ALGERIA AND THE ARAB WORLD: MOVING FROM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 09 ALGIERS 05347 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL XF AG SUBJECT: ALGERIA AND THE ARAB WORLD: MOVING FROM RADICALISM TO MEDIATION REF: KPRP-4 (FY-87) ¶1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT ¶2. SUMMARY: UNLIKE ITS SELF-PERCEIVED LEADERSHIP ROLE IN AFRICA, ALGERIA HAS ATTEMPTED TO POSITION ITSELF IN THE ARAB WORLD AS A MEDIATOR/PEACEMAKER AT THE CENTER OF COMPETING FACTIONS AND INTERESTS. ALGERIA IS NO LONGER IN THE FOREFRONT OF RADICAL ARAB CAUSES, ALTHOUGH IT STILL TRADES ON THE FORMER ASSOCIATIONS IT ESTABLISHED UNDER BOUMEDIENE AND THUS RETAINS ACCESS TO VIRTUALLY ALL ARAB GROUPS. REFLECTING PRESIDENT BENDJEDID'S OWN CONSENSUS-BUILDING DOMESTIC STYLE, ALGERIA HAS WORKED FOR THE CREATION OF A GREATER ARAB MAGHREB AS AN UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION UNDER WHICH REGIONAL PROBLEMS MIGHT BE SOLVED AND HAS ATTEMPTED TO PROMOTE PLO UNITY AS A MEANS OF MOVING THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS FORWARD (IN CONJUNCTION WITH RECONCILIATION EFFORTS IN LEBANON). ALTHOUGH PESSIMISTIC ABOUT FINDING A CONCILIATORY BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN THE GULF WAR, ALGERIA HAS PERSISTED IN SEEKING OPENINGS TO ACHIEVE AT LEAST A CEASEFIRE THERE. RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST CONFRONTATION STATES OF SYRIA AND JORDAN HAVE WAXED AND WANED OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, AS HAVE TIES WITH THE GULF STATES, PARTICULARLY SAUDI ARABIA. ALGERIA REMAINS ACTIVE IN THE ARAB LEAGUE AND ITS VARIOUS SUB-ORGANIZATIONS, BUT IS SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE VITALITY OF THE LEAGUE AND ITS ABILITY TO UNITE, INSTEAD OF DIVIDE, ITS MEMBER STATES. ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB STATES ARE BASED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON PETROLEUM--ITS PRICE AND THE QUANTITIES MARKETED. AS A PRICE "HARDLINER," ALGERIA OFTEN FINDS ITSELF AT ODDS WITH ITS FELLOW ARAB PRODUCERS WITHIN OPEC. THE GOA LEADERSHIP ALSO DEVOTES CONSIDERABLE ENERGY TO ADVANCING ITS INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD, AT LEAST IN PART TO ENCOURAGE GREATER STABILITY AS A HEDGE AGAINST THE POTENTIAL ENCROACHMENT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM INTO NORTH AFRICA. ¶3. AS A CREDIBLE GO-BETWEEN WITH MOST ARAB GROUPS, ALGERIA HAS CONTRIBUTED IMPORTANTLY TO THE ACHIEVE- MENT OF SOME U.S. REGIONAL OBJECTIVES, FROM THE MEDIATION OF THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS IN 1980/81 TO PRESENT GOA EFFORTS IN LEBANON, AS WELL AS ACTING AS A COUNTER TO LIBYAN INFLUENCE. ALGERIA WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY WITH THE U.S. ON TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO RESOLVING NUMEROUS ARAB-RELATED ISSUES, EVEN WHERE WE SHARE A COMMON GOAL. HOWEVER, UNLIKE UNDER BOUMEDIENE, THE BENDJEDID REGIME IS PREPARED TO "REASON WITH US" AND EXPLORE POTENTIALLY WORKABLE SOLUTIONS FREE OF THE RHETORIC WHICH PREVIOUSLY CHARACTERIZED ALGERIAN POLICYMAKING. END SUMMARY. -------------- THE MAGHREB -------------- ¶4. FOR ALGERIA, ITS POLICY IN THE ARAB WORLD BEGINS WITH THE MAGHREB AND EFFORTS TO FOSTER REGIONAL STABILITY, PARTICULARLY ALONG ITS BORDERS. TO FURTHER THIS GOAL THE GOA HAS PROMOTED A POLICY OF REGIONAL UNITY UNDER THE RUBRIC OF A "GREATER ARAB MAGHREB" AND HAS CONCLUDED A FRIENDSHIP AND CONCORD TREATY WITH TWO OF ITS MAGHREB NEIGHBORS, TUNISIA AND MAURITANIA. WHILE A FUNCTIONING MAGHREB ORGANIZATION IS STILL IN THE DISTANCE, THE IDEA OFFERS ALGERIA A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH TO SEEK RESOLUTION OF SOME OF ITS