JAN 28, 2010 HLTF: ALLIES CONSIDER BROAD EURO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USNATO 000064 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020 TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM PREL SUBJECT: JAN 28, 2010 HLTF: ALLIES CONSIDER BROAD EURO SECURITY AGENDA AND AWAIT U.S. LEAD ON CFE NEXT STEPS REF: STATE 8267 (JAN 28 HLTF GUIDANCE) Classified By: D/POLAD Alejandro "Hoot" Baez for reasons 1.4(B)&(D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Allies used the January 28 HLTF and related meetings to touch base on CFE in the wake of the December 2009 NATO and OSCE Ministerials, as well as SYG Rasmussen's mid-December trip to Moscow. Allies welcomed and evinced considerable interest in the information that senior U.S. officials are focused on thinking through the way ahead on CFE and European security generally. The need to reassure Allies about the thrust of U.S. thinking, and engage them as our views develop, was a central message. During the brief HLTF discussion and in more robust meetings on the margins, Allies endorsed the U.S. assessment that we need to examine our goals for European security broadly, as NATO considers how to shape an effective approach that encompasses CFE, and Russia's proposed European Security Treaty (EST) and NATO-Russia Treaty. Some expressed the hope that positive momentum from the Corfu process for engaging Russia on EST would have a positive impact on CFE, while others underscored a disconnect between how NATO Allies and Russia regard the Corfu process. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY, cont'd. Several Allies underscored that new thinking on CFE was desirable given that the way forward in the broader European security context was unclear, but they also stressed support for the Parallel Actions Package as a balanced and thoughtful approach. SYG Rasmussen's report from his Moscow visit that Russia was ready to engage on CFE drew a tepid response, with none feeling this signaled any real change in Russia's position. There was no/no support for an informal International Staff (I.S.) idea to break the substantial combat forces issue out of the CFE package, and negotiate a definition in the NATO Russia Council (NRC) context, in order to prime the pump for achieving a CFE solution. At the same time, a number of Allies who spoke on the way ahead noted one of the reasons we need to consider next steps is because the parallel actions approach, so far, has not yielded a deal. A few Allies indicated during bilateral meetings that the prospect of NATO not agreeing to exchange data with Russia in December 2010 (which was implicit in the December 2009 Ministerial statement) meant that we have limited time to see progress on CFE. ¶3. (C) SUMMARY, cont'd. In the Quad meeting prior to the HLTF, the UK, supported by Germany, emphasized the need to table a Vienna Document 99 (VDoc 99) proposal in the FSC immediately in order to take a proactive stance, limit an initial round of discussions of VDoc 99 enhancement, and test Russian intentions with regard to concrete measures on military transparency. The U.S. team did not object to the UK tabling its proposal due to tactical considerations, but noted Washington would need to review its specifics in light of other issues in play. END SUMMARY. -------------- CONTACTS and BILATERALS -------------- ¶4. (C) As expected, reporting on contacts and bilaterals with Russian interlocutors was minimal but provided some insights: -- The main report was the account by the HLTF Chair (Robert Simmons) of CFE discussions during SYG Rasmussen's mid-December Moscow trip. Simmons noted that FM Lavrov signaled Russia's continued readiness to engage on the basis of the parallel actions package while laying down a clear marker that Russia would not implement CFE at present. Simmons underscored that Prime Minister Putin engaged extensively on CFE stressing the need to resolve it and belaboring familiar complaints: the failure of Allies to ratify the adapted Treaty; the bloc to bloc nature of the old Treaty; flank restrictions on Russia (asserting that these limits should not be necessary if Russia does not pose a threat); the need for all current Allies that are not CFE States Parties to accede; and continued linkage between Istanbul commitments and CFE. -- Slovenian rep Slapnicar reported on a routine political directors meeting in Moscow during which MFA Director Antonov USNATO 00000064 002 OF 005 repeated familiar Russian positions. U.S. rep Rich Davis per reftel reported on limited bilateral CFE discussions in December with MFA Director Anton Mazur as well as between U/S Tauscher and DFM Ryabkov. Davis also noted that MFA Director Antonov had indicated to A/S Gottemoeller, on the margins of START negotiations, that he would be prepared to engage on CFE as soon as START was completed. -- During the Quad meeting which preceded the HLTF, German rep Banzhaf commented on a meeting with Mazur on the margins of the late November