KAZAKHSTAN AT THE REINS OF THE OSCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000055 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2030 TAGS: PGOV PREL OSCE PINR KZ SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN AT THE REINS OF THE OSCE Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Carol Fuller for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Representing the Chair in Office (CiO) at the OSCE, Kazakhstan's Vienna representatives have begun to show their mettle in dealing with conflict and their intentions for the coming year. Led by seasoned diplomat Kairat Abdrakhmanov, the Kazakhstani delegation is off to a shaky start in Vienna, appearing to have only a superficial understanding of the OSCE and frequently bumbling while hoping - above all - never to lose face. Abdrakhmanov is often disengaged, reluctant to make decisions, reliant on underlings and, despite generally projecting a congenial, cosmopolitan image, occasionally revealing a steely intransigence. ¶2. (C) (Summary continued) It is still early days to assess whether Kazakhstan seeks to have a meaningful impact on the development or direction of the OSCE but early indications are that more than anything, it hopes to hold a high profile summit and make it through the year without any major embarrassments. The Government of Kazakhstan (GOK) has committed substantial resources - in both funding and personnel - to this endeavor. On the other side of the coin, however, it has already instituted some unwelcome changes to long-standing OSCE traditions and customs. How much of this can be attributed to cultural differences between an authoritarian country and the long-standing democratic traditions of the west and how much to political intention is not yet clear. Multi-vector Kazakhstan has an opportunity to be an honest broker with the West while retaining Moscow's trust, but so far, at least in Vienna, the overriding goal is to burnish the GOK's international image through the holding of a Summit. At the same time, we will need to counter Kazakhstan's declared intention to provide "balance" of greater emphasis on hard security and less on the human dimension. As we seek to work with Kazakhstan at OSCE, this message is provided to offer initial insights into the Kazakhstani actors in Vienna. End summary. ABDRAKHMANOV LEADS, WITH DIFFIDENCE -- OR INTRANSIGENCE -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the OSCE is Ambassador Kairat Abdrakhmanov: a seasoned diplomat who has previously held top-level positions, including Ambassador to Israel (2003-2006),Deputy Foreign Minister (1999-2001 and 2006-2007) and bilateral Ambassador to Austria (2007)- which he ceded for the undoubtedly career enhancing possibility of representing Kazakhstan's chairmanship of the OSCE. With over a year to get prepared for the Chairmanship, Abdrakhmanov has ably fashioned a figurative role of a visiting orchestral conductor - waving his hands over the orchestra, while not paying much attention to the preparatory work behind the stage. He appears to rely inordinately on those beneath him expecting all will go smoothly. This has contributed to him and his team getting off to a shaky start in Vienna, frequently bumbling and appearing to have (and not to be bothered about having) no more than a superficial understanding of the OSCE or its institutions, while striving - above all - to deliver the promised summit decreed by Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev without ever losing face. ¶4. (C) Abdrakhmanov's behavior is in some ways reminiscent of Soviet models. He is authoritarian yet disengaged. He is often unable to make decisions and fears being called to account by his superiors. Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center German Ambassador Herbert Salber told USOSCE CDA that Abdrakhmanov was visibly reluctant to remain in the car with FM Saudabayev during the minister's January 2010 visit to Vienna. His inability to make decisions is very frustrating to OSCE delegations. For example, the Austrian Ambassador to the OSCE repeatedly asked Abdrakhmanov for information about the 2010 Ambassadors' Retreat - an event traditionally paid for by the Austrian government. After each request, she received no response. In exasperation, she finally announced publicly that due to the lack of consultation Austria could not cover the costs of the event. Even the OSCE Secretary General (SYG) Marc Perrin De Brichambaut told USOSCE CDA that it is nearly impossible to get a decision out of Abdrakhmanov - even on simple logistical issues like the date and venue for the retreat. The event finally took place February 12-13 and was paid for lavishly by the CiO. ¶5. (C) Abdrakhmanov relies inordinately on underlings and cultivates the image of himself as a congenial, debonair socialite. He delights in showing off the riches of his country at social events. However, when confronted with unpleasantness or disagreements, Abdrakhmanov drops that USOSCE 00000055 002 OF 004 facade to reveal an intransigent streak. While his English is good, he can also be difficult to understand sometimes because he mumbles and speaks very