NATO-RUSSIA: ALLIED VIEWS ON RUSSIA'S NRC TREATY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000049 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO RS SUBJECT: NATO-RUSSIA: ALLIED VIEWS ON RUSSIA'S NRC TREATY REF: 09 USNATO 585 Classified By: Political Advisor Kelly Degnan for reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Allies remain united in rejecting Russia's proposed binding treaty with NATO, although differences exist over whether NATO should discuss with Russia certain elements of the draft text presented by Foreign Minister Lavrov during the December NATO-Russia Council Ministerial. Russia-skeptic eastern Allies question the need to discuss the Russian initiative, arguing that Moscow could perceive doing so as openness to exploring a proposed treaty that would give Russia a veto over NATO decision making and limit the sovereignty of NATO's newer members. In contrast, several western Allies are willing to discuss elements of the draft treaty in order to appear sensitive to Russian concerns. They see an opportunity for a dialogue with Russia on security, transparency, and defense planning, although there is currently no unity on which multilateral forum should be the location for this discussion. These Allies recognize that the challenge will be to use the Russian initiative to launch a dialogue without exacerbating divisions within the Alliance. End summary. Allies Remain United and Divided -------------- ¶2. (C) Recent discussions with Allies indicate predictable divisions over the draft treaty delivered by Russian FM Lavrov during the December 4 NRC Ministerial. While Allies agree that the Russian proposal for a binding treaty with NATO is a non-starter, western Allies are open to discussing elements of the draft treaty with Russia and eastern Allies remain concerned about giving any sort of positive response to Moscow (reftel). ¶3. (C) Diplomats from Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania have stated that they see the draft NRC Treaty as an unfriendly gesture by Moscow that attempts to limit their sovereignty by placing restrictions on the basing of forces on their territory. These Allies also view the Russian concept of one party not enhancing its security at the expense of the other as allowing Russia undue influence in NATO decision making. Finally, they are not convinced that the NRC Treaty is a serious effort by Moscow to redefine European security architecture, considering it an attempt to create complications for the West and sow division among NATO Allies. They fear that discussion of the draft treaty in the NRC will achieve this objective for Moscow. Such views have led the eastern Allies to deem the NRC Treaty "outrageous," making potentially poisonous attempts to spin off some aspect of the treaty for discussion in the NRC or OSCE. These Allies were skeptical that rejecting outright the NRC Treaty would strengthen conservative elements in Moscow. ¶4. (C) The Germans, French, Italians, British, Canadians, Turks, and Norwegians generally share the view that NATO cannot say yes, but it cannot simply say no to the NRC Treaty. The French characterized their approach as "open to contact but closed on the form," as there is an interest in talking with Russia but none in the Russian treaty proposal. There are differences in opinion on how to respond to Moscow: The Germans see this as an opportunity to focus on and strengthen the CFE, which they consider the appropriate context to respond to Russia's desire to define "substantial combat forces." They view the Russian proposal in Article 2 of the draft treaty to use the NRC to discuss imminent security issues as an appropriate use of the NRC as an "early warning system" to address brewing problems. The UK Delegation advised London that the similarities between the draft NRC and EST treaties argue for their being considered "holistically" for the time being. The UK suggested using the existing CFE structure or convening a special HLTF to tackle defining "substantial combat forces." The French, Italians, Turks, Norwegians, and Canadians do not yet have a definitive idea how to respond, but favor using a discussion of ideas presented in the draft NRC Treaty to address issues of interest to NATO. Ottawa is presently seeking input from its embassies in NATO capitals to inform its policy development. USNATO 00000049 002 OF 002 A United Response to Moscow -------------- ¶5. (C) Comment: Any response to Moscow's proposed NRC Treaty must be particularly sensitive to differences within the Alliance regarding Russia. Allies are looking to the U.S. for leadership and will need to perceive any U.S. approach as advancing Allied interests and maintaining unity. Given Allies' general rejection of the proposed NRC Treaty as unacceptable at best and outrageous at worst, it is not advisable to use the Russian text as the starting point for discussion. But, the Russian proposal offers some elements for a dialogue that the U.S. and certain Allies are open to having with Russia. An intra-Alliance discussion will be a prerequisite in order to reach consensus within NATO on how to make the most of this opportunity. End Comment. DAALDER