Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
85MOSCOW8814
1985-07-01 12:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
(C) DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN: A SOVIET VIEW
how-toR 011258Z JUL 85 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2098 INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD AMEMBASSY BEIJING AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY PARIS USMISSION USNATO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY MANAMA AMEMBASSY MUSCAT AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 08814
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL UR IR
SUBJECT: (C) DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN: A SOVIET VIEW
REF: MOSCOW 08415
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 08814
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL UR IR
SUBJECT: (C) DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN: A SOVIET VIEW
REF: MOSCOW 08415
1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)
.
SUMMARY
--------------
2. A WELL-INFORMED SOVIET OBSERVER OF EVENTS IN IRAN
RECENTLY DISCUSSED WITH US THE UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING
FUTURE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TEHRAN. WHILE ASSERTING
THAT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH IRAN WOULD
CONTINUE, OUR INTERLOCUTOR CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT THERE IS
NO CONSENSUS IN MOSCOW ON THE LIKELY SUCCESS OF SUCH
EFFORTS. END SUMMARY.
3. EMBOFF RECENTLY HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS
DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE ORIENTAL
INSTITUTE'S DEPARTMENT FOR AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, IRAN,
AND TURKEY, YURIY GANKOVSKIY (PROTECT). WHILE GANKOVSKIY
IS NOT A POLICY-MAKER, HE IS ONE OF THE BEST INFORMED AND
MOST THOUGHTFUL SOVIET ANALYSTS ON IRAN, AS WELL AS A
REPUTED MFA ADVISER.
.
4. IRAN/IRAQ WAR: GANKOVSKIY WITHOUT PROMPTING VOLUNTEER-
ED THAT IRAN WAS CLEARLY RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTINUATION OF
THE WAR. HE ASSERTED THAT THE SAUDIS AND OTHER ARAB
COUNTRIES WERE READY TO MEET IRANIAN DEMANDS FOR CASH
PAYMENTS TO OFFSET WAR DAMAGES. HOWEVER, GANKOVSKIY SAW
LITTLE PROSPECT FOR AN END TO THE WAR BECAUSE THE
AUTHORITIES IN TEHRAN REMAIN DETERMINED TO BRING DOWN
SADDAM HUSAYN.
.
5. FUTURE POLITICAL PROSPECTS IN IRAN: GANKOVSKIY
DISCOUNTED A BID BY THE IRANIAN MILITARY EITHER TO OVER-
THROW KHOMEINI OR TAKE POWER FOLLOWING HIS DEATH. HE
ATTRIBUTED THE MILITARY'S RELUCTANCE TO MAKE A BID FOR POW-
ER TO THE OFFICER CORPS' PREOCCUPATION WITH THE WAR, THE
STRENGTH OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS, AND THE DECIMATION
OF THE IRANIAN MILITARY'S BEST OFFICERS IN SUCCESSIVE
WAVES OF REPRESSION. GANKOVSKIY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE
REPRESSION HAD TAKEN A HEAVY TOLL AMONG THE "LEFT"
OPPOSITION, WHICH WAS FURTHER WEAKENED BY LACK OF UNITY.
HE CONCLUDED THAT, EVEN AFTER KHOMEINI'S DEATH, THERE
WOULD BE "NO SOLUTION ON THE LEFT" FOR IRAN. INTERESTING-
LY, GANKOVSKIY WOULD NOT RULE OUT A COMEBACK BY THE
WESTERN-ORIENTED IRANIAN "BOURGEOISIE." WHILE THEY WERE
IN EXILE NOW, IRAN HAD A LONG HISTORY OF EXILES WHO HAD
MADE STARTLING POLITICAL COMEBACKS. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER,
GANKOVSKIY SAID THAT KHOMEINI'S SUCCESSOR WOULD MOST
LIKELY COME FROM AMONG THOSE POLITICAL FIGURES ASSOCIATED
WITH THE CURRENT REGIME AND THAT RAFSANJANI SEEMED THE
BEST BET FOR THE PRESENT.
.
6. EMBOFF ASKED GANKOVSKIY WHETHER THERE WERE NOT TWO
BROAD LINES IN SOVIET THINKING ABOUT RELATIONS WITH IRAN.
SOME SOVIETS SEEMED TO ADVOCATE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO
IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE CURRENT REGIME, WHILE OTHERS
SEEMED DEEPLY SKEPTICAL THAT EFFORTS TO COOPERATE WITH
THE TEHRAN AUTHORITIES WOULD SERVE SOVIET INTERESTS (REF-
TEL). GANKOVSKIY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WERE NOT TWO
LINES, BUT "TWENTY LINES" IN SOVIET THINKING ABOUT IRAN.
DESPITE THESE DIFFERENCES IN OPINION, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET
UNION HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO TRY TO WORK OUT A BETTER
RELATIONSHIP WITH A COUNTRY WITH WHICH IT SHARED A LONG
BORDER.
.
7. COMMENT: WHILE MUCH OF WHAT GANKOVSKIY HAD TO SAY IS
STANDARD, HIS COMMENTS SUGGEST CONSIDERABLE UNCERTAINTY
AMONG KNOWLEDGEABLE SOVIETS ABOUT IRAN'S LONG-TERM COURSE.
