G-77 OVERREACH KEEPS NUCLEAR FUEL BANK IN SPOTLIGHT

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000058 SIPDIS FOR ISN/NESS, T-TIMBIE, DESAULTES, S/SANAC, IO/GS, L/NPV-SHAH DOE NA-243 GOOREVICH, OEHLBERT NSC SCHEINMAN, HOLGATE, CONNERY NRC OIP DOANE, HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2015 TAGS: PREL ENRG TRGY KNNP IAEA SUBJECT: G-77 OVERREACH KEEPS NUCLEAR FUEL BANK IN SPOTLIGHT REF: UNVIE 0030 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Vienna advocates of assurance of nuclear fuel supply are vexed over the Director General's acquiescence to a G-77 request to postpone a technical briefing on the issue. We understand Egypt and Algeria, in part fronting for Iran, failed to get G-77 consensus to adopt a confrontational position and to dispute the premises of the ref Secretariat Note, itself a compendium of replies to issues these very states and others raised in the June 2009 Board of Governors discussion. Falling back, the Algerian chairwoman of the G-77 wrote the DG to request a postponement. The new Board Chairman took note in a February 15 group meeting of the consternation expressed by WEOG member states; he indicated to Ambassador Davies February 17 that he expected by the next day to have a proposal from the G-77 chair on rescheduling the briefing. ¶2. (C) Summary Cont'd.: We conveyed to a large group of "friends" of the issue USG's intention to see the fuel bank concept readied for Board action by June. While we have many allies in support of developing IAEA mechanisms for nuclear fuel assurance, few share our ambitious timetable for the fuel bank. In our informal consultation, views were all over the map as to whether and when to bring specific proposals to decision. Many acknowledge only the potential withdrawal of seed money by the NGO Nuclear Threat Initiative as a cause to act by September; otherwise, they view the issue as a provocation to countries we collectively want to bring along on more important matters in the context of the NPT RevCon. End Summary. Energizing "Friends" of the Fuel Bank -------------- ¶3. (U) On February 10 several member states met at expert level to discuss continued promotion of an IAEA fuel bank and other proposals for assured supply of nuclear fuel. The U.S. chaired the informal meeting; Italy, Romania, Canada, France, Russia, Kazakhstan, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, the U.K., and Denmark participated actively; Norway, Sweden, Peru, New Zealand and Ukraine were present but silent; Azerbaijan, Kuwait, the U.A.E. and Philippines were invited but not present. Discussion focused on three main areas: 1) how to keep the fuel assurance issue moving; 2) what procedures and timelines need to be taken into account; and 3) how is the issue influenced by the highly politicized atmosphere between regional groups. The 90-minute discussion was frank and lively; we expect the group to re-convene and expand in the coming weeks, convened by others or the U.S. in turn. How to keep the issue moving? -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The U.S. shared its objective that the Director General bring the fuel bank to the June Board for decision. The UK, France, and Russia supported this intention while Japan and Germany cautioned that June was too soon and unrealistic; they noted that the outreach required to gain consensus, or at least broad support, would interfere with the NPT Revcon. Japan said it understands the G-77 will aim to make fuel assurances/fuel banks very controversial and divisive in Main Committee III of the Revcon, which Japanese Ambassador Nakane will chair. There was consensus that the Secretariat's recently published Note 2010/1 on Assurance of Supply was a good attempt to clarify certain questions raised by the NAM/G-77 and others at the June 2009 Board and since. However, Japan, Germany, Korea, and Canada voiced concern over unanswered questions treating costs and human resource requirements. In this context, Kazakhstan reiterated its willingness to host the fuel bank. All attendees agreed that a briefing on the Secretariat's paper, i.e. an open discussion, is necessary. Romania, supported by many others, pushed for more consistent consultations between Member States (especially the skeptics) and the Secretariat. The U.S. noted that DG Amano hopes to recruit an advocate-country ambassador to act as convener of informal discussions between states on various sides of the issue in a process of "soft consultation" aimed at overcoming any sense that states have been ignored or inadequately consulted. Advocates Want Time to Heal Wounds and Demonstrate Pursuit of Consensus -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The UK spoke about its proposal for Nuclear Fuel Assurance, noting that the concept, originally called "enrichment bonds," has been discussed since 2005 and was included in a Secretariat report in 2007. While the UK intended to brief on its work with the Secretariat on the proposal at the March Board, it has now pushed back its plan to seek inclusion of the proposal on the agenda to the June Board. The UK is currently finalizing the two model supply agreements with the Secretariat. ¶6. (SBU) Germany said it agreed with the Secretariat's decision not to address fuel assurances in March. Germany believes a discussion in March would further poison the waters and questioned whether the June Board was a realistic point at which to expect a decision. Canada shared that the DG's intentions were for a discussion in June and a decision in November after the General Conference. Canada also suggested that the NPT RevCon could be seen as an opportunity to discuss the dozen or so proposals on the table and whittle them down to three or four that are realistic and deserve Member States' attention, review, and support. Switzerland agreed with the Canadian proposal. Japan and several others emphasized that, with the Russian reserve approved, each further fuel assurance mechanism, including the IAEA fuel bank, must demonstrate distinct "value added" to merit Board approval. The U.S. shared that it was aware of the full-year scenario Canada attributed to DG Amano, and reported that senior U.S. officials have conveyed to Amano our preference for moving the issue to the Board earlier, with June as our target. Russia pledged to support the U.S. in gaining approval of the fuel bank in June if