MAJOR REGIONAL PREOCCUPATIONS. THE GOA BELIEVES A MAGHREB ORGANIZA- TION COULD PROVIDE AN INSTITUTIONAL COVER FOR A WESTERN SAHARA SOLUTION AND ALSO RESOLVE ALGERIA'S OUTSTANDING BORDER PROBLEMS WITH MOROCCO AND LIBYA. IN ALGERIA'S VIEW IT WOULD HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR GREATLY EXPANDING ECONOMIC COOPERATION THROUGH COMPLEMENTARY ECONOMIES AND A POSSIBLE FREE TRADE ZONE PATTERNED AFTER THE COMMON MARKET. THE GOA BELIEVES IMPROVED REGIONAL TIES WOULD ENHANCE POLITICAL STABILITY AND THE POSSIBILITY FOR A PEACEFUL TRANSITION IN TUNISIA AFTER BOURGUIBA. FINALLY, THE GOA HOPES THAT THE POTENTIAL ADHERENCE BY LIBYA TO SUCH A REGIONAL GROUPING WOULD MODERATE QADHAFI'S BEHAVIOR TO SOME EXTENT AND INCREASE HIS STAKE IN COOPERATION. ¶5. DESPITE ALGERIA'S ASPIRATIONS FOR A GREATER MAGHREB AS A SOURCE OF REGIONAL UNITY AND STRENGTH, THE GOAL DOES NOT APPEAR ANY CLOSER TO REALIZATION NOW THAN PRIOR TO THE MOROCCAN-LIBYAN ACCORD OF AUGUST 1984. ALGERIA'S BILATERAL STRAINS WITH MOROCCO AND THE CONTINUING UNWILLINGNESS BY QADHAFI TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF ALGERIA'S AGREEMENT WITH TUNISIA AND MAURITANIA MILITATE AGAINST A UNITED MAGHREB. IN ADDITION, THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT REMAINS A MAJOR COMPLI- CATING FACTOR BLOCKING GREATER REGIONAL COOPERATION. ¶6. GIVEN THE UNCERTAIN PROSPECTS FOR A GREATER MAGHREB, THE GOA NEVERTHELESS DIRECTS ITS POLICIES TOWARD ITS NEIGHBORS AS IF SUCH A SCHEME MIGHT BE ACHIEVABLE. WITH TUNISIA THE GOA FOLLOWS AN ACTIVE POLICY OF PROMOTING ECONOMIC COOPERATION, PROVIDING ASSURANCES AND MATERIAL SUPPORT TO COUNTER LIBYAN PRESSURES AGAINST THE GOT, EXCHANGING HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO COORDINATE SOME REGIONAL ACTIONS AND MAINTAINING AS CLOSE TIES AS POSSIBLE WITH A VIEW TOWARD A PEACEFUL, POST- BOURGUIBA TRANSITION. ON LIBYA, GOA POLICY HAS MOVED AWAY FROM RADICAL SOLIDARITY AS A MEMBER OF THE "REJECTIONIST FRONT" TO ONE OF SOMETIMES OPEN AND OTHER TIMES DISGUISED OPPOSITION TO THE QADHAFI REGIME. ALGERIA OPENLY OPPOSES LIBYAN ACTIONS IN CHAD AND ITS SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE. THE GOA ATTEMPTS TO COUNTER LIBYAN INFLUENCE IN WEST AFRICA, SUDAN, AND EVEN AMONG RADICAL ARAB FACTIONS. DESPITE THESE POLICY DIFFERENCES, ALGERIA HAS, SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 1986, TRIED TO EASE BILATERAL TENSIONS THROUGH A MEASURED PUBLIC RAPPROCHEMENT WITH LIBYA. THIS POLICY HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED TO US BY BENDJEDID'S ADVISOR GENERAL BELKHEIR AS A MEANS OF FOLLOWING THE LIBYAN DOMESTIC SITUATION CLOSELY WHILE LOOKING FOR OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH WHICH IT CAN MODIFY QADHAFI'S BEHAVIOR OR HIS POSITION WITHOUT RUINING FUTURE RELATIONS WITH A POST-QADHAFI LIBYA. ¶7. CURIOUSLY, ALGERIANS FEEL THE CLOSEST AFFINITY WITH MOROCCANS EVEN THOUGH IN GEOPOLITICAL TERMS MOROCCO IS THE ONLY COUNTRY WHICH COULD LAY PLAUSIBLE CLAIM TO BEING A REGIONAL RIVAL. FOR THE MOMENT, THAT RIVALRY IS FOCUSED ON THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT, WHICH APPEARS STALEMATED BOTH MILITARILY AND DIPLOMATICALLY. