AMBASSADOR PRESSES AUSTRIA ON IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 000119 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO AND ISN/RA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2025 TAGS: PARM PREL UNSC IR AU SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESSES AUSTRIA ON IRAN REF: STATE 9124 Classified By: Ambassador W.C. Eacho. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. On Feb. 1, Amb. Eacho delivered reftel demarche to MFA Secretary General Johannes Kyrle. Kyrle, maintaining that Austria was in the European mainstream, was supportive of efforts to win enhanced sanctions in the UN Security Council (UNSC),where he said China would ultimately be the key voice. Kyrle would not be pinned down on whether Austria would agree to work now within the EU and with the U.S. on a more robust sanctions plan for deployment in the event the UNSC is unable to agree on a robust new sanctions package. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Amb. Eacho delivered reftel demarche to Austrian MFA Secretary General Kyrle on Feb. 1. (Foreign Minister Spindelegger is out of Vienna all week.) As the Ambassador reviewed Iran's human rights record, Kyrle interjected to note that Austria had called in the Iranian Ambassador the previous week to raise those concerns. He reported that Austria had done so 3-4 times. After the Ambassador had finished his points, which included noting the importance of sustaining respect for the IAEA, Kyrle said that Austria's position was clear: It would do whatever it could to support the development of a consensus on further sanctions within the UNSC and that the only way to do so was to have the support of Russia and China. Austria's position, he said, placed it in the middle of the range of EU views. Kyrle suggested that because of its UNSC seat, Austria (in contrast to the UK and France) was obliged to represent EU positions. He reported that he understood the French were to put forward a proposal on sanctions on Feb 1, but complained that Austria (and the rest of the EU) knew too little about deliberatiions among the P-5. If, he concluded, progress was not possible in the UNSC, Austria would expect the issue would be raised in the EU. ¶3. (C) Amb. Eacho noted again USG concern that UNSC sanctions might not be robust enough to move the Iranians and that the west would need to think at the same time about both possible UN sanctions and ways to amplify them. Kyrle noted that Iran was high on the agenda of every session of the EU's Foreign Affairs Council and assured the Amb. that the issue was taken very seriously by senior levels within the EU. ¶4. (C) Asked about Austrian views on possible sanctions, Kyrle avoided the question by noting Austria's strong commitment to enforcing present sanctions. ¶5. (C) Comment: Kyrle's reluctance to take a clear position on sanctions outside the UNSC context reflects an Austrian position that long predates its UNSC membership. That said, Austria has shifted from insisting on UNSC sanctions only to accepting that it will have to consider EU sanctions. We believe that continued pressure from the U.S. and from France, the UK, and Germany will continue to move the Austrians slowly toward more robust EU sanctions. As this process continues, we believe the Austrians will work reliably in New York to try and win the maximum possible from the Russians and Chinese. End Comment. EACHO