IAEA/BOARD/IRAN: RUSSIA,S TOUGHENING STANCE; PRC

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000076 SIPDIS FOR P, T, ISN, IO, ISN/RA, IO/GS, IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2020 TAGS: AORC PARM KNNP IAEA IR SUBJECT: IAEA/BOARD/IRAN: RUSSIA,S TOUGHENING STANCE; PRC PLAYS TO TYPE Classified By: Ambassador Glyn T. Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d (C) Russian Ambassador Zmeyevskiy, in sharp contrast with his Chinese counterpart, took a markedly tougher stance on Iran than he has previously during German-hosted P5-plus-1 informal pre-Board consultations February 26. Essentially agreeing with the P3-plus-1 appraisal, Russia viewed the DG report as a factual, objective assessment of developments on Iran's nuclear program. Going further, Zmeyevskiy underlined that the report confirmed that what we had initiated with the November Board resolution on Iran "was not groundless." He referenced a recent comment by President Medvedev that Iran must correlate its actions with Agency requirements, and affirmed that Russia will support those requirements. The Russian Ambassador also expressed concern that Iran has been successful in imposing "its interpretation" of events, including with respect to the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) deal, on ill-informed G-77/NAM delegations. He feared that there would be voices of support for Iran on the Board and suggested outreach to NAM delegations. Zmeyevskiy underscored the responsibility of the P5-plus-1 to give an objective version of developments to the Board of Governors and counter Iranian misrepresentations. (Comment: Coming from a super-cautious Zmeyevskiy, who never oversteps his brief on IAEA matters -- typically deferring to capital-based Russian Governor Berdennikov - these remarks are a telling indication of an evolution in the Russian position on Iran. Drawing him out further on Iran's claim to some NAM delegations that Russia had agreed only to provide a reactor load of fuel for Bushehr thus justifying Iran's indigenous enrichment, German Ambassador Luedeking elicited a disdainful huff from Zmeyevskiy: "We have a different interpretation." End Comment). ¶2. (C) By contrast, Chinese Ambassador Hu spoke once to relay China's position, which was clearly out of step with the other P5-plus-1. He began by noting that China had not co-sponsored the November Board resolutioQon Iran and that the situation had gone from bad to worse since then with Iran's announcement of its intent to build more facilities and the move to 20 percent enrichment. China will take note of the DG report and Iran's views in the Board, Hu said, and was not surprised by the more critical tone of the report, attributing this to Amano's influence (rather than Iran's actions). China will deliver a short statement similar in tone to previous Chinese statements, Hu specified, on the need for dialogue and negotiations. China would urge "all sides" to engage and believed that there was still hope for reaching agreement on the TRR, as all solutions had not been exhausted. The Chinese Ambassador added that the Iran issue should be handled by Political Directors. Germany pushed back, citing the Board's obligation to uphold safeguards requirements and respond to Iran's failure to live up to them. Luedeking underlined that calling for dialogue is insufficient, in that dialogue "takes two" and Iran is refusing dialogue with the P5-plus-1 and the IAEA, whose frustration with Iran's refusal to engage on possible military dimensions is palpable. Ambassador also contrasted our willingness to engage with Iran's lack of reciprocity on the TRR offer. ¶3. (C) The E3 and U.S. focused on the factual nature of the DG report and counseled against an interpretation (including in the media) personalizing the "new tone" as a function of DG Amano versus former DG ElBaradei. Germany also highlighted Iran's lack of cooperation with the IAEA's request to upgrade the safeguards approach at Natanz before proceeding to 20 percent enrichment. Luedeking cited this as another example of Iran "testing the redlines" of its safeguards agreement, while French Ambassador Mangin cautioned against delving into the legalities on this point. France did not see a substantial basis for a Board resolution in the report but much cause for concern. Germany recommended that all P5-plus-1 national statements recall the November Board resolution on Iran, a suggestion we should incorporate in the U.S. statement expected for March 3. DAVIES