UNODC: Afghan Opium Stabilizing: What is International

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 UNVIE VIENNA 000050 KABUL FOR ANDREW QUINN STATE FOR S/SRAP MATTHEW STIGLITZ STATE FOR INL/AP MICHAEL OVERBY SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SNAR AF UN JP SUBJECT: UNODC: Afghan Opium Stabilizing: What is International Community Going to Do About It? -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. Summary. Fresh off his trip to the January 28 London Conference, and with the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) "Winter Afghanistan Opium Assessment Survey" in hand, Executive Director Costa predicted that after two years of significant decline (36 percent overall),opium cultivation in Afghanistan will stabilize in ¶2010. Along with this "positive development," Costa predicted that lower agricultural yields can be expected in the country due to the current drought. As a result, Costa believes that up to twenty-five provinces could be "poppy free" by summer of 2010, and called upon the international community to direct its development assistance to those "swing provinces" where poppy cultivation is marginal but vulnerable to increases. More worrisome, he argued, is the simultaneous decline in agricultural commodity prices, which could reduce the incentives for farmers to turn away from poppy. Costa's briefing underscores the importance of integrated UNODC benchmarks to assess counter narcotics progress in Afghanistan as well as the need for an integrated UNODC strategy which includes alternative development assistance. UNODC is already working on both; when the strategic country program is ready for consideration, as early as the end of next month, we should be ready to seriously consider funding support in order to maximize some of UNODC's comparative advantages in Afghanistan. End Summary. -------------- The Good News -------------- ¶2. On February 3 and 4, Costa briefed major donor and Central Asian regional ambassadors on his preliminary conclusions based on the annual "Winter Afghanistan Opium Result Survey." (Note. This annual assessment is based on a nation-wide survey of villagers and farmers to better understand their current and future intentions with regard to cultivating opium poppy. Costa and his statistical team are increasingly confident that the winter assessment, while only indicative, is a strong predictor of the country's future cultivation and production results. End note.) ¶3. Costa predicted an opium crop consistent with last year's numbers. Such an outcome would end two years of substantial declines, but also indicates that "poppy free" provinces (i.e. those with less than 100 hectares of cultivation) are increasingly stable and less likely to return to large numbers. Costa therefore asked delegations to target their development assistance to those provinces where cultivation is currently minimal, but which could be trending in the wrong direction,specifically, Baghlan, Frayab and Sari Pul, but also Kunar, Nanharhar, Kabul, Laghman and Badakhshan. If development assistance and community-inspired measures like shura-driven campaigns and governor-led eradication are effectively targeted and implemented, Costa said up to twenty-five provinces could achieve "poppy free" status; and if so, would prove Costa's current thesis that "Afghanistan doesn't have an opium poppy problem. A few districts in a few provinces have an opium poppy problem." ¶4. Along with a stable and increasingly localized cultivation problem, Costa also predicted an overall decrease in the yield of opium due to ongoing drought conditions and lower than average snowfall. With these conditions unfortunately hitting the licit agricultural sector as well, Costa nevertheless believes that this is a promising omen for the counter-narcotics situation in Afghanistan. ¶5. Finally, Costa noted that opium prices, even after calculating for inflation, are at Taliban-era levels, currently standing at US $48/kilo for fresh opium. Costa attributed the crash of opium prices to increasing international pressure on drug traffickers and interdiction, and a consistent cultivation decrease over the past few years. Costa also noted the current opium glut (resulting from the boom years of 2004-2007) has flooded the market and has helped to lower prices as well. -------------- But the Bad News, Too -------------- ¶6. On the other hand, Costa warned that licit agricultural prices are falling at a much faster rate than opium, which could induce farmers to switch back to opium poppy. Costa pointed to wheat prices (43 percent decline since 2009) and maize (38 percent decline) as examples of this worrying trend. In comparison, fresh opium prices have only decreased 13 percent and dry opium just 6 percent. Costa attributed some of this to the already "rock-bottom" price of opium, UNVIE VIEN 00000050 002 OF 003 but encouraged member states to increasingly focus their support towards