softly or in a convoluted style. Abdrakhmanov has also perfected the ability to talk at great length while saying very little of substance. In weekly meetings with USOSCE, he will often speak in general terms for nearly all the meeting until pushed to get down to specifics of the week's agenda. ¶6. (C) While every Chairmanship brings its own unique style to the OSCE's helm, Kazakhstan has sometimes disturbed delegations by changes to OSCE traditions. In a departure from established practice, Abdrakhmanov refused to permit Georgia - the country under discussion at a Permanent Council meeting - to be the final speaker as is both custom and courtesy. In that instance, in what appeared to all to be a slap in the Georgian ambassador's face, Abdrakhmanov permitted the Russians to speak last. Abdrakhmanov has abandoned another OSCE tradition to let all participating States make Permanent Council remarks before any partner state does so. Other cultural differences appear as well. Female OSCE support staff have complained to U.S. delegates that the "non-European Kazakhstanis treat women as if they are good for only two things: getting coffee and the oldest profession in the world." ¶7. (C) Abdrakhmanov is disorganized, or deliberately lax about, sharing information in a timely manner. Announcements of meetings, schedule changes or invitations to representational events often arrive late. Although it is possible that the CiO is just going through normal "growing pains," the impression given is clear: when the Chair issues a document or an invitation, all delegations are expected to be immediately attentive and responsive. OSCE SYG De Brichambaut told CDA that the cycle of consultations and the pressure of building consensus likely would start to wear on the Kazakhstani delegation relatively quickly and recommended interlocutors be "discreet" and avoid surprises, particularly given Abdrakhmanov's preoccupation with "face" and image. De Brichambaut said he expected an "authoritarian streak" to show itself in Abdrakhmanov (noting that Chairmanships often suffered from a "master of the universe" syndrome). ¶8. (C) This tendency was particularly pronounced in early and mid-February as USOSCE worked with the Kazakhstani delegation and others to shape a workable agenda for the Human Dimension in 2010. As CiO, Kazakhstan bears the responsibility for developing a Human Dimension agenda by setting forth topics for the seven Human Dimension events to take place throughout the year. However, the Kazakh proposal lacked almost any of the priorities the U.S., the EU, Canada, Norway, and other like-minded missions presented to them earlier. Instead, the proposal was heavy on non-controversial tolerance and nondiscrimination topics (Russian and Central Asian favorites) and bereft of fundamental freedoms or basic human rights. The Kazakhstani delegation initially presented their package of ideas as being sacrosanct, warning delegations not to "open the package." Under pressure to broker a compromise, they held repeated formal and informal meetings, but negotiations fell apart on February 17. USOSCE learned that the delegation had just received instructions from Astana to reaffirm the CiO's initial draft and refuse to negotiate any changes, insisting that it is a take it or leave it deal. In an interchange with the Charge and Senator Ben Cardin of the Helsinki Commission at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly February 18, Abdrakhmanov insisted that freedom of religion is a fundamental freedom and that that should be good enough for us. Senator Cardin assured him again that including fundamental freedoms is a priority for the U.S. OTHER PLAYERS -------------- ¶9. (C) Kazakhstan dramatically increased the size of its Mission to the OSCE after receiving the chairmanship at the Madrid Ministerial Council in 2007. It now has three Deputy Permanent Representatives (DCMs),approximately 15 other accredited diplomats and six support staff. The primus inter pares among the three DCMs is widely seen as Yerkin Akhinzhanov. An information sheet provided by the Kazakhstani delegation lists his portfolio as encompassing a wide range of responsibilities, including general coordination, the OSCE Summit, the Corfu Process, the Preparatory Committee and the Political Military Dimension. Akhinzhanov, an extrovert, is seen as a capable and gregarious interlocutor who speaks good English. He shares a great variety of information (maybe even more than a more seasoned diplomat would do). While he is largely seen as being good at what he does, it is frequently evident that he is operating above his level of experience or comfort. He has made painstaking, but sometimes inept, efforts to USOSCE 00000055 003 OF 004 coordinate the timing for the OSCE's largest security-related events on the Corfu Process, constantly revising the timing to suit this or that concern voiced by various delegations. This stands in sharp contrast to Abdrakhmanov's more authoritarian approach, but it also contributes to undermining the Chair's effectiveness in an organization where gaining a balance between progress and universal acceptance is more of an art