POLISH EXPECTATIONS ON BELARUS "TORPEDOED"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000111 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CE, EUR/UMB E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/22/2020 TAGS: BO PGOV PHUM PL PREL SUBJECT: POLISH EXPECTATIONS ON BELARUS "TORPEDOED" Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER RUPERT FINKE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND ( D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. MFA officials say that Polish expectations for improved relations with Minsk were "torpedoed" by Belarus's recent seizure of a Polish cultural center in Iwieniec and the detention of several dozen Polish activists. One official characterized FM Sikorski's February 12 tete-a-tete with Belarusian FM Martynov as a tough exchange. The MFA will continue to talk to Belarusian authorities in the hope that Belarus will recognize its "blunder" and reverse course. If not, Poland will selectively apply visa controls, review economic assistance, and seek international support for excluding Belarus from participating in Western initiatives, including the economic elements of the EU's Eastern Partnership. Sikorski's supporters and detractors tell us that the Foreign Minister--who spearheaded Poland's efforts to ease relations with Belarus a year ago--has suffered a political bruising on a well-publicized and emotional issue just as he began his campaign to become the PO presidential candidate. END SUMMARY. A TOUGH EXCHANGE WITH MARTYNOV -------------- ¶2. (C) The recent arrests of ethnic Poles in Belarus has been the leading foreign policy story in Poland's major media for the past week, putting intense pressure on the Government. Jaroslaw Bratkiewicz, the MFA's Eastern Policy director, told a gathering of foreign diplomats on February 16 that the controversy dominated FM Sikorski's one-on-one meeting with his Belarusian counterpart in Warsaw. Bratkiewicz characterized the conversation as a flurry of "arguments and counterarguments." He said Sikorski proposed ways in which Warsaw could help Minsk--such as assistance in seeking loans, as well as gaining a seat in the Council of Baltic States and the Council of Europe--if Belarus respected the rights of ethnic Poles. Sikorski also warned Martynov that there would be negative consequences if Belarus continued to repress ethnic Poles. According to Bratkiewicz, Martynov agreed there should be a de-escalation of the conflict, but was otherwise noncommittal. ¶3. (C) The Foreign Minister himself privately told U.S. officials that he had a "good meeting" with Martynov, whom he characterized as "better than his government." However, Sikorski conceded that the Belarusian government had started arresting members of the ethnic Polish community a few days after his meeting. SIKORSKI'S ABOUT-FACE -------------- ¶4. (C) Sikorski, who led the charge a year ago to ease relations with Belarus, has aggressively sought to minimize the political fallout from an emotional issue. In a quick turnaround from his conciliatory approach to the Belarusian regime, Sikorski has assumed a tough public stance and is aggressively implementing countermeasures against Belarus. Sikorski will lead the upcoming Foreign Affairs Council in considering fresh sanctions, and he is reaching out to the U.S. and international institutions to apply similar pressure. He has twice recalled Poland's Ambassador to Belarus for consultations, publicly touted his tough "man-to-man" meeting with Martynov, and announced that the MFA would implement visa restrictions against Belarusians (i.e. pro-government journalists and members of the Belarusian-supported version of the Union of Poles) who work against Polish interests. ¶5. (C) Sikorski also coordinated with President Kaczynski on the latter's letter to Lukashenko calling for his personal intervention, and won public statements of support for the Union of Poles from EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Ashton and European Parliament President Jerzy Buzek. The Polish Sejm (lower house of Parliament) passed a resolution on February 17 condemning the actions against the Union of Poles in Belarus. ¶6. (C) MFA officials told us they will keep communication lines open with Belarusian counterparts in the hope that Belarus will soon realize its "blunder" and reverse course. If not, then Poland will seek international support in limiting Belarusian participation in Western initiatives, including the economic development aspects of the EU's Eastern Partnership that Belarus had been enthusiastic about implementing. It will also seek to limit Belarus's access to funds from the IMF, EBRD, and EU. MFA development assistance WARSAW 00000111 002 OF 002 officials have stated publicly that continued economic assistance to Belarus--the top recipient of Polish aid after Afghanistan--is contingent on an end to the crackdown on Union of Poles leadership. However, MFA officials made it clear to us they would not seek to curtail people-to-people contacts between Poland and Belarus, as evidenced by the February 12 signing of the local cross border traffic agreement. TROUBLE ON THE HOMEFRONT -------------- ¶7. (C) In the domestic sphere, Sikorski has suffered a setback that could damage his presidential ambitions. Bratkiewicz told us that Sikorski understood the risk of his engagement policy, as well as last week's meeting with Martynov, but admitted the setbacks had provided the opposition with ample ammunition "at an inopportune time" for Sikorski's political goals. The opposition PiS party senses blood in the water and is leveraging the issue to damage Sikorski's credibility. Member of the European Parliament Pawel Kowal (PiS) told the press that it was time for PM Tusk to intervene after Sikorski's policy "ended in such defeat." PiS Leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski publicly alleged that Sikorski has been sympathetic to Belarusian interests. Some within Sikorski's own party also foresee trouble. Sejm deputy Robert Tyszkiewicz (Civic Platform, PO) told us that Sikorski's presidential bid within the PO could be jeopardized if the Belarus issue continues to burn. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) In a political season, Poland's earlier engagement policy with Belarus is being depicted as a setback for the Foreign Minister. Sikorski,s opponents are attempting to undermine his image as a protector of Poles and Polish interests abroad by highlighting his decision to meet with Martynov while Belarusian authorities rounded up ethnic Poles. Sikorski has pushed back against the Belarusians very aggressively, but as long as the plight of ethnic Poles dominates the media, it will be difficult for him to turn the political conversation to a more favorable subject. FEINSTEIN