ABU NIDAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 08873

TERREP EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER NL
SUBJECT: ABU NIDAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

REF: (A) STATE 371962, (B) STATE 371963,


1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)


2. SUMMARY: EMBASSY HAS DISCUSSED ISSUE OF ABU NIDAL
TERRORISM (REFTELS) WITH APPROPRIATE MFA OFFICIALS.
THE INITIAL MFA RESPONSE INDICATED THE DUTCH RECOGNIZE
THE DANGER OF ABU NIDAL GROUP AND ARE PREPARED TO
PARTICIPATE IN A "POLITICAL DIALOGUE" WITH THE US AND
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE JOINT
ACTION. NONETHELESS, THERE IS NO CLEAR IDEA WITHIN THE
MINISTRY AS TO HOW SUCH A DIALOGUE MIGHT BE STRUCTURED
AND WHAT CHANNELS OF COORDINATION WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE.
THE DUTCH ALSO TOOK ADVANTAGE OF OUR DEMARCHE TO PASS
ON INFORMATION CONCERNING A POSSIBLE AMAL TERRORIST
ACTION WHICH THE MFA RECEIVED CONFIDENTIALLY FROM TWO
LIBYAN GOVERNMENT SOURCES. END SUMMARY.


3. AMBASSADOR RAISED ISSUE OF ABU NIDAL TERRORISM
(REFTELS) WITH MFA DIRECTOR FOR MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
AFFAIRS JAN HORAK AND EMBASSY OFFICER FOLLOWED UP IN
GREATER DETAIL WITH AREND HUITZING, HEAD, MFA MIDDLE
EAST OFFICE, AND JOOP VAN BOSSE, HEAD, NORTH AFRICA
OFFICE. WE EXPLAINED USG INTEREST IN INCREASED INTER-
NATIONAL COOPERATION AGAINST ABU NIDAL, DRAWING ON
POINTS REF A, AND PROVIDED MFA WITH US INTELLIGENCE
ASSESSMENT ON THE SUBJECT (REF B). WE ARE ALSO
PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT TO DUTCH INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES VIA SIRO LIAISON CHANNELS.


4. HUITZING AND VAN BOSSE INDICATED THAT GON IS CON-
CERNED ABOUT ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION, WHICH WAS
RESPONSIBLE FOR BOMBING OF AN EL AL OFFICE IN
AMSTERDAM IN SEPTEMBER. HUITZING NOTED THAT
NETHERLANDS AND US ARE ALREADY EXCHANGING INFORMATION
ON TERRORISM THROUGH APPROPRIATE CHANNELS AND HE DOUBTS
THERE WAS MUCH NEW THE DUTCH COULD OFFER IN THIS AREA.
HE DID THINK, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS A NEED FOR A
"POLITICAL DIALOGUE" BETWEEN THE US AND CONCERNED
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO SEE WHAT CONCRETE DIPLOMATICC
SECURITY MEASURES WE COULD JOINTLY TAKE TO DEAL WITH THE
ABU NIDAL THREAT.


5. WE ASKED HUITZING AND VAN BOSSE IF THEY HAD ANY
SUGGESTIONS AS TO THE BEST FORUM FOR SUCH A DIALOGUE.
THE TWO MEN DISAGREED IN THEIR RESPONSES. HUITZING
FAVORED DEALING WITH THE ISSUE AT NATO, WHILE
VAN BOSSE THOUGHT A US DIALOGUE WITH THE EC "TREVI"
GROUP DEALING WITH TERRORISM MIGHT BE BETTER.
HUITZING'S PREFERENCE FOR NATO SEEMED BASED ON HIS
DESIRE TO GIVE PREEMINENCE TO THE POLITICAL/
DIPLOMATIC ASPECTS OF SUCH A DIALOGUE, WHILE VAN BOSSE
FELT THE TREVI GROUP COULD BETTER DEAL WITH THE LAW
ENFORCEMENT SIDE OF THE TERRORISM ISSUE. BOTH MEN
AGREED THE MFA LACKS A CLEAR POINT OF CONTACT FOR
COORDINATING TERRORISM POLICY COMPARABLE TO THE
STATE DEPARTMENT'S M/CT.


