OSCE/FSC ON 2/24: DIFFERENCES OVER CODE OF

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000068 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER, NILSSON, FRIEDT OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL) JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5 E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OSCE PARM PREL KCFE RS XG SUBJECT: OSCE/FSC ON 2/24: DIFFERENCES OVER CODE OF CONDUCT; NO MOVEMENT YET ON VD99 PROPOSALS ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The February 24 Forum for Security Cooperation focused on the Code of Conduct, which drew out differences between U.S. and Russian approaches to dealing with conflict prevention and crisis management. It also underscored ambiguities within the Code and the tension between consensus and action by the OSCE in response to a potential crisis. Russia's proposal for OSCE conflict prevention was discussed in Working Group "B." Discussion of the British and Danish Vienna Document Food-for-thought papers in Working Group "A" made little headway. End Summary. -------------- Presentations on Code of Conduct -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The 605th Meeting of the Forum for Security Cooperation on February 24 focused on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, fulfilling in part the third tasking from ministers under the Issues Relevant decision (MC.DEC/16/09). As part of the Security Dialogue, the FSC received presentations from Wolfgang Zellner, Acting Head of the OSCE Center for OSCE Research; Andrei Zagorski, Lead Researcher at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations; and David Law, Senior Fellow at the Geneva Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces. ¶3. (SBU) Zellner's presentation focused on the Code's "ground-breaking" language that applies the principle of democratic controls, individual accountability, and the extension of essentially national norms to international applicability for all security forces within a State. Zagorski explored the concept of indivisible security and its manifestation within a framework of cooperative, external and internal security. He noted so-called "positive ambiguities" and the absence of a binding dispute resolution mechanism that would force participating States to seek common understanding at critical intervals in their relationships. With respect to CSBMs, Zagorski emphasized that updating VD99 and taking conventional arms control to the next level would constitute a first step in considering further measures aimed at solidarity within the OSCE. ¶4. (SBU) Law focused his remarks on the need to apply democratic control principles, including human rights and an effective division of labor between civilian leadership and the security forces to extend norms to private security forces that are outside the Code of Conduct oversight mechanisms. Besides the importance of incorporating private and traditional security providers into an agreed set of standards and norms, Law also underscored the added value of public-private partnerships in building accountability mechanisms. -------------- Responses by States on the Code -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) noted the plenary discussion demonstrated the consistency between the Russian proposal for a European Security Treaty and the concept of comprehensive security. Ulyanov pointed out that the EST ) like the Code of Conduct - need not be discussed outside the political-military dimension "as some have suggested." He then raised the prospect for a Europe-based missile defense system as an example of the violation of the Code's principle that no state should strengthen its security at the expense of another (presumably Russia). Ulyanov said this justified the need for a legally-binding charter since its absence created different security spheres in that indivisible security has a legal character in NATO, but not for the OSCE Code of Conduct; he referred to the difference as "abnormal." Ulyanov ended his remarks pleased the U.S. had incorporated elements of the Russian proposal for conflict prevention but USOSCE 00000068 002 OF 004 said the U.S. proposal was vague and Russia's was a more precise elaboration of this concept. ¶6. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) underscored the Code's continued relevance for adapting the comprehensive security concepts of the Helsinki Final Act to addressing 21st century threats in inter- and intra-state relations. He also posed a question to Zagorski about the tension between consensus and the ability to act to avert crisis. Spain (Anson),speaking for the EU Presidency, emphasized the Code's stipulation against forces that are "not accountable to or controlled by their constitutionally established authorities." Switzerland (Von Arx) noted the Code called for respecting the sovereign right of states to choose their relationships including neutrality, but added there was room to develop the concept of solidarity of action such as how to address a violation of commitments. Von Arx speculated that a reconfirmation of the Code of Conduct, including all principles contained therein, would do much to underscore the basic principles of European security, and avoid a selective reading of those principles. Georgia (Giorgazde) questioned Zellner's characterization of the Russian proposed European Security Treaty as "sharing the same vision as the Corfu Process," because Georgia sees the two as incompatible since Russia was not offering a comprehensive approach to security. ¶7. (SBU) Germany (Genrich) said the Forum needed to return to the beginning of the Code, recognizing the tensions among its principles, and consider how to address those tensions in the new security environment including review of the capacity for oversight. As a way to address these tensions, he proposed that perhaps the OSCE should think about new mechanisms of a consultative nature. Genrich added that dealing with the Code in the AIAM was not the best solution. Ireland (O'Leary) expressed strong support for Austria's proposed reference list for completing the Code of Conduct Questionnaire. Not surprisingly, Belarus (Krayushkin) emphasized that the principles in the Code of Conduct were only politically binding, which was why a document to ensure implementation was needed, such as Russia's proposal for a legally-binding EST. Latvia (Nilsons) called for "faithful implementation" of current mechanisms and concrete