NATO SHOULD FACTOR NORTHERN STRATEGY INTO KFOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000048 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020 TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV MOPS MARR KV YI AFDB SUBJECT: NATO SHOULD FACTOR NORTHERN STRATEGY INTO KFOR DRAWDOWN Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 29, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and non-NATO KFOR contributors discussed with EU representatives the situation in Kosovo and NATO's way ahead on the KFOR drawdown after reaching Gate 1 (10,000 troops) of deterrent presence. Stressing the importance of integrating the north into the rest of Kosovo, International Civil Representative/EU Special Representative (ICR/EUSR) Feith asked NATO not to draw down forces precipitously while the Northern Strategy was being addressed. Ambassador Daalder supported Feith's request, saying the Alliance needed to keep sufficient forces in place while key POLITICAL issues were being tackled in the north. The UK challenged Feith's request and said NATO should continue with the drawdown. This issue will come up at the Istanbul Defense Ministerial. END SUMMARY -------------- Northern Kosovo is Stagnant and Unsustainable -------------- ¶2. (C) ICR/EUSR Feith told the North Atlantic Council and non-NATO KFOR contributors on January 29 that the situation was stable and improving in southern Kosovo but stagnant and unsustainable in the north. Feith said Belgrade's takeover of electricity distribution and reinforcement of parallel institutions in the north were clear violations of UNSCR 1244 and possible steps toward functional partition. Against this backdrop, he assessed that the upcoming ICJ ruling and KFOR's drawdown would critically affect the possibility for strategic change. ¶3. (C) EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) Head de Kermabon said EULEX was reaching the limits of its technical mandate in the north and was dependent on key stakeholders addressing POLITICAL problems in order to do more. He protested Belgrade's appointment of parallel judges and reinforcement of parallel institutions and asked Allies to convey to Belgrade the imperative of standing down on the judiciary issue in Mitrovica. He said the electricity issue had escalated from a commercial to a POLITICAL problem that was not in EULEX's mandate but needed attention. Switzerland responded that EULEX must continue to show resolve and advance its work in the north. -------------- Taking the Northern Strategy Forward -------------- ¶4. (C) Feith said the International Civil Office (ICO) Strategy for the North aimed to deal with issues that had been left unaddressed for 10 years. He said the strategy was not intended to destabilize the region but to provide better public services and improve the quality of life. He said he would consult with Belgrade but not give it a veto. The four key strands would be extending the rule of law in the north, promoting decentralization beginning with municipal elections in Mitrovica around September, improving social and economic conditions, and maintaining security. Feith said he was looking to move forward in the coming weeks and planned to tackle easier problems first before moving on to more difficult issues. He asked NATO to consider the situation in the north as it looked to drawdown KFOR, with an eye to maintaining sufficient forces in the country. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Daalder said the U.S. agreed that the situation in the north was stagnant and unsustainable and, along with the German PermRep, pledged full support for the ICO Northern Strategy. Ambassador Daalder said the U.S. understood implementation would take time. The German PermRep said the Mitrovica courthouse would be a key test of USNATO 00000048 002 OF 003 EULEX readiness. Albania advised that the prospect of EU integration should be used to induce Belgrade's cooperation. The Italian PermRep said the international community could not allow 10 years of work in Kosovo to fail -- it needed to move Kosovo from "fragile stability" to "stable stability." ¶6. (C) EU Civilian Operations Commander Klompenhouwer said these problems could be solved only by dialogue and not by force. The Greek PermRep stressed Athens' view that the northern strategy was not an EU document. He said that while Belgrade did not have a veto in the north, it had an important role to play. He called for Pristina to do a better job of facilitating refugee returns. The Czech PermRep expressed concern that the northern strategy had already elicited a threat of force by Belgrade and said steps needed to be taken to de-escalate the rhetoric. -------------- Factor Northern Strategy into KFOR Drawdown -------------- ¶7. (C) Feith said that these critical issues in the north needed to be addressed before KFOR completed its drawdown (Gate 3 - 2,500 troops) and requested that NATO factor this into its deliberations regarding the move to Gate 2 (5,500 troops). He said the KFOR move to deterrent presence was a positive development for Kosovo but asked that KFOR retain the ability to act with strategic effect. Klompenhouwer added that EULEX expects resistance as it works to extend the rule of law and would need KFOR back-up. ¶8. (C) Ambassador Daalder and the German PermRep supported Feith's request. Amb. Daalder stressed that while it was not KFOR's role to implement the northern strategy, KFOR needed to maintain sufficient forces on hand as POLITICAL issues were tackled. He warned that the international community needed to address the north now or there would be no safe and secure environment in the future. Albania, Croatia, and Norway also advocated caution. ¶9. (C) The UK disputed Feith's comments, saying that a steady KFOR drawdown would send a positive message, there was no reason to attach specific conditions to specific gates, and perceptions of risks should not interfere with the drawdown. The UK called for NATO to take a more strategic view, saying the Alliance faced global issues, not just Kosovo, and should also consider NATO's severe resource constraints. The Italian PermRep said NATO did need to take a strategic view, but the drawdown must remain conditions-based. He stressed that conditions on the ground must be right before moving to Gate 2. -------------- Unfix with Caution -------------- ¶10. (C) Feith said he fully supported KFOR transfer of responsibility for protecting the Gazimestan monument -- one of nine KFOR-guarded sensitive patrimonial sites -- to the Kosovo Police (KP). He said the KP was ready and cautioned Allies not to be unnerved by protests or other propaganda efforts. De Kermabon said EULEX was working closely with the KP on Gazimestan and was confident of success. De Kermabon said EULEX was giving the unfixing process its utmost attention and would continue to participate in joint meetings and planning with KFOR and the KP. ¶11. (C) Germany, Czech Republic, Albania, and Norway cautioned that unfixing the other eight patrimonial sites would be more difficult. Spain and Greece stressed the need to address Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) concerns. Greece said NATO must remember that the patrimonial sites would USNATO 00000048 003 OF 003 continue to need protection even after unfixing. Feith and de Kermabon advocated a gradual approach, active consultation with the SOC, and a proactive media campaign to build confidence. De Kermabon recommended unfixing Pec and Decani last and said he was pushing the KP in Decani to deepen relations with the SOC leaders there. ¶12. (C) De Kermabon said turning over border monitoring duties from KFOR to the KP would also be a sensitive process. He noted that the KP was increasing the number of officers in the border police but said these officers needed training. He said EULEX would collaborate with KFOR to ensure a good turnover. -------------- NATO-EU Cooperation Working in Kosovo -------------- ¶13. (C) Feith and de Kermabon expressed appreciation for excellent cooperation with KFOR. Feith said the ICO, EULEX, and KFOR shared a common vision. De Kermabon added that the KP, EULEX, and KFOR have a common understanding of their respective first, second, and third responder roles. Turkey noted that it was taking a constructive approach to KFOR-EULEX coordination in theater, but this did not change its main lines with regards to NATO-EU relations. ¶14. (C) Klompenhouwer praised EULEX-KFOR cooperation as well as NATO-EU cooperation in Afghanistan. Klompenhouwer, supported by Croatia, said NATO and the EU should increase cooperation at the operational level and pursue more informal contacts given the two organizations' common challenges. DAALDER