PROSPECTS FOR COLOMBIA'S GUERRILLA WAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 09347



E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: KPRP, PINS, MILI, PTER, CO

SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR COLOMBIA'S GUERRILLA WAR



1. (C) SUMMARY: THE GUERRILLA WAR IN COLOMBIA IS

STALEMATED: THE GUERRILLAS ARE UNABLE TO CONTROL AREAS

OF SIGNIFICANT POPULATION OR ENGAGE IN SET-PIECE

BATTLES, BUT THE GOVERNMENT IS UNLIKELY TO DESTROY

THEM. FIGHTING MAY INCREASE FOLLOWING THE INAUGURATION

OF THE BARCO ADMINISTRATION. THE GROUPS OUTSIDE THE

PEACE PROCESS WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT, BUT THE MAIN

LONG-TERM GUERRILLA THREAT IS THE FARC: WELL-ARMED,

WELL-FINANCED, POLITICALLY DURABLE, AND (FOR NOW) IN THE

PEACE PROCESS. THE COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES ARE HAMPERED

BY PROBLEMS OF PERSONNEL, INTELLIGENCE AND EQUIPMENT,

AND WOULD BE HARD PRESSED TO ENGAGE ALL COLOMBIA'S

GUERRILLA GROUPS AT ONE TIME. THE ARMED FORCES AND

PRESIDENT-ELECT BARCO ARE AWARE OF THESE DEFICIENCIES

AND WILL SEEK TO RECTIFY THEM. END SUMMARY.





A NEW BALL GAME?

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2. (C) FROM NEW PRESIDENT A NEW APPROACH: COLOMBIA IS

ABOUT TO ENTER A NEW STAGE IN ITS THIRTY-YEAR BATTLE

WITH GUERRILLA INSURGENCY. VIRGILIO BARCO AS THE NEW

PRESIDENT IS EXPECTED TO CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT'S

ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE GUERRILLA FORCES RANGED AGAINST

IT. BARCO HAS TOLD US OF HIS INTENTION TO MAKE THE

PEACE PROCESS CONFORM TO THE INTERESTS OF THE COLOMBIAN

GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE, AND REDUCE GUERRILLA MANIPULATION

OF THE PROCESS. HE WILL OFFER SOME ECONOMIC AND

POLITICAL REFORMS, CONCENTRATED IN RURAL AREAS WHERE THE

INSURGENCIES ARE STRONG. HE HAS ALSO SAID THAT HE WILL

STRENGTHEN THE ARMED FORCES. HOW THE GUERRILLA FORCES

WILL REACT TO BARCO'S TWO-HANDED POLICY IS THE KEY

QUESTION.



3. (C/NF) THE INSURGENT LINE-UP: THE COLOMBIAN

INSURGENCY IS A COMPLEX AND CONTRADICTORY PHENOMENON.

THE LARGEST OF COLOMBIA'S GUERRILLA GROUPS, THE

REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC),IS AT

PRESENT THE LEAST ACTIVE MILITARILY DUE TO ITS

PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS. THE FARC MAINTAINS

AROUND 4,000 PERSONNEL. COLOMBIAN ARMY SOURCES INDICATE

THAT THIS NUMBER INCLUDES ONLY HEAVILY ARMED FIGHTERS,

WITH SOME "FRONTS" (LOCAL FARC UNITS, DIVIDED ON A

GEOGRAPHIC BASIS) ABLE TO QUINTUPLE THEIR STRENGTH

THROUGH USE OF LIGHTLY ARMED AUXILIARIES. A SEPARATE

AND RECENT ESTIMATE DIVIDED FARC GUERRILLAS BETWEEN FULL

AND PART-TIMERS, AND CAME UP WITH 3,500 UNDER EACH

HEADING. THE FATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS WILL DETERMINE

WHETHER THIS CONSIDERABLE FORCE IS BROUGHT INTO THE

SCALES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THE REMAINING INSURGENT

GROUPS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY SPECTRUM -- THE M-19,

NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (ELN),POPULAR LIBERATION ARMY

