NEW DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL OPEN TO IMPROVE RELATIONS

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SUBJECT: NEW DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL OPEN TO IMPROVE RELATIONS
BETWEEN CROATIA AND SERBIA

REF: A. ZAGREB 00026

B. ZAGREB 00032

C. 09 ZAGREB774

D. 09 ZAGREB 746

Classified By: PolOff Peter D'Amico, Reasons 1.4 B/D


1. (C/NF) Summary. In a meeting on January 20, MFA State
Secretary Bozinovic discussed with the Ambassador the
recently opened channel with Serbian President Boris Tadic to
improve bilateral relations. Bozinovic believed there was
good will on both sides to try and tackle the complicated
open issues and described his meeting with Tadic in Belgrade
on December 23 and a follow up meeting in Zagreb with
Tadic,s advisors on January 19. These discussions are known
to only a small circle of officials in Croatia and Serbia.
Another meeting should take place in Belgrade in the next few
weeks. Bozinovic said one of the main outstanding issues for
the GoC was the fate of missing persons while the Serbian
side's main concern was refugees. Bozinovic explained why
Croatia opposed the Serbian position on the issue of
compensating refugees who did not want to return to Croatia.
He said that if there were progress on this and other
outstanding issues it was likely Croatia would drop its ICJ
genocide suit. Both sides discussed how they could help
improve the situation in Bosnia. Bozinovic said that
although Tadic would not attend President-elect Josipovic,s
inauguration, other high-level official visits were likely to
happen in the near future. The new channel between Zagreb
and Belgrade is a welcome development, but bridging the gap
between both sides will likely require major work and
comprehensive deal on the unresolved issues from the war.
End Summary.

Secret Channel Between Zagreb and Belgrade


2. (C/NF) In a meeting on January 20, MFA State Secretary
Davor Bozinovic discussed recent efforts via the newly opened
channel with Serbian President Boris Tadic to improve
bilateral relations (ref A). Bozinovic said that when Tadic
called PM Kosor in December to discuss the then-planned visit
of President Mesic to Kosovo in early January, Kosor
suggested using the model she had employed with Slovenia --
having close advisors quietly meet to work on resolving
outstanding issues. Tadic decided a few weeks later to
accept the proposal and Bozinovic, who earlier served as
Ambassador to Serbia, went to Belgrade as the PM,s envoy on
December 23 to see the Serbian President. Bozinovic said
that they talked for over an hour about bilateral relations
as well as the domestic situation in Croatia, particularly
what role former PM Sanader was playing in decision making.
(Note: This was prior to Sanader,s failed attempt to stage a
political comeback at Kosor,s expense. End note.) Tadic
and Bozinovic agreed it was time for both sides to find
solutions to outstanding issues, such as the fate of missing
persons, border demarcation, refugees, and the return of
cultural items. Bozinovic said he did not reply directly to
Tadic,s question about Croatia,s genocide suit against
Serbia, commenting that all of the outstanding issues are
connected with the breakup of Yugoslavia and that the
genocide suit could be resolved if those issues were
resolved. He said this seemed to be the position of both
President-elect Josipovic and PM Kosor.


3. (C/NF) Following this first encounter, Tadic sent his
advisors Jovan Ratkovic and Mladan Djordjevic to Zagreb on
January 19 to continue the discussion with Bozinovic and PM
Kosor,s Foreign Policy Advisor Davor Stier. For the
Croatians, one of the particularly sensitive issues raised
was determining the fate of missing persons from the war.
The Serbian MOD was believed to have more information about
possible grave sites where the missing persons might be
located, and the GoC wanted to make greater progress on
bringing closure to the victims and their families.

Refugees


4. (C/NF) The main issue for the Serbian side was refugees.
Bozinovic noted that there had also been a working level
conference among countries in the region on refugees in
Zagreb on January 15 (ref B). Bozinovic claimed that 8
percent of the state budget goes to resolving issues from the
war and that politically there was no longer any sensitivity
on the Croatian side preventing refugees in Serbia to return
to Croatia if they wanted to. What was most difficult to
find agreement on was the issue of former tenancy right
holders, in particular the Serbian demand that Croatia
provide compensation to those who wanted to remain in Serbia
or Bosnia, rather than return and re-integrate in Croatia.

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Bozinovic called this demand impossible from a legal,
political, and even economic perspective given the estimated
30 billion Euros in damages inflicted by Serbia on Croatia
during the war. He questioned how individuals who had left
Croatia nearly 20 years ago and were well integrated in
another country could be characterized as refugees requiring
compensation, and insisted on the development of updated
statistics to determine the exact number of people who still
qualified as refugees under international law (i.e., those
who had not obtained citizenship or a job in Serbia). Once
the concrete number was established, Bozinovic said the GoC
would support the creation of an international fund to assist
such people, adding that Croatia wanted to help those in
genuine need as long as it was not placed under a new
obligation to do so.