Berlin seminar. Mazur repeated Russian arguments but noted that "everything is negotiable" without offering any specifics. Of particular interest, the German rep stressed that Germany urged patience and tried to "pour water" on any notion of a special Russian-German relationship. -------------- THE WAY AHEAD -------------- ¶5. (C) HLTF Chair Simmons launched the way ahead discussion by noting Russia continues to claim interest in resolving CFE and has not rejected the parallel actions package but also has not acknowledged the December NATO Ministerial statement call to implement CFE. Specifically on the issue of defining "substantial combat forces" as Russia seeks to do within its proposed NATO-Russia Treaty proposal, Simmons recounted that Lavrov expressed to Rasmussen a lack of understanding of NATO's reluctance to engage on this and unwillingness to link it to Russia's concerns with NATO enlargement. Simmons sought views on the question of whether Allies should consider defining "substantial combat forces" in the NRC in connection with NATO's request for Russia to provide its CFE data. -- European Security Initiatives and CFE: U.S. rep Davis broadened the discussion up front with an assessment that Allies need to examine our goals for CFE together with our broader response to Russia's European Security Treaty (EST) and NATO-Russia Treaty proposals, as well as our overarching goals for European security. He underscored that Secretary Clinton would give a speech in Paris on January 29 that would cover the broad range of themes and principles Allies share, and the challenges we face, to include CFE, but that there would be no surprise on specifics. In the HLTF and on the margins, all Allies who spoke endorsed the U.S. assessment that issues addressed in CFE and in these other areas overlap, and NATO needs to consider how to shape an effective approach that encompasses all these areas. Allied reps also honed in on the Corfu process, its role in the bigger picture, and the positive impact it could have on CFE. Greece (Daskorolis),echoed by Spain (Salazar) and Slovenia (Slapnicar),stressed that arms control and CFE were a part of the Corfu process and that discussions needed to be mutually reinforcing as we move forward. Turkey (Tuzel), supported by the Netherlands (Kleinjan),reminded all that the Corfu process means different things to different players, highlighting that Russia takes a selective view and has yet to embrace it as an all-encompassing process. France (Raharinaivo) and Romania (Stoica) noted that Allies should emphasize the Corfu process as the platform for engaging in EST discussions and called for Allies to continue stressing this message to Russia. -- SYG Moscow Report and the Parallel Actions Package: HLTF Chair Simmons reported that SYG Rasmussen was personally energized by his meetings in Moscow - including the featured Putin lecture on CFE - and expressed interest in engaging actively to find a solution. Greece was pleased with the SYG's report on Russia's interest in CFE and called for delivering a clear message to Russia and the international community that CFE was irreplaceable and we must continue our support of the parallel actions package. Romania was a bit more skeptical of Russia's continued interest, noting it was Russia's "leitmotif," but elaborated during bilateral discussions (see below) on the package as the only path forward that would preserve NATO's principled positions. Others refrained from general comments on CFE next steps in the HLTF plenary deferring to the U.S. assessment on the need for a comprehensive approach, but Allies were clear that the I.S. informal idea of defining substantial forces in the NRC context was not the next step. USNATO 00000064 003 OF 005 -- Defining Substantial Combat Forces (SCF): All Allies who spoke - in the full HLTF and on the margins - said that negotiating a definition of SCF in isolation from the other elements of the CFE package was a recipe for failure. Romania stressed the need for a broad dialogue on all elements of the package and noted concern that engaging on a definition prematurely could result in Russia using it to hold the package hostage. German rep Banzhaf, seconded by Turkey, was clear in the HLTF: substantial combat forces should not/not be discussed in isolation as it is part of the package. (Germany provided a very detailed elaboration of its position during Quad discussions. See para 6.) The Netherlands (Kleinjan) and Italy (Pugliese) agreed that Russia was playing games by calling for an NRC discussion on this with Kleinjan adding that there should be no discussion of any details of the package without first achieving overall agreement and Pugliese calling for no "cherry-picking" and pre-coordination for any discussion in the HLTF. (The list of Allies who spoke against this idea in the plenary included: RO, GER, TU, NETH, IT, CZ, UK, ES; the same point was made on the margins by a number of allies, including CAN, PO, and GR.) -- HLTF