MUSEVENI AND THE RADICAL MUSLIMS.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 02314


E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL PINS PNAT PTER PGOV EPET PLO UG WI LY IR XA SX
SUBJECT: MUSEVENI AND THE RADICAL MUSLIMS.


1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.


2. SUMMARY: UGANDA'S RELATIONS WITH LIBYA CONTINUE TO
INTENSIFY. PRESIDENT MUSEVENI HAS MET WITH DELEGATIONS FROM
THE PLO AND SAHARAN ARAB DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (SADR); GOU
HAS NORMALIZED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE LATTER
ORGANIZATIONS. NRM HAS ALSO RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO
FEELERS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH IRAN. THIS RAPPRO-
CHEMENT WITH RADICAL MUSLIM STATES --AND IT IS A
RAPPROCHEMENT SINCE MOST ENJOYED GOOD RELATIONS WITH
THE AMIN GOVERNMENT-- STEMS FROM AN NRM PERCEPTION THAT
IT WILL ENHANCE ITS ATTRACTIVENESS TO POTENTIAL MUSLIM
DONORS AND A FUNDAMENTAL IDENTITY OF VIEWS ON SELF-
DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS AND BLACK SOUTH
AFRICANS. END SUMMARY.


3. THE PACE OF LIBYAN-UGANDAN RELATIONS IS INTENSIFYING.
IN RECENT MONTHS THE LIBYANS HAVE SENT A TRADE DELEGATION,
A FINANCIAL TEAM AND MEDICAL TEAM. GOU HAS ANNOUNCED THAT
MUSEVENI HAS HELD TALKS WITH A DOCTOR MUKHTAR ALI ON THE
POSSIBILITY OF SETTING UP A JOINT HOLDING COMPANY TO
COOPERATE WITH THE UGANDA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. THE
GOU HAS ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT IT IS EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY
OF CREATING AN OIL COMPANY IN COOPERATION WITH THE GOL.
ON JULY 4,THE GOU ACKNOWLEDGED IT WAS RECEIVING DONATED
DRUGS FROM THE GOL.


4. THE LIBYAN PEOPLES BUREAU HAS EXPANDED IN SIZE
TO SIX , AND THE STAFF HAVE ADOPTED A HIGHER PROFILE ROLE
IN KAMPALA. THE LIBYANS ARE LIKELY TO SOON RAISE RELATIONS
TO THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL (SINCE THE 1979 WAR AGAINST AMIN
THE LIBYAN MISSION HAS BEEN HEADED BY A CHARGE).


5. COMMENT: THE HOLDING COMPANY AND OIL COMPANY WILL
ALLOW THE LIBYANS TO ENLARGE THEIR COMMUNITY, SOMETHING
THEY WERE UNABLE TO DO DURING THE OBOTE/OKELLO PERIOD.
THE UGANDANS PROBABLY BELIEVE SINCERELY-- ALBEIT NAIVELY--
THAT THEY CAN GENUINELY BENEFIT FROM LIBYAN LARGESSE AND
STILL RETAIN CONTROL OF THE RELATIONSHIP. THE OIL COMPANY
IS PARTICULARLY ATTRACTIVE AND FITS NICELY WITH NRM ECONO-
MIC PLANNING. AS A LANDLOCKED COUNTRY, TOTALLY DEPENDENT
ON IMPORTED POL, UGANDA HAS ALWAYS BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT
ITS VULNERABILITY TO BEING CUT OFF FROM POL SUPPLIES.
TRADITIONALLY THE SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN TO
TREAT THE PRIVATE OIL COMPANIES VERY WELL BY THIRD WORLD
STANDARDS. THEY WERE ALLOWED TO BE PROFITABLE AND INDEPEN-
DENT IN RETURN FOR GUARANTEEING UGANDA'S SUPPLY OF POL.
THE NRM DISTRUSTS THE TRADITIONAL MODUS OPERANDI AND IS
IDEOLOGICALLY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH WHAT IS PERCEIVED AS
VULNERABILITY TO MULTINATIONAL CAPITALISM. THE GOU WOULD
LIKE LIBYAN ASSISTANCE TO SET UP A GOU CONTROLLED OIL
COMPANY TO GUARANTEE ITS SECURITY OF SUPPLY, MUCH AS IT
HAS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PURCHASING A SHARE OF THE
MOMBASA REFINERY FROM GOK FOR SIMILAR REASONS. ACCORDING
TO AN OIL COMPANY SOURCE IN KAMPALA, THE PROPOSED COMPANY
IS LIKELY TO BE A PARASTATAL OIL PROCUREMENT COMPANY OF
THE TYPE COMMON IN AFRICA. IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR
SUCH A COMPANY TO BE PROFITABLE, ACCORDING TO SOURCE, UNLESS
THE LIBYANS PROVIDE A MASSIVE SUBSIDY EITHER IN THE FORM OF
ESSENTIALLY FREE OIL, OR MONETARY EQUIVALENT. END COMMENT.