(EPL),AND THE MINOR GUERRILLA GROUPS HAVE LARGELY

ABANDONED THE PEACE PROCESS, ALTHOUGH TWO FRONTS OF THE

ELN REMAIN INSIDE. OFFICIAL COLOMBIAN ESTIMATES OF THE

STRENGTH OF THE REMAINING MAJOR INSURGENT GROUPS

(INCLUDING BOTH FULL AND PART-TIME GUERRILLAS) ARE AS

FOLLOWS: AROUND 650 EPL, ABOUT THE SAME NUMBER OF ELN,

AND OVER 1,400 M-19. WE DO NOT HAVE GREAT CONFIDENCE IN

ANY OF THESE ESTIMATES. WHEN COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES

WISH TO LOOK SUCCESSFUL, THE NUMBERS GO DOWN; WHEN THEY

TALK ABOUT NEEDING MORE RESOURCES, THE NUMBERS GO UP.

IF FORCED TO CHOOSE, WE WOULD GUESS THAT ACTUAL STRENGTH

IS HIGHER THAN OFFICIALLY ESTIMATED, RATHER THAN LOWER.



4. (LOU) INSURGENT GAME PLANS: THE TACTICS OF THESE

GROUPS HAVE TRADITIONALLY CONSISTED OF EXTORTION,

KIDNAPPING, AND AMBUSHES OF COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES.

THE AVAILABLITY OF NARCO MONEY IN RECENT YEARS MAY HAVE

REDUCED THE PROPORTIONATE ROLE OF EXTORTION IN TOTAL

GUERRILLA FINANCING. URBAN TERRORISM REMAINS A PROBLEM,

BUT POLICE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN FAIRLY SUCCESSFUL IN

HUNTING DOWN TERRORIST SAFE HOUSES. POSSIBLY AS A

RESULT, M-19 AND ITS ALLIES HAVE CONCENTRATED IN RECENT

MONTHS MAINLY ON RURAL OPERATIONS IN THE VALLE DEL CAUCA

(CALI) AREA. AN IMPORTANT FACTOR SINCE LATE 1985 HAS

BEEN THE FORMATION OF AN ALLIANCE OF ALL THE GUERRILLA

GROUPS WHO ARE OUTSIDE THE PEACE PROCESS, INTO THE

NATIONAL GUERRILLA COORDINADORA (CNG). THIS

ORGANIZATION, WHICH HAS BEEN DOMINATED BY M-19 TO THE

POINT THAT SOME GUERRILLAS HAVE THEMSELVES COMPLAINED,

HAS PROBABLY ENABLED THE GUERRILLAS TO MASS LARGER

NUMBERS FOR PARTICULAR ATTACKS THAN WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE

BEEN POSSIBLE. SHOULD THE FARC ONE DAY LEAVE THE PEACE

PROCESS AND JOIN THE CNG, POSSIBILITIES WOULD OPEN FOR

EVEN LARGER-SCALE OPERATIONS.





FARC: ENEMY NUMBER ONE

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5. (C/NF) FARC -- PATIENT AND DISCIPLINED: WHETHER AS

PART OF THE CNG OR OTHERWISE, THE FARC REPRESENT

POTENTIALLY THE GREATEST DANGER TO THE COLOMBIAN

GOVERNMENT. UNLIKE THE OTHER GUERRILLA GROUPS, THE

FARC'S DEDICATION TO A REVOLUTIONARY TRIUMPH IS TEMPERED

BY PATIENCE AND DISCIPLINE. THE FARC LEADERSHIP IS TOO

SOPHISTICATED TO EXPECT POWER BASED ON A SHORT-TERM

MILITARY VICTORY. THIS ATTITUDE CONTRASTS WITH THAT OF

THE M-19, WHICH CONCENTRATES ON SPECTACULAR, BUT

ULTIMATELY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE, ACTIONS SUCH AS THE

PALACE OF JUSTICE SEIZURE, THE ATTACK AGAINST THE CIUDAD

JARDIN SUBURB OF CALI, OR THE ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE THE

