IRAN/TRR: IRAN DELIVERS FORMAL REPLY TO IAEA

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000005 SIPDIS DEPT FOR P, T, ISN, IO. NEA DOE FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN AND STEVE AOKI E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2020 TAGS: AORC IAEA KNNP IR SUBJECT: IRAN/TRR: IRAN DELIVERS FORMAL REPLY TO IAEA Classified By: CDA Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons 1.4 b and d Summary and Action Request -------------- ¶1. (C) IAEA External Relations (EXPO) Director Vilmos Cserveny reported to Charge January 6 and in a follow-up discussion January 7 that Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh had on January 5-6 delivered to Director General Amano an official "reply" to the IAEA proposal for refueling the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). The main elements of Iran's reply were subsequently reformulated at Amano's request as a short nonpaper drafted by EXPO and agreed by Iran (full text para 5). The January 5 Iranian verbal reply broke no new ground and contained no surprises -- it noted Iranian willingness to simultaneously swap in Iran two batches of Natanz LEU (totaling 800 kg) for fuel elements as opposed to removal of 1200 kg of LEU from Iran for further enrichment in Russia and fuel fabrication in France as originally agreed in principle in Geneva and proposed for signature by then-Director General ElBaradei in Vienna in mid-October. Significantly, the quantity of LEU was deliberately left out of the nonpaper, which Cserveny characterized as an Iranian attempt to allow negotiating space. This is essentially (and admittedly by Iran) the same counter-proposal floated by Iran in the October 19-21 Vienna talks and summarily rejected by all parties during the talks and since. DDG/Safeguards Heinonen, who also attended the January 5 meeting, reported that Soltanieh, when pressed, denied that Iran already has plans to produce 20 percent enriched fuel indigenously should the other parties not accept Iran's proposal. Soltanieh reiterated, however, that Iran would be compelled to consider options other than the IAEA proposal for fueling the reactor but did not specify how the fuel elements would be fabricated. ¶2. (C) Action request: DG Amano and Cserveny are aware of U.S. redlines and realize that this reply is unacceptable but have undertaken at Iran's request to inform the participants in the TRR talks - the U.S., Russia and France. French and Russian Missions have both sent Iran's reply back to caitals. Mission seeks guidance in providing the IAA a response that we can also share with French nd Russian Missions. ¶3. (C) Separately on Decmber 31, DG Amano had reaffirmed to Ambassador Davies that he would stand by the previously negotited IAEA deal on the TRR. Amano has asked a key Iran advisor, Graham Andrew (in addition to Management DDG David Waller) to join him on his January 11-12 consultations in Washington as he expected the Iran nuclear issue to figure prominently. According to DDG/Safeguards Heinonen, Soltanieh spent most of the January 5 one-hour meeting with Amano (his first official audience with the DG) berating the IAEA for continuing to pursue Iranian safeguards issues that Tehran considers closed. (Mission will report septel on the DG-led IAEA planning effort to re-engage Iran under the Amano administration.) End Summary and Action Request. Iran's Reply to IAEA -------------- ¶4. (C) The genesis of the January 5 meeting was Iran's request for an official call on Amano, according to Cserveny. When Cserveny noted that Amano would ask about the TRR deal, Soltanieh acknowledged the need for an official reply from Tehran. Soltanieh delivered that reply orally during the meeting and at Amano's request, Cserveny drafted a written summary and subsequently undertook an iterative coordination process with Soltanieh to gain approval. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) head Salehi signed off on the Januaray 6 text and Soltanieh sent the nonpaper back to Tehran as the official record of the discussion with the IAEA. Soltanieh agreed to Cserveny's suggestion to leave off the specific amount of LEU (only 800 kg) which Cserveny assess shows Soltanieh and Salehi's interest in allowing space for negotiation. ¶5. (C) Begin Text: "Main Elements of the Proposal by Iran for IAEA Assistance in the Provision of Nuclear Fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor ¶1. As of 5 January 201, Iran's proposal made during the negotiation held at IAEA headquarters from 19 to 21 October 2009 is still on the table; ¶2. The proposal is based on the simultaneous exchange of fuel for Iran's research reactor with LEU with 3.5 percent enrichment produced by Iran in two batches; ¶3. Iran is ready to place under IAEA seals and custody in Iran the required amount of LEU produced by Iran for this purpose of this project until the date of the simultaneous exchange of the fuel and the LEU in Iran; ¶4. As regards timing, Iran is prepared to start with the simultaneous exchange of the above specified amount of LEU with the fuel as soon as the fuel will be delivered to Iran; ¶5. Iran expects the Agency to continue to act in accordance with its statutory role in assisting Iran with facilitating the provision of the fuel for Iran's research reactor; ¶6. Should it not be possible to implement the above proposal of Iran for this purpose, Iran will be compelled to consider other options for ensuring the continued operation of its research reactor for humanitarian purposes." End Text. Reading Between the Lines -------------- ¶6. (C) The IAEA plans no public statement and Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh also claimed that Iran would not make its reply public. (Note: Notwithstanding his propensity for talking to the press, Soltanieh insisted on