6. MUSEVENI HAS RECENTLY RECEIVED A PLO DELEGATION. THIS
IS PROBABLY A UNILATERAL INITIATIVE ON THE PART OF PLO TO
REESTABLISH THE FAVORABLE POSITION IT HELD UNDER THE AMIN
REGIME WHEN THE PLO OPERATED A FARM AND TRAINING CAMPS IN
UGANDA. COMMENT: THIS IS NOT A SURPRISING DEVELOPMENT.
FROM DAY ONE OF THE MUSEVENI GOVERNMENT THE PRESIDENT HAS
MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WILL TREAT WITH NEITHER THE SOUTH
AFRICAN OR ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS; HIS SYMPATHIES ARE CLEARLY
WITH THE PALESTINIANS, WHO HE FEELS HAVE BEEN EVICTED FROM
THEIR HOMELAND BY ISRAELI MILITARY MIGHT. HE BELIEVES THE
PLO IS JUSTIFIED IN FIGHTING FOR ITS RIGHTS, BUT FIRMLY
DRAWS THE LINE AGAINST THE USE OF TERRORIST TACTICS,
ESPECIALLY ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS WHETHER INSIDE OR OUTSIDE
OF ISRAEL. HE POINTS WITH PRIDE TO THE FACT HE NEVER RESORTED
TO TERRORISM DURING HIS FIVE YEAR STRUGGLE. BY ALLOWING THE
PLO TO REESTABLISH ITS PRESENCE IN UGANDA, HE SIMPLY REJOINS
THE RANKS OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF AFRICAN STATES. END COMMENT.


7. MUSEVENI RECENTLY RECEIVED A DELEGATION FROM THE SAHARAN
ARAB DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (SADR) AND ISSUED A PUBLIC STATE-
MENT INDICATING THAT HE WOULD ESTABLISH RELATIONS IN
-ACCORDANCE WITH UGANDA'S POLICIES OF MAINTAINING GOOD
RELATIONS WITH ALL FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. ACCORDING TO AN
EGYPTIAN SOURCE, THE MEETING RESULTED FROM AN INITIATIVE
BY THE ALGERIANS. COMMENT: THE ACT OF RECOGNIZING
THE SDAR IS MORE SIGNIFIC?NT THAN EMBRACING THE PLO, AS
BY SO DOING MUSEVENI HAS TAKEN SIDES ON AN ISSUE WHERE
THERE I? NO OVERWHELMING CONSENSUS IN AFRICAN AND ARAB
CIRCLES. END COMMENT


8. COMMENT AND CONCLUSION:

SEVERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT MUSEVENI'S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH
THE RADICAL ARABS (AND PERHAPS PERSIANS) ARE IN ORDER.

-- FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND
LIBERATION ORGANIZATIONS, MUSEVENI'S EMBRACE REPRESENTS
THE REESTABLISHMENT OF A FORMER POSITION. THE PLO AND
LIBYANS WERE REPRESENTED HERE AND WERE QUITE INFLUENTIAL
DURING THE AMIN YEARS. INCIDENTALLY, THEY ARE NOT REMEM-
BERED FONDLY BY THE BULK OF UGANDANS.

-- MUSEVENI IS DISAPPOINTED WITH THE WESTERN DONOR
RESPONSE TO HIS EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE REQUEST OF DOLS
160 MILLION; TO DATE, LESS THAN DOLS 40 MILLION HAS BEEN
PLEDGED. WHILE WE HAVE NO FIRM FIGURES, IF THE LIBYANS ARE
PLAYING TRUE TO FORM THEY PROBABLY ARE BRANDISHING ABOUT
RATHER SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS THAT, IF DELIVERED, WOULD MAKE
THEM THE MOST IMPORTANT BILATERAL DONOR ON THE LOCAL SCENE.

-- THERE IS AN IDEOLOGICAL COMPONENT TO MUSEVENI'S FAVORING
THE RADICAL MIDDLE-EASTERNERS; THEY ARE PERCEIVED AS BEING
TRULY NON-ALIGNED AND NOT DOMINATED BY EITHER WESTERN OR
EASTERN BLOCS. THIS MAY BE NONSENSE, BUT THIRD WORLD
SOLIDARITY IS CLEARLY EMERGING AS A MAJOR THEME OF MUSEVENI'S
IDEOLOGY. MORE IMPORTANTLY THE ARAB'S SHARE MUSEVENI'S
COMMITMENT TO MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND HE
THEIRS OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS.

-- INCIDENTALLY, THE STYLE OF ARAB RELATIONS IS WELL
SUITED TO THE MUSEVENI REGIME, WHICH IS HIGHLY PERSONAL
AND CENTERED AROUND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. TO ARRANGE
LIBYAN ASSISTANCE MUSEVENI NEED ONLY TELEPHONE THE COLONEL,
NOT ENGAGE IN THE SLOW PERSUASION AND BUREAUCRATIC CONCENSUS
BUILDING NECESSARY FOR WESTERN ASSISTANCE.

-- BY HOSTING AN EXPANDING RADICAL ARAB PRESENCE MUSEVENI
IS INVITING PROBLEMS WITH A HOST OF COUNTRIES WHO HAVE BEEN
VICTIMS OF LIBYAN-SUPPORTED SUBVERSION AND TERRORISM,
NOTABLY EGYPT, ZAIRE, KENYA AND THE WESTERN NATIONS. WHILE
MUSEVENI HAS SAID HE HAS TOLD THE LIBYANS HE WOULD NOT
COUNTENANCE EXTRA-LEGAL ACTIONS ON UGANDAN TERRORITY, THE
LIBYANS INEVITABLY WILL CHEAT AND WILL CREATE PROBLEMS FOR
MUSEVENI WITH MOBUTU AND MOI. INTERNALLY, LIBYAN SUPPORT
FOR LOCAL MUSLIM GROUPS WILL CREATE PROBLEMS AS WELL, AND
WILL WORK AGAINST MUSEVENI'S EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE SECTARIAN-
ISM AS A FACTOR IN LOCAL POLITICS.

-- IN SUM, MUSEVENI IS GAMBLING THAT HE CAN STEER AND
CONTROL THE RELATIONSHIP; THAT HE CAN USE THE RADICALS
WITHOUT HIMSELF BEING VIOLATED. THE REAL DANGER TO
AMERICANS IN UGANDA WILL COME WHEN THE LIKES OF THE LIBYANS
CONCLUDE THAT THE VALUE OF THE MUSEVENI RELATIONSHIP DOES
NOT OUTWEIGH THE OPPORTUNITY TO STRIKE LOCALLY AT U.S.
INTERESTS.


HOUDEK