IRAN UPS ITS NUCLEAR ANTE TO 20 PERCENT

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000043 SIPDIS DEPT FOR P, T, ISN, IO, NEA, S/SNAC, ISN/RA, IO/GS, ISN/MNSA AND PA CROWLEY DOE FOR S-2, SA-20 NSC FOR SAMORE, RYU E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2020 TAGS: AORC PARM KNNP IAEA IR SUBJECT: IRAN UPS ITS NUCLEAR ANTE TO 20 PERCENT Classified By: Ambassador Glyn T. Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d Summary -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) Iran officially notified the IAEA February 8 of its intention to enrich up to 20 percent, specifying a "pilot plant of a single IR-1 centrifuge cascade." The IAEA is expected to circulate Iran's note to the Board of Governors. Likeminded DCMs/experts (E3, Spain, JUSCANZ) met simultaneous to Iran's announcement and agreed our focus should be on the "political message" that 20 percent enrichment is a pretext and violation of UNSCRs rather than on technical, safeguards grounds. This line of argumentation would be more persuasive with the G-77/NAM and potentially UNSC members Turkey and Brazil, especially given conflicting signals from Tehran that, the likeminded agreed, were designed to sow confusion. France agreed that the most cogent technical argument was Iran's lack of capacity to produce fuel with the 20 percent uranium and was skeptical as to Iran's capability in the foreseeable future. In considering next steps in Vienna, the likeminded questioned the likelihood of UNSC action prior to the March Board. Mission agrees with the French perspective that the political argument is the crux of the matter. We should aim to disconnect Iran's escalatory action from the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) debate. Thus, the UNSC is probably the best venue for a response to Iran's provocation -- especially as Board debate would likely get bogged down in safeguards legalities. End Summary. Iran Notifies IAEA -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Director General Amano, DDG Safeguards Olli Heinonen, and DG's Special Assistant for Science and Technology Graham Andrew all confirmed to Mission that the IAEA had received Iran's letter of intention to enrich up to 20 percent in line with President Ahmadinejad's weekend press announcement. Amano told the Ambassador the letter noted a "provisional production of up to 20 percent is foreseen." Heinonen indicated the letter specified a "pilot plant" of a single IR-1 centrifuge cascade. The DG reported that the Iranian message asserted this activity would take place in the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, PFEP, at Natanz. Reportedly, the letter also did not indicate a start-up date for these activities. The IAEA currently is seeking additional details from the Iranians. Reacting to the Announcement -------------- ¶3. (C) While Iran was delivering its letter to the IAEA, we convoked likeminded DCMs/experts (E3, Spain, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) to the Mission to discuss the anticipated announcement on 20 percent enrichment. IAEACouns drew from the cleared script characterizing this as a provocative move in defiance of UNSCRs and Board requirements. He highlighted international flexibility on the TRR and the fact that Iran cannot fabricate fuel assemblies for the TRR, also noting that there were other alternatives to help Iran procure medical isotopes. The likeminded agreed that Iran's announcement is best met with a political message that this gambit is a pretext for 20 percent enrichment in violation of UNSCRs as Iran has had plenty of opportunity to accept the TRR offer (despite Iran trying to pin the failure of the TRR deal on the other parties.) This would be more persuasive, including with NAM/G-77 opinion leaders and UNSC members Brazil and Turkey, than would a technical/safeguards-legality focused argumentation - in fact, the re may not be a clear-cut safeguards violation. A French expert noted enrichment to 20 percent using existing cascades would not constitute "new activity" subject to a 60-day notification requirement; it may not even require a new safeguards approach as the cascade configurations may be the same for higher enrichment. Nor is Iran in violation of Code 3.1 modified, given that it is notifying the IAEA of its decision, he noted. (Note: Mission will seek confirmation from IAEA. End note.) ¶4. (C) French and German DCMs agreed that arguing this from a political/UNSC rather than an IAEA safeguards implementation standpoint would be more straightforward. Just as it is not credible for Iran to enrich to 3.5 percent for peaceful use, it is even less credible for it to claim 20 percent for peaceful use, French DCM opined. Japanese counselor agreed we cannot allow Iran to raise the stakes in this way. French DCM also noted that proposals to facilitate provision of medical isotopes to Iran merit further consideration, though German DCM noted that this may not be as persuasive to the NAM given Iran's "right" to indigenous production. ¶5. (C) The most cogent technical point, the French agreed, is that Iran does not have the capacity to produce fuel assemblies for the TRR from the 20 percent enriched uranium, hence no peaceful use for the higher enrichment level. Privately the French were even more skeptical, assessing that producing fuel cells for the TRR is beyond Iran's technical grasp "in any meaningful period of time" (citing, in particular, cladding and metallurgical work related to TRR fuel manufacture.) ¶6. (C) Likeminded interlocutors tried to make sense of the 20 percent announcement in the context of contradictory signals from Ahmadinejad and FM Mottaki in recent days. Germany noted that the announcement would make it easier to proceed in the UNSC. Japanese counselor saw Iran as sowing confusion in advance of UNSC consideration, and cited in this connection Iranian MFA spokesman's iteration of three options for the TRR refueling (the TRR offer, purchase of fuel or enrichment to 20 percent). AEOI Director Salehi's comments in the press indicating that Iran would halt production of 20 percent uranium if it received the fuel from abroad were along the same lines, Msnoff noted, to keep the promise of the TRR deal alive (or to strong arm the international community into a deal on Iran's terms). Spanish DCM attributed the mixed signals to internal discord and, noting that Iran is working under the assumption of UNSC sanctions, it makes perfect sense to stir things up now. (Note: In a follow-up telcon, Spanish DCM said his government takes the view the Commission (Lady Ashton) needs to answer Iran, since Madrid speaking would dilute the pattern from the past in which former HiRep Solana would have been the one to respond. EU HOMs will discuss developments tomorrow. End note). Comment -------------- 7.(C) Likeminded also discussed an appropriate response in the Board or UNSC and whether the Security Council would adopt a UNSCR prior to the March Board session. French DCM argued that Iran's announcement merits a political response, that is, UNSC action. More to the point, IAEA Board discussion could easily get bogged down in safeguards legalities, losing sight of the broader political argument that 20 percent enrichment is a provocation and flagrant violation of UNSCRs. While the Board can serve as a springboard for UNSC action, arguably we did this already with the November Board resolution. Furthermore, we would not want Board action to be portrayed (including by China) as a substitute for a UNSCR. DAVIES