NATO: AMBASSADORIAL REVOLT LIKELY TO KILL SECGEN'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000053 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2020 TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS PGOV MARR EUN SUBJECT: NATO: AMBASSADORIAL REVOLT LIKELY TO KILL SECGEN'S INFORMAL GROUP ON NATO-EU REF: A. A. USNATO 516 ¶B. B. STATE 4074 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission John Heffern. Reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On February 3, many NATO Ambassadors protested against the Secretary General's establishment of an informal group (ref a) on NATO-EU relations. As a result, we anticipate that this group will end, at least in its current form. The group did not make concrete progress but did allow frank exchanges on sensitive issues. The U.S. representative promoted establishment of the informal NATO-EU "High Level Group" and practical arrangements for ISAF support to EUPOL in Afghanistan (ref b). END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) On February 3, more than a dozen NATO Ambassadors, led by Belgium, protested against the Secretary General's establishment of an informal 8-9 Ally group (ref a) on NATO-EU relations. While the SYG's next step is not clear, we anticipate that this group will end, at least in its current form. Allied complaints focused on the group's lack of transparency and inclusiveness. Everyone acknowledges that there are many informal and ad hoc groups of Allies meeting on issues in small formats. What triggered this revolt was that the SYG's office initiated the group and selected the participants (U.S., UK, France, Germany, Turkey, Greece, Canada, Norway, and Spain). ¶3. (C) The group met four times between November and January. While no concrete progress was achieved, the informal setting and uninstructed dialogue allowed frank exchanges on sensitive issues, including Cyprus, informal NATO-EU meetings, Turkish interest in participating in the European Defense Agency, NATO-EU cooperation under "Berlin-plus," and practical cooperation in Afghanistan. Three new papers were circulated in the group: one list of potential areas of cooperation by the International Staff; one "personal paper" by the UK rep; and one by Canada. We have sent the three papers to USEU, State/RPM, OSD/NATO and the NSC. ¶4. (C) The U.S. representative pushed the group in two main areas. We pushed for near term establishment of the "High Level Group," recommended in a French paper last year and endorsed, with conditions, in a Turkish paper. The informal NATO-EU group could include the Secretary General, SACEUR/DSACEUR, Chairman of the Military Committee and Director of the International Military Staff on the NATO side and the EU High Representative, EU Operational Commander, EU Commission (an important addition),and EU Military Committee Chairman. Now that the new EU team is in place, Secretary General Rasmussen wants to launch this group and all Allies, except Turkey, strongly support him. Turkey remains cautious on all informal NATO-EU groups. However, based partly on the discussions of the nine-country group, we believe, in the end, Ankara will accept and, hopefully, try to make use of this high level NATO-EU contact. ¶5. (C) The second area that we pushed (ref b) was for practical arrangements for ISAF support to EUPOL in Afghanistan. We argued that as the EU consolidates its police training presence in population centers there might be scope for ISAF, under its existing operational plan, to enhance its current level of informal security support. No one in the group explicitly opposed this cooperation, although the Turkish representative (please protect) urged that any such cooperation be framed broadly to include the United Nations and other international organizations. If the cooperation is presented explicitly as a NATO-EU project, Ankara will insist that Berlin-plus arrangements apply and the cooperation will stop (Note: We are currently working quietly on a bilateral basis with the Turkish Delegation to NATO to find a workable formula. End note.). HEFFERN