keeping this out of the public realm out of concern for domestic blowback in Tehran on him personally for agreeing to something many might find unpalatable, as was the case following the October TRR talks. End note.) On a positive note, Soltanieh emphasized that Iran intends to "abide by its NPT commitments" instead of repeating any of the bluster voiced by some in Tehran about withdrawal from the NPT or indigenous production of 20 percent enriched uranium fuel. Heinonen said that Soltanieh was asked specifically whether the recent statements by Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki reflected an Iranian decision to enrich uranium to 20 percent indigenously. Soltanieh reportedly responded "we have not said that" and would say only that Iran would be forced to consider other options if the Iranian proposal was not accepted. Heinonen also said Soltanieh accused former DG ElBaradei of mishandling the issue; Soltanieh believes he should have approached other potential suppliers beyond Russia, France, and the United States. ¶7. (C) While awaiting reaction from Paris, French DCM also noted that the overall tone of Iran's reply to the IAEA was softer that what several Iranian officials have said publicly. However, the last point in the nonpaper is probably meant to imply that Iran would pursue the option of domestic enrichment to 20 percent if its "offer" is rejected, as FM Mottaki and others have threatened. Thus, the written reply to the IAEA may be a further gambit putting Iran "on record" that it forewarned of its intent to ramp up enrichment. ¶8. (C) Iran's reply also tracks with the analysis of UK Ambassador in Tehran Simon Gass, as relayed by the UK Mission. Gass reported to London that Iran has been following a "two-track" strategy, on the one hand playing up its flexibility on the nuclear issue, while on the other, stressing that the West risked losing an opportunity if it did not move in Tehran's direction. While his early January report was drafted prior to Iran's reply to the IAEA, Gass noted Mottaki's recent statements -- in mid-December telling the press that Iran was ready to exchange 400 kgs of LEU on Kish Island in return for 20 percent enriched fuel; going a bit further December 24 in suggesting that Iran would not object to a simultaneous fuel swap in a third country; and then toughening a bit in a January 3 interview with an ultimatum that the West either agree (by February) to sell Iran TRR fuel or swap 20 percent enriched fuel for Iran's LEU, or Iran would enrich its own uranium to 20 percent. Per Gass's analysis, Iran seeks to keep the initiative by setting deadlines and making it appear that the West (rather than Iran) is not responding. The Iranian reply to the IAEA can be seen as a further manifestation of this strategy -- "here's our reply, now what will you do ?" ¶9. (C) Mission largely agrees with the British Ambassador's assessment above. Tehran's formal response may be part of a "two-track" strategy wherein, on one hand, some in Tehran may be testing the waters to see whether they can force a U.S. concession. The lack of specification of a quantity (i.e., 800 kilos) of LEU in the IAEA-drafted nonpaper may be -- as Cserveny suggests -- a further indication that Iran is hinting at flexibility on the quantity if the U.S. were flexible on initial IAEA custody in Iran (Comment: However, not all factions in Iran would likely support such flexibility and this may have been agreed to by Soltanieh and glossed over in Tehran's quick read. End comment.) On the other hand, virtually all factions in Tehran may see value in setting themselves up to further claim that the U.S., not Iran, was unresponsive to a constructive proposal. ¶10. (C) In Iran's reply, as elsewhere in Iranian comments on the TRR deal, Soltanieh attempts to create the perception that the IAEA has a statutory obligation to provide the fuel without conditions. Looking ahead, Iran will likely further argue that the IAEA is focused too much on safeguards and not enough on peaceful uses of nuclear technology, that some countries are pressuring the IAEA to take actions that contradict its mandate, and that Iran is fighting for the little guy by working to guarantee the rights of "have nots" under the NPT and within the IAEA. These arguments are likely to find some support within the NAM and G-77 and could undercut efforts at the next Board meeting to call out Iran's failure to accept the TRR deal and focus attention on what Iran's lack of acceptance indicates about its nuclear intentions. ¶11. (C) However, should Iran signal that it is moving to enrich uranium to 20 percent, it would risk destroying the chimera it may be seeking to create. Cserveny says he warned Soltanieh that enriching to 20 percent would be highly provocative; since everyone knows Iran lacks the ability to manufacture fuel for the TRR, the move to 20 percent would be seen as a leap toward HEU production. Assuming we and the IAEA can effectively communicate to the international community that Iran has no/no ability to fabricate the TRR fuel it needs in the timeline it says is necessary to keep the reactor running, the enrichment to higher levels should be seen as a provocation in the context of possibly amassing a nuclear weapons capability. ¶12. (S) Cserveny said he pushed Iran on the idea of escrow in Turkey, and the fact that Iran seems to have abandoned that option by referring only to an exchange in Iran in its reply to the IAEA. Soltanieh claimed that this could be a subject of negotiation. But Iran's nonpaper might also present an opportunity to move Ankara from a position of supporting flexibility on Iran because of the possibility of its involvement in the TRR deal to encouraging Turkey to see Iran's feigned interest in placing its material in Turkey as a purposeful distraction. PYATT