IAEA/IRAN: TECHNICAL BRIEFING SIGNALS TOUGHER

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000075 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2035 TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: TECHNICAL BRIEFING SIGNALS TOUGHER APPROACH OF NEW DIRECTOR GENERAL Classified By: Ambassador GLYN DAVIES for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) -------------- Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C//NF) On February 24, Ops B Director Herman Nackaerts provided Member States a technical briefing on the Director General's (DG) February 18 report on Iran. The briefing reprised the points covered in the report, but also offered more details about the IAEA's proposals for adjusted Safeguards measures for the new 20 percent enrichment line at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz and aired helpful new details regarding Iran's unprepardness to manufacture fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. With respect to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) at Qom, heavy water-related issues, and UNSC requirements, Nackaerts highlighted that Tehran asserts the IAEA's requests were "beyond Iran's obligations under its Safeguards Agreement." The briefing further underlined the credibility and consistency of what Nackaerts described as an "avalanche of information" related to possible military dimensions (PMD) to Iran's nuclear program. Overall, the briefing was tougher in tone and more direct than recent technical briefings in relaying the IAEA's frustration with Iran's noncooperation on a number of fronts, with a marked absence of "balance" between calls on Iran to comply with its obligations and calls on member states to allow the Agency to share more intelligence information with Iran. This was the Safeguards Department unfettered -- no longer fearing the IAEA Director General should they speak directly to Iran's noncooperation. ¶2. (C//NF) The question and answer session focused on Iran's move to 20 percent enrichment, the chronology of the development of the Fordow enrichment plant, and the uranium metal pyroprocessing activities at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Laboratory. Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh delivered an aggressive retort in which he tried to bully Nackaerts with a series of yes/no questions. Nackaerts tried not to engage Soltanieh, though DDG Safeguards Heinonen felt obliged to intervene at one point to correct Soltanieh's mischaracterizations of safeguards applying to only declared nuclear material, the level of access the Additional Protocol (AP) provides, the correspondence between the IAEA and Iran on the move to 20 percent enrichment, and the facts and chronology of IAEA-Iran interactions regarding the 2007 Iran "workplan" and PMD issues. ¶3. (C//NF) New and noteworthy was Soltanieh's repeated characterization that the IAEA's approach to the Iran report under the past DG contrasted with the approach now under DG Amano. Soltanieh's first yes/no question was to ask for confirmation that, apart from Iran's enrichment to 20 percent, "nothing has changed since the last report except there is a new DG." He repeatedly contrasted this first report by DG Amano to those of his predecessor and invoked ElBaradei's refrain on the need to verify the "authenticity" of the alleged studies documents on weaponization. Soltanieh continued to dismiss possible military dimensions as disinformation based on "the stupid American laptop." The Iranians also circulated a non-paper to Member States (Ref A) explaining Tehran's negative views of the DG's report and citing discrete areas of cooperation by Iran, and including copies of Safeguards Confidential correspondence related to Iran's notification to the IAEA of 20 percent enrichment at Natanz. In an uncharacteristically combative quip, Nackaerts disputed an inference by Soltanieh that, although such details were "OK" for a technical briefing, the inclusion of specific technical details in the DG's report would create obstacles for future cooperation with the IAEA. Nackaerts pointedly said that if that is the case, the IAEA will give more details on the PMD issues in the next Technical Briefing. ¶4. (C//NF) The change in the tone of the briefing was not lost upon Member States as well as others in the IAEA Secretariat, many of whom welcomed Heinonen's bluntness in correcting Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh's outlandish statements. Privately, Heinonen said he felt he needed to defend the IAEA and was pleased that he can finally say what he thinks to Soltanieh. That said, the IAEA's new found assertiveness is certain to draw criticism from NAM members at next week's Board meeting. End Summary and Comment. -------------- Safeguards Approach for the PFEP -------------- ¶5. (C//NF) In the technical briefing of February 24, 2010, open to all Member State delegations, Safeguards Ops B Director Herman Nackaerts provided a timeline for Iran's further enrichment to 20 percent at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz, which detailed the correspondence between the IAEA and Iran (as released by the IAEA as GOV/INF documents) as well as initial operation preparations. He emphasized that Iran had ignored the IAEA's request that Iran not begin 20 percent enrichment until the IAEA had developed a new Safeguards approach for the PFEP> Nackaerts also described the following details about the current status of cascades at the PFEP: -Cascade 1 contains 164-IR1 centrifuges, with a feed of 3.47 percent enriched uranium and a 20 percent product; -Cascade 2 contains 8 single centrifuge machines and a 20-machine cascade; -Cascade 3 contains 4 single centrifuge machines, a 10-machine cascade, and a 20 machine cascade; -Cascades 4, 5, and 6 are empty. ¶6. (C//NF) In addition, Nackaerts noted there currently are 5 surveillance cameras installed at the PFEP to observe its activities. He explained that the IAEA believes it needs to adjust the Safeguards measures in preparation for the increase to 20 percent enrichment. These measures include the repositioning of cameras; unannounced inspections; load cell verification for the feed, product, tails, and dump cylinders; and destructive analysis on samples from the