the proposal is put to decision then. Russia added that the IAEA fuel bank and UK Nuclear Fuel Assurance proposals were best placed among current proposals to create synergies with the Russian LEU reserve approved at the November 2009 Board. Russia also shared that consultative meetings continue with the Secretariat to iron out unaddressed issues in implementing the Angarsk reserve. G-77 Stalls the Discussion -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The U.S. briefed on a recent decision by the Director General, at the request of the G-77, to remove a discussion of fuel assurances from the announced February 12 technical briefing, otherwise treating the nuclear safety and Nuclear Technology Review agenda items for the March Board. The majority of countries around the table expressed regret and dismay at the Secretariat's decision to "cave" to the G-77 on whether or not to have a briefing. Several delegations understood that the G-77 request for delay resulted from the Group's refusal of a proposal from a few to adopt a common position of confrontation and to dismiss some premises of the Secretariat's paper. While Canada and France suggested that advocates of the nuclear fuel bank should express their regret in writing about this, others did not agree that an official communication from the group would be of use. ¶8. (C) In a subsequent bilateral conversation, Kuwaiti First Secretary Talal al-Fassam shared with us that the G-77 "task force" on the issue remains heavily weighted toward opponents of the fuel bank. Kuwait and the Philippines, in his telling, are on their own in a group that includes Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, and South Africa. (The U.A.E., a fellow fuel bank donor, is reportedly often not in evidence in Group meetings.) A Pakistani counterpart also reported February 17 that the G-77 is seeking to finalize a common position on the Secretariat's paper. On February 18, al-Fassam (protect) passed us the G-77 talking points critiquing the Secretariat's Note (emailed to ISN/NESS and IO/GS). The G-77 response combines valid but familiar technical issues, dismissals of some Secretariat information as inadequate, and rejection of both the nonproliferation aim of a fuel bank -- that of "reducing the incentives to establish national enrichment facilities" -- and of the criterion that a state eligible to procure fuel from the bank must be one "with respect to which ... no specfic report relating to safeguards implementation ... is under consideration by the Board of Governors." ¶9. (SBU) Following our informal session reported above, Ambassadors or their designees from the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) of Member States convened February 15 for their conventional pre-Board session with the Board Chairman. Fuel assurance, specifically the cancellation of the technical briefing, was the big topic of discussion. After Canada first raised its "disappointment," new Board Chair Shahrul Ikram (Malaysia) turned to Secretariat staff to clarify the status. Head of the Policy Making Organs (PMO) Kwaku Aning reported that the G-77 had indicated by letter that it was not ready for the proposed briefing and needed time to study the Secretariat's Note. Aning promised the briefing would be set at a later time. Several states jumped on this to press for the briefing as soon as possible, preferably before the March Board meeting. This request came from WEOG Chair Denmark, New Zealand, and the U.S., as well as the UK (asking rhetorically how one can be "not ready to be briefed"),France (asserting this decision to postpone at the request of a few should not set a precedent),Australia (saying Member States should "draw a line in the sand") and Japan (calling the delay inappropriate, as the G-77 had said they wanted discussion and the Secretariat was responding to their questions). The U.S. asked whether others saw a need for an agenda item in the Board meeting to discuss the procedural way forward on assurance of supply; no one seconded the idea in the open meeting, but offline some likeminded thought we might need to formalize our request if we do not get satisfaction. The UK noted to the Board Chairman that it will discuss progress on its proposal under AOB, and Denmark indicated offline that an EU statement on fuel assurance was in the works. In a subsequent bilateral consultation, Ambassador Davies alerted the Chairman that the U.S. also would take up assurance of supply under "Any Other Business." Seeing if They Can They Make Him Dance -------------- ¶10. (C) Comment: A handful of countries engineered the G-77 request for postponement of the technical briefing after failing to cement a group position for dismissing the issue completely from the Agency's work. Our Peruvian colleague at the U.S.-hosted February 10 meeting professed not to know that a group her country is a member of had written the DG requesting a delay. The meeting that the skeptics succeeded in putting off had no decision-making character. A Pakistani counterpart freely admitted that the intent was purely and simply to delay. We read their tactic, in combination with other Vienna background music, as an example of countries that opposed Amano's election as DG testing how readily they can extract accommodations from him. Some likeminded missions found the DG's decision to agree to a postponement the most troubling aspect of the matter. Through our subsequent use of the WEOG meeting with the new Board Chair and Secretariat, Amano will have been reminded that fuel bank advocates are engaged and intent on progress. ¶11. (C) Comment cont'd.: Divisions on the substance within the G-77 and NAM, evidenced in the November 2009 vote on the Russian reserve, are substantive and persisting. We have interested interlocutors in all "camps." The Secretariat's proposal and our arguments in support now have to go further in answering the "value added" questions, posed even by supporters of fuel assurance: How will criteria for an IAEA fuel bank complement rather than replicate those for the Russian reserve; in what scenarios does an IAEA fuel bank provide true deepening of the commercial market; what operational costs will arise from Agency participation? And, the message from our closest allies on the issue is to subordinate this discussion as an element in a constructive approach to the NPT Revcon. DAVIES