MINISTER OF GOVERNMENT. THE KEY TO THE FARC'S STRATEGY

APPEARS TO BE ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

THE FARC HAS USED THE AMBIGUITIES OF THE PEACE TREATY TO

GAIN MORE RECRUITS, AS WELL AS INCREASED NUMBERS AND

TYPES OF WEAPONS, WHILE ALSO ACQUIRING SOME POLITICAL

RESPECTABILITY. FARC LEADERS HAVE DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE

EFFORT TO CONSOLIDATING THEIR CONTROL IN AREAS UNDER

THEIR INFLUENCE. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF FARC

ATTEMPTS TO REACH AGREEMENTS WITH THE ELN AND THE EPL IN

AREAS WHERE THEY COMPETE TO ENABLE JOINT OPERATIONS SUCH

THAT THE FARC'S PARTICIPATION WOULD BE COVERT. SUCH AN

ARRANGEMENT WOULD GIVE FARC LEADERS PLAUSIBLE DENIAL FOR

TERRORIST ACTS WHILE ALLOWING THEM TO MAINTAIN CONTROL

OF THEIR AREAS OF INFLUENCE. MEANWHILE, COLOMBIAN

MILITARY SOURCES CLAIM THAT, OUT OF ANXIETY TO AVOID

BREAKING THE TRUCE, PRESIDENT BETANCUR ORDERED THE ARMED

FORCES NOT TO ENTER AREAS OF FARC ENCAMPMENTS. THE FARC

HAS BEEN THE LEADER AMONG THE GUERRILLAS IN FORGING

HIGHLY PROFITABLE LINKS WITH THE NARCO-TRAFFICKERS,

WHOSE AREAS OF ACTIVITY ARE FREQUENTLY IN TRADITIONAL

FARC OPERATING AREAS. IN VIEW OF THESE TANGIBLE

BENEFITS, THE FARC PROBABLY DESIRES TO MAINTAIN THE

PEACE PROCESS IN ITS PRESENT FORM.



6. (C/NF) FARC-UP IN CONGRESS: PERHAPS THE GREATEST

BENEFIT ACHIEVED BY THE FARC IS THE MODICUM OF

RESPECTABILITY DERIVING FROM ITS ENTRY INTO COLOMBIAN

ELECTORAL POLITICS VIA ITS FRONT PARTY, THE PATRIOTIC

UNION (UP). THOUGH THE UP'S VOTE TOTAL WAS NOT

SPECTACULAR, THE PARTY HAS INJECTED THE FARC INTO

MAINSTREAM POLITICS. REPORTING INDICATES THAT THE FARC

INTENDS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ITS SEVERAL SEATS IN

CONGRESS TO PRESS FOR A UNITED OPPOSITION FRONT TO THE

NEW BARCO GOVERNMENT. SUCH A FRONT WOULD FEATURE

ALLIANCES WITH CONGRESSMEN FROM ANY PARTY OR BACKGROUND

DISAFFECTED WITH THE LIBERAL GOVERNMENT. THE UNITED

FRONT IDEA IS OVER-AMBITIOUS BUT NOT TOO FAR-FETCHED.

ASSORTED LIBERALS AND NEW LIBERALS ALLIED READILY WITH

THE UP IN THE MARCH LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS. A "NEW

LIBERAL" LEADER SAID BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

THAT HIS PARTY WOULD SEEK TO RECOUP ITS STANDING BY

ALIGNING ITSELF WITH ANY PARTY IN THE CONGRESS,

INCLUDING THE UP. THE UP/FARC LEADERS HOPE THIS

STRATEGY WILL EVENTUALLY MAKE THEIR GROUP THE LEADING

OPPOSITION FORCE IN COLOMBIA. THEY WILL PUSH THE PUBLIC

ARGUMENT THAT THE TWO MAJOR PARTIES ARE MUTUALLY

COMPROMISED LOOK-ALIKES.



