MINURCAT MANDATE RENEWAL -- CAUSE FOR CONCERN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000053 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL KPKO PREF UNSC CD CT SU SUBJECT: MINURCAT MANDATE RENEWAL -- CAUSE FOR CONCERN REF: A. NDJAMENA 00049 ¶B. NDJAMENA 000043 ¶C. PARIS 00084 ¶1. This is an action request, see paragraph 7. ¶2. (SBU) Summary: On January 25, the French mission held an informal meeting with Security Council experts and a Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) team prior to its January 26 trip to Chad to discuss the Government of Chad's (GoC) objections to MINURCAT's mandate renewal. The only delegations that spoke were Japan, Austria, France and the U.S., and the general atmosphere was one of inertia. DPKO indicated that it did not have a clear understanding of the extent to which the Council supported extending the MINURCAT mandate, a critical fact necessary before going into negotiations. The French will call an additional meeting to discuss with DPKO its findings when the team returns from Chad. USUN requests Department guidance on MINURCAT renewal prior to this meeting, and suggests that, if a decision is made to advocate for renewal, the Department consider demarching other key Council Members to urge their support. End Summary. ¶3. (SBU) In a January 25 meeting with Security Council experts, DPKO briefly outlined the regional implications of an early withdrawal of the UN Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT). Noting that 2010-11 would be a sensitive period with elections in Chad, Sudan and CAR, DPKO said that a precipitous withdrawal could adversely impact regional security. DPKO stated that if MINURCAT withdrew from Chad, training and mentoring of the Detachment Integre de Securite (DIS) could not be carried out by the remaining UN country team. DPKO also indicated that contributors would be much less likely to provide resources to the Trust Fund that facilitates DIS training, and the GoC would need to provide this funding. DPKO said that there were redlines the Secretariat would not be prepared to cross in negotiations, noting that the projected MINURCAT force level was already at the bare minimum necessary for effective peacekeeping operations. ¶4. (SBU) A representative from the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) stated that the sources of displacement in Chad and in Darfur had not changed, nor were they likely to change in the next twelve months. The OCHA rep stressed that humanitarian services are still needed. With the GOC's capacity to provide law and order being quite weak, OCHA expressed concern that MINURCAT's withdrawal would result in increased banditry, lawlessness and reduced mobility for humanitarian actors. OCHA noted that MINURCAT had provided 19,000 patrols and 5,000 escorts and was a key logistical partner for humanitarians. OCHA stated that the MINURCAT presence had allowed approximately 3,000 humanitarians to provide services to 600,000 refugees and displaced persons. OCHA also stressed the subregional implications of MINURCAT's withdrawal, noting that the mission had worked closely with the UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). ¶5. (SBU) In the brief discussion with SC experts that followed, Japan requested that DPKO share its redlines with the Council before the UN began negotiating with Chad. France indicated that President Deby had informally requested all MINURCAT troops to be withdrawn by April 30, 2010. Austria asked about progress in obtaining a replacement for the Norwegian Level II hospital, and DPKO responded that a replacement had not yet been found. The U.S. requested DPKO to assess the extent to which the GoC would be able to take over the responsibilities of MINURCAT with respect to providing a stable and secure environment that would allow provision of humanitarian assistance to the 600,000 refugees and internally displaced persons in Chad. ¶6. (SBU) In a private side-conversation, the Chinese expert indicated to poloff that the GoC had approached China to support its position advocating for withdrawal of MINURCAT troops by April 30, but the Chinese have not yet decided whether they will support the Chadian request. The DPKO expert also privately indicated to poloff that the French did not appear to be interested in strongly advocating for an extension of the MINURCAT mandate. (Comment: USUN suggests that if the U.S. position is to support renewal of the MINURCAT mandate, the Department might want to consider demarching key Council Members in capitals. End Comment.) ¶7. Action Request: USUN requests guidance from the Department on the U.S. position regarding the MINURCAT mandate renewal. USUN NEW Y 00000053 002 OF 002 RICE