OSCE: 2/3 FSC HOLDS ROBUST DISCUSSION ON VIENNA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000033 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER, NILSSON, FRIEDT OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL) JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5 E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OSCE PARM PREL KCFE RS XG SUBJECT: OSCE: 2/3 FSC HOLDS ROBUST DISCUSSION ON VIENNA DOCUMENT AND ON RUSSIA'S CONFLICT PREVENTION PROPOSAL REF: ELLIS-WRIGHT 1/27 EMAIL ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) received a presentation on one potential way ahead for the Vienna Document from alumnus Col Wolfgang Richter, currently with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Richter's presentation supported the currently tabled Danish and UK proposals for strengthening the CSBM regime, which will be discussed on 10 February. There were lengthy, but positive reactions from FSC delegates to Richter's presentation. The Russian proposal for a new Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Decision in Working Group "B" also generated many but less generous interventions. We noted our concerns about the procedural issues raised by the Russian proposal (see paras 9-11). End Summary. But first, the UK's Food for Thought -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The 602nd Meeting of the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) on February 3 featured under Agenda Item 2, Security Dialogue a presentation on the role of the Vienna Document in an evolving Security Environment by Germany's Col Wolfgang Richter. Prior to Richter's address, the UK (Gare) introduced under Agenda Item I, General Statements its Food-for-Thought paper (FSC.DEL.13/10)on "A Way Forward" on negotiation procedures for strengthening Vienna Document 1999 (VD99). The UK proposed a negotiation package of Chapters Five (Prior Notifications) and Nine (Compliance and Verification) for strengthening the CSBM regime. The UK emphasized its "good faith commitment" to address the directive from the Athens Ministerial Council Decision 16/09 and requested inclusion of its paper on the February 10 agenda for Working Group "A". Gare explained her "unorthodox approach" for introducing the UK paper under this agenda item was to inform the pS during the presentation and discussion of Richter's address to the FSC. France (Alabrune) expressed strong support for the UK proposal, especially for opening the door to other "packages." "Enhancing Vienna Document" -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Richter, an FSC alum currently with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (circulated as FSC.DEL/16/10),gave a tour d' horizon on the added value of the Vienna Document and set forth some concrete suggestions on how to keep it relevant (circulated as FSC.DEL/16/10). Some highlights: -- Arms Control and confidence building built the framework for stability and strategic reassurances for not only ending the cold war, but for the ensuing political transformation of Europe. -- Originally the West insisted on hard arms control to offset the ethereal character of political intentions by focusing on the facts of military capabilities. -- Modifications to the Vienna Document in the 1990s reflected political will and conceptual imagination to address changes in the strategic environment; and these elements are still needed in order to fulfill the pledges made at the 1999 Istanbul Summit. -- VD99 information requirements are insufficient for transparency on evolving force structures based on smaller military unit levels with increased capabilities and short-term, rapid developments. USOSCE 00000033 002 OF 005 -- Inspection quotas and evaluation visits need adaptation to current unit structures and military activities to retain their integrity in assuring transparency and confidence. -- The acquisition of military capabilities by internal security Forces are excluded though they play an important role in intra-state conflict, -- The small unit levels, including manpower and hardware, also change the effective value for prior notification and observation of certain military activities. -- CSBM verification mechanisms cannot contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management if inspection quotas are depleted when they are most needed. Also ambiguities regarding Force Majeure can have a similar negative impact on conflict prevention and crisis management. --The negotiation process to achieve the goal of improving VD99 should not be held hostage to solving the CFE crisis but undertaken on its own merits. Twenty-two Interventions! -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Most of the 22 interventions made by pS with few exceptions following Richter's remarks were expansive expressions of appreciation and pledges to work constructively to strengthen VD99. France (Alabrune) proposed the FSC focus on addressing observation and verification mechanisms and all but gave a complete endorsement of the UK paper. Germany (Genrich) warmly welcomed the Food-for-thought papers presented by the UK and Denmark, and aligned itself with the French proposal. ¶5. (SBU) Drawing on the Secretary,s 29 January remarks