than a science. ¶10. (C) Next in authority is Usen Suleimenov who is responsible for, inter alia, the Human Dimension, the OSCE Troika, the Office of the Secretary General, field missions in Central Asia, Asian Partners for Cooperation and protocol. Suleimenov is considered the toughest negotiator of the top-tier Kazakhstani team. His negotiating style can frequently shift (even in a single meeting) from bullying, to pleading, to pretending to have been offended or insulted, to serious negotiator. He quickly personalizes issues and depicts even minor setbacks as impassable disagreements which will sink the Chairmanship and inevitably lead to the ruination of his diplomatic career. ¶11. (C) Suleimenov is not above blatant efforts to horse-trade unrelated issues. In an effort to get USG agreement to his preferred language in a draft decision at the December 2009 Athens Ministerial, prior to the Kazakh Chairmanship, Suleimenov essentially offered a bribe: Kazakhstan would create a personal representative of the CiO for gender issues and staff it with an American if we would withdraw our objections. We did not, and Kazakhstan is again seeking to fill the post with an amcit - this time, without a bribe. Suleimenov is also occasionally boorish, and has been overheard by U.S. delegates making sexist remarks to female delegates. ¶12. (C) Third in line is Akan Rahkmetullin who is responsible for the Economic and Environmental Dimension (EED),the External Cooperation Department, and field missions in South Eastern Europe, among other things. Akan is seen by some as an intellectual lightweight who is more interested in making friends and being liked than taking hard-line positions or forging difficult compromises. In a recent conversation with Poloff, he mentioned he has been in the MFA since 1992, but it is not uncommon for those meeting him for the first time to assume him to be younger or less experienced than this would indicate. In his work on the EED, Akan so far has not taken the lead on providing proposals or substance, preferring to rely, instead, on other delegations to provide extensive written input first. A number of pS have expressed privately to USOSCE (and somewhat openly in a recent committee meeting) frustration that the Kazakhstani handling of energy security, expected to be a salient part of the EED agenda for 2010, has been passive and slow-moving. On the Balkans, Akan admits readily that he does not have a deep knowledge of the region (a region where Kazakhstan is without diplomatic representation) and in two recent meetings with USDEL and visiting USG officials to discuss Balkans issues he has been almost entirely in listening mode. LEADERSHIP OPPORTUNITY AWAITS -------------- ¶13. (C) A coincidental irony for Kazakhstan is that it assumed the Chairmanship just as the OSCE moved into higher gear on a comprehensive review of European security and ongoing threats to it. Geographically and historically removed from the issue, Kazakhstan has an opportunity to be an honest broker while retaining Moscow's trust. Or, as seems increasingly likely as time goes by, Ambassador Abdrakhmanov can step back and orchestrate the process from a comfortable distance, seeking only to obtain some sort of initial step worthy of presenting to a Summit. By tapping ten other Ambassadors as "Corfu Coordinators" to follow specific issues and work with the Chair, Abdrakhmanov has skillfully spread out the work (and the responsibility) for the success or failure of the project. Since eight of these are EU ambassadors, this bodes well for keeping the process on track with the spirit of the Corfu process. Nevertheless, as with other components, the hard work of butting heads and forging compromises - the responsibility of the OSCE CiO - lies ahead, and Abdrakhmanov cannot afford to continue as a passive player. COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (C) It is apparent that Kazakhstan's prime interest is to burnish its international credentials, notably with the crowning achievement of a first-in-a-decade OSCE Summit - no matter the topic or outcome - rather than leaving a lasting imprint on the organization. To achieve that, the Kazakhstan Delegation seems keen to avoid major embarrassments and political turmoil. At the same time, there is still a USOSCE 00000055 004 OF 004 possibility that their actions may reflect political intention. Kazakhstani President Nazarbayev and Foreign Minister Saudabayev have both stated on numerous occasions that Kazakhstan wants to see 'balance' restored to the OSCE - words echoed by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in his February 6 address at the Munich Security Conference. This is largely code for reducing focus on the Human Dimension and reemphasizing traditional, hard security or first dimension issues. We will continue to state our clear priorities to the Kazakhstani representatives in Vienna as we proceed with this year's OSCE agenda. We believe it is important, more than with past Chairmanships, that our messages be carefully synchronized between Vienna, Washington and Astana, and that we stay in close contact with our EU and NATO allies. FULLER