IAEA/SYRIA: TOUGH BOARD REPORT CALLS INTO QUESTION

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000059 SIPDIS ISN/RA FOR NEPHEW AND DANIEL, IO/T FOR DETEMPLE, NEA FOR ABELL E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2035 TAGS: PREL PARM SY KN IAEA KNNP SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: TOUGH BOARD REPORT CALLS INTO QUESTION CORRECTNESS AND COMPLETENESS OF SYRIA'S DECLARATIONS Classified By: AMBASSADOR GLYN DAVIES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Director General Amano's first report on Syria, released February 18 in tandem with his report on Iran, provides a convincing, comprehensive account of the Agency's investigation of both Dair Alzour (Al-Kibar) and of the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR),highlighting continued non-cooperation in both areas. The Agency's report identified a failure by Syria to meet its safeguards obligation in terms of reporting requirements, though it does not term it a "failure" as such, noting rather that Syria has not "met its nuclear material reporting obligations." This, in conjunction with the IAEA's doubts about the correctness and completeness of Syria's declaration (due to the findings of anthropogenic uranium of a type not in Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material at two sites and possible but not yet substantiated links between the two) raises serious concerns about the nature of Syria's nuclear activities in stronger terms than previous DG reports and sets the stage for possible Board action, (see Guidance Request, paras 4-7.) The report also reads like the precursor to a possible special inspection request by the Secretariat. ¶2. (SBU) No progress is reported on the Dair Alzour investigation since the last DG report. With regards to the MNSR investigation, the IAEA sample results from the mid-November inspection confirmed the characteristics of the uranium contamination as coming from yellowcake produced at a pilot phosphoric acid purification plant at Homs (a facility that received TC assistance from the IAEA),previously undeclared uranyl nitrate compounds derived from the yellowcake (i.e. in undeclared experiments involving the yellowcake),and/or from small quantities of previously undeclared imported uranyl nitrate materials. The Agency notes that Syria "has not yet provided a full explanation of the activities and experiments involving nuclear material conducted at the MNSR" and requested further clarification from Syria to resolve the issue and to exclude any possible link to the contamination at Dair Alzour. However, Syria did not respond to two Agency letters for more information and denied a request for a meeting. ¶3. (SBU) The Agency again offered to establish the necessary modalities to protect military and other information at the sites. In possible efforts to lay the groundwork for a forthcoming special inspection request, the report provides a laundry list of outstanding requests on the Dair Alzour investigation and requests "prompt access" to all relevant information which could be affected by the "passage of time and possible degradation of information," this making a potential argument for "urgent and essential" (i.e., compulsory) nature of a special inspection request. End Summary. Guidance Request -------------- ¶4. (S) This hard-hitting report on Syria, from a safeguards perspective, arguably provides a basis for a Board action -- the safeguards reporting failures and suspicious experiments at the MNSR coupled with unaccounted for uranium and almost two years of stonewalling the IAEA investigation of Dair Alzour beg a response. While that response could eventually come in the form of a Special Inspection request from the IAEA Secretariat, there is no guarantee this will be the case and a Board of Governors resolution pressing for Syrian cooperation is probably long overdue. Nor is there any guarantee that IAEA inspectors will continue to uncover further evidence of safeguards failures, or that the investigation might not eventually run out of steam. Already, there has been significant Board "fatigue" on Syria with the battle-lines clearly drawn between NAM and WEOG in scripted exchanges of national and group statements that sound the same as the previous Board session - the NAM blame Israel and exonerate Syria while WEOG and a handful of others call upon Syria to cooperate. The findings at the MNSR have breathed new life into the stalemated Syria safeguards investigation and raise the potential for Board action. In short, we could defer Board action to a later time but there may be no time like the present absent a special inspection request. ¶5. (S) Prior to the release of the report, Canadian and French nonproliferation experts agreed with our assessment that considered "in a vacuum" the Board should pursue a resolution in response to potential safeguards failures and lack of Syrian cooperation which has tested the credibility of the Agency safeguards system. That said, EU and U.S. efforts to engage Syria on issues outside the IAEA context and split Iran and Syria may complicate the political calculus. Raising the stakes on Syria could also further polarize the NPT RevCon. ¶6. (S) There are practical considerations in considering Board action. Given the Board divisions on this issue, the margin for victory would be much narrower than on Iran - we can count on 14-15 votes (EU, JUSCANZ, ROK, Ukraine plus Argentina). While an 18-vote majority is required, the threshold would be lower with abstentions, which we would expect from Russia and China, for example. In order to bring potential fence-sitters such as Switzerland and middle of the road NAM along, preambular reference to Israel's destruction of the suspect reactor at Dair Alzour would probably be unavoidable. ¶7. (S) A further consideration is who would be the sponsor of such a resolution? Given its pursuit of an association agreement with Syria, we would not expect the EU to take the lead, nor would Japan as it remains closely associated with the Director General. The most likely sponsor might be Canada or possibly Australia. A capital-based Canadian expert informally told DepCouns that Ottawa may