7. (C/NF) FARC FALLBACK TO ARMS: EVEN WHILE IT PLAYS ITS

LEGAL POLITICAL "CARD," THE FARC HAS NOT LOST SIGHT OF

ITS AMBITION TO ACHIEVE PRIMACY AMONG COLOMBIA'S

GUERRILLA FACTIONS. THE FARC LEADERSHIP MAY BE

CONSIDERING JOINING THE CNG. THE GOAL OF SUCH A MOVE

WOULD MOST LIKELY BE TO DOMINATE ALL COLOMBIA'S

GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS, SUBJECT THEM TO FARC/COMMUNIST

PARTY DISCIPLINE, AND LEAD THEM BACK INTO THE PEACE

PROCESS. FARC LEADERS PRIVATELY ARGUE THAT ALL GROUPS

COULD CONTINUE MILITARY OPERATIONS WHILE INSIDE THE

PEACE PROCESS, DENY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM, AND THEREBY

ATTAIN A MEASURE OF PROTECTION AGAINST COLOMBIAN

GOVERNMENT ACTIONS -- AS THE FARC HAS DONE.





M-19: VIOLENCE IN A VACUUM

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8. (C/NF) SEEKING ATTENTION, FACING ATTRITION: WHILE THE

FARC POSES THE GREATEST LONG-TERM THREAT TO COLOMBIA,

THE 19TH OF APRIL MOVEMENT (M-19) CONTINUES TO DOMINATE

THE HEADLINES BOTH IN COLOMBIA AND ELSEWHERE. THE

M-19'S RECENT HISTORY IS REPLETE WITH GROSS

MISCALCULATIONS. THE CONTINUING ATTRITION OF THE M-19'S

LEADERSHIP, REPRESENTED BY THE DEATHS OF MEN SUCH AS

JAIME BATEMAN THREE YEARS AGO, IVAN MARINO OSPINA IN

CALI IN AUGUST 1985, ANDRES ALMARALES IN THE PALACE OF

JUSTICE SIEGE LAST NOVEMBER, AND ALVARO FAYAD IN A MARCH

1986 BOGOTA FIGHT, HAS LEFT THE MOVEMENT WITH MANY

PISTOLEROS BUT FEW POLITICALLY ASTUTE CHIEFS. M-19'S

CONTINUED ATTEMPTS TO GO FOR THE ELUSIVE KNOCKOUT, WITH

ACTIONS LIKE THE SEIZURE OF THE PALACE OF JUSTICE AND

THE CIUDAD JARDIN ATTACK, SHOW THE UNREALITY OF ITS

POLITICAL CALCULATIONS. AS A RESULT, ITS POPULAR

SUPPORT -- WHICH WAS ONCE QUITE LARGE (IN A 1981 OPINION

POLL, 40 PERCENT NATIONALLY EXPRESSED "SOME SYMPATHY"

FOR M-19) -- IS DECLINING.



9. (C/NF) LEADING FROM WEAKNESS?: SEVERAL ACTIONS ATTEST

TO THE M-19'S INFLATED SENSE OF ITS CAPABILITIES. THE

FORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONALIST "AMERICAS BATTALION"

IN DECEMBER 1985 WAS AN OSTENSIBLE ATTEMPT TO FORM A NEW

"BOLIVARIAN ARMY" TO LIBERATE ANEW THE ANDEAN

COUNTRIES. BUT THE AMERICAS BATTALION HAS NOT ENJOYED

MUCH SUCCESS IN ITS CHOSEN THEATER, THE CAUCA VALLEY.

DESPITE THEIR WEAKNESS IN NUMBERS, THE M-19 LEADERSHIP

CONTINUES TO PLAN TO ESTABLISH AN ALTERNATE GOVERNMENT

IN VALLE DEL CAUCA DEPARTMENT AND CONVENE A NATIONAL

"CONGRESS" THERE IN AUGUST 1986. THE M-19 HAS SAID IT

WILL NOT RPT NOT SEEK AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE BARCO

REGIME, BUT WILL CONTINUE ITS OPERATIONS AS USUAL.

(ATTEMPTS TO SEEK PAPAL MEDIATION, IN THE NEWS LATELY,

WERE ALMOST CERTAINLY MADE WITH THE EXPECTATION THAT

THEY WOULD FAIL IMMEDIATELY. THEY WERE PUBLICITY

GESTURES ONLY.)