operator's mass spectrometer sampling point. Regarding the construction status of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) at Qom, Nackaerts said no nuclear material had yet been introduced, but all centrifuge mounting pads are installed, all the header and sub-header pipes are installed, and the utilities are erected with transformers and chillers in place. Iran also plans to redesign the withdrawal system to fit a 30B cylinder. -------------- Question and Answer Session Spotlights Iran's Noncooperation -------------- ¶7. (C//NF) Nackaerts, expecting that Soltanieh would try to hijack the Technical Briefing as he has attempted in the past (Ref B),suggested to Msnoff on February 22 that the like-minded work together to immediately raise placards once his briefing ends so that he could call on others first. When it came time for the question and answer session Nackaerts, as promised, called on Australia and Canada before recognizing Ambassador Soltanieh. ¶8. (C//NF) Australia, Canada, Germany, and the U.S. asked questions following Nackaerts' presentation. The U.K. and Switzerland also had their placards raised to ask questions but were unable to as time ran short given a lengthy intervention by Ambassador Soltanieh. Australia started off the question period by asking about the overall chronology of the FFEP and for more information about design and construction work the IAEA says may have begun as early as ¶2006. Specifically, Australia wanted to know if the 2006 date was derived from the information the IAEA received from Member States on the facility which the DG's report noted matched up with the actual design of the facility, thus suggesting the date was credible. Nackaerts affirmed that Member State information on the FFEP was detailed and proved to be correct during the design information verification (DIV) visits. He said that the information about the 2006 start of design and construction work was, indeed, referenced in the briefings provided by the Member States. ¶9. (C//NF) Australia also asked about the dialogue between the IAEA and Iran on the establishment of new safeguards for the PFEP, specifically questioning whether there was an understanding between the IAEA and Iran as to what that new agreement would look like from the meeting Nackaerts said had taken place that day. Nackaerts replied that according to his understanding, Iran had not yet agreed to the new safeguards approach, but was considering it. Iran may be able to provide the IAEA a response within a week; Nackaerts hoped to finalize the issue in meetings with the Iranian delegation in Vienna for the coming Board meeting. Nackaerts added that with the low enriched uranium hexafluoride (LEUF6) stored in a sealed container, the IAEA is comfortable for the time being that there is no diversion of material. He noted, however, that the PFEP was designed and declared as a research and development facility, not as a production facility as it is now being used for 20 percent enriched uranium. As such, the layout is "flexible" and the design of long-term safeguards covering the facility must account for ensuring against undeclared use in light of such flexibility. In response to a later question from Canada Nackaerts reinforced his point that the IAEA will take care in formulating the safeguards approach because the Agency has only one other facility under safeguards at which nearly 20 percent enriched uranium is being produced. ¶10. (C//NF) Nackaerts then called on Canada, which asked what the technical challenges would be of further enriching the 20 percent to weapons-grade uranium. Nackaerts said he was not in position to respond directly to the question and discussed further the safeguards issue (as noted above). ¶11. (C//NF) In response to the second question from Canada, Nackaerts said that the IAEA had received hundreds of pages of information on the alleged studies issue in which the work seemed to have ended in 2004. However, since then, the IAEA has received new information suggesting that the work has continued since 2004. He described the information as "sufficiently credible to confront Iran with," but noted that the IAEA needed to give Iran an opportunity to see/consider the new material before presenting it to the Board in more detail. He said it was consistent with the alleged studies in terms of the people, entities, and type of work involved. -------------- "But ElBaradei Said..." -------------- ¶12. (C//NF) Nackaerts then called on Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh, who noted that since he had received complaints last time for not actually asking questions, this time he would structure his remarks in a series of yes or no questions. Soltanieh proceeded to rhetorically ask a series of aggressive questions for over 25 minutes, beginning with whether there was any non-diversion of declared nuclear material or any new development since the last DG's report on Iran, noting that apart from the move to 20 percent enrichment, nothing has changed "except the DG." Soltanieh took issue with how the new DG report was written, both on the amount of technical details in the report (which he claimed had caused confusion in Tehran and with Board of Governors members who lack technical expertise) and on the document's tone. He argued that other than the new Director General, little was new since the November 2009 report that would warrant such different text. Soltanieh also launched an almost adhominum attack on DG Amano, repeatedly contrasting this first report by Amano to those of his predecessor and invoking ElBaradei's refrain with respect to the need to verify the "authenticity" of the alleged studies on weaponization, ¶13. (C//NF) As usual, Soltanieh complained that the document had been leaked in its entirety and again noted that all of this had made Iran less interested in working with the IAEA. In particular, he said Iran saw no benefit resulting from its "early and voluntary" disclosure of the FFEP to the IAEA and would now only notify the IAEA of new facilities 180 days prior to the introduction of nuclear material. (Comment: While Iran has said this before, Soltanieh's reiteration may be of greater note in light of recent press announcement that Iran will begin construction soon of two