IAEA TECHNICAL BRIEF ON SYRIA LAYS IT ON THE LINE

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000077 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, P. ISN, IO, NEA, ISN/RA, IO/GS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020 TAGS: AORC PARM KNNP IAEA SY SUBJECT: IAEA TECHNICAL BRIEF ON SYRIA LAYS IT ON THE LINE REF: UNVIE 059 Classified By: Ambassador Glyn T. Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) At the February 24 technical briefing on the DG's Syria report, the IAEA underscored the need for Syrian cooperation on an increasing number of issues, some involving Syria's failure to report nuclear material under its Safeguards Agreement. In particular, Director of Safeguards Operations B Herman Nackaerts noted the Agency's rights and responsibilities with respect to verifying the correctness and completeness of Syria's declarations. In addition to recounting the repeated requests for information related to the Dair Alzour former reactor site, Nackaerts also highlighted the information Syria must provide the Agency to meet its reporting requirements for design and nuclear material changes at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) in Damascus. He informed Member States that the planned FeQuary 23 inspection at the MNSR did not take place; Syria had informed the Agency it could not accommodate the request because of the Board obligations of key people. During the question and answer session, Charge asked whether it is typical to refuse the IAEA access to a declared facility and whether doing so in this manner was a safeguards violation. DDG Safeguards/Heinonen acknowledged that inspections typically can shift by a day or two (for technical reasons) from what the Agency requests, but normally a state offers an alternative day well in advance; to his recolleQion no other date was offered in Syria's case. Responding to the question of whether or not a violation was occurring, Legal Advisor Johan Rautenbach admitted that a flat out refusal would "not be consistent with safeguards obligations," but quickly added that in this case he understood discussion was underway to reschedule the inspection. ¶2. (C) Comment: Following the briefing, Heinonen privately expressed frustration with the Legal Advisor's downplaying of Syria's refusal of the IAEA request to visit the declared MNSR facility. He commented that we had been handed a "golden ticket" with respect to Syria's refusal and it was up to the Board to do something about it, as this was a real "test." Syria could have postponed, he noted, but had miscalculated with its flat out refusal. Heinonen described how he had proposed the MNSR inspection as a means to keep the pressure on Damascus; he was pleased that Amano had approved their gambit, even after others in the Secretariat had counseled a less confrontational approach. Several likeminded colleagues noted that the Legal Advisor had caught himself and stopped just short after audibly beginning to articulate the word "violation." In a further development Heinonen relayed that he had received a green light from DG Amano to request access at the Homs facility, where Syria produced the uranium yellowcake used in the undeclared experiments at the MNSR. (Note: The IAEA wants to ensure that the yellowcake at Homs, a quantity of at least "hundreds" of kilograms, has not also been processed in undeclared activities. End note.) This request for access at Homs would not, at least initially, be in the form of a special inspection and would not be in lieu of a broader special inspection request advocated by Heinonen. Heinonen told Mission, however, that he would need to see evidence of strong support from member states to IAEA efforts to ensure Syria accepts immediately the routine inspection at the MNSR if he is to believe member states would support a subsequent special inspection request. In this regard, we note DG Amano reportedly told Gordon Brown's Foreign Policy advisor that with respect to a special inspection in Syria, he "cannot slay too many dragons at once," implying that the ongoing Iran investigation complicated his ability to proceed on Syria. ¶3. (C) Notably, the briefing was attended by the new Syrian Ambassador Bassam Sabbagh, who we have learned from likeminded had been one of the escorts on the IAEA's sole visit to Dair Alzour in June 2008. For the second time in a row, Syria did not speak at the technical briefing and Syrian Atomic Energy head Ibrahim Othman sat discretely in the back of the room. End summary and comment. Laying out the Safeguards Case -------------- ¶4. (SBU) IAEA Director of Safeguards Operations B Herman Nackaerts delivered the February 24 technical briefing on the DG's Syria report following his presentation on the Iran report (septel). The majority of the briefing retold the verification story on both the Dair Alzour investigation and the findings at the MNSR. Nackaerts underscored the Agency's rights and responsibilities with respect to verifying the correctness and completeness of Syria's declarations. He reviewed the many outstanding issues and the need for Syrian cooperation as the key to breaking the logjam. Syria needs to "urgently" provide access to Dair Alzour and other sites, he emphasized, provide access and reports related to the MNSR issue, and establish modalities with the IAEA for managed access that would protect sensitive material in Syria. Nackaerts specified outstanding issues related to the MNSR that need to be addressed: -- Syria must provide a full declaration of nuclear material (given the materials at the MNSR that need to be added); -- The Agency would then verify Syria's declared inventory; -- Examination of source documents associated with experiments and accounts