PROBLEMS OF THE COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES

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10. (C/NF) RESOURCES THINLY STRETCHED: AS IT PREPARES

FOR A SITUATION WHICH MAY CHANGE CONSIDERABLY OVER THE

NEXT YEAR, THE COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES CONFRONT SEVERAL

MAJOR PROBLEMS. ONE IS A SHORTAGE OF PERSONNEL: THE

COLOMBIAN ARMY TOTALS ABOUT 70,000 MEN. GIVEN THE

GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD OF THE GUERRILLA FORCES, THE

INHOSPITABLE TERRAIN, THE NEED TO DEFEND MANY FIXED

HIGH-VALUE TARGETS, AND THE SHORTAGE OF DEPLOYABLE

FORCES, THE ARMY IS ALREADY STRETCHED THIN. SHOULD THE

PEACE PROCESS UNRAVEL AND THE FARC RESUME THE ATTACK,

THE ARMY WOULD BE HARD PRESSED. ONE GENERAL OFFICER

SPECULATED THAT 15,000 ADDITIONAL TROOPS WOULD BE

REQUIRED, SHOULD THE FARC SHIFT TO A WAR FOOTING.



11. (C/NF) SEEING THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY: LACK OF

INTELLIGENCE IS ANOTHER MAJOR PROBLEM FOR COLOMBIAN

MILITARY PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH THE ARMY HAS CONDUCTED

OPERATIONS FOR SEVERAL MONTHS AGAINST THE AMERICAS

BATTALION IN VALLE DEL CAUCA AND CAUCA DEPARTMENTS, THE

LACK OF GOOD AND READILY AVAILABLE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

PREVENTS A CLEAR PICTURE OF THE SITUATION. AT LEAST IN

THIS THEATER, THE ARMY APPEARS BOGGED DOWN AND UNABLE TO

BRING ITS CONCENTRATED STRENGTH TO BEAR. THE POLICE

(MORE THAN 60,000 STRONG, AND PARA-MILITARY) ALSO PLAY A

LARGE ROLE IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN ALL AREAS, BUT

PARTICULARLY IN THE CITIES. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

APPEARS MORE AVAILABLE IN THE CITIES, AND GUERRILLA

OPERATIONS THERE HAVE BEEN HURT RECENTLY.



12. (C/NF) ARMS SHORTFALLS: QUALITY OF EQUIPMENT IS YET

ANOTHER ISSUE. GOC OFFICERS ARE CONVINCED THAT THE

QUALITY OF ARMS IN THE HANDS OF THE GUERRILLAS,

PARTICULARLY THE FARC, ACTUALLY EXCEEDS THAT OF THE

ARMY'S WEAPONS. GIVEN THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE

TO THE GUERRILLAS THROUGH EXTORTION AND NARCOTICS, THEIR

ABILITY TO PURCHASE SUCH ARMS IS UNQUESTIONED. SOME

COLOMBIAN OFFICERS FEEL THAT THE GAP CAN BE BEST

ADDRESSED THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF TECHNOLOGY,

STRESSING IN PARTICULAR THE USE OF MORE HELICOPTERS TO

PROVIDE LIFT AND MOBILITY.





THE YEAR AHEAD: DRAWING THE BATTLE LINES

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13. (C) SLIPPING STALEMATE?: THE PRESENT MILITARY

SITUATION IS IN MANY RESPECTS A STALEMATE. THE

COLOMBIAN ARMY IS UNABLE TO DEFEAT THE GUERRILLAS

CURRENTLY RANGED AGAINST IT. FOR THEIR PART, THE

GUERRILLAS ARE UNABLE TO MAKE INROADS AGAINST THE

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN AREAS OF DENSE SETTLEMENT, BUT ARE

EXPANDING IN SOME ISOLATED RURAL REGIONS -- PARTICULARLY

WHERE THEY ALREADY HAVE TRADITIONAL SUPPORT. THE

CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HOLDS THAT A GOVERNMENT IS LOSING

