JAN 28, 2010 HLTF: ALLIES CONSIDER BROAD EURO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USNATO 000064

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020
TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM PREL
SUBJECT: JAN 28, 2010 HLTF: ALLIES CONSIDER BROAD EURO
SECURITY AGENDA AND AWAIT U.S. LEAD ON CFE NEXT STEPS

REF: STATE 8267 (JAN 28 HLTF GUIDANCE)

Classified By: D/POLAD Alejandro "Hoot" Baez for reasons 1.4(B)&(D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Allies used the January 28 HLTF and related
meetings to touch base on CFE in the wake of the December
2009 NATO and OSCE Ministerials, as well as SYG Rasmussen's
mid-December trip to Moscow. Allies welcomed and evinced
considerable interest in the information that senior U.S.
officials are focused on thinking through the way ahead on
CFE and European security generally. The need to reassure
Allies about the thrust of U.S. thinking, and engage them as
our views develop, was a central message. During the brief
HLTF discussion and in more robust meetings on the margins,
Allies endorsed the U.S. assessment that we need to examine
our goals for European security broadly, as NATO considers
how to shape an effective approach that encompasses CFE, and
Russia's proposed European Security Treaty (EST) and
NATO-Russia Treaty. Some expressed the hope that positive
momentum from the Corfu process for engaging Russia on EST
would have a positive impact on CFE, while others underscored
a disconnect between how NATO Allies and Russia regard the
Corfu process.


2. (C) SUMMARY, cont'd. Several Allies underscored that new
thinking on CFE was desirable given that the way forward in
the broader European security context was unclear, but they
also stressed support for the Parallel Actions Package as a
balanced and thoughtful approach. SYG Rasmussen's report
from his Moscow visit that Russia was ready to engage on CFE
drew a tepid response, with none feeling this signaled any
real change in Russia's position. There was no/no support
for an informal International Staff (I.S.) idea to break the
substantial combat forces issue out of the CFE package, and
negotiate a definition in the NATO Russia Council (NRC)
context, in order to prime the pump for achieving a CFE
solution. At the same time, a number of Allies who spoke on
the way ahead noted one of the reasons we need to consider
next steps is because the parallel actions approach, so far,
has not yielded a deal. A few Allies indicated during
bilateral meetings that the prospect of NATO not agreeing to
exchange data with Russia in December 2010 (which was
implicit in the December 2009 Ministerial statement) meant
that we have limited time to see progress on CFE.


3. (C) SUMMARY, cont'd. In the Quad meeting prior to the
HLTF, the UK, supported by Germany, emphasized the need to
table a Vienna Document 99 (VDoc 99) proposal in the FSC
immediately in order to take a proactive stance, limit an
initial round of discussions of VDoc 99 enhancement, and test
Russian intentions with regard to concrete measures on
military transparency. The U.S. team did not object to the
UK tabling its proposal due to tactical considerations, but
noted Washington would need to review its specifics in light
of other issues in play. END SUMMARY.

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CONTACTS and BILATERALS
--------------


4. (C) As expected, reporting on contacts and bilaterals
with Russian interlocutors was minimal but provided some
insights:

-- The main report was the account by the HLTF Chair (Robert
Simmons) of CFE discussions during SYG Rasmussen's
mid-December Moscow trip. Simmons noted that FM Lavrov
signaled Russia's continued readiness to engage on the basis
of the parallel actions package while laying down a clear
marker that Russia would not implement CFE at present.
Simmons underscored that Prime Minister Putin engaged
extensively on CFE stressing the need to resolve it and
belaboring familiar complaints: the failure of Allies to
ratify the adapted Treaty; the bloc to bloc nature of the old
Treaty; flank restrictions on Russia (asserting that these
limits should not be necessary if Russia does not pose a
threat); the need for all current Allies that are not CFE
States Parties to accede; and continued linkage between
Istanbul commitments and CFE.

-- Slovenian rep Slapnicar reported on a routine political
directors meeting in Moscow during which MFA Director Antonov

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repeated familiar Russian positions. U.S. rep Rich Davis per
reftel reported on limited bilateral CFE discussions in
December with MFA Director Anton Mazur as well as between U/S
Tauscher and DFM Ryabkov. Davis also noted that MFA Director
Antonov had indicated to A/S Gottemoeller, on the margins of
START negotiations, that he would be prepared to engage on
CFE as soon as START was completed.

-- During the Quad meeting which preceded the HLTF, German
rep Banzhaf commented on a meeting with Mazur on the margins
of the late November Berlin seminar. Mazur repeated Russian
arguments but noted that "everything is negotiable" without
offering any specifics. Of particular interest, the German
rep stressed that Germany urged patience and tried to "pour
water" on any notion of a special Russian-German relationship.

--------------
THE WAY AHEAD
--------------


5. (C) HLTF Chair Simmons launched the way ahead discussion
by noting Russia continues to claim interest in resolving CFE
and has not rejected the parallel actions package but also
has not acknowledged the December NATO Ministerial statement
call to implement CFE. Specifically on the issue of defining
"substantial combat forces" as Russia seeks to do within its
proposed NATO-Russia Treaty proposal, Simmons recounted that
Lavrov expressed to Rasmussen a lack of understanding of
NATO's reluctance to engage on this and unwillingness to link
it to Russia's concerns with NATO enlargement. Simmons
sought views on the question of whether Allies should
consider defining "substantial combat forces" in the NRC in
connection with NATO's request for Russia to provide its CFE
data.

-- European Security Initiatives and CFE: U.S. rep Davis
broadened the discussion up front with an assessment that
Allies need to examine our goals for CFE together with our
broader response to Russia's European Security Treaty (EST)
and NATO-Russia Treaty proposals, as well as our overarching
goals for European security. He underscored that Secretary
Clinton would give a speech in Paris on January 29 that would
cover the broad range of themes and principles Allies share,
and the challenges we face, to include CFE, but that there
would be no surprise on specifics. In the HLTF and on the
margins, all Allies who spoke endorsed the U.S. assessment
that issues addressed in CFE and in these other areas
overlap, and NATO needs to consider how to shape an effective
approach that encompasses all these areas. Allied reps also
honed in on the Corfu process, its role in the bigger
picture, and the positive impact it could have on CFE.
Greece (Daskorolis),echoed by Spain (Salazar) and Slovenia
(Slapnicar),stressed that arms control and CFE were a part
of the Corfu process and that discussions needed to be
mutually reinforcing as we move forward. Turkey (Tuzel),
supported by the Netherlands (Kleinjan),reminded all that
the Corfu process means different things to different
players, highlighting that Russia takes a selective view and
has yet to embrace it as an all-encompassing process. France
(Raharinaivo) and Romania (Stoica) noted that Allies should
emphasize the Corfu process as the platform for engaging in
EST discussions and called for Allies to continue stressing
this message to Russia.

-- SYG Moscow Report and the Parallel Actions Package: HLTF
Chair Simmons reported that SYG Rasmussen was personally
energized by his meetings in Moscow - including the featured
Putin lecture on CFE - and expressed interest in engaging
actively to find a solution. Greece was pleased with the
SYG's report on Russia's interest in CFE and called for
delivering a clear message to Russia and the international
community that CFE was irreplaceable and we must continue our
support of the parallel actions package. Romania was a bit
more skeptical of Russia's continued interest, noting it was
Russia's "leitmotif," but elaborated during bilateral
discussions (see below) on the package as the only path
forward that would preserve NATO's principled positions.
Others refrained from general comments on CFE next steps in
the HLTF plenary deferring to the U.S. assessment on the need
for a comprehensive approach, but Allies were clear that the
I.S. informal idea of defining substantial forces in the NRC
context was not the next step.

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-- Defining Substantial Combat Forces (SCF): All Allies who
spoke - in the full HLTF and on the margins - said that
negotiating a definition of SCF in isolation from the other
elements of the CFE package was a recipe for failure.
Romania stressed the need for a broad dialogue on all
elements of the package and noted concern that engaging on a
definition prematurely could result in Russia using it to
hold the package hostage. German rep Banzhaf, seconded by
Turkey, was clear in the HLTF: substantial combat forces
should not/not be discussed in isolation as it is part of the
package. (Germany provided a very detailed elaboration of
its position during Quad discussions. See para 6.) The
Netherlands (Kleinjan) and Italy (Pugliese) agreed that
Russia was playing games by calling for an NRC discussion on
this with Kleinjan adding that there should be no discussion
of any details of the package without first achieving overall
agreement and Pugliese calling for no "cherry-picking" and
pre-coordination for any discussion in the HLTF. (The list
of Allies who spoke against this idea in the plenary
included: RO, GER, TU, NETH, IT, CZ, UK, ES; the same point
was made on the margins by a number of allies, including CAN,
PO, and GR.)

-- HLTF Chair Simmons concluded there was clearly broad
support for the SCF issue to remain in the CFE discussion
while recognizing it will surface in other fora and will have
to be addressed even if not substantively. Meanwhile, the
broader question of a way forward on CFE was currently being
reviewed in capitals in light of the broader European
security context proposals in play.

--------------
MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS
--------------


6. (C) On the margins of the HLTF, the U.S. met with Quad
reps from Germany, France and the UK, as well as conducted
bilateral meetings with Turkey, Romania, and Poland.
Additionally, during the Heads of Delegation lunch and
subsequently, several representatives took the opportunity to
share views directly with the U.S. rep. While Allies
reviewed points they made in the main HLTF meeting, there was
a greater tendency at this HLTF to engage with the U.S. team
directly and especially to confirm that they understood
correctly what the U.S. had said in the plenary about
reviewing CFE in the broader context of European security.

-- The need to reassure Allies about the thrust of U.S.
thinking, and engage them as our views develop, was a central
message in many sidebar discussions. While several Allies
underscored that new thinking was desirable given that the
way forward on CFE was unclear, they reiterated a familiar
theme, that Allies support the Parallel Actions Package as a
balanced and thoughtful way ahead. Romanian rep Stoica
stressed this approach had been hard to agree in NATO and
setting it aside would be a serious step. He warned against
any approach that might be read as intended to mollify Russia
at the price of real NATO interests. Turkish rep Tuzel
explicitly underscored that while Turkey supports U.S.-Russia
engagement, CFE is an Alliance issue. Dutch rep Kleinjan
said privately that while the U.S. had a change of
Administration last year, other NATO Allies had not, and
Allies stand by the positions on CFE that were painstakingly
developed over the last few years. German rep Banzhaf
remarked privately that Germany
was keenly interested in supporting U.S. efforts to "save"
the legally binding CFE Treaty regime, and not a lesser
alternative. He commented, again privately, that Germany was
eagerly awaiting a green light from Washington so it could
circulate to the Quad its ideas on CFE that had been shared
with U/S Tauscher on November 30.

-- Quad: In the CFE Quad in particular, Allies were open to
considering next steps on CFE in the broader European
security context as the way forward evolved. UK rep Clark
suggested 2010 would be the "year of arms control" and that
now was a good time to reflect on how CFE would contribute to
this wider European security context and whether there were
opportunities to reopen negotiations. Clark added that
London was also considering what might happen if we "jump off
the CFE boat." What would be the implications if Allies

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stopped implementing CFE? German rep Banzhaf specified that
arms control and disarmament were high on the German agenda,
and though the focus now is more on nuclear disarmament,
conventional arms control maintains a prominent role. The
UK, Germany and France all noted there was much thinking
underway in capitals, while acknowledging they were anxiously
awaiting the outcome of U.S. thinking - in light of progress
on START and NPT - in addition to further consultations to
elaborate positio
ns on CFE.

-- Defining substantial combat forces (SCF) in the NRC: The
German rep agreed with U.S. thinking that Russia could view a
legal agreement to define SCF as a substitute for the CFE
Treaty; engaging on a definition prematurely could have an
adverse impact on a package approach to CFE. The German rep
said that if a definition of SCF was important to Russia,
then it was one of the few "bargaining chips" NATO possessed.
When played, we should get something comparable for it. It
emerged that Berlin had done some thinking about the
substance of an SCF definition that had reinforced their
concerns about going forward precipitately and shared an
informal paper laying out factors for consideration regarding
this issue. The German team commented that a brigade might be
hugely significant in some parts of Europe, and a minor
matter in others. Additionally, the SCF commitment had been
conceived alongside the national and territorial ceilings of
the Adapted CFE Treaty. The ambiguity of the NATO-Russia
Founding Act language had been complemented by the structure
of Adapted CFE ceilings, which define the "headroom" that
would be available on any state's territory to host foreign
forces temporarily or permanently. Use of that headroom
would have been considered to be consistent with the SCF
commitment, and the available headroom differed considerably
from one area to another. (The Polish rep made this same
point in a bilat meeting noting that Warsaw considers A/CFE
headroom to essentially be the SCF definition.) Others
recalled that for some Allies, Russian forces on Russian
territory were a direct concern; a limit on Allied stationing
that was not matched by a limit on Russia's regional presence
would be problematic. Discussion led to the conclusion that
although SCF is a topic for the NRC, it is an issue that must
be left open to work into the overall solution on CFE.

-- Proposal on HLTF and VCC: The UK noted that a review of
NATO committee structures was underway and that this
streamlining initiative could have implications for the HLTF.
It includes suggestions for the NAC to have greater
visibility of the HLTF and for the VCC to be directly
subordinated to the HLTF. This topic was left to further
discussion at the next HLTF pending release of an expected
proposal.

-- UK Vienna Document 99 Proposal: In the Quad, the UK
emphasized that it felt the need to go ahead with tabling in
Vienna its proposal to limit an initial round of discussion
of VDoc 99 enhancement to a package on Chapters V and IX,
which would encompass quotas, inspection teams, and
thresholds - and benefit the Allies. The idea is that Allies
would have a proactive stance in calling for such a focus,
and at the same time test Russian intentions with regard to
enhancements that would produce actual gains in military
transparency. The Germans were supportive, stressing the
need for a proactive stance in Vienna, as well as the need to
give structure to the process and provide a litmus test for
Russian intentions. The U.S. team noted appreciation for the
tactical concerns and did not object to tabling the proposal,
while emphasizing that Washington would need to review its
specifics and might have future input.

-- Turkey: During bilateral discussions with Turkish Rep
Tuzel, it was evident Turkey is interested in further
elaboration of U.S. thinking on the way ahead. Tuzel noted
2010 should be the year for action on CFE; considering the
December NATO statement, no forward movement will mean
serious consideration of the data exchange. He suggested
Allies need to consider this in the coming months and develop
a strategy.

-- Romania: In side meetings, Romanian rep Stoica remarked
at length that Allies needed to carefully consider even
subtle changes in statement language or risk flagging nuanced

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changes in Alliance agreed positions. He underscored that
Romania remains a firm supporter of the Parallel Actions
Package which contains elements that are intertwined and must
be addressed as a whole. Stoica cautioned against
interlinking the range of issues in play as it could lead to
further deadlock and feed into Russia's tactic of dividing
positions and pocketing gains. Stoica expressed a preference
for compartmentalizing issues noting that the NATO Strategic
Concept review would address how NATO will shape the future
security environment, that the Corfu process was the place
for discussions on Russia's European Security Treaty
proposal, and that Allies should exercise patience regarding
CFE and the package approach by waiting for Russia to signal
readiness to honor the principle of host nation consent. He
indicated Romania could not support any approach to "start
fresh" on CFE as it carries considerable risk of appearing as
if the Alliance were giving in. Regarding the data exchange
in December, he noted our next move largely depended on
Russia's openness to deal on CFE once START negotiations were
finalized.

-- Poland: Polish rep Przenioslo indicated interest in the
outcome of U.S. thinking on CFE noting that Warsaw was
starting to consider what the way ahead could look like since
the Russians appeared very unlikely to agree on the current
CFE deal. He expressed hope that a START deal would soon be
concluded so that other matters such as CFE could be
addressed. He noted that Warsaw remains uncertain as to
whether or not Russia is willing to engage seriously on CFE
as Russia is comfortable with the current situation and is
likely losing military interest in CFE. This translates into
no means to oblige Russia to return to CFE. Przenioslo
posited it may be time for a new negotiation and a new
solution that would salvage the key aspects of the regime and
address the range of issues in the parallel actions package.
When pressed for Poland's view of the purpose of CFE,
Przenioslo offered his personal assessment that arms control
was critical for providing predictability and transparency in
Europe which promotes cooperation and rational military
planning. He added that limits remain important as well,
even if currently a second-order issue since all States
Parties are currently under overall CFE limits.

-- On the margins, a number of Allies (Poland and UK among
others) asked about reports that former USNATO Ambassador
Victoria Nuland would be taking responsibility for CFE issues
and expressed interest in the status of those plans and the
potential scope of her position.


7. (SBU) NEXT MEETING. Allies agreed on March 18, 2010 for
the next HLTF.
DAALDER