additional enrichment plants.) End comment.) Soltanieh argued that Iran had been cooperative on its move to 20 percent enrichment, and in particular disputed the implication in the report and in the Technical Briefing that Iran had disregarded the IAEA's request to put new Safeguards measures in place before further enriching. (Comment: The IAEA on February 10 in a GOV/INF circular documented that had on February 8 it had requested Iran to forego enrichment until a revised safeguards approach was agreed. End comment.) According to Soltanieh, he did not receive the IAEA's request until the next week, and by then it was too late. Soltanieh also said that an IAEA inspector's comment that one of the tunnels at the FFEP was not correctly configured for centrifuges was proof that it had originally been intended for a different purpose. ¶14. (C//NF) Soltanieh argued that verifying Iran's heavy water-related activities was beyond the scope of Iran's Safeguards Agreement. He noted that the Agency argues it needs access to verify the UNSC-mandated suspension. If that is the case, Soltanieh said, he could resolve the issue by "telling you now that Iran will never suspend these activities." Thus, he concluded, the IAEA does not have to continue wasting time and resources trying to determine whether or not Iran has done so. Soltanieh said he was surprised to see that the IAEA had quoted from a UNSC resolution regarding the Heavy Water Production Plant, which was the first time a UNSCR had been quoted in an IAEA document, and said that he will formally complain to DG Amano about this change (Note: The title of the DG report has long referred to implementation of IAEA Safeguards and UNSC resolutions. End note. ) Always looking for a laugh from the crowd, Soltanieh said he had been happy to provide these "cost-free explanations"--a slight to ward cost-free experts, the use of which in the Safeguards Department he has repeatedly denounced in various IAEA meetings. -------------- Heinonen Defends the IAEA -------------- ¶15. (C//NF) Once Soltanieh was finished, Heinonen responded that the text of the report was warranted because the lack of timely or complete responses from Iran in response to IAEA questions and its obligations, for example under Code 3.1 Modified, had led the IAEA to have lower confidence that all nuclear material was adequately safeguarded and that the IAEA was aware of all nuclear sites in Iran. He also reiterated that the IAEA had indeed informed Iran of its request not to further enrich at the PFEP until new safeguards were in place and provided Soltanieh with the reference citation of the IAEA's request. -------------- Back to the Questions -------------- ¶16. (C//NF) Nackaerts then called on Charge d'Affaire who asked whether Iran had indicated whether it planned to enrich all of the 1950 kgs of LEUF6 it has moved to the PFEP, and also asked if Iran has provided the IAEA with its plans and intentions regarding the actual fabrication of nuclear fuel for the TRR, including whether the IAEA was aware of a facility in which Iran could safely turn the 20 percent enriched material into nuclear fuel. Nackaerts responded that the IAEA had not received from Iran any stated plans or intentions regarding the production of nuclear fuel and thus was in no position to comment on safety. He noted that the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) was only equipped and declared to handle up to 5 percent enriched material and that it was not clear to the IAEA where Iran would convert the LEUF6 gas into reactor fuel. (Comment: In regard to our first question on whether Iran had informed the Agency if it plans to enrich all 1950 kgs of LEUF6 to 20 percent, DDG Safeguards Heinonen told us privately that Iran has not provided information on the future use of the total amount. He said states are normally obliged via the Subsidiary Arrangements to their Safeguards Agreement to provide such information in advance on a semi-annual basis. He undertook to "remind" Iran about this obligation. End comment.) ¶17. (C//NF) Nackaerts then called on Germany, which sought to better understand the comment made in the DG's report regarding Iranian interest in pyroprocessing LEUF6 into uranium metal asking if Iran had identified a civilian purpose for this research. Nackaerts responded that Iran had not provided any such information. Germany also asked why Iran refused to provide original design documents for the FFEP. Nackaerts responded that the Agency believes Iran could have responded quicker to the IAEA's still outstanding request for original design information, and that it would help if the IAEA had access to designers and construction officials responsible for the facility. Furthermore, since the facility is nearing completion, Nackaerts said, updated design information should be available and should be provided to the IAEA. He added that Iran should provide some evidence that would support its statements that the facility was only converted to nuclear purposes after mid-2007. -------------- New Sheriff in Town -------------- ¶18. (C//NF) Comment: The presumed "Amano Factor" in the frankness of both last week's report and the technical briefing is at the forefront of conversation here, not just with our like-minded who welcome it but with many NAM counterparts. Moderates in the NAM fear the stoking of confrontation, in which they will be compelled to show solidarity. We understand, for instance, that Iran has received NAM backing for a statement that "expresses concern that the DG has deviated from the standard verification language"--this is a reference to para 46 "cannot confirm that all nuclear activity is in peaceful use." (Note: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements us the formulation "nuclear activity" without a qualifier as to declared or undeclared, so the NAM is technically correct. End Note.) We are emphasizing to such delegations that what is most significantly new on the Iran file since the November 2009 Board is a seriesctions in the wrong direction. Further, we are focusing them on the technical foundation for the Agency's assessment and reinforcing Amano's own message that he aims for a dispassionate bilateral implementation with Iran of its obligations. End Comment. DAVIES