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE GOA WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK TO ISOLATE MOROCCO WITHIN THE REGION, IN THE ARA8 WORLD AND IN AFRICA, AS A MEANS OF INCREASING PRESSURE FOR A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT. HAVING SUPPORTED THE POLISARIO CAUSE FOR THE PAST TEN YEARS, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF DECOLONIALIZATION FOR EVEN LONGER, THE GOA LEADERSHIP IS NOT LIKELY TO ABANDON THE POLISARIO AND CEDE SOVEREIGNTY TO MOROCCO WITHOUT A CREDIBLE POLITICAL PROCESS BEING ESTABLISHED TO SETTLE THE ISSUE. UNTIL THEN, DESPITE THE VOICED BEST INTENTIONS OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, BILATERAL RELATIONS WILL REMAIN COM- PETITIVE RATHER THAN COOPERATIVE, WITH THE RISK OF DIRECT CONFRONTATION BEING LOW. ON THE MARGINS WILL BE COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE IN MAURITANIA IN WHICH THE GOA COMPETES FOR INFLUENCE THROUGH ITS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE GIRM. -------------- EGYPT -------------- ¶8. EGYPT, AT THE EDGE OF THE MAGHREB, HAS HAD ALTERNATELY WARM AND COOL RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA. DURING ALGERIA'S INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE NASSER'S EGYPT PROVIDED SIGNIFICANT MILITARY TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE. MANY OF THE ALGERIAN SOLDIERS WHO SURVIVED ON THAT AID HAVE ATTAINED RANKING POSITIONS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY AND ARE A SOURCE OF WARM PERSONAL CONTACTS FOR EGYPT. HOWEVER, THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS OF 1978 PUSHED BOUMEDIENE'S ALGERIA INTO BECOMING AN ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE "REJECTIONIST FRONT" TO MOBILIZE ARAB EFFORTS TO ISOLATE EGYPT. BUT BENDJEDID BEGAN TO MOVE ALGERIA GRADUALLY BACK TOWARD EGYPT IN THE EARLY 1980'S. THE PACE OF THIS RAPPROCHEMENT HAS ACCELERATED IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, ESPECIALLY SINCE AUGUST 1984 WHEN, IN THE WAKE OF THE OUJDA ACCORD, ALGERIA SOUGHT TO BALANCE AN INCREASED THREAT IT PERCEIVED FROM LIBYA WITH GREATER COORDINATION ON INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF JOINT SECURITY MEASURES WITH EGYPT ALONG LIBYA'S EASTERN AND WESTERN BORDERS. HIGH-LEVEL VISITS HAVE BECOME MORE FREQUENT AND VISIBLE, AS HAVE CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES. IN RECENT MONTHS, THE PACE OF IMPROVING RELATIONS HAS SLOWED, PERHAPS AS A RESULT OF IMPROVING EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF A DIMINISHED LIBYAN "THREAT." NEVERTHELESS, SUBSTANTIVE HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS CONTINUE, WITH THE MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF MONITORING AND INFLUENCING QADHAFI'S BEHAVIOR. IT IS NOT LIKELY THE GOA WILL RE-ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH EGYPT ANYTIME SOON, BUT COOPERATION WILL CONTINUE TO EVOLVE AS EACH ATTEMPTS TO PURSUE ITS INTERESTS--ALGERIA TO FORESTALL ANOTHER SHIFT IN EGYPTIAN POLICY ON THE WESTERN SAHARA BACK TO FAVORING MOROCCO (EGYPT SUPPORTED THE ALGERIAN POSITION IN THE 1985 UNGA) AND EGYPT TO MAINTAINING SYMPATHETIC ACCESS TO ARAB "RADICAL" STATES AND GROUPS THROUGH ALGERIA WHEN NECESSARY. -------------- PALESTINE AND THE PALESTINIANS -------------- ¶9. ALGERIA HAS ALWAYS PRIDED ITSELF AS BEING ONE OF THE STRONGEST SUPPORTERS OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE AND OF ITS MAJOR POLITICAL/MILITARY ORGANIZA- TION, THE PLO. ALGERIA'S OWN EXPERIENCE IN GAINING INDEPENDENCE HEAVILY INFLUENCES ITS VIEW OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND ITS BELIEF THAT THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE MUST HAVE THEIR OWN LAND IN WHICH THEY CAN EXPRESS THEIR NATIONAL CHARACTER. AS ALGERIA WAS ABLE TO ACHIEVE INDEPENDENCE ONLY THROUGH THE UNITY THE FLN DEMONSTRATED IN THE FACE OF THE FRENCH "OCCUPATION," SO THE LOCAL CATECHISM GOES, THE PLO WILL BE ABLE TO REGAIN ITS HOMELAND ONLY THROUGH A SIMILAR POLICY OF UNITY. THEREFORE, THE GOA BELIEVES PLO UNIFICATION IS ESSENTIAL IF THERE IS TO BE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ALGERIA ACKNOWLEDGES THERE ARE SERIOUS IDEOLOGICAL AND PERSONALITY DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE PLO, BUT HAS URGED THE PLO TO SUBMERGE THESE DIFFERENCES BEHIND A FACADE OF UNITY. ALGERIA'S OVERRIDING CONCERN WITH UNITY HAS TENDED TO MAKE ALGERIA A SUPPORTER OF PLO CHIEF ARAFAT WHO THE GOA BELIEVES IS THE ONLY PALESTINIAN LEADER WHO HAS THE STATURE AND BROAD FOLLOWING TO UNITE THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THE GOA DIFFERS WITH ARAFAT ON STRATEGY AND TACTICS, AS IT DID IN EARLY 1985 OVER THE HOLDING OF THE PNC IN JORDAN AND THE SUBSEQUENT AMMAN ACCORD. (THE GOA REFRAINED FROM PUBLIC DENUNCIATION BUT PRIVATELY EXPRESSED STRONG SKEPTICISM THAT THE AMMAN ACCORD COULD HAVE ANY POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE PEACE PROCESS.) ¶10. SINCE MARCH 1986 THE GOA HAS ATTEMPTED TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO ITS PRINCIPLES ON PLO UNITY. FOLLOW- ING BENDJEDID'S MARCH 25-28 VISIT TO MOSCOW, HE LAUNCHED A MAJOR INITIATIVE TO HOLD A UNITY MEETING IN ALGIERS OF THE NINE PLO EXECUTIVE COUNCIL FACTIONS. OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS THE GOA HAS SENT SPECIAL MISSIONS TO SYRIA, LIBYA, AND THE USSR, AS WELL AS RECEIVED MOST OF THE SIGNIFICANT PLO LEADERS IN ALGIERS. THUS FAR, ALGERIAN EFFORTS HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED BY CONTINUING INTERNAL PLO DIFFERENCES, THE UNWILLINGNESS OF SYRIA TO CONTRIBUTE TO A PLO UNITED BEHIND ARAFAT, AND A LACK OF SUFFICIENT SOVIET LEVERAGE ON SYRIA TO FORCE SYRIAN COOPERATION. DESPITE THESE SETBACKS, THE GOA WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR PLO UNITY, WHILE PROVIDING MODEST MILITARY TRAINING WITHIN ALGERIA, AS THE ONLY MEANS, IN THE GOA VIEW, OF OBTAINING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ¶11. CONCURRENTLY, THE GOA MAINTAINS SOME ACCESS TO THE MARGINAL "RADICAL" FACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING ABU NIDAL, ABU MUSA, AND HIZBOLLAH. ALGERIA HAS SERVED AS A CONDUIT TO THESE GROUPS ON VARIOUS HOSTAGE ISSUES, BUT ALSO HAS ACQUIRED INTELLIGENCE ON THEIR LEADERSHIP AND STRUCTURES. IN SOME CASES, THE GOA HAS BEEN WILLING TO SHARE THIS INTELLIGENCE WITH NON-ARAB COUNTRIES. UNLIKE THE BOUMEDIENE GOVERNMENT, THE PRESENT ALGERIAN REGIME APPARENTLY DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THESE FACTIONS. -------------- -------------- RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST CONFRONTATION STATES -------------- -------------- ¶12. ALGERIA HAS ATTEMPTED TO PLAY A MEDIATING ROLE IN LEBANON WITH THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF CREATING A STABLE ARAB BASE FROM WHICH MORE EFFECTIVE CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL COULD BE ORGANIZED. IN THE PROCESS THE GOA HOPES TO PRESERVE THE LIVES OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES WHO ARE ENCAMPED IN LEBANON, END THE INTERNECINE KILLING AMONG ALGERIA'S ARAB BROTHERS, ENCOURAGE THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN TROOPS, EXPEL ISRAELI TROOPS FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON, AND EVENTUALLY RE-ESTABLISH A VIABLE LEBANESE STATE-- ALL IN ALL A TALL ORDER. THE GOA HAS MOVED CAUTIOUSLY TO ACHIEVE RECONCILIATION IN LEBANON, USING ITS FORMER AMBASSADOR (ABDELKRIM GHERAIEB) TO OPEN CONTACTS WITH ALL LEBANESE GROUPS AND SEEK OPPORTUNITIES TO ENCOURAGE FURTHER TALKS AMONG THESE GROUPS. ALGERIAN CONTACTS WITH NABIH BERRI'S AMAL WERE PARTICULARLY USEFUL DURING THE JUNE 1985 TWA HIJACKING TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF AMERICAN CITIZENS AND MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS WITH U.S. HOSTAGES REMAINING IN LEBANON. ALTHOUGH ALGERIA HAS SUSPENDED ITS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ARAB LEAGUE'S SOLIDARITY FUND FOR