consider taking the lead on a Syria resolution if it looked like such a resolution would succeed. However, should there be no takers, Mission will need guidance as to whether the U.S. would be willing to lead such an effort against Syria in the context of bilateral and regional factors. Reporting Failures at the MNSR -------------- ¶8. (S) New in this report are developments related to the MNSR investigation. The IAEA inspected the MNSR on November 17, 2009, the week before the November Board meeting. The sample results (obtained and shared with Syria on January 21) confirmed the characteristics of the uranium contamination as coming from yellowcake produced at a pilot phosphoric acid purification plant at Homs, previously undeclared uranyl nitrate compounds derived from the yellowcake (i.e. in undeclared experiments involving the yellowcake),and/or from small quantities of previously undeclared imported uranyl nitrate materials. (Comment: Mission understands from a key Agency official that this does not confirm the uranyl nitrate or yellowcake from Homs are the source of the uranium, rather that the characteristics of the material are consistent with this explanation. End Comment.) ¶9. (SBU) The MNSR is a declared facility and "Syria is required to provide complete reporting of all nuclear material in Syria and to provide the Agency with access to all relevant documentation." Syria "has not provided design information concerning the irradiation of uranium at the MNSR" (i.e. the experiments involving yellowcake or uranyl nitrate should have been declared) or "met its nuclear material reporting obligations under the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/407)" (i.e. the material involved and/or produced by these experiments should have been declared.) While this assessment stops short of using the term "failure," the implication is clearly there. ¶10. (SBU) The Agency notes that Syria "has not yet provided a full explanation of the activities and experiments involving nuclear material conducted at the MNSR" and requested further clarification from Syria to resolve the issue and to exclude any possible link between the contamination at Dair Alzour. (Note: This is the first time in a DG report where such a link is implied. End note.) However, Syria did not respond to two Agency letters for more information and denied a request for a meeting. The Agency noted in the reports that it has a planned inspection at the MNSR on February to "verify nuclear material at the MNSR and examine relevant source documents related to the experiments." Taken in tandem, the undeclared uranium and failure to meet reporting requirements amount to more than just a "misdemeanor." Investigating Scientific Publications -------------- ¶11. (SBU) In addition to the sampling at the MNSR in November, the IAEA provided Syria with a list of experimental activities involving nuclear material that, according to open sources, had been performed in Syria and could be of relevance in determine the origin of the particles found at the MNSR. The IAEA requested access to persons involved in the activities and detailed information regarding the nuclear material and equipment used during the November 17 inspection. Syria made one of the requested persons available and "discussions were held" on the experimental activities. (Note: During the November technical briefing, Section Head Max Aparo showed a list of four publications from the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission that he indicated may be related to the experiments at the MNSR. Two of the papers were titled: "Preparation of in-house neutron detectors and the software needed to process experimental data, April 2007," and "Measure of the fast neutron flux in the MNSR, 2007." End note.) Yellowcake Originates from TC and UNDP Project -------------- - ¶12. (SBU) The report indicates that yellowcake was produced at a pilot plant for the purification of phosphoric acid, which was constructed and commissioned in 1997 at Homs, Syria. This was done through the support of the IAEA and the United Nations Development Program. Inspectors, during a July 2004 visit, observed "some hundred of kilograms of yellowcake" at Homs. (Note: The objective of the Technical Cooperation project, SYR3003, was to recover uranium from phosphoric acid.) Renewing the Case on the Syrian Reactor -------------- ¶13. (SBU) No progress is reported on the Dair Alzour investigation since the last DG report. Unlike previous reports under DG ElBaradei, this report repeats the full case on the reactor investigation, and does not rely on Board members to seek out previous reports and figure out the implications for themselves. Mission expects this report, which makes a compelling case for the presence of a nuclear reactor under construction in conjunction with the MNSR safeguards failures, could help garner renewed support in the Board room for Syrian cooperation on the Dair Alzour investigation. Mission in particular notes that the last development in this IAEA investigation was the finding of anthropogenic uranium reported in November 2008 and March ¶2009. ¶14. (SBU) The report reviews the case noting building features, a connected and adequate water pumping capacity, procurements of graphite and barium sulphate, and unexplained uranium contamination. The report says "the presence of such particles points to the possibility of nuclear-related activities at the site and adds questions concerning the nature of the destroyed building." It is worth noting that the report retains the qualifier "while it cannot be excluded that the destroyed building was intended for non-nuclear use..." before going on to review the case. Israel is also still referenced in the destruction of the facility and more surprisingly in not providing clarifying information on missiles, despite the "low probability" the uranium could originate from Israeli munitions. ¶15. (SBU) Comment: Although the report makes a compelling case, we do not expect the NAM proponents of Syria on the Board to remove their blinders or stop castigating Israel. In this regard, the gratuitous reference to Israel providing information is unfortunate. DAVIES