licit agricultural activities and markets. Indeed, Costa noted, opinion surveys in the south and west showed that the number two and three reasons for not cultivating opium poppy was its low yield and sale price (Note: That it was banned by the government was the number one reason cited. End Note.) Such opinion results, Costa asserted, should reinforce international efforts to take advantage of the window of opportunity offered by the current relatively low opium prices and increase alternative development assistance as a means to more permanently incentivize farmers to move away from poppy cultivation. Separately, UNODC officials noted their eagerness to work with other partners, including bilateral assistance agencies and other UN bodies (for example the World Food Program and UNIDO) to promote alternative development. (Note. UNODC is reinvigorating its own alternative livelihood program, potentially including such elements as pest management, canal clean up, improving produce hygiene, and organic pistachio cultivation. UNVIE will send the updated project proposal separately, as soon as it is ready. End Note). ¶7. Costa stressed the strong correlation UNODC sees between "insecurity" and cultivation. The better the security situation, the less likely a village would plant opium poppy. Costa highlighted the promise that receiving some kind of agricultural assistance (for example, provision of seeds, fertilizer, irrigation) seems to have a positive effect on a farmer's decision to forego cultivating poppy. Indeed, the UNODC has incorporated in its currently small alternative livelihood program, the conditionality that no cultivation, trafficking, or migrant harvesting of opium is undertaken by recipients. -------------- Measuring Success -------------- ¶8. Expressing U.S. support for the excellent UNODC reports on the Afghanistan opium situation, DCM Pyatt queried Costa on how UNODC is measuring whether Afghan and international counter-narcotics efforts are succeeding. As in his separate briefing to Ambassadors the previous day, Costa acknowledged the need for integrated benchmarks and reported that UNODC was currently working on these benchmarks in cooperation with the Afghan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics. He added that UNODC hoped to have something to share by early summer 2010 (Note. U.S. has provided funding for this initiative. End note.) Costa referenced several possible benchmarks in addition to the current opium cultivation one: price trends, the tally-board of "poppy free" provinces, analyses of precursor chemical use/importation, corruption, cannabis cultivation, and Afghan drug addiction. Costa also opined that a proper understanding of the Afghanistan drugs problem would be better served by an analysis that focused on individual provinces and villages in addition to the general national results. -------------- Japan Offers UNODC US $7 Million -------------- ¶9. During the meeting, Japan DCM announced that his government, in recognition of the strategic threat posed by Afghan opium production and trafficking, is preparing to pledge USD $7 million to UNODC during its FY2010. Currently, USD $3.9 million is slated for UNODC's Afghanistan program projects and USD $3.1 million would be dedicated to a variety of country projects in neighboring countries including Iran. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. Costa clearly sees an Afghanistan at a crossroads and is in the process of positioning UNODC as a partner in an integrated Afghanistan counter narcotics strategy, including border control, anti-corruption measures, criminal justice capacity building, and demand reduction (Note. The country program is slated to also contain a counter terrorism component. End Note). Now, UNODC is taking steps to mainstream these objectives in the wider reconstruction and development context, and is reinvigorating its alternative livelihood program, particularly focusing on western Afghanistan. UNODC is already taking a regional approach in its Afghanistan programs, including through its Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC),and the Triangular Initiative on border enforcement among Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. With regard to alternative development, UNODC is taking steps to identify international partners to maximize efficiencies. While UNODC's current estimated Afghanistan budget of US $89 million is UNVIE VIEN 00000050 003 OF 003 tiny compared to our bilateral efforts, we believe UNODC is a valuable international partner and we should be ready to look closely at the integrated country strategic program when it is ready (we hope by the end of next month) in order pinpoint programs we can fund (for an amount that would actually be very small compared to our overall Afghanistan counter narcotics budget) and that, as an internationally-backed effort, would complement and reinforce our own national strategy. END COMMENT. DAVIES