Chair Simmons concluded there was clearly broad support for the SCF issue to remain in the CFE discussion while recognizing it will surface in other fora and will have to be addressed even if not substantively. Meanwhile, the broader question of a way forward on CFE was currently being reviewed in capitals in light of the broader European security context proposals in play. -------------- MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS -------------- ¶6. (C) On the margins of the HLTF, the U.S. met with Quad reps from Germany, France and the UK, as well as conducted bilateral meetings with Turkey, Romania, and Poland. Additionally, during the Heads of Delegation lunch and subsequently, several representatives took the opportunity to share views directly with the U.S. rep. While Allies reviewed points they made in the main HLTF meeting, there was a greater tendency at this HLTF to engage with the U.S. team directly and especially to confirm that they understood correctly what the U.S. had said in the plenary about reviewing CFE in the broader context of European security. -- The need to reassure Allies about the thrust of U.S. thinking, and engage them as our views develop, was a central message in many sidebar discussions. While several Allies underscored that new thinking was desirable given that the way forward on CFE was unclear, they reiterated a familiar theme, that Allies support the Parallel Actions Package as a balanced and thoughtful way ahead. Romanian rep Stoica stressed this approach had been hard to agree in NATO and setting it aside would be a serious step. He warned against any approach that might be read as intended to mollify Russia at the price of real NATO interests. Turkish rep Tuzel explicitly underscored that while Turkey supports U.S.-Russia engagement, CFE is an Alliance issue. Dutch rep Kleinjan said privately that while the U.S. had a change of Administration last year, other NATO Allies had not, and Allies stand by the positions on CFE that were painstakingly developed over the last few years. German rep Banzhaf remarked privately that Germany was keenly interested in supporting U.S. efforts to "save" the legally binding CFE Treaty regime, and not a lesser alternative. He commented, again privately, that Germany was eagerly awaiting a green light from Washington so it could circulate to the Quad its ideas on CFE that had been shared with U/S Tauscher on November 30. -- Quad: In the CFE Quad in particular, Allies were open to considering next steps on CFE in the broader European security context as the way forward evolved. UK rep Clark suggested 2010 would be the "year of arms control" and that now was a good time to reflect on how CFE would contribute to this wider European security context and whether there were opportunities to reopen negotiations. Clark added that London was also considering what might happen if we "jump off the CFE boat." What would be the implications if Allies USNATO 00000064 004 OF 005 stopped implementing CFE? German rep Banzhaf specified that arms control and disarmament were high on the German agenda, and though the focus now is more on nuclear disarmament, conventional arms control maintains a prominent role. The UK, Germany and France all noted there was much thinking underway in capitals, while acknowledging they were anxiously awaiting the outcome of U.S. thinking - in light of progress on START and NPT - in addition to further consultations to elaborate positio ns on CFE. -- Defining substantial combat forces (SCF) in the NRC: The German rep agreed with U.S. thinking that Russia could view a legal agreement to define SCF as a substitute for the CFE Treaty; engaging on a definition prematurely could have an adverse impact on a package approach to CFE. The German rep said that if a definition of SCF was important to Russia, then it was one of the few "bargaining chips" NATO possessed. When played, we should get something comparable for it. It emerged that Berlin had done some thinking about the substance of an SCF definition that had reinforced their concerns about going forward precipitately and shared an informal paper laying out factors for consideration regarding this issue. The German team commented that a brigade might be hugely significant in some parts of Europe, and a minor matter in others. Additionally, the SCF commitment had been conceived alongside the national and territorial ceilings of the Adapted CFE Treaty. The ambiguity of the NATO-Russia Founding Act language had been complemented by the structure of Adapted CFE ceilings, which define the "headroom" that would be available on any state's territory to host foreign forces temporarily or permanently. Use of that headroom would have been considered to be consistent with the SCF commitment, and the available headroom differed considerably from one area to another. (The Polish rep made this same point in a bilat meeting noting that Warsaw considers A/CFE headroom to essentially be the SCF