WHILE HE WAS CAREFUL TO ASSERT SOVIET INTEREST IN IMPROVE-
MENT OF RELATIONS WITH IRAN, GANKOVSKIY CLEARLY IMPLIED
THAT THERE IS NO CONSENSUS AMONG SOVIET ANALYSTS ABOUT THE
LIKELY SUCCESS OF SUCH AN EFFORT.
HARTMAN
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL UR IR
SUBJECT: (C) DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN: A SOVIET VIEW
REF: MOSCOW 08415
1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)
.
SUMMARY
--------------
2. A WELL-INFORMED SOVIET OBSERVER OF EVENTS IN IRAN
RECENTLY DISCUSSED WITH US THE UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING
FUTURE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TEHRAN. WHILE ASSERTING
THAT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH IRAN WOULD
CONTINUE, OUR INTERLOCUTOR CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT THERE IS
NO CONSENSUS IN MOSCOW ON THE LIKELY SUCCESS OF SUCH
EFFORTS. END SUMMARY.
3. EMBOFF RECENTLY HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS
DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE ORIENTAL
INSTITUTE'S DEPARTMENT FOR AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, IRAN,
AND TURKEY, YURIY GANKOVSKIY (PROTECT). WHILE GANKOVSKIY
IS NOT A POLICY-MAKER, HE IS ONE OF THE BEST INFORMED AND
MOST THOUGHTFUL SOVIET ANALYSTS ON IRAN, AS WELL AS A
REPUTED MFA ADVISER.
.
4. IRAN/IRAQ WAR: GANKOVSKIY WITHOUT PROMPTING VOLUNTEER-
ED THAT IRAN WAS CLEARLY RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTINUATION OF
THE WAR. HE ASSERTED THAT THE SAUDIS AND OTHER ARAB
COUNTRIES WERE READY TO MEET IRANIAN DEMANDS FOR CASH
PAYMENTS TO OFFSET WAR DAMAGES. HOWEVER, GANKOVSKIY SAW
LITTLE PROSPECT FOR AN END TO THE WAR BECAUSE THE
AUTHORITIES IN TEHRAN REMAIN DETERMINED TO BRING DOWN
SADDAM HUSAYN.
.
5. FUTURE POLITICAL PROSPECTS IN IRAN: GANKOVSKIY
DISCOUNTED A BID BY THE IRANIAN MILITARY EITHER TO OVER-
THROW KHOMEINI OR TAKE POWER FOLLOWING HIS DEATH. HE
ATTRIBUTED THE MILITARY'S RELUCTANCE TO MAKE A BID FOR POW-
ER TO THE OFFICER CORPS' PREOCCUPATION WITH THE WAR, THE
STRENGTH OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS, AND THE DECIMATION
OF THE IRANIAN MILITARY'S BEST OFFICERS IN SUCCESSIVE
WAVES OF REPRESSION. GANKOVSKIY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE
REPRESSION HAD TAKEN A HEAVY TOLL AMONG THE "LEFT"
OPPOSITION, WHICH WAS FURTHER WEAKENED BY LACK OF UNITY.
HE CONCLUDED THAT, EVEN AFTER KHOMEINI'S DEATH, THERE
WOULD BE "NO SOLUTION ON THE LEFT" FOR IRAN. INTERESTING-
LY, GANKOVSKIY WOULD NOT RULE OUT A COMEBACK BY THE
WESTERN-ORIENTED IRANIAN "BOURGEOISIE." WHILE THEY WERE
IN EXILE NOW, IRAN HAD A LONG HISTORY OF EXILES WHO HAD
MADE STARTLING POLITICAL COMEBACKS. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER,
GANKOVSKIY SAID THAT KHOMEINI'S SUCCESSOR WOULD MOST
LIKELY COME FROM AMONG THOSE POLITICAL FIGURES ASSOCIATED
WITH THE CURRENT REGIME AND THAT RAFSANJANI SEEMED THE
BEST BET FOR THE PRESENT.
.
6. EMBOFF ASKED GANKOVSKIY WHETHER THERE WERE NOT TWO
BROAD LINES IN SOVIET THINKING ABOUT RELATIONS WITH IRAN.
SOME SOVIETS SEEMED TO ADVOCATE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO
IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE CURRENT REGIME, WHILE OTHERS
SEEMED DEEPLY SKEPTICAL THAT EFFORTS TO COOPERATE WITH
THE TEHRAN AUTHORITIES WOULD SERVE SOVIET INTERESTS (REF-
TEL). GANKOVSKIY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WERE NOT TWO
LINES, BUT "TWENTY LINES" IN SOVIET THINKING ABOUT IRAN.
DESPITE THESE DIFFERENCES IN OPINION, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET
UNION HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO TRY TO WORK OUT A BETTER
RELATIONSHIP WITH A COUNTRY WITH WHICH IT SHARED A LONG
BORDER.
.
7. COMMENT: WHILE MUCH OF WHAT GANKOVSKIY HAD TO SAY IS
STANDARD, HIS COMMENTS SUGGEST CONSIDERABLE UNCERTAINTY
AMONG KNOWLEDGEABLE SOVIETS ABOUT IRAN'S LONG-TERM COURSE.
WHILE HE WAS CAREFUL TO ASSERT SOVIET INTEREST IN IMPROVE-
MENT OF RELATIONS WITH IRAN, GANKOVSKIY CLEARLY IMPLIED
THAT THERE IS NO CONSENSUS AMONG SOVIET ANALYSTS ABOUT THE
LIKELY SUCCESS OF SUCH AN EFFORT.
HARTMAN