proposals in the field of CSBMs and Arms Control as a good basis for furthering cooperation. -------------- "Consensus Minus" and the Code of Conduct -------------- ¶8. (SBU) In their closing remarks, Law advocated for the OSCE to press for a better dialogue between the armed forces and the public. In response to a U.S. question about the tension between consensus and the ability to act to avert crisis, Zagorski noted that the Human Dimension allowed for consensus minus one as a way for OSCE to take action, albeit temporarily and not as a substitute for building consensus. He added this was important in that the OSCE has other impediments like no enforcement mechanisms and a dependence on the political will of the states concerned. ¶9. (SBU) Zagorski noted the OSCE should be able to act with the widest possible support but only until consensus was achieved to ensure all participating states own a decision to act. Zellner called for exploring tangible proposals on how to use in a positive way the tensions built into the Code, including possibly holding a seminar to consider how to bridge the gulf between consensus, solidarity of action, and conflict prevention. In response to Georgia, Zellner pointed out that Russia and the Corfu Process shared a vision for a security dialogue that supported greater cooperation: "the vision is agreed but not the path to achieve it." ¶10. (SBU) Russia, returning to the question of "consensus USOSCE 00000068 003 OF 004 minus" raised in part by the U.S. intervention, called the point "crucial" that, although theoretically possible, consensus minus could only be achieved within a more mature organization that has codified its institutional mandate. Ulyanov said, "We would need a European Charter first, with clear rules of play, before we could take seriously a 'consensus minus' mechanism in conflict prevention." ¶11. (SBU) Under Any Other Business, Ukraine thanked the CPC for the report on implementation of cycle one of the melange removal project, and expressed appreciation to the donor countries. Russia intervened to note that it was a Russian company doing the lion's share of the actual melange disposal, a point which Ukraine graciously acknowledged. Georgia called for an FSC discussion, which he hoped would include Heidi Tagliavini and relevant NGOs, dedicated to the August 2008 conflict with Russia, "not to point fingers but to examine lessons learned." -------------- - Working Group "B" ) Russia: "Never say never!" -------------- - ¶12. (SBU) Following the reintroduction of Russia's proposed draft decision on conflict prevention (FSC-PC.DEL/1/10/Corr.1),Switzerland (Von Arx) raised the importance of considering the Russian proposal within the framework of the Corfu Process and looking for common denominators between the Russian draft and the other Food-for-thought proposals being circulated on the same topic. Von Arx also said there was room to consider the role to be played by other OSCE institutions like the CPC. ¶13. (SBU) The U.S. (Ellis) asked Russia for clarification on whether the last operative paragraph of its FFT excluded the possibility of the OSCE reaching consensus on a conflict prevention mechanism that may not need consensus before triggering an OSCE response to a crisis. While noting he did not have official instructions on this issue, Russia (Ulyanov) responded with "never say never!" but the specific mechanism would need to be discussed along with the rules associated with that mechanism. He reiterated his belief that "consensus minus" would be difficult to approve unless OSCE had a "Charter" (i.e., a legally-binding agreement) that would make it a well-established, serious, and mature organization. ¶14. (SBU) The Greek Chair (Sourani),in support of a Hungarian comment about the important role for the FSC in examining a comprehensive approach to early warning, crisis management and conflict prevention proposals, argued that the procedures for engagement were less important that reaching consensus. The U.S. (Ellis) noted "the devil's in the details" and that adherence to clear procedures is important for examining the specific mechanisms that can get the OSCE to consensus. (Comment: there is no consensus in the FSC regarding the attempt by Russia and Greece to create a joint FSC-PC decision-making mechanism. Most delegations, however, are still on the sidelines, observing the exchange on not just the Russian draft proposal, but also the ongoing discussion over the procedural questions raised by Russia and Greece. End Comment.) -------------- -------------- Working Group "A" ) No movement on VD99 proposals -------------- -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Greece (Kalpadakis) announced Uzbekistan failed to respond to a VD99 evaluation visit requested on February 9 (CBM/GR/10/003/F36/0),and that a similar request in 2009 also went unanswered. No delegation commented on the non-compliance by Uzbekistan; the Uzbeks were not present at the Working Group. USOSCE 00000068 004 OF 004 ¶16. (SBU) The UK draft on VD99-A Way Forward" (FSC.DEL/13/10/Rev.1) was revised to reflect Denmark's co-sponsorship. The revision also reflected adjustments to the UK's operative paragraph 2 that successful renegotiation of Chapters V and IX "will supersede corresponding chapters of VD99," in order to complement the Danish proposal for "VD-plus," which includes VD Review Meetings (FSC.DEL/9/10/Rev.1) that would create a routine and targeted mechanism for incorporating future changes and updates to the Vienna Document. ¶17. (SBU) Russia (Geyandov),though still awaiting instructions from Moscow, underscored that it already expressed overall Russian support for the paper, but sought clarification on whether the changes would follow the Danish Draft for a VD Review Meeting, or would allow for the more traditional format that incorporates additions at the end of the year. The UK (Gare) said that procedures were up for discussion and it would depend on where was the FSC at the time. Denmark (Petersen) noted there was sufficient flexibility to having a VD Review Meeting whenever there was consensus to do so, though it would be preferable to hold them in conjunction with the Annual Implementation and Assessment Meetings (AIAM). Ukraine, Belarus, and Finland said the two proposals were under consideration by their respective capitals. ¶18. (U) The next meeting of the FSC plenary and Working Groups is scheduled for March 10 (the week following the AIAM). FULLER