5. (C/NF) Bozinovic noted that the GoS under Milosovic had
manipulated the refugees into believing they could not
return, so as to boost the number of ethnic Serbs living in
Kosovo and Vojvodina. He expressed concern that the refugees
were now being used as a tool either to extract money from
Croatia by attempting to link the issue to Croatia,s EU
entry or to delay Croatia,s EU accession. The Ambassador
said that it was good that there were bilateral discussions
on the refugee issue and that USG urged both sides to
consider creative solutions.

Other Issues


6. (C/NF) Addressing other outstanding issues, Bozinovic was
positive about the progress that had been made regarding the
return of cultural items. Regarding border questions,
Bozinovic believed that, if it was not possible to reach a
bilateral agreement, both sides would likely find it
acceptable to send the case to the ICJ. He thought the issue
of missing persons from the war would be difficult to
address. Bozinovic also noted that Croatia had officially
decided to give the Croatian translation of the EU's "acquis
communautaire" to all other Southeastern European countries
that wanted a copy, including Serbia (ref C).


7. (C/NF) Potential cooperation on Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH)
was the key foreign policy issue discussed. Bozinovic
suggested that Serbia and Croatia cooperate in particular in
support of BiH,s NATO aspirations. Ratkovic and Djordjevic
said that it had been a mistake not to give MAP to BiH,
particularly since withholding it provided little leverage
over Dodik, who was indifferent about joining NATO.


8. (C/NF) Ratkovic and Djordjevic told the Croats that Tadic
had clearly stated he would not support a referendum for
secession in Republika Srpska (RS) and that he would do what
he could to follow up on his pledge to Vice President Biden
to persuade RS PM Dodik to be constructive. However, the
Serbs said it was unrealistic to expect Tadic to tell the
Bosnian Serbs that Sarajevo is their capital, as Croatian
President Mesic had told the Bosnian Croats. At one point in
the discussion on BiH, Ratkovic and Djordjevic commented that
99 percent of the Serbs in the RS would like to join Serbia
and 99 percent of the Bosnian Croats would like to join
Croatia. Bozinovic said he restated the GoC position in
support of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH,
with equality among its three constituent peoples.


9. (C/NF) Bozinovic noted that Kosovar President Sejdiu had
officially confirmed that he would attend Josipovic,s
inauguration, so Tadic would not be coming. Tadic had boxed
himself in and precluded quiet diplomacy by delivering a
public ultimatum that he would not attend if Sejdiu was
there. However, Bozinovic said that Serbian PM Cvetkovic
would likely travel to Zagreb soon, and that Josipovic would
likely go to Belgrade some time after that. Bozinovic
posited that Tadic would come to Zagreb in the second half of

2010.


10. (C/NF) Bozinovic said that he and Stier were expecting to
go to Belgrade for another round of discussions in several
weeks. He noted that these discussions were so far only
known to a small circle of people in Croatia and Serbia. As
far as Bozinovic was aware, in Croatia only his and the PM,s
staff, Justice Minister Simonovic, FM Jandrokovic,
Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS) Party Leader Milorad
Pupovac, Deputy PM Slobodan Uzelac, and MOD State Secretary
Pjer Simunovic knew about his trip to Belgrade. Bozinovic
noted that, if it had not been done already by the PM, it
would be important to brief President-elect Josipovic and to
establish a joint approach by both leaders toward Serbia. In
Serbia, Bozinovic was only aware that the new Serbian
Ambassador to Croatia Vukicevic and Tadic,s close advisors

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knew about the channel. Ambassador Foley strongly encouraged
the continuation of the bilateral dialogue and pledged U.S.
readiness to assist both sides in improving relations.

Comment


11. (C/NF) The new channel between Zagreb and Belgrade is
obviously a welcome development, one that we will want to
encourage. As difficult as the outstanding issues will be to
resolve, it is certain that there is no chance of resolving
them in the public domain, as underscored by the most recent
war of words. Certainly Kosor, by virtue of her experience
with Slovenia, believes that quiet diplomacy can pay
dividends. But the lesson of that example is also that
success requires compromise. In the case of Croatia and
Serbia, this will mean time-consuming and painstaking work to
forge a broad strategic deal on a number of outstanding
issues from the war in 1990s, such as missing persons,
refugees, the ICJ genocide suits, and potential reparations
claims (ref D). Achieving this kind of comprehensive
agreement will likely require active support from the two
sides, US and European partners.
FOLEY