DPRK: EXPERTS INVESTIGATE SANCTIONS VIOLATIONS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000028

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2020
TAGS: PREL PHUM ETTC MCAP KN UNSC
SUBJECT: DPRK: EXPERTS INVESTIGATE SANCTIONS VIOLATIONS,
REQUEST INFO

Classified By: Amb. Alejandro Wolff for Reasons 1.4 (B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: The Panel of Experts
(POE),a team mandated in UNSCR 1874 to help monitor and
improve implementation of UN sanctions on North Korea, has
launched investigations into the four sanctions violations
reported to the Security Council's DPRK Sanctions Committee
("1718 Committee"). The team is entering a make-or-break
period: it has only three months or so to wrap up its
investigations in time to finish its final report due in May

2010. The POE plans to submit to the Committee an "incident
report" for each violation that will lay out relevant facts,
analysis and recommendations for actions the Committee may
take in response. To aid its work, the POE will travel to
key capitals, mostly in Asia, in January and February. The
POE has requested that "friendly governments" supply them
with more information and leads to aid these and other
investigations. USUN requests that Washington consider
favorably the POE's request for more information. END
SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST.

POE: SLOWLY GETTING UP TO SPEED
--------------


2. (C) Halfway through its year-long mandate, the UN Panel of
Experts (POE) -- a seven-person independent team mandated by
UNSCR 1874 to monitor the enforcement of UN sanctions on
North Korea and recommend ways to improve their
implementation -- has launched investigations into the four
sanctions violations reported to the Security Council's DPRK
Sanctions Committee ("1718 Committee'). These investigations
will occur during a critical make-or-break period for the
Panel: it must complete its investigations in the first three
months of 2010 in order to be able to finish its final report
due to the Council in May 2010. The POE's work in this short
window will be an important factor in whether the Council
decides to renew the POE's mandate in June 2010.


3. (C) Established in June 2009 but not operational until
October, the POE has had a slow start and only recently begun
investigating these violations. The POE -- whose members
come from the P-5 countries, Japan and South Korea -- has
also faced internal disagreements about how aggressively it
should carry out its mission. The Security Council itself
has offered conflicting advice, with the P-3 and Japan having
encouraged the team to investigate sanctions violations
aggressively, while China and Russia have urged greater
caution. China and Russia have also begun to assert that
work of the Committee and POE must not interfere with talks
on denuclearization, implying that the work of both the POE
and Committee should be put on the back burner if there is a
resumption of substantive dialogue with Pyongyang.

AGREEING ON METHODOLOGY FOR RESPONSE
--------------


4. (C) On January 12, USUN convened a meeting with the U.S.,
UK, French, Japanese and South Korean members of the POE and
expert-level representatives from these countries' missions
to discuss the POE's approach to investigating sanctions
violations. (NOTE: This format excludes the Russian and
Chinese POE members, who have been more cautious with respect
to the POE's work. END NOTE). USUN emphasized to the POE
its clear directive in UNSCR 1874 to "gather, examine and
analyze information" regarding the sanctions implementation
"...in particular incidents of non-compliance." In line with
that mandate, USUN and other mission representatives urged
the POE to be proactive and aggressive in investigating and
following-up on all reported sanctions violations.


5. (C) During the discussion, the mission experts and POE
discussed a general approach for the POE to deal with
sanctions violations reported to the 1718 Committee, namely:

-- As soon as the report is received, the POE will reach out
to the country reporting the incident;

-- The Committee will immediately write to the reporting
state to request more information and urge full cooperation
with the POE;

-- If appropriate and upon invitation from the reporting
state, the POE will arrange site visits to inspect the
contraband;


-- After assembling the facts, the POE will submit for the
Committee's consideration an "incident report" that includes
factual reporting, analysis and recommendations for Committee
or Council action to be taken in response;

-- The POE will also be prepared to answer requests for
information or guidance from reporting states, such as where
states may get assistance in disposing of seized cargo.


6. (C) USUN emphasized that the POE was not limited to
investigating violations formally reported to the Committee,
but should also be following its own leads. USUN added that
the POE should work with supportive missions to brainstorm
actions the Committee can take to respond to sanctions
violations, as these incidents can be used as leverage to
engage states and improve sanctions implementation. Such
actions could include publicizing relevant details of a
violation through positing an "Implementation Assistance
Notice" on the Committee's website, writing additional
letters to states involved in violations, considering
additional sanctions designations or even raising the issue
to the attention of the Security Council.

UPDATE ON FOUR REPORTED VIOLATIONS
--------------


7. (C) POE Coordinator David Birch (UK) briefed mission
experts on the state of play of the four sanctions violations
reported to the 1718 Committee in 2009:

-- "ANL Australia" (a violation reported by the UAE in August
2009 involving the transfer of arms-related materiel from
Iran to the DPRK): Birch explained that the POE had engaged
the UAE mission in New York and was waiting for a formal
visit to inspect the cargo, preferably in January. The UAE
authorities, he said, may wish for the POE to be present when
the cargo is destroyed. The POE has also been analyzing
additional information supplied by Member States in the fall
in response to requests from the Committee regarding the
incident.

-- "MS Rachele" (a violation reported by South Korea in
October involving the transfer of chemical warfare protection
suits from the DPRK to Syria): Birch reported that the POE
had inspected the suits on a December visit to the South
Korean port of Busan. He noted that although some Committee
members believed that the protection suits did not constitute
"arms-related materiel" for the purposes of UNSCR 1874, the
team's visit to South Korea had uncovered facts that
supported the conclusion that these suits were primarily for
military use. The POE has begun drafting an incident report,
but is still negotiating the language with the
Russian/Chinese experts who believed the items had a
plausible civilian use.

-- Thai air seizure (a violation reported by Thailand in
December 2009 involving the transfer of arms from the DPRK
aboard an aircraft): Birch said that the POE was also waiting
on an invitation to visit Bangkok to inspect the items. The
POE hoped to schedule this trip in late January, but was
frustrated that the Thai mission, which seemed unclear about
what they should do in the aftermath of this incident, had
not yet extended a formal invitation. Mission
representatives agreed to prod the Thais to issue one soon.
At the same time, the 1718 Committee is poised to send
letters to all the states involved in the incident requesting
additional information and cooperation with the POE.

-- Luxury yachts (a violation reported by Austria in December
involving the DPRK's attempt to procure yachts, which are a
"luxury good" banned for export under UNSCR 1718): Birch said
the report from Austria illustrated the need for the
Committee to help states define what "luxury goods." He said
the POE had already detected a wide disparity in national
practice regarding the implementation of this provision. In
addition to engaging with the Austrians and the Italian
authorities who later seized the yachts the POE is now
working on draft guidance on the definition of "luxury goods"
that the Committee may wish to publish on its website.

LOOKING FOR LEADS
--------------


8. (C) The POE reiterated its request that "friendly
governments" provide it with information and leads that might


aid its investigations. Vic Comras, the U.S. expert on the
team, suggested that such information could be shared
privately (i.e., with only him or with a trusted subset of
the POE). This information, Comras and the other POE members
asserted, could help the POE focus its limited time and
resources on the investigations most likely to bear fruit.
Comras also said that the POE could agree not to identify the
United States as the source of information. The information,
Comras proposed, could then be repackaged in a formal POE
report sent to the Committee, thereby enhancing its
credibility.


10. (C) ACTION REQUEST: USUN recommends that Washington
consider seriously the POE request for more information or
leads that might help focus the team's efforts. The regular
provision of such information could significantly improve the
POE's ability to support better enforcement of the UN
sanctions imposed on North Korea. END ACTION REQUEST.

RICE