IAEA/IRAN: DG AMANO GIVES FAILING GRADE TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000066 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2035 TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: DG AMANO GIVES FAILING GRADE TO TEHRAN IN HIS FIRST REPORT Classified By: Ambassador GLYN DAVIES for reasons 1.4(b) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) On 18 February, Director General (DG) Amano released the IAEA's latest reports on its investigations in Iran in preparation for the IAEA Board of Governors meeting the week of March 1. The report was the toughest seen in years and concluded Iran's cooperation has been insufficient to resolve the serious concerns and outstanding issues that remain about its nuclear program. The report is sharper in tone and more clinical than those produced during former IAEA DG ElBaradei's tenure. As the first such report of the Amano era, it creates a positive precedent for how he intends to run Safeguards investigations. The IAEA, once more, reported that Iran has failed to suspend its enrichment- and heavy water-related programs, as required by the UNSC and Board. Instead, Iran has increased its stockpile of low enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) product at Natanz to approximately 2,065 kilograms, which is more than enough for one nuclear weapon if enriched further to weapons-grade. Iran also has moved quickly to achieve near-twenty percent enrichment, shifting almost all of its available UF6 (more than Iran would need to supply the Tehran Research Reactor even if it could fabricate the requisite fuel assemblies) to the aboveground Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz to support enrichment operations there. ¶2. (SBU) The remainder of the DG's report is a recitation of the many areas in which Iran has refused to answer the IAEA's questions or provide the requested level of access. This includes providing access to documents and individuals associated with the decision to construct the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) near Qom, confirmation that there are no new enrichment facilities under construction in Iran, or acknowledgement that Iran has a continuing obligation to declare new nuclear facilities when the decision is made to construct them (Code 3.1 Modified). The report concludes by spelling out in detail the IAEA's questions concerning possible military dimensions (PMD) to Iran's nuclear program, noting there are indications that Iranian nuclear weaponization-related work may have continued beyond 2004 and suggesting that there are current such projects ongoing in Iran. ;¶3. (C) Comment: Arguably such a tough report could be the premise for Board action but it is not clear what the value added of another Board resolution would be beyond what was already accomplished in the November Board of Governors resolution on Iran. It is not clear the UN Security Council needs another negative report card from the Board, beyond that laid out in the DG's hard-hitting report. The ball would seem to fall in New York's court to respond to the escalating and direct violation of previous UNSC resolutions. Strong EU and E3 statements in the Board along with muscular national statements from the United States and Russia (as well as likeminded) would suffice to cue up UN Security Council action. While at first blush a P5 1 joint statement at this juncture may appear to hold little promise (as it is likely to be diluted by China),we will take soundings here in coming days of Chinese and Russian reactions to the report. Mission recommends high level intervention in Brasilia and Ankara to press for more unambiguous national statements in the Board in light of this failing report by the DG, as statements by these UNSC /Board members will be closely watched. End Summary and Comment. -------------- Enriching to 20 Percent, but Other Operations of the IR-1 Decreasing -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The report describes Iran's recent moves to further enrich its stock of 3.5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) to 20 percent in one centrifuge machine cascade at the PFEP at Natanz. Contrary to the IAEA's request on February 9 to not begin feeding LEU for higher enrichment before the IAEA could implement additional-and necessary-safeguards procedures, Iran began operations anyway. Although para 34 of the report notes the IAEA should have been provided sufficient time to adjust the Safeguards at the PFEP for the increase from approximately 5 to 20 percent enrichment, per Article 45 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, it falls short, however, of calling Tehran's rush move to further enrichment a violation or failure of its Safeguards obligations. In addition to the 20 percent enrichment activity at the PFEP, the report notes increased activity with Iran's advanced generation centrifuges-specifically theIR-2 modified and IR-4 models. ¶5. (SBU) While Iran pushes ahead with its 20 percent enrichment, its other centrifuge operations at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz have continued to decline. As of January 31, Iran was feeding UF6 gas into 3772 centrifuges--a decrease from the 3936 that were being fed with UF6 as of November 2009. There also was a decrease in centrifuges under vacuum and installation, with several cascades being disconnected or removed. Per the annual physical inventory verification (PIV) at the FEP in November 2009, the IAEA confirmed the production of 1808 kg of LEU UF6 since the beginning of operations in 2007. Since then, Iran has estimated that an additional 257 kg of LEU has been produced bringing the total to approximately 2065 kg LEU UF6. The report also notes that Iran has moved practically its entire product-1950 kg of LEU UF6-from the underground (FEP) halls to the above ground PFEP for the 20 percent enrichment operations. -------------- Iran Must Explain Chronology of Fordow -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Regarding the FFEP at Qom, the IAEA reiterated its request for Iran to explain the timing of the decision to construct the facility because Tehran had not fully addressed the IAEA's questions. Noting that Iran told the IAEA in October 2009 that the FFEP construction decision was made in the second half of 2007, the report explains that a number of sources allege the design work on the facility started in 2006, when Iran itself accepts it was bound by Code 3.1 Modified, and insists Iran provide the additional information and access to individuals and companies involved in the design of the facility. The report provides confirmation of the credibility of these "sources" by stating the "extensive information from a number of sources detailing the design of the facility was consistent with the design verified by the IAEA." ¶7. (SBU) The IAEA has verified that construction of the FFEP is ongoing, but no centrifuges have yet been introduced into the facility. The IAEA also conducted environmental samples of the facility and equipment, and discovered