY TO THE LOYALTY OF THE MASS CENTER -- PERHAPS ONE REASON THE MB WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE SHURA COUNCIL IN 1989. ALTHOUGH SUCH AN IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE HAS LITTLE PROMISE OF SHAKING THE BEDROCK OF MASS PERSONAL AND COMMUNAL INTERESTS THAT ADD UP TO SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME, IT MERITS EXAMINATION AS A REFLECTION OF THE MB'S READING OF THE MINDSET OF THE BROADER CONSTITUENCY THEY MUST HOPE ONE DAY TO WREST FROM THE REGIME. -------------- THE MB'S PROGRAM TODAY -------------- ¶12. THE MOST RECENT, DETAILED AND COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT OF THE MB'S PROGRAM WAS THEIR MAY 1989 SHURA COUNCIL ELECTION PLATFORM (REF FBIS). IT IS NOTABLY SHORT ON ISLAMIC CANT AND LONG ON THE EVERYDAY, LIBERAL, CENTRIST BROMIDES THAT ARE THE STUFF OF BOTH THE WAFD AND THE NDP'S PITCHES TO POPULAR POLITICAL DEMANDS. THE MB CANDIDATES PLEDGE TO FIGHT, "IN SOLIDARITY WITH ALL HONORABLE ELEMENTS WITHIN THE NATIONALIST FORCES," FOR ACHIEVEMENTS IN: CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL REFORM; GRADUAL IMPLEMENTATION OF ISLAMIC LAW; ELIMINATING CORRUPTION; EDUCATION, MEDICAL CARE, HOUSING AND OTHER SOCIAL SERVICES; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS: -- CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL REFORM: THE MB CALLS FOR DIRECT ELECTION OF A PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT FROM AMONG SEVERAL CANDIDATES, AS WELL AS ELECTION OF MAYORS AND GOVERNORS. THEY WANT ABOLISHMENT OF THE EMERGENCY LAW AND ALL OTHER "ANTI-DEMOCRATIC" LAWS AND PRACTICES; COMPLETE FREEDOM FOR FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES (IN OTHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS, HOWEVER, THEY STATE THEIR CONTINUING OPPOSITION TO THE NASSERITES, NO DOUBT DUE TO THE PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL SCARS INFLICTED ON THEM BY NASSER); SEPARATION OF THE RULING PARTY FROM STATE ORGANS; GUARANTEES OF THE FAIRNESS OF ELECTIONS; AND REPRESENTATION OF WORKERS AND PEASANTS (IRONICALLY, THE WESTERNIZED LIBERALS SUCH AS THE WAFDISTS SEE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE UNEDUCATED AS ONE OF THE CRITICAL WEAKNESSES OF EGYPTIAN "DEMOCRACY;" HERE, THE PROPERTIED MB ARE CASTING A BONE TO THE LEFT.) THEY CALL FOR STRENGTHENING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY, AND PUTTING IT IN CHARGE OF PRISONS IN ORDER TO END TORTURE AND INDEFINITE PREVENTATIVE DETENTION. -- ISLAMIC LAW: THE MB CALL FOR "IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION" OF THE ARTICLE OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH STATES THAT ISLAM IS THE RELIGION OF THE STATE AND "THE PRINCIPLES OF ISLAM ARE THE MAIN SOURCE OF LEGISLATION." (MORE RADICAL ISLAMICISTS WANT THE CONSTITUTION TO STATE THAT ISLAM IS THE ONLY/ONLY SOURCE OF LEGISLATION.) THEY DEFLATE THE URGENCY OF THEIR APPEAL, HOWEVER, BY CALLING ONLY TO "BEGIN THE REPEAL OF LAWS THAT CLEARLY VIOLATE ISLAMIC LAW." TO FURTHER ASSUAGE THE MODERATE CENTER, THEY EMPHASIZE THAT "ISLAM IS A STATE AND CIVILIZATION OWNED BY ALL WHO CONTRIBUTED TO IT. THUS THE BROTHER COPTS IN PARTICULAR AND THE PEOPLE OF THE BOOK IN GENERAL HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AS MUSLIMS." -- CORRUPTION: THE MB IDEALISTICALLY EXHORT PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, TO BE GOOD, AND URGE OFFICIAL ENCOURAGEMENT, EDUCATION, PROHIBITIONS AND SANCTIONS TO THIS END. SIGNIFICANTLY, THE MB DO NOT/NOT CALL FOR THE "HUDUD" - CHOPPING OFF HANDS OF THIEVES, STONING OF ADULTERERS, ETC, THAT THE RADICALS PUT AT THE HEART OF ISLAMIC LAW. THE MB WOULD CLOSE ALL GOVERNMENT-OWNED ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE FACTORIES (NO REFERENCE TO PRIVATELY OWNED PRODUCERS),STOP GAMBLING, AND ISSUE NO MORE LICENSES FOR "BUFFOONERY AND ENTERTAINMENT ON THE PRETEXT OF ENCOURAGING TOURISM." PRESUMABLY, CURRENT LICENSES FOR BUFFOONERY WOULD BE UNAFFECTED. -- EDUCATION AND CULTURE: THE MB CALL FOR RADICAL EDUCATIONAL IMPROVEMENT TO PERMIT EGYPT TO "FOLLOW THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION." ANY CALL FOR