LEBANON, IT REMAINS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN LEBANESE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION EFFORTS, RECENTLY DISPATCHING A SPECIAL ENVOY (MINISTER OF CULTURE BOUALEM BESSAIEH) AND A RANKING FLN PARTY MEMBER (SADEK ZOUATEN) TO EXPLORE THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS. ALGERIA DOES PROVIDE SOME BILATERAL ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF 200 UNIVERSITY SCHOLARSHIPS ANNUALLY, BUT NOT MUCH FINANCIAL AID DESPITE GEMAYEL'S BEST EFFORTS. OVER THE NEXT YEAR, THE GOA IS LIKELY TO MAINTAIN AN ACTIVELY NEUTRAL "WATCHING BRIEF" IN LEBANON RATHER THAN RISK ITS PRESTIGE IN A DRAMATIC POLICY INITIATIVE. ¶13. RELATIONS WITH JORDAN HAVE IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY SINCE THE LATE 1970'S, INCLUDING AN EXCHANGE OF HIGH-RANKING MILITARY DELEGATIONS AND THE VISIT OF THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER IN 1985. THE MILITARY EXCHANGES WERE USEFUL FOR THE GOA BECAUSE THEY PROVIDED FURTHER INSIGHTS ON HOW TO APPROACH AND DEAL WITH WESTERN ARMS SUPPLIERS, NOTABLY THE U.K. AND THE U.S., WITH WHOM ALGERIA HOPES TO DIVERSIFY ITS ARMS PURCHASES. SECONDLY, THE GOA WAS EXPOSED TO WESTERN ARMS SYSTEMS AND THEIR CAPABILITIES. DESPITE CRITICISM FROM RADICAL ARAB FACTIONS AND STATES OF THE AMMAN ACCORD, ALGERIA RESERVED ITS JUDGMENT, THUS PRESERVING ITS ENTREE WITH THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT. OTHERWISE, BILATERAL RELATIONS ARE CORDIAL WITHOUT BEIMG PARTICULARLY PROFOUND. WHAT IS NOTEWORTHY IS THAT ALGERIA NOW RECOGNIZES THE VALUE OF MAINTAINING CORDIAL TIES WITH ARAB "MODERATES" (EVEN MONARCHS),A RECOGNITION OF THE VALUE OF SUCH TIES THAT ONLY FAINTLY EXISTED IN THE PRE-BENDJEDID ERA. ¶14. PERHAPS ALGERIA'S MOST FRUSTRATING POLITICAL RELATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE WITH SYRIA, A COUNTRY WITH WHICH ALGERIA USED TO SHARE AN IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY AND INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK. THE IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY HAS BEEN FADING RAPIDLY IN RECENT YEARS, AND ALGERIA'S INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE HAS BEGUN TO DIVERGE SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THAT OF SYRIA IN THE PAST 18 MONTHS. ALGERIA NO LONGER FINDS ITSELF ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN A REJECTIONIST FRONT MEETING AND IS RELUCTANT TO RECONSTITUTE SUCH A FRONT. WHILE SYRIA SUPPORTS ALGERIA ON THE WESTERN SAHARA AND COOPERATES WITH ALGERIA IN EFFORTS TO ISOLATE MOROCCO, IT REMAINS THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO ALGERIA'S ATTEMPT TO UNIFY THE PLO. ALGERIA HAS ALSO BEEN CRITICAL OF SYRIA'S ROLE IN LEBANON (AS A COMPLICATING FACTOR PREVENTING RECONCILIATION) AND HAS BEEN UNHAPPY WITH SYRIA'S SUPPORT FOR HIZBOLLAHS "TERRORIST" ACTIVITIES. NEVERTHELESS, THE TWO COUNTRIES MAINTAIN VERY ACTIVE HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS TO COORDINATE POLICIES OF MUTUAL INTEREST, WITH THE GOA HOPING FOR ADDITIONAL SUPPORT ON PLO UNITY AND SYRIA HOPING TO EXCHANGE THIS FOR A NEW REJECTIONIST FRONT. -------------- THE GULF WAR -------------- ¶15. THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ, LIKE THEIR PREVIOUS DISPUTE IN THE 1970'S MEDIATED BY ALGERIA, IS AN ONGOING CONCERN FOR THE GOA. IN DISCUSSING THE SITUATION, FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIMI IS ALWAYS QUICK TO POINT OUT HIS PREDECESSER LOST HIS LIFE TRYING TO NEGOTIATE AN END TO THE WAR. PERHAPS BECAUSE OF THIS SETBACK, AND ALGERIAN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE CONTINUING INTRANSIGENCE OF BOTH PARTIES, THE GOA HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY NEW INITIATIVE ON THE WAR. IN THE INTERIM ALGERIA HAS MAINTAINED ITS CREDIBILITY WITH IRAN BY ABSTAINING ON ONE- SIDED ARAB LEAGUE RESOLUTIONS FAVORING IRAQ AND CONTINUING HIGH-LEVEL EXCHANGES. THE GOA HAS USED THESE CONTACTS TO PROBE IRANIAN FLEXIBILITY, THUS FAR WITHOUT ANY POSITIVE RESULTS, ADDING TO THE PESSIMISM IBRAHIMI HAS EXPRESSED TO US. RECENT IRANIAN GAINS AND OCCUPATION OF IRAQI TERRITORY HAVE "TILTED" ALGERIAN POLICY TOWARD IRAQ. HOWEVER, ALGERIA IS ONE OF THE ONLY COUNTRIES WHICH CAN APPROACH EITHER IRAN OR IRAQ TO ARRANGE A CEASEFIRE THAT MIGHT LEAD TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. -------------- SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES -------------- ¶16. ALGERIAN RELATIONS IN THE GULF, AS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES, REVOLVE AROUND TIES WITH SAUDI ARABIA. IN THIS REGARD, WHILE THE TENOR OF GOA-SAG RELATIONS HAS IMPROVED TO THE LEVEL OF A POLITE DIALOGUE, THERE ARE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES PREVENTING CLOSER COOPERATION. SIMILAR TO THE SAUDIS, THE ALGERIANS ARE QUICK TO TAKE OFFENSE AT PERCEIVED SLIGHTS AND THEY ATTACH MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE ETIQUETTE OF RELATIONS, GRANTING OR WITHDRAWING ACCESS FOR SAUDI EMISSARIES DEPENDING ON TREATMENT ACCORDED TO ALGERIANS. BEYOND SUCH ATMOSPHERIC ISSUES, THE GOA HAS BEEN CRITICAL OF SAUDI SUPPORT FOR THE MOROCCAN WAR EFFORT IN THE WESTERN SAHARA, SAUDI STRATEGY WITHIN OPEC, AND SAUDI PARTICIPATION IN THE EXTRAORDINARY ARAB SUMMIT ORGANIZED IN CASABLANCA IN AUGUST 1985. FM IBRAHIMI HAS ALSO VOICED IMPATIENCE OVER REPEATED SAUDI REQUESTS FOR ALGERIAN INTERVENTION WITH "RADICAL" ARABS WITHOUT RECEIVING RECIPROCAL SAUDI SUPPORT ON THE WESTERN SAHARA. NEVERTHELESS, ALGERIA RECOGNIZES THE DEGREE OF SAUDI INFLUENCE WITHIN OPEC, THE ARAB LEAGUE AND WITH THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT, AND HAS ATTEMPTED TO EMPLOY A QUIET DIPLOMACY IN THE PAST YEAR TO MODIFY SAUDI POLICIES. THE GOA GIVES ITSELF CREDIT FOR SOME PROGRESS WITHIN OPEC AND IS MODESTLY OPTIMISTIC THAT SAUDI ARABIA WILL AGREE TO HOLD AN ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT IN DECEMBER TO "CLOSE ARAB RANKS." (THIS WOULD BE THE LONG- DELAYED SUMMIT ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR 1984.) ON THE WESTERN SAHARA, THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE. ¶17. ALGERIA MAINTAINS CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT, THE UAE, AND OMAN. THE GOA JUST ASSIGNED NEW RESIDENT AMBASSADORS TO BAHRAIN AND QATAR, AND THIS MAY PORTEND AN UPSURGE IN THE IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS. HOWEVER, RELATIONS ARE LIKELY TO FOCUS CHIEFLY ON OIL PRICING AND PERHAPS SECONDARILY ON KEEPING THE "WOLF" OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AWAY FROM THE GULF'S DOOR. FURTHER SOUTHWEST, ALGERIA WAS DISTURBED BY THE OVERTHROW OF THE ALI NASIR MUHAMED REGIME IN SOUTH YEMEN AND THE SOVIET ROLE IN SUPPORTING HIS SUCCESSOR. THE GOA LEADERSHIP DERIVED A CERTAIN LESSON FROM THESE EVENTS AND HAS INFUSED A COOLNESS INTO ITS FORMERLY CLOSE RELATIONS WITH SOUTH YEMEN. INFREQUENT CONTACTS PERSIST WITH ALI NASIR MUHAMED, ALTHOUGH THE ALGERIANS HAVE NOT ASSISTED ANY EFFORTS TO OVERTHROW THE ATTAS GOVERNMGNT. ON THE CONTRARY, THERE HAS BEEN A RELUCTANT ACCEPTANCE OF ATTAS, WHO IS EXPECTED TO VISIT ALGIERS LATER THIS YEAR OR IN EARLY 1987. AS FOR NORTH YEMEN, THE YAR JUST APPOINTED A NEW AMBASSADOR TO ALGIERS WHO APPEARS WELL-CONNECTED WITHIN SANAA, POSSIBLY SIGNIFYING IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. ALGERIA HAS COORDINATED TO A SMALL EXTENT ITS RESPONSES WITH NORTH YEMEN ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FALL OF ALI NASIR. -------------- THE ARAB LEAGUE -------------- ¶18. FOR THE PAST FEW YEARS ALGERIA HAS VIEWED THE ARAB LEAGUE AS A NEARLY MORIBUND, INCREASINGLY IRRELEVANT ORGANIZATION, REFLECTIVE OF THE DISARRAY IN THE ARAB WORLD. APPARENTLY,THOUGH, WITHIN THE PAST TWO MONTHS THE GOA HAS SEIZED UPON THE LEAGUE AS A POTENTIAL VEHICLE FOR RENEWING/ REVITALIZING ARAB UNITY. TO THIS END THE GOA HAS SENT EMISSARIES TO DAMASCUS (MESSAADIA),SAUDI ARABIA (IBRAHIMI) AND BEIRUT (BESSAIH/ZOUATEN) TO LOBBY FOR THE NECESSITY OF A SUMMIT, OPTIMISTICALLY IN DECEMBER. THE GOA HAS ALSO USED THE ARAB LEAGUE TO REINFORCE ITS CREDIBILITY WITH IRAN BY OPPOSING ANTI-IRANIAN RESOLUTIONS ON THE GULF WAR. HOWEVER, ALGERIA HAS BEEN LESS SUCCESSFUL IN GAINING ARAB SUPPORT ON THE WESTERN SAHARA ISSUE, AND THIS HAS HINDERED ALGERIAN EFFORTS TO GAIN SDAR ADMISSION INTO THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM). FURTHERMORE, THE GOA HAS BEEN UNHAPPY WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE LEAGUE AND HAS WORKED TO BOTH STREAMLINE AND IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS AT THE LEAGUE'S HEADQUARTERS IN TUNIS. -------------- ECONOMIC RELATIONS -------------- ¶19. OIL AND HYDROCARBON REVENUES ARE THE LIFEBLOOD OF THE ALGERIAN ECONOMY, AND THEREFORE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING OIL ARE CRITICAL TO ALGERIA'S WELFARE. ALGERIA HAS ATTEMPTED TO MAINTAIN HIGH PRICES WHILE PRESSURING MAJOR PRODUCERS TO ACCEPT "REASONABLE" PRODUCTION LEVELS, PARTICULARLY SAUDI ARABIA. THIS PRESSURE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH LIBYA AND IRAN PRINCIPALLY, BUT RECENTLY THE GOA HAS TRIED TO FORM AN ASSOCIATION OF AFRICAN PRODUCERS FOR A SIMILAR OBJECTIVE. AS PRICES HAVE STABILIZED SINCE AUGUST, ALGERIA HAS TAKEN SOME SATISFACTION FROM ITS EFFORTS, EVEN IF IN REALITY THEY HAD ONLY A MARGINAL IMPACT ON OPEC DECISIONS. BESIDES OIL, THERE IS VERY LITTLE TRADE BY ALGERIA WITHIN THE ARAB MARKET, AND ONLY A BARELY MORE SIGNIFICANT MONETARY INTEREST BY ARAB BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE ARAB DEVELOPMENT BANK AND THE SAUDI DEVELOPMENT BANK. WE BELIEVE LOANS FROM THESE SOURCES WERE LESS THAN $100 MILLION, REPRESENTING A DECLINE FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR. THUS, AS THE OIL MARKET GOES, SO GO ALGERIA'S TRADE RELATIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD, HAVING SOME REPERCUSSIONS FOR ITS POLITICAL RELATIONS. -------------- ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM -------------- ¶20. AS IN MOST ARAB COUNTRIES, ISLAM IS THE STATE RELIGION IN ALGERIA AND, AS SUCH, ENJOYS A PRIVILEGED POSITION VIS-A-VIS OTHER INSTITUTIONS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ATTEMPTED TO CO-OPT ISLAMIC PRECEPTS AND VALUES BY INCORPORATING THEM INTO THE NATIONAL CHARTER AND BY ENCOURAGING MOSQUE CONSTRUCTION AND PAYING AND TRAINING THE IMAMS. THERE IS ALSO SUBSTANTIAL ANNUAL SUPPORT FOR ALGERIAN PILGRIMS TO PERFORM THE HAJJ TO MECCA. HOWEVER, WHEN EXTERNAL INFLUENCES HAVE ATTEMPTED TO INVADE THE GOA'S MONOPOLY ON ISLAM, IT REACTS VIGOROUSLY. THE GOA WAS PARTICULARLY INCENSED BY LIBYAN EFFORTS IN 1983-84 TO FUND "PRIVATE" MOSQUES, WHICH THE GOA CORRECTLY VIEWED AS SOURCES OF FUNDAMENTALISM. RUMORS OF SAUDI FINANCING TO ALGERIAN ISLAMISTS IN MID-1986 ALSO RAISED GOA SUSPICIONS ABOUT SAUDI INTENTIONS. THE GOA CON- TINUES TO BE CONCERNED BY BEN BELLA'S EFFORTS TO USE ISLAM TO RECRUIT ANTI-REGIME ELEMENTS. TO COUNTER THESE ACTIVITIES, THE GOA HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT TO RECRUIT TRADITIONALLY ORIENTED ISLAMIC SCHOLARS TO STAFF ALGERIA'S NEW UNIVERSITY OF ISLAMIC AND SCIENTIFIC STUDIES IN