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10USNATO12 2010-01-11 18:44:00 CONFIDENTIAL Mission USNATO
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DE RUEHNO #0012/01 0111844
O 111844Z JAN 10
					  C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000012 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2020

REF: STATE 132520

Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder for reasons 1.4(b),(d)

1. (C) Summary. Post concurs with reftel that appointment of
a NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) with expanded
mandate and staff will contribute significantly to improving
coordination of the civilian effort in Afghanistan. Many
Allies agree, as reported separately. A more robust SCR will
fill the need for a political counterpart to COMISAF and
support UNAMA's broader efforts to coordinate international
civilian assistance. Existing coordination mechanisms have
proved unable to persuade nations to synchronize their
assistance efforts with Afghan government and NATO/ISAF
identified priorities, undermining the impact and progress of
international initiatives. A strong, effective SCR, with the
staff, mandate and personality to work with ISAF nations to
bring greater coherency to their counter-insurgency (COIN)
related civilian efforts, would provide substantial support
to ISAF, UNAMA and the Afghan government (GOA). Adjusting
the civilian chain of command to dual-hat appropriate
civilians in the field to link subnational efforts with the
SCR in Kabul, as well as with national governments, would
promote better coordination. A clear message from ISAF
capitals that nations are willing to coordinate (and be
coordinated) pursuant to an agreed, comprehensive approach
will be essential. The London Conference may offer an
opportunity for Foreign Ministers to emphasize that full,
meaningful coordination of civilian efforts, led by UNAMA and
supported by SCR for NATO/ISAF countries, is critical to the
success of our mission in Afghanistan. End Summary.

2. (C) Allies agree that improved civilian coordination
requires strengthening UNAMA and the Special Representative
to the Secretary General (SRSG) and bolstering the SCR's
ability to coordinate NATO/ISAF COIN-related efforts. When
renewing UNAMA's mandate (UNSCR 1868), the UN called for
strong cooperation, coordination and mutual support between
UNAMA and ISAF as part of a comprehensive approach to
addressing the challenges in Afghanistan. NATO's focus has
been on improving coordination within ISAF in order to better
support UNAMA, GOA and ISAF priorities identified in the
Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), the Afghanistan
Compact (the "Compact"), COMISAF's assessment and related
documents. This is consistent with ISAF's mandate to closely
consult with the GOA and UNAMA, and with the Compact, under
which ISAF and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) pledged
to promote security and stability throughout Afghanistan,
including by strengthening Afghan capabilities.

3. (C) While the SCR's current Terms of Reference (TOR) are
arguably broad enough to encompass a more robust role, some
Allies may press for revisions in order to clarify the scope
of his expanded coordination authority. Engaging with Allies
at NATO, the UN, the EU and in capitals to explain the
purpose and intent of bolstering the SCR should prevent
significant erosion of the broad coordination mandate
envisioned. Revised TORs should be coordinated with possible
revisions to a new SRSG's terms of reference and UNAMA's
mandate when it is reviewed in March 2010 to ensure the
necessary synergy.

4. (C) The SCR already sits on the Joint Coordinating and
Monitoring Board (JCMB); in the event an Executive Steering
Group (ESG) is created, as proposed by SRSG Kai Eide, the SCR
should be a member, providing another link between ISAF/NATO
civilian efforts and GOA and UNAMA. Such a UN-sponsored ESG,
consisting of appropriate GOA ministers, the SRSG, SCR,
COMISAF, EU representative and a few other key stakeholders,
could serve as a joint decision-making body for synchronizing
civilian and military assessments of Afghan capabilities as
we move toward the GOA assuming more direct responsibility.
The ESG would give the SCR a smaller, more flexible outlet
for engagement and coordination with the UN and GOA, in
addition to the larger JCMB, and ensure good information
flow. By providing a more flexible forum for coordination
and discussion of NATO/ISAF civilian efforts among the
primary stakeholders, the ESG would ensure coherency with
Afghan government priorities at the Kabul and subnational
government levels.

5. (C) Within NATO/ISAF, adjustments to the current civilian
chain of command would facilitate coordination between the
field and Kabul, and potentially influence national
assistance decisions outside the SCR's purview. National
senior civilians at district, provincial, Task Force and
Regional Command (RC) would also serve as ISAF SCRs,
reporting up through the chain of command to the Deputy SCR,
who would focus on operational issues and coordination
throughout the RCs. Afghan and ISAF priorities could be
communicated more effectively to and from the field,
improving the connection between Kabul and the provinces and
better focusing assistance efforts.

6. (C) The January 28 London Conference offers an opportunity
to announce the plan to strengthen UNAMA, the SRSG and the
SCR, and preferably would include endorsement of UN and NATO
candidates for the positions. This would allow the new SRSG
and SCR to develop jointly their TORs and plan of action for
improving coordination. The Conference is also a chance for
Foreign Ministers to issue a clear message that nations are
willing to coordinate (and to be coordinated) pursuant to an
agreed, comprehensive approach, and to emphasize that full,
meaningful coordination of civilian efforts, led by UNAMA and
supported by SCR for NATO/ISAF countries, is critical to the
success of our mission in Afghanistan.