INTENSIFYING ISLAMIC INDOCTRINATION OR CENSORSHIP IS NOTABLY OBSCURE, IF NOT ABSENT; THE MB LIMIT THEMSELVES TO URGING STATE PROPAGANDA EFFORTS AIMED AT SPREADING RELIGIOUS VALUES AND OVERCOMING ALIENATION. THEY ALSO CALL FOR FREEING THE MEDIA FROM GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL. -- SOCIAL SERVICES AND ECONOMIC REFORM: THE MB URGE "SERIOUS ... SOLUTIONS THAT DO NOT DEPEND ON THE GUIDANCE OF THE IMF OR USAID." THE STATE SHOULD "BEWARE OF INTERFERENCE BY FOREIGNERS" IN ECONOMIC POLICY AND "GUARD AGAINST THEIR CONTROL OF ECONOMIC AND PRODUCTIVE GUIDANCE CENTERS." DEVELOPMENT SHOULD BE BASED ON "SELF-RELIANCE" AND "ISLAMIC PRIORITIES." THEY WOULD STOP PRINTING NEW BANKNOTES TO COVER THE DEFICIT; REDUCE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON LUXURIES; "LIQUIDATE MONEY-LOSING ECONOMIC ESTABLISHMENTS"; REFORM THE TAX SYSTEM TO SOAK THE RICH AND REDUCE THE BURDEN ON THE POOR; RAISE THE MINIMUM WAGE; MAINTAIN SUBSIDIES OF BASIC COMMODITIES; AND ENCOURAGE THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO JOIN THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN BUILDING LOW- AND MEDIUM- INCOME HOUSING. THE MB MAKE THE FIRST CAMPAIGN REFERENCE WE HAVE SEEN IN EGYPT TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE, CALLING FOR REDUCING POLLUTION AS A PREVENTATIVE MEDICAL STEP. THEY WOULD ENCOURAGE EGYPTIAN INVESTMENT IN EGYPT, AND COOOPERATE WITH ARAB ECONOMIES, BUT THEY MAKE NO REFERENCE TO ENCOURAGING "FOREIGN" (I.E. NON-ARAB) INVESTMENT. ORGANS OF THE STATE SHOULD "URGE" CITIZENS TO CONSUME LESS AND PREVENT WASTE. THE STATE SHOULD INTERVENE IN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, WITH LONG- AND SHORT- TERM PLANS. THE PUBLIC SECTOR IS THE "NERVE CENTER" OF THE ECONOMY, BUT IT MUST GET OUT OF FIELDS THAT THE PRIVATE SECTOR CAN HANDLE. -- FOREIGN RELATIONS: THE MB SUPPORT THE EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES. THEY URGE COMMITMENT TO THE NAM POLICY OF "BALANCED RELATIONS WITH BOTH EAST AND WEST" (IN CONTRAST TO THE ISOLATIONIST "NEITHER EAST NOR WEST" LINE OF RADICAL ISLAM). THEY MERELY URGE "CARE" IN RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., IN LIGHT OF ITS "FLAGRANT" PRO-ISRAELI STANDS; "FREEZING", NOT ABROGATION, OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS; A "COMPREHENSIVE BOYCOTT OF THE ISRAELI PRESENCE IN EGYPT," BUT WITHOUT CALLING FOR A BREAK IN BILATERAL RELATIONS; AND CALL ONLY FOR SUPPORT OF THE "POLITICAL JIHAD", NOT THE VIOLENT STRUGGLE, "BEING WAGED BY OUR PALESTINIAN BROTHERS," AND OF "THEIR RIGHT TO ESTABLISH THEIR INDEPENDENT STATE ON THEIR SOIL." THEY OPPOSE FRAGMENTATION AND SECTARIANISM IN LEBANON AND SECESSIONISM IN SUDAN. -------------- MUTUAL BENEFIT OF THE MB-GOVERNMENT DEAL -------------- ¶13. CONCLUSION: BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND MB EVIDENTLY HAVE GOT MUCH OF WHAT THEY WANTED FROM THEIR 1987 DEAL: THE MB GAINED SOMETHING CLOSE TO LEGITIMACY, ACCESS TO THE NATIONAL MEDIA (INCLUDING TELEVISED PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY DEBATES),AND A VALUABLE IMMUNITY FROM OUTRIGHT REPRESSION, REGARDLESS OF THE INTERIOR MINISTER'S OUTSPOKEN VIEWS. THEIR POSITION AS THE ONLY PLAUSIBLE ISLAMIC POLITICAL MOVEMENT, HOWEVER WEAK, IS STRENGTHENED: WITH THEIR PRIVATE WEALTH, LINGERING MASS APPEAL, DISCIPLINE, AND AT LEAST A FEW DEDICATED YOUTHFUL LEADERS WAITING IN THE WINGS, THE MB ARE MORE LIKELY THAN ANY OF THE ESTABLISHED PARTIES TO ENDURE AS A FORCE IN EGYPTIAN POLITICS. FOR THE REGIME'S PART, IN RETURN FOR ENDURING MORE VOCAL PUBLIC CRITICISM FROM ISLAMIC POLITICAL QUARTERS, IT HAS SPLIT THE ISLAMIC OPPOSITION INTO A COMFORTABLY-MANAGED MAINSTREAM ELEMENT (THE MB) AND A "CRIMINAL" ELEMENT ("THE ISLAMIC GROUP" AND THE LIKE) THAT IT IS STERNLY REPRESSING WITH LITTLE SIGN OF BROAD PUBLIC REACTION. MEANWHILE, AS ALL THIS OCCURS AT THE RAREFIED POLITICAL LEVELS, A CULTURAL RELIGIOUS REVIVAL CONTINUES IN FITS AND STARTS IN THE BROADER EGYPTIAN SOCIETY. THE GOVERNMENT SEEMS TO HAVE MUCH MORE INFLUENCE ON THAT LARGER CULTURAL PROCESS THAN HAVE THE MB, OR ANY OTHER POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS GROUPS. WISNER