MUSEVENI AND THE RADICAL MUSLIMS.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 02314 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL PINS PNAT PTER PGOV EPET PLO UG WI LY IR XA SX SUBJECT: MUSEVENI AND THE RADICAL MUSLIMS. ¶1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. ¶2. SUMMARY: UGANDA'S RELATIONS WITH LIBYA CONTINUE TO INTENSIFY. PRESIDENT MUSEVENI HAS MET WITH DELEGATIONS FROM THE PLO AND SAHARAN ARAB DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (SADR); GOU HAS NORMALIZED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE LATTER ORGANIZATIONS. NRM HAS ALSO RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO FEELERS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH IRAN. THIS RAPPRO- CHEMENT WITH RADICAL MUSLIM STATES --AND IT IS A RAPPROCHEMENT SINCE MOST ENJOYED GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE AMIN GOVERNMENT-- STEMS FROM AN NRM PERCEPTION THAT IT WILL ENHANCE ITS ATTRACTIVENESS TO POTENTIAL MUSLIM DONORS AND A FUNDAMENTAL IDENTITY OF VIEWS ON SELF- DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS AND BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS. END SUMMARY. ¶3. THE PACE OF LIBYAN-UGANDAN RELATIONS IS INTENSIFYING. IN RECENT MONTHS THE LIBYANS HAVE SENT A TRADE DELEGATION, A FINANCIAL TEAM AND MEDICAL TEAM. GOU HAS ANNOUNCED THAT MUSEVENI HAS HELD TALKS WITH A DOCTOR MUKHTAR ALI ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SETTING UP A JOINT HOLDING COMPANY TO COOPERATE WITH THE UGANDA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. THE GOU HAS ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT IT IS EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF CREATING AN OIL COMPANY IN COOPERATION WITH THE GOL. ON JULY 4,THE GOU ACKNOWLEDGED IT WAS RECEIVING DONATED DRUGS FROM THE GOL. ¶4. THE LIBYAN PEOPLES BUREAU HAS EXPANDED IN SIZE TO SIX , AND THE STAFF HAVE ADOPTED A HIGHER PROFILE ROLE IN KAMPALA. THE LIBYANS ARE LIKELY TO SOON RAISE RELATIONS TO THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL (SINCE THE 1979 WAR AGAINST AMIN THE LIBYAN MISSION HAS BEEN HEADED BY A CHARGE). ¶5. COMMENT: THE HOLDING COMPANY AND OIL COMPANY WILL ALLOW THE LIBYANS TO ENLARGE THEIR COMMUNITY, SOMETHING THEY WERE UNABLE TO DO DURING THE OBOTE/OKELLO PERIOD. THE UGANDANS PROBABLY BELIEVE SINCERELY-- ALBEIT NAIVELY-- THAT THEY CAN GENUINELY BENEFIT FROM LIBYAN LARGESSE AND STILL RETAIN CONTROL OF THE RELATIONSHIP. THE OIL COMPANY IS PARTICULARLY ATTRACTIVE AND FITS NICELY WITH NRM ECONO- MIC PLANNING. AS A LANDLOCKED COUNTRY, TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON IMPORTED POL, UGANDA HAS ALWAYS BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT ITS VULNERABILITY TO BEING CUT OFF FROM POL SUPPLIES. TRADITIONALLY THE SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN TO TREAT THE PRIVATE OIL COMPANIES VERY WELL BY THIRD WORLD STANDARDS. THEY WERE ALLOWED TO BE PROFITABLE AND INDEPEN- DENT IN RETURN FOR GUARANTEEING UGANDA'S SUPPLY OF POL. THE NRM DISTRUSTS THE TRADITIONAL MODUS OPERANDI AND IS IDEOLOGICALLY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH WHAT IS PERCEIVED AS VULNERABILITY TO MULTINATIONAL CAPITALISM. THE GOU WOULD LIKE LIBYAN ASSISTANCE TO SET UP A GOU CONTROLLED OIL COMPANY TO GUARANTEE ITS SECURITY OF SUPPLY, MUCH AS IT HAS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PURCHASING A SHARE OF THE MOMBASA REFINERY FROM GOK FOR SIMILAR REASONS. ACCORDING TO AN OIL COMPANY SOURCE IN KAMPALA, THE PROPOSED COMPANY IS LIKELY TO BE A PARASTATAL OIL PROCUREMENT COMPANY OF THE TYPE COMMON IN AFRICA. IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR SUCH A COMPANY TO BE PROFITABLE, ACCORDING TO SOURCE, UNLESS THE LIBYANS PROVIDE A MASSIVE SUBSIDY EITHER IN THE FORM OF ESSENTIALLY FREE OIL, OR MONETARY EQUIVALENT. END COMMENT. ¶6. MUSEVENI HAS RECENTLY RECEIVED A PLO DELEGATION. THIS IS PROBABLY A UNILATERAL INITIATIVE ON THE PART OF PLO TO REESTABLISH THE FAVORABLE POSITION IT HELD UNDER THE AMIN REGIME WHEN THE PLO OPERATED A FARM AND TRAINING CAMPS IN UGANDA. COMMENT: THIS IS NOT A SURPRISING DEVELOPMENT. FROM DAY ONE OF THE MUSEVENI GOVERNMENT THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WILL