the presence of a small number of depleted uranium particles. This contamination is similar to the particles found at Natanz, and Mission agrees that the presence of these particles likely are a result of cross contamination from Natanz, since some of the equipment at the FFEP had been transferred from Natanz. -------------- IAEA Firm that Code 3.1 Modified Remains in Force -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The report states that despite Iran's refusal to adhere to Code 3.1 Modified, it remains in force, as Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement affirms that agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally nor suspended. The report goes on to describe Iran's failure to notify the IAEA in a timely manner about the planned reactor at Darkhovin and the FFEP at Qom as inconsistent with its safeguards obligations, which also raises concerns about the completeness of Tehran's declarations. The DG also draws attention to Iran's declaration, during the October 2009 initial visit to the FFEP, that no other nuclear facilities currently exist in Iran and that Tehran will submit to the IAEA any plans for future facilities in accordance with its Safeguards Agreements, but then calls out Iran's public statements in December 2009 of its intention to construct 10 new facilities -5 of which locations had already been decided-noting that the IAEA has not been provided any further information. Iran responded, stating that it had suspended Code 3.1 Modified in March 2007. -------------- Concern that PMD Activities Continued Past 2004 -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The report shows that although Iran has refused to cooperate with the IAEA on the possible military dimensions (PMD) issues since 2008, the IAEA has continued its efforts to investigate and study the material available to it. The IAEA identifies a handful of new items not previously mentioned, including, project and management structure, nuclear related safety arrangements, component manufacturing for high explosive initiation systems, and neutron generation and detection experiments. The report also indicates these activities seem to have continued beyond 2004. ¶10. (SBU) In an effort to build a more solid base for the PMD accusations and to deflate Iran's continued insistence that these "studies are baseless fabrications," the DG explains the "information available to the IAEA in connection with these outstanding issues is extensive and has been collected from a variety of sources over time. It is also broadly consistent and credible in terms of technical detail, the time frame in which the activities were conducted and the people and organizations involved. Altogether, this raises concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile." Also, unlike in the previous DG's reports, the IAEA does not mention the need for Member States to provide their original documentation to Iran. -------------- New Developments with Heavy Water and UCF Activities -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Explaining the IAEA's duties to verify the suspension of uranium enrichment- and heavy water related activities via the UNSC resolutions, the IAEA repeated its request for Iran to allow it to take environmental samples of the proclaimed indigenously produced heavy water stored at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan, since the IAEA was denied sampling during its last visit. The IAEA also requests access to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP),which is co-located with the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor (HWRR) at Arak. ¶12. (SBU) The report for the first time details several process lines intended for or currently at the UCF, most of which are new, including the lines for the IR-40 reactor fuel, 5 percent enriched light water reactor fuel, and uranium metal lines to be used in research and development and storage and shielding purposes. The IAEA noted that no UF6 has been produced since August 2009, although the process line cleaning resulted in an additional 5 tons of UF6. Also, only 42 tons of uranium in the form of uranium ore concentrate (of its original approximately 500 tons imported from South Africa) remains at the UCF for Iran to process. ¶13. (SBU) In addition, Iran informed the IAEA that it was undertaking pyroprocessing research and development activities at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) in Tehran in order to study the electrochemical production of uranium metal. The IAEA is seeking additional information regarding these activities. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) Although Iran's repeated failure to heed to the multiple calls by the UNSC and Board of Governors and its continued lack of cooperation with the IAEA on a number of issues of serious concern would suggest action on Iran is warranted at the March 1-5 Board meeting , efforts at the UNSC may trump any action in Vienna. Arguably such a tough report could be the premise for Board action but it is not clear what the valued added of another Board resolution would be beyond what was already accomplished in the November Board of Governors resolution on Iran. In terms of substance, a Board resolution could underline concerns about: the escalation of enrichment activities and condemn Iran's decision to go to 20 percent; failure to clarify possible military dimensions (which seem to have continued beyond 2004 and may be current); failure to substantiate the chronology and purpose of the Fordow plant; and failure to apply Code 3.1 Modified and the AP. It could also register regret that Iran has not accepted the IAEA's offer of assistance on the Tehran Research Reactor. This would amount to a report card with a failing grade for Iran. ¶15. (C) However, it is not clear the UN Security Council needs another report card from the Board, as this is already contained in the DG report. The ball would seem to be in New York's court to respond to the IAEA Board's November resolution and the escalating and direct violation of previous UNSC resolutions. Strong EU and E3 statements in the Board along with muscular national statements from the United States and Russia (as well as likeminded) would suffice to cue up UN Security Council action. We anticipate a P5 plus 1 joint statement would likely to be diluted by China, but will weigh our recommendation after learning local Chinese and Russian views on the DG's findings. We recommend straightaway high-level intervention in Brasilia and Ankara to press for more unambiguous national statements in the Board in light of this failing report by the DG, as statements by these UNSC /Board members will be closely watched. Another key consideration arguing against a Board resolution is that its impact would be measured by proponents' success in replicating if not improving on the decisive November tally -- the stakes would be higher now as likely abstentions by Turkey and Brazil in particular would be read as direct indicators of their UNSC votes. DAVIES