in Paris, the U.S. (Neighbour) underlined the importance of transparency. Inter alia, he said the U.S. supports a more open exchange of military data, including visits to military sites and observation of military activities and exercises. Thanking Richter for his remarks and the UK for its paper, he said both would be studied carefully in Washington. ¶6. (SBU) Russia's representative Ulyanov said he personally thought the UK and Danish proposals contained "some attractive and intriguing elements that merit further attention.", but that he had no instructions yet from Moscow on how to respond. He further opined that they would likely need some &modifications.8 Turkey (Begec) underscored closing loopholes that allowed circumvention of VD99 provisions, and proselytized about being attentive to Russian proposals even on issues that may lead to "discomfort." He also focused on including internal security forces so that they could not be used to circumvent VD. ¶7. (SBU) Latvia (Nilsons) emphasized the importance of reciprocity and suggested a possible Food-for-thought that would change the inspection quota procedures to provide the right to inspection/evaluation based on receiving an inspection or evaluation visit. Sweden (Byren) noted it no longer uses regiments or brigades as units, especially within the framework of EU "battle groups." Georgia (Giorgazde) elicited a brief Russian response after it described the failure of VD99 mechanisms to prevent conflict in the events leading up to the August 2008 clash. Georgia asked how to improve the VD99 mechanisms which in 2008 had yielded ¬hing positive for either Russia or Georgia. Ukraine (Yelchenko) was especially supportive of the proposal to improve information exchange which was in line with its own proposal last year. He also said that they agreed with USOSCE 00000033 003 OF 005 Richter,s statement that VD99 not be held hostage to CFE, but dealt with on its own merits. ¶8. (SBU) In response to delegations, Richter cautioned pS not to lose sight of the requirement to improve transparency in the changing European security environment. He described VD99 Chapters five and nine as the most urgent for improving, and cautioned that VD99 is only one piece of the useful political military toolbox of the OSCE. Richter was "encouraged" there was a way forward to improve VD99 based on the discussions and active participation in the FSC. In answer to Georgia,s question about improving VD conflict prevention mechanisms, Richter opined that challenge inspections over and above the quota in such conflict situations would by &their mere presence8 have a de-escalating effect. Russia's Conflict Prevention Proposal in Working Group "B" -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) referred to his introductory remarks at the Opening Session of the FSC (see FSC.JOU/606). He stated the aim of the Russian proposed "joint" Draft Decision on Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management (FSC-PC.DEL/1/10/Corr.1) was to strengthen the OSCE's potential and avoid the double standards of applying OSCE rules to conflict situations. Several delegates remarked on the need for discussion on this issue within the Corfu Process framework before engaging on substantive elements within the Russian draft. France (Simonet) observed the Russian proposal did not address the use of OSCE mechanisms to prevent conflict and asked for clarification of the phrase "parties to the conflict." Italy (Negro) said the proposal was still being studied, and while agreeing with France that there was room for further clarifications on some phrases in the draft decision, it was not opposed to considering new mechanisms. Germany (Risse) questioned the applicability of the Russian proposal on the sub-regional level. Hungary (Toth) noted the topic required a comprehensive review to understand the relationship of the Russian proposal to other applicable tools. Switzerland (Halter) noted the Russian draft was not the only proposal on the table, argued for better implementation of the documents that have already been approved, including the Code of Conduct. ¶10. (SBU) The UK, Latvia, Romania, Moldova and Azerbaijan made interventions varying on the themes previously noted. Georgia (Giorgazde) was very blunt criticizing the Russian draft as an attempt to "legalize violations of international law." Giorgazde said Russia's draft ignores principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, internationally recognized borders and other elements of the Helsinki Final Act. He accused Russia of attempting "to deconstruct the Corfu Process instead of consolidating a dialogue to put into effect flexible functional mechanisms." That said, Giorgazde noted, Georgia stood ready to engage in "constructive dialogue." ¶11. (SBU) In reaction, Ulyanov explained that its proposal was a clear link between the Corfu Process and the FSC, and its proposal, which he admitted was "unorthodox" procedurally since it called for a joint FSC and PC decision, was complementary to the Corfu formula and in response to the West's call for comprehensive approaches. He expressed a willingness to delay the next round of discussion of the Russian draft decision until after