IRAN/IRAQ WAR: SITUATION IN TEHRAN

S E C R E T STATE 227611 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: IR IZ PK SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ WAR: SITUATION IN TEHRAN REF: ISLAMABAD 15582 ¶1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. ¶2. DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES VERY MUCH MFA ADDITIONAL SECRETARY KHAN'S READOUT OF HIS RECENT VISIT TO TEHRAN (REFTEL). WE AGREE WITH HIS GENERAL ASSESSMENT THAT THERE ARE NO SIGNS THAT THE IRANIAN SIDE IS READY TO MOVE TOWARD MEDIATION/NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WAR. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT HE IS CORRECT THAT A MAJOR IRANIAN OFFENSIVE SHOULD BE EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS, IF IT CAN BE MANAGED LOGISTICALLY. WE WERE STRUCK, HOWEVER, AND VERY INTERESTED, IN HIS COMMENTS REGARDING IRANIAN MORALE AND DECREASING SUPPORT FOR THE REVOLUTION WHICH HE OBSERVED, BOTH IN TEHRAN AND THE COUNTRYSIDE. HIS OBSERVATION ON THE MODERATE GROUP AMONG THE CLERGY WAS ALSO OF GREAT INTEREST TO US. ON DOMESTIC IRANIAN ISSUES AS WELL AS ON MATTERS OF SHIA THEOLOGY AND THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE CLERGY AND THE GOVERNMENT, SUCH A GROUP HAS BEEN IDENTIFIABLE FOR SOME TIME. WE HAVE NOT SEEN, HOWEVER, RECENT EVIDENCE THAT ITS DIFFERENCES WITH THE DOMINANT, MORE RADICAL GROUP EXTENDED TO OPPOSITION TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR. ¶3. WITH THAT AS BACKGROUND, WE WOULD APPRECIATE EMBASSY FOLLOWING UP WITH KHAN, FOCUSSING ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: -THE CHANGED ATMOSPHERE IN TEHRAN: ON WHAT DOES HE HINGE HIS JUDGMENT THAT THE MOOD TOWARD THE REVOLUTION OR THE WAR HAS CHANGED? SPECIFICALLY, WHAT ARE HIS GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT THE FRUSTRATIONS NOTED REFTEL EXTEND TO LOWER CLASS SUPPORTERS OF THE REGIME AND ARE THUS NOT JUST A MIDDLE CLASS PHENOMENON? DO THE PAKISTANIS BELIEVE THEY HAVE A GOOD SENSE OF POLITICAL TRENDS IN SOUTH TEHRAN, FOR EXAMPLE? (SOUTH TEHRAN IS THE LOWER CLASS RESIDENTIAL AREA OF THE CAPITAL, WHERE MANY OF THE RECENT MIGRANTS FROM THE COUNTRY LIVE). --ON WHAT BASIS DOES HE JUDGE THAT THE MOOD "IN THE COUNTRYSIDE" HAS CHANGED ALONG THE LINES OF THE MOOD IN TEHRAN? HOW DOES HE MEASURE/ASSESS THAT MOOD? --THE COMPOSITION OF THE MODERATE CLERICAL GROUP INTERESTS US. WHO ARE ITS LEADERS? PROMINENT SUPPORTERS? HOW DOES KHAN KNOW THEIR VIEWS ON THE WAR (AS OPPOSED TO DOMESTIC ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS WHICH ARE SUBJECTS OF OPEN DEBATE)? DOES HE HAVE THE SENSE THAT THIS GROUP IS GROWING IN IMPORTANCE? AND, ABOVE ALL, DOES HE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE IRANIAN VIEW OF THE WAR IS A MATTER OF POTENTIAL DEBATE OR CONCEIVABLE CHANGE OF POLICY WHILE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI REMAINS IN ACTIVE CONTROL OF THE REGIME? IS THERE ANY INDICATION THAT A MIDDLE GROUND MIGHT DEVELOP (OR EXISTS) WHEREBY IRAN WOULD ACCEPT AN END TO THE WAR AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN FROM POWER, BUT NOT THE ELIMINATION OF BAATH PARTY CONTROL OF THE STATE? SHULTZ