of nuclear material; -- Clarification of all experimental activities performed with nuclear material; -- Clarification of design information concerning irradiation activities. New Developments -------------- ¶5. (SBU) New details were briefed on Syria's February 10 letter to the Agency, in which Syria declined an IAEA request for February 8-9 meetings to discuss the results of the latest samples taken at the MNSR (taken November 17). In the letter, Syria informed the Agency that more Homs yellowcake was located at the MNSR. Nackaerts noted this material was on the order of kilograms, according to the letter. Syria also provided a description of the process used to convert the yellowcake to uranyl nitrate, although no details were given during the technical briefing. Nackaerts further added that the information, timing, and locations of the experiments (presumably as noted in the process description) are inconsistent with the information previously provided by Syria. ¶6. (SBU) Nackaerts confirmed that the yellowcake material sampled during the November 17 visit to MNSR was "approaching the commercial standard for uranium ore concentrate feed material for fuel fabrication." (Comment: This is the strongest statement to date on the potential use or relevance of the experiments conducted at the MNSR. It should also serve as another point of uncertainty about the scope and nature of Syria's nuclear activities; as fuel fabrication would have direct applicability to an operating nuclear reactor such as Dair Alzour. End comment). ¶7. (SBU) Nackaerts also noted that the planned February 23 inspection at the MNSR did not take place. He said the Agency received a letter on February 23 (but dated February 18) saying that Syria could not accommodate the request because of the IAEA Board-related obligations of key Syrian officials. During the question and answer session, Charge asked whether it is typical to refuse the IAEA access to a declared facility and whether this instance was a safeguards violation. DDG Safeguards/Heinonen acknowledged that inspections typically can change by a day or two (for technical reasons) from what the Agency requests, but normally a member state requesting the rescheduling offers another day well in advance; to his recollection no other date was offered in Syria's case. Responding to the question of whether or not a violation was occurring, Legal Advisor Johan Rautenbach bit off the word "violation" as he began to use it, characterized a flat out refusal as "not consistent with safeguards obligations," but quickly added that in this case he understood discussion was underway to reschedule the inspection. (Note: Heinonen told us privately after the briefing that, had it been him, he would have stated bluntly that this is noncompliance. End Note.) Linkages -------------- ¶8. (SBU) In a follow up question on the possibility of a link between the uranium particles found at MNSR and Dair Alzour (as noted in the report and technical briefing),Canada asked what else is needed to determine a linkage (Canada sought to underscore the access Syria needs to provide). Nackaerts noted that currently the Agency cannot conclude a linkage one way or the other. He said that the Agency had identified activities, of which it was not previously aware. For example, on the Homs material (yellowcake),the Agency needs to understand how this material and the experiments fit into Syria's nuclear program, whether Syria plans to convert this material and turn it into fuel or if there are other foreseen nuclear facilities in the future. Canada also asked if the Agency could provide more details about the "use of natural uranium compounds" at the MNSR that might be relevant to allegations concerning one of the three other locations, asking specifically which site the Agency referred to but Nackaerts did not answer this question. Homs -------------- ¶9. (SBU) In the context of Syria's statements that yellowcake produced at the Homs facility, Nackaerts provided details on the Homs plant (Homs Phosphate Acid Purification Pilot Plant) not included in the DG report: -- Facility commission in 1998; -- 1 cubic meter/hour throughput of raw phosphoric acid with 60 ppm uranium; -- Second process to purify phosphoric acid to 'food grade' - added in 2003; and -- Agency visited the site in July 2004 and inspectors observed hundreds of kilograms of yellowcake at that time (this was in a footnote to the DG report). Uranyl Nitrate -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Lastly, Australia also asked a question on the uranyl nitrate, and how the Agency accounts for Syria's changing explanations on the source of the uranium contamination at the MNSR. Nackaerts noted the uranyl nitrate could either be purchased on the open market or produced at the MNSR from Homs yellowcake. As to why Syria did not declare this activity, Nackaerts said he did not know, but speculated matter-of-factly on a possible lack of understanding of reporting obligations on Syria's part. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Mission detects a slowly increasing cognizance among like-minded that the Syrian portfolio at the IAEA remains a serious challenge with no easy end-game in sight. Unlike the November Technical Briefing, Canada and Australia joined us in pursuing questions of the Secretariat. In the run-up to the meeting we urged France to do so as well, but were told that the French Mission was instructed not to take the floor in light of ongoing French efforts to engage the Syrians. We reminded the French Mission that absent Syrian cooperation with the IAEA, we are inexorably heading toward a possible special inspection request on which the IAEA would look to France to be supportive. DAVIES