TREAT WITH NEITHER THE SOUTH AFRICAN OR ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS; HIS SYMPATHIES ARE CLEARLY WITH THE PALESTINIANS, WHO HE FEELS HAVE BEEN EVICTED FROM THEIR HOMELAND BY ISRAELI MILITARY MIGHT. HE BELIEVES THE PLO IS JUSTIFIED IN FIGHTING FOR ITS RIGHTS, BUT FIRMLY DRAWS THE LINE AGAINST THE USE OF TERRORIST TACTICS, ESPECIALLY ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS WHETHER INSIDE OR OUTSIDE OF ISRAEL. HE POINTS WITH PRIDE TO THE FACT HE NEVER RESORTED TO TERRORISM DURING HIS FIVE YEAR STRUGGLE. BY ALLOWING THE PLO TO REESTABLISH ITS PRESENCE IN UGANDA, HE SIMPLY REJOINS THE RANKS OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF AFRICAN STATES. END COMMENT. ¶7. MUSEVENI RECENTLY RECEIVED A DELEGATION FROM THE SAHARAN ARAB DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (SADR) AND ISSUED A PUBLIC STATE- MENT INDICATING THAT HE WOULD ESTABLISH RELATIONS IN -ACCORDANCE WITH UGANDA'S POLICIES OF MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. ACCORDING TO AN EGYPTIAN SOURCE, THE MEETING RESULTED FROM AN INITIATIVE BY THE ALGERIANS. COMMENT: THE ACT OF RECOGNIZING THE SDAR IS MORE SIGNIFIC?NT THAN EMBRACING THE PLO, AS BY SO DOING MUSEVENI HAS TAKEN SIDES ON AN ISSUE WHERE THERE I? NO OVERWHELMING CONSENSUS IN AFRICAN AND ARAB CIRCLES. END COMMENT ¶8. COMMENT AND CONCLUSION: SEVERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT MUSEVENI'S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE RADICAL ARABS (AND PERHAPS PERSIANS) ARE IN ORDER. -- FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND LIBERATION ORGANIZATIONS, MUSEVENI'S EMBRACE REPRESENTS THE REESTABLISHMENT OF A FORMER POSITION. THE PLO AND LIBYANS WERE REPRESENTED HERE AND WERE QUITE INFLUENTIAL DURING THE AMIN YEARS. INCIDENTALLY, THEY ARE NOT REMEM- BERED FONDLY BY THE BULK OF UGANDANS. -- MUSEVENI IS DISAPPOINTED WITH THE WESTERN DONOR RESPONSE TO HIS EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE REQUEST OF DOLS 160 MILLION; TO DATE, LESS THAN DOLS 40 MILLION HAS BEEN PLEDGED. WHILE WE HAVE NO FIRM FIGURES, IF THE LIBYANS ARE PLAYING TRUE TO FORM THEY PROBABLY ARE BRANDISHING ABOUT RATHER SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS THAT, IF DELIVERED, WOULD MAKE THEM THE MOST IMPORTANT BILATERAL DONOR ON THE LOCAL SCENE. -- THERE IS AN IDEOLOGICAL COMPONENT TO MUSEVENI'S FAVORING THE RADICAL MIDDLE-EASTERNERS; THEY ARE PERCEIVED AS BEING TRULY NON-ALIGNED AND NOT DOMINATED BY EITHER WESTERN OR EASTERN BLOCS. THIS MAY BE NONSENSE, BUT THIRD WORLD SOLIDARITY IS CLEARLY EMERGING AS A MAJOR THEME OF MUSEVENI'S IDEOLOGY. MORE IMPORTANTLY THE ARAB'S SHARE MUSEVENI'S COMMITMENT TO MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND HE THEIRS OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS. -- INCIDENTALLY, THE STYLE OF ARAB RELATIONS IS WELL SUITED TO THE MUSEVENI REGIME, WHICH IS HIGHLY PERSONAL AND CENTERED AROUND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. TO ARRANGE LIBYAN ASSISTANCE MUSEVENI NEED ONLY TELEPHONE THE COLONEL, NOT ENGAGE IN THE SLOW PERSUASION AND BUREAUCRATIC CONCENSUS BUILDING NECESSARY FOR WESTERN ASSISTANCE. -- BY HOSTING AN EXPANDING RADICAL ARAB PRESENCE MUSEVENI IS INVITING PROBLEMS WITH A HOST OF COUNTRIES WHO HAVE BEEN VICTIMS OF LIBYAN-SUPPORTED SUBVERSION AND TERRORISM, NOTABLY EGYPT, ZAIRE, KENYA AND THE WESTERN NATIONS. WHILE MUSEVENI HAS SAID HE HAS TOLD THE LIBYANS HE WOULD NOT COUNTENANCE EXTRA-LEGAL ACTIONS ON UGANDAN TERRORITY, THE LIBYANS INEVITABLY WILL CHEAT AND WILL CREATE PROBLEMS FOR MUSEVENI WITH MOBUTU AND MOI. INTERNALLY, LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MUSLIM GROUPS WILL CREATE PROBLEMS AS WELL, AND WILL WORK AGAINST MUSEVENI'S EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE SECTARIAN- ISM AS A FACTOR IN LOCAL POLITICS. -- IN SUM, MUSEVENI IS GAMBLING THAT HE CAN STEER AND CONTROL THE RELATIONSHIP; THAT HE CAN USE THE RADICALS WITHOUT HIMSELF BEING VIOLATED. THE REAL DANGER TO AMERICANS IN UGANDA WILL COME WHEN THE LIKES OF THE LIBYANS CONCLUDE THAT THE VALUE OF THE MUSEVENI RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT OUTWEIGH THE OPPORTUNITY TO STRIKE LOCALLY AT U.S. INTERESTS. HOUDEK