CONSTANTINE. THE GOA ALSO TRIES TO CONTROL THE INFLOW OF ISLAMIC MATERIALS, SUCH AS RECORDED SERMONS AND LITERATURE, WITH ONLY MODERATE SUCCESS. DESPITE RELATIVELY ACTIVE CONCERN ABOUT THE POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTALISM, THE GOA DOES NOT APPEAR TO COORDINATE ITS RESPONSES WITH ITS MAGHREB NEIGHBORS. FOR ALGERIA, FUNDAMENTALISM REMAINS MORE OF A LONG- TERM POTENTIAL PROBLEM RATHER THAN AN IMMEDIATE THREAT, AND AS SUCH IS USUALLY NOT ON ALGERIA'S AGENDA IN ITS BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH MOST ARAB COUNTRIES. -------------- IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. -------------- ¶21. MUTUAL U.S.-ALGERIAN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS HAVE HAD A POSITIVE IMPACT ON ALGERIA'S APPROACH ON NUMEROUS ARAB-RELATED ISSUES. DESPITE OUR DISAGREEMENT OVER TACTICS, OUR SHARED DISTRUST OF QADHAFI HAS ALLOWED US TO MAINTAIN A USEFUL DIALOGUE WITH THE GOA ON LIBYA. SIMILARLY, ALGERIA HAS ADOPTED A CONSTRUCTIVE, NON-AGGRESSIVE POSTURE TOWARD TUNISIA TO CONTRIBUTE TO A STABLE TRANSITION THERE. ALGERIAN REACTIONS WERE RELATIVELY MUTED TO THE U.S. RAID ON TRIPOLI (APRIL 15),AND, AFTER A BRIEF PAUSE, THERE WAS AN UPSURGE IN BILATERAL COOPERATION ACROSS A BROAD SPECTRUM, INCLUDING MILITARY AND SECURITY INTERESTS. FOREIGN MINISTRY SECGEN HAMDANI EXPLAINED TO US THAT ALGERIAN EFFORTS TO HAVE THE PLO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE ARE INTENDED TO ENABLE THE PLO TO RESPOND TO PEACE INITIATIVES IN A MORE POSITIVE MANNER. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN COOPERATIVE EFFORTS MADE TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF U.S. HOSTAGES IN LEBANON, AIDED BY ALGERIA'S ACCESS TO THOSE RADICAL GROUPS HOLDING THE AMERICANS. FINALLY, THE GOA HAS RECENTLY TAKEN STEPS TO COOPERATE WITH THE U.S. ON COUNTERING TERRORISM. ¶22. THESE CONCRETE ACTIONS BY THE GOA TO WORK WITH THE U.S. ON ARAB-RELATED ISSUES THAT AFFECT OUR INTERESTS HAVE BEEN REFLECTED TOO IN ALGERIA'S RHETORICAL PUBLIC APPROACH, WITH A LOWERING OF DIRECT CRITICISM, EVEN WHILE VOTING AGAINST U.S. POSITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. THE GOA LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN WILLING TO PAY A DOMESTIC PRICE FOR THIS POLICY, DEFLECTING CRITICISM BY INTERNAL HARDLINERS AND MOVING FORWARD, ALBEIT GRADUALLY, WITH A VARIETY OF BILATERAL PROGRAMS. ACTIVE U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY WHEN IT TOUCHES UPON NORTH AFRICA, AS IT DID IN THE OCTOBER 1985 ISRAELI BOMBING OF PLO HEADQUARTERS IN TUNIS, WILL GIVE THE GOA SERIOUS INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES IN WORKING TOWARD BROADLY DEEPER COOPERATION ON ARAB-RELATED ISSUES. HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE A GROWING CAPACITY TO SEPARATE ISRAELI ACTIONS FROM U.S. POLICIES, AS APPEARS TO BE THE CASE WITH ALGERIAN ACCUSATIONS OF ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT IN MOROCCO. IF THIS TREND CONTINUES, IT MIGHT BE A STRONG INDICATION THAT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP HAS TAKEN ON AN IMPORTANCE WHICH COULD TRANSCEND PREVIOUS ALGERIAN CONVICTIONS THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF ARAB SOLIDARITY WAS THE PRIMARY CONSIDERATION IN ITS POLICY FORMULATION. IN ANY CASE, IT IS CLEAR THAT ALGERIA NOW INCLUDES POTENTIAL U.S. REACTIONS AS PART OF ITS POLICY DELIBERATIONS AND FREQUENTLY GIVES THESE REACTIONS CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT IN ITS DECISION-MAKING. THIS WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE U.S. WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE GOA TO ADVANCE OUR INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD. JOHNSTONE