WHEN MERELY KEEPING AN INSURGENCY AT BAY. THE SHIFT IN

STRENGTH MAY BE GLACIAL, BUT OVER TIME THE DECAY OF THE

GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IS REAL. THERE ARE MORE

GUERRILLAS ACTIVE NOW IN COLOMBIA, AND THE LEVEL OF

POLITICAL VIOLENCE IS HIGHER, THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE

CIVIL WAR OF THE 1950'S -- BUT DURING THAT WAR, MOST

GUERRILLAS WERE LIBERALS, NOT COMMUNISTS. THE SITUATION

IS NO CAUSE FOR PANIC. THE NUMBER OF GUERRILLAS IS

SMALL IN PROPORTION TO THE SIZE OF THE COUNTRY, AND

COLOMBIANS CAN TOLERATE A LOT OF VIOLENCE. BUT IT CAN

SCARCELY PROMOTE EASY SLUMBER FOR COLOMBIAN LEADERS.



14. (C/NF) THE COMING YEAR: AS THE PRESIDENTIAL

INAUGURATION APPROACHES, ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT

ANTICIPATE CHANGES IN THE PRESENT REALITY. IN PRIVATE

TALKS AND IN HIS SIX-POINT PEACE PROGRAM,

PRESIDENT-ELECT BARCO HAS SERVED NOTICE THAT THE PEACE

PROCESS MUST AND WILL CHANGE. THE ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF

STAFF EXPECTS AN INEVITABLE (BUT PROBABLY GRADUAL)

INCREASE IN GUERRILLA ACTIVITY AFTER THE INAUGURATION,

AS THE GUERRILLAS REACT TO BARCO'S HARDER LINE. THE

PAYOFF WOULD, HOPEFULLY, COME IN A YEAR OR TWO WHEN THE

GUERRILLAS HAVE EITHER LAID DOWN THEIR ARMS OR BEEN

DEALT WITH FORCEFULLY. BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN

LEADERS HAVE EXPRESSED TO US THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL

RESOURCES TO MEET THIS EXPECTED UPTURN IN GUERRILLA

ATTACKS. WHILE CONTINUED AND EVEN EXPANDED ACTIVITIES

BY GROUPS SUCH AS THE M-19, ELN, AND EPL, SEEM

INEVITABLE, THE WILD CARD REMAINS THE FARC. MANUEL

MARULANDA VELEZ (AKA TIROFIJO),TOP LEADER OF THE FARC,

HAS HINTED THAT THE GROUP WILL NOT ACCEPT AN ATTEMPT BY

BARCO TO CHANGE THE RULES OF THE GAME. IN AN INTERVIEW

PUBLISHED IN THE COLOMBIAN WEEKLY "SEMANA," TIROFIJO

DECLARED THAT THE FARC WILL NOT ACCEPT ULTIMATUMS FROM

THE BARCO GOVERNMENT, VIEWING SUCH DEMANDS AS AN ATTEMPT

TO RUPTURE THE PEACE PROCESS. HE ALSO DECLARED THAT HIS

GUERRILLAS WOULD NOT DEMOBILIZE UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT

IMPLEMENTED THE FULL RANGE OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL

REFORMS DEMANDED BY THE FARC. HIS STATEMENT AGREES WITH

REALITY, AS WE SEE IT FOR THE FARC: WITHOUT GUNS, THE

FARC WOULD BE A NEGLIGIBLE MINI-PARTY. WITHOUT GUNS,

THEY WOULD HAVE NO ATTRACTION FOR NARCO MONEY. WITHOUT

GUNS, THEY WOULD SWIFTLY FADE FROM PUBLIC ATTENTION. WE

CONCLUDE THAT, THEREFORE, THEY WILL FIND A PRETEXT TO

KEEP THE GUNS. THE SPARRING HAS BEGUN. OVER THE COURSE

OF THE YEAR FOLLOWING THE AUGUST 7 INAUGURATION, WE

THINK THE FIGHT BETWEEN THE GOC AND ITS GUERRILLA

ENEMIES WILL GET HOTTER BEFORE IT GETS COLDER.





GILLESPIE