OSCE ambassadors have had a chance to discuss conflict prevention. Ulyanov added that Russia was not attempting to make its proposal complete, since its draft reflected "only one element" of the crisis management problem. Referring to Georgia's intervention, Ulyanov noted that if the principles as contained within the USOSCE 00000033 004 OF 005 Russian draft were respected, then there would have been no August 2008 "tragedy." Russia is trying to put order in place of chaos. Procedural Issues Raised -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The U.S. (Ellis) raised the point of whether it was appropriate for Working Group "B" to discuss a proposed draft decision in view of the fact that Russia previously submitted the exact same proposal at the January 21 Permanent Council. In addition to the point that as a cross-dimensional issue that should be discussed first in the broader context in order to inform the way ahead in Working Group "B", the U.S. noted it was unclear how Russia expected to proceed with its proposal for a decision in the FSC while simultaneously seeking a decision in the PC, which is a separate autonomous OSCE decision-making body. Furthermore, the U.S. noted the political-military tools and instruments that are within the competency of the FSC were not explicit in the Russian proposal. It was not inconceivable that in the process of working on the Russian draft, the Prepcom and the Working Group could arrive at two distinct texts without a procedure in place for reconciling differences. The U.S. underscored that the introduction of any new decision-making process must first be agreed through consensus. ¶13. (SBU) Note: The Greek Chair (Sourani) appealed to the Secretariat to explain the principle behind a "joint FSC-PC decision." The Secretariat's senior coordination officer Yerzhan Birtanov confirmed that because the procedure was not addressed within OSCE rules of procedure, it could be created by delegates "if they collectively decide to do so," adding "it could be a useful tool to develop a joint decision-making process." The Greek Chair acknowledged that what was being advanced would require some mechanism for joint FSC-PC decisions, such as through a combined Prepcom-Working Group "B" format, but the FSC will not have to cross that bridge until perhaps the June time frame! Ulyanov acknowledged Russia was taking an "unorthodox approach," ensuring that no decision would be taken without consensus, and that if/when progress was made on the Russian text, perhaps there would be a requirement to engage in the PC's Prepcom. ¶14. (SBU) Comment: Russia's motives for a joint decision are not clear, other than we suspect they do not want to engage in cross-dimensional discussions in the PC alone, preferring to keep the focus on "hard security." Greece, on the other hand, would like to have a new decision-making format in support of cross-dimensional conclusions that come out of the Corfu Process. The irony of this discussion following Col Richter's presentation that noted differences between the weighted value of military capabilities and the risk of inconstant political intentions was lost on the FSC. A new proposed tandem decision making process, if not carefully managed, could blur the lines between PC (intentions) and FSC (capabilities) mandates, risking forum shopping for any issue deemed multi-dimensional, with unpredictable implications for the Corfu Process. End Comment. Working Group "A" ) SALW -------------- ¶15. (SBU) There were no issues for discussion under Agenda Item 2, Vienna Document. Sweden (Byren) made a general presentation on the meeting of the Friends of the Small Arms/Light Weapons Informal Working Group held on January 29 (ref a). Sweden and the UK (Hartnell) and FSC Troika member Hungary (Toth) urged delegates to provide specific, concrete proposals in order to facilitate the FSC efforts on developing a Plan of Action by May 2010 as directed by USOSCE 00000033 005 OF 005 Ministers. The U.S. reminded delegations of its points raised at the January 27 discussion and again at the Informal Working Group. ¶16. (SBU) The Austrian Food for Thought paper on a reference guide on the questionnaire on the OSCE Politico-Military Code of Conduct (FSC.DEL/14/10) was discussed cursorily. (Comment: this was a particularly long FSC plenary and Working Group "B" discussion that delayed convening Working Group "A" until late afternoon; Austria's representative left for another obligation. End comment.) The issue will remain on the agenda for the next Working Group "A" on February 10. Nonetheless, Canada (Linteau) announced it was prepared to co-sponsor the Austrian draft. Hungary (Toth) also expressed strong support. ¶17. (SBU) Under "Any other business," the CPC (Salber) reported distribution of its monthly report (FSC.GAL.13/10), its briefing of the FSC Information Exchange procedures (FSC.GAL.12/10),and the availability of a new set of "melange" guides in the Russian language. ¶18. (U) The 603rd Meeting of the FSC and its Working Groups are scheduled for February 10. USDel notes that in Working Group "A" that day, currently tabled Danish and UK proposals for strengthening the VD99 regime will be discussed in more detail. FULLER