6. WE ALSO ASKED VAN BOSSE ABOUT INFORMATION PROVIDED
TO US THAT A NUMBER OF DUTCH TRAVELING TO
LIBYA HAD TWO PASSPORTS, ONE OF WHICH WAS OFTEN
SEIZED BY LIBYAN AUTHORITIES. VAN BOSSE CLARIFIED
THAT SUCH SEIZURES USUALLY ONLY OCCUR WHEN THE
LIBYANS HAVE AN UNRESOLVED COMMERCIAL OR FINANCIAL
CLAIM AGAINST THE DUTCH CITIZEN IN QUESTION. THE
PASSPORTS ARE ALMOST ALWAYS RETURNED
EVENTUALLY BY THE LIBYANS, VAN BOSSE SAID, AND THERE
IS NO EVIDENCE THEY HAVE BEEN USED TO FACILITATE
ILLEGAL TRAVEL BY TERRORISTS. HUITZING NOTED THAT
IT WOULD BE FAR EASIER FOR THE LIBYANS TO OBTAIN
DUTCH PASSPORTS ON THE "BLACK MARKET" FROM AMONG
PASSPORTS REPORTED LOST OR STOLEN WITHIN THE
NETHERLANDS THAN TO ATTEMPT TO USE ONE OF THE FEW
SEIZED DIRECTLY BY THEIR AUTHORITIES, SINCE THE
DUTCH KEEP A CLOSE WATCH ON THOSE PASSPORTS AND
WOULD BE AWARE IMMEDIATELY OF LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT
IF THEY SHOWED UP IN THE HANDS OF TERRORISTS.


7. VAN BOSSE ALSO USED THE OPPORTUNITY OF OUR
DEMARCHE TO PASS TO US INFORMATION RECEIVED IN CONFI-
DENCE FROM TWO DIFFERENT LIBYAN DIPLOMATS REGARDING
POSSIBLE TERRORIST ACTIVITY. VAN BOSSE SAID THE
DUTCH EMBASSY IN TRIPOLI HAD BEEN TOLD IN JULY THAT
THE AMAL GROUP IN LEBANON WAS PLANNING A POSSIBLE AIR
HIJACKING OF A DUTCH AND/OR LIBYAN AIRCRAFT. ACCORDING
TO THE LIBYAN SOURCES, THE TERRORISTS WOULD BE USING
FORGED LEBANESE OR LIBYAN PASSPORTS. VAN BOSSE
ADMITTED THE INFORMATION WAS RATHER DATED, BUT HE
PRESENTED IT TO US TO UNDERSCORE THE DUTCH MFA ARGUMENT
THAT MAINTAINING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH LIBYA CAN
OCCASIONALLY YIELD VALUABLE INFORMATION OF USE TO THE
WEST'S EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM.


8. VAN BOSSE AND HUITZING CONCLUDED BY SAYING THEY
WOULD BRING OUR DEMARCHE ON ABU NIDAL TO THE ATTENTION
OF SENIOR MFA OFFICIALS AND WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH US IF
THE MINISTRY HAD ANY ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS ON POSSIBLE
FUTURE COOPERATION IN THIS AREA.


9. COMMENT: VAN BOSSE'S AND HUITZING'S READY
UNDERSTANDING OF THE VALUE OF A STEPPED-UP WESTERN
POLITICAL DIALOGUE ON TERRORISM IS ENCOURAGING.
WE WILL BE FOLLOWING UP TO FOMENT SIMILAR
UNDERSTANDING AT SENIOR MFA LEVELS. EVEN WITH SUCH
UNDERSTANDING, HOWEVER, IT WILL NOT BE EASY TO
TURN WESTERN DIALOGUE INTO OUR OBJECTIVE OF JOINT
OR PARALLEL PRESSURES BY THE DUTCH UPON LIBYA AND
SYRIA. WHAT WE NEED AS A FIRST STEP IS TO IDENTIFY
A WESTERN FORUM FOR DIALOGUE WHERE WE COULD BUILD
MOMENTUM FOR JOINT ACTION IN WHICH WE COULD CATCH
UP THE DUTCH AND OTHERS.


BREMER