definition.) Others recalled that for some Allies, Russian forces on Russian territory were a direct concern; a limit on Allied stationing that was not matched by a limit on Russia's regional presence would be problematic. Discussion led to the conclusion that although SCF is a topic for the NRC, it is an issue that must be left open to work into the overall solution on CFE. -- Proposal on HLTF and VCC: The UK noted that a review of NATO committee structures was underway and that this streamlining initiative could have implications for the HLTF. It includes suggestions for the NAC to have greater visibility of the HLTF and for the VCC to be directly subordinated to the HLTF. This topic was left to further discussion at the next HLTF pending release of an expected proposal. -- UK Vienna Document 99 Proposal: In the Quad, the UK emphasized that it felt the need to go ahead with tabling in Vienna its proposal to limit an initial round of discussion of VDoc 99 enhancement to a package on Chapters V and IX, which would encompass quotas, inspection teams, and thresholds - and benefit the Allies. The idea is that Allies would have a proactive stance in calling for such a focus, and at the same time test Russian intentions with regard to enhancements that would produce actual gains in military transparency. The Germans were supportive, stressing the need for a proactive stance in Vienna, as well as the need to give structure to the process and provide a litmus test for Russian intentions. The U.S. team noted appreciation for the tactical concerns and did not object to tabling the proposal, while emphasizing that Washington would need to review its specifics and might have future input. -- Turkey: During bilateral discussions with Turkish Rep Tuzel, it was evident Turkey is interested in further elaboration of U.S. thinking on the way ahead. Tuzel noted 2010 should be the year for action on CFE; considering the December NATO statement, no forward movement will mean serious consideration of the data exchange. He suggested Allies need to consider this in the coming months and develop a strategy. -- Romania: In side meetings, Romanian rep Stoica remarked at length that Allies needed to carefully consider even subtle changes in statement language or risk flagging nuanced USNATO 00000064 005 OF 005 changes in Alliance agreed positions. He underscored that Romania remains a firm supporter of the Parallel Actions Package which contains elements that are intertwined and must be addressed as a whole. Stoica cautioned against interlinking the range of issues in play as it could lead to further deadlock and feed into Russia's tactic of dividing positions and pocketing gains. Stoica expressed a preference for compartmentalizing issues noting that the NATO Strategic Concept review would address how NATO will shape the future security environment, that the Corfu process was the place for discussions on Russia's European Security Treaty proposal, and that Allies should exercise patience regarding CFE and the package approach by waiting for Russia to signal readiness to honor the principle of host nation consent. He indicated Romania could not support any approach to "start fresh" on CFE as it carries considerable risk of appearing as if the Alliance were giving in. Regarding the data exchange in December, he noted our next move largely depended on Russia's openness to deal on CFE once START negotiations were finalized. -- Poland: Polish rep Przenioslo indicated interest in the outcome of U.S. thinking on CFE noting that Warsaw was starting to consider what the way ahead could look like since the Russians appeared very unlikely to agree on the current CFE deal. He expressed hope that a START deal would soon be concluded so that other matters such as CFE could be addressed. He noted that Warsaw remains uncertain as to whether or not Russia is willing to engage seriously on CFE as Russia is comfortable with the current situation and is likely losing military interest in CFE. This translates into no means to oblige Russia to return to CFE. Przenioslo posited it may be time for a new negotiation and a new solution that would salvage the key aspects of the regime and address the range of issues in the parallel actions package. When pressed for Poland's view of the purpose of CFE, Przenioslo offered his personal assessment that arms control was critical for providing predictability and transparency in Europe which promotes cooperation and rational military planning. He added that limits remain important as well, even if currently a second-order issue since all States Parties are currently under overall CFE limits. -- On the margins, a number of Allies (Poland and UK among others) asked about reports that former USNATO Ambassador Victoria Nuland would be taking responsibility for CFE issues and expressed interest in the status of those plans and the potential scope of her position. ¶7. (SBU) NEXT MEETING. Allies agreed on March 18, 2010 for the next HLTF. DAALDER