NATO SENIOR CIVILIAN BRIEFS ON HELMAND OPERATION;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000075 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2020 TAGS: MOPS MARR PGOV PREL NATO AF PK SUBJECT: NATO SENIOR CIVILIAN BRIEFS ON HELMAND OPERATION; SYG CALLS FOR TRAINERS USNATO 00000075 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: D/Polad Alejandro "Hoot" Baez for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) Summary: New NATO Senior Civilian Representative, Ambassador Mark Sedwill, briefed the North Atlantic Council for the first time February 17 by video conference. ISAF Commander General McChrystal participated alongside Sedwill, presenting a clear picture of civilian-military peer counterparts working in concert. They explained that the ongoing operation in Marja, Helmand Province, was backwards-planned to deliver two principles: Afghans in the lead to protect the population and Afghan government delivery of services to civilians. Sedwill and GEN McChrystal were pleased with the pace of the operation, as well as with its coverage in the Afghan media. Sedwill said he would provide the Council feedback on how his terms of reference should be re-crafted and the personnel and budget resources he might need in about three weeks' time. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen urged Allies to come to the February 23 special force generation conference prepared to pledge new trainers and training capabilities in order to fill the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan manning shortfall. END SUMMARY. OPERATION MOSHTARAK -------------- ¶2. (SBU) NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) Mark Sedwill and ISAF Commander GEN McChrystal gave a joint briefing on the ongoing Operation Moshtarak in Marja, Helmand Province. They noted that military "clearing" activities were the enabler in the operation to achieve two primary goals: demonstration of Afghan leadership in protecting the population and of Afghan government ability to deliver services to civilians. Sedwill described the backwards-planning of the entire operation from the desired civilian effects to the structuring of military forces as "an order of magnitude difference in the integration of civ-mil planning." While the first few days of the operation were military-heavy, Sedwill said the profile of civilian effects would increase every day. Initial civilian activities included engagement with local shuras (councils) by local government authorities and Kabul Ministers and "quick win activities" such as repair of damage caused by the operation, small cash for work programs, and bringing back district prosecutors and judges who had been self-exiled by the security situation. Sedwill cautioned that while the Afghan government had sufficient capacity to sustain its civilian presence following the operation in Marja, Nad Ali district, it could become over-stretched during future operations in priority districts later this year. ¶3. (SBU) Sedwill and GEN McChrystal were similarly content with current Afghan media coverage of the operation, which had picked up on the Afghan government's leadership role in the operation and had reported civilian casualty events factually rather than inciting political friction. The SCR attributed the more positive reporting to ISAF's transparency in communicating directly with the Afghan government at all levels up to President Karzai. ¶4. (C) GEN McChrystal noted that ISAF forces could have taken the area around Marja on the first night, but instead took a slow and deliberate pace that enabled Afghan forces' participation (reinforcing the operation's goal of Afghan lead) and mitigated the risk to troops. Responding to a question, McChrystal estimated that most of the 200-300 Taliban from the area had fled -- some to Pakistan, others to the west, and still others to the northeast. He said it was unclear where they all went, but many of the local fighters would probably not travel long distances, and ideally would return to be peacefully reintegrated into their communities. He added that Special Operations Forces' efforts would also continue targeting the leadership of the fleeing Taliban. ¶5. (SBU) The Italian Permanent Representative asked whether the pre-notification to the community about the pending operation had greater benefits than the loss of an USNATO 00000075 002.2 OF 002 opportunity to confront the Taliban, who had fled. SCR Sedwill said that warning the population in advance was related to the fundamental mission to protect the population, not kill insurgents. The fact that fighters had vacated Marja also would enable civilian/governance gains to take hold, making it harder for insurgents to return to seize power in the area. GEN McChrystal replied that the advantages of pre-notification were that the military began the operation with local public support, and the warning reinforced the message to the population that ISAF and Afghan forces were aiming to protect civilians. It also sent the message that "although insurgents had all the warning time they needed, they were unable to prevent the operation from happening." He added that the method of inserting ISAF and Afghan forces into Marja on the first night of the operation had still enabled "tactical surprise." ¶6. (C) Responding to a Canadian question about the Afghan National Security Forces' contribution to the operation, GEN McChrystal explained that the first phase of clearing included Afghan National Army (ANA) units partnered with ISAF units. After initial clearing, 900 Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) would join the operation to serve as a bridge to hold the area. Finally, 1000 Afghan Uniform Police (many currently in training) would be assigned to the area over 3-4 months to incrementally take over from the ANCOP, with the military presence drawing down in the area. He assured the Council that ISAF and ANA units would remain in place until ANCOP and Afghan Police proved they could sustain the security gains. SCR TERMS OF REFERENCE -------------- ¶7. (C) SCR Sedwill said he had not yet had time to consolidate his feedback to the NATO Secretary General and the Council on how his terms of reference should be re-crafted or the personnel or budget resources he might need. He planned to report back in about three weeks. SYG PRESSES FOR NTM-A CONTRIBUTIONS -------------- ¶8. (C) Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen closed the briefing by reminding Permanent Representatives of the upcoming February 23 force generation conference specifically for fulfilling Afghan National Security Force training shortfalls, particularly those related to the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. He urged nations to